1

Law

Levie on the

58

of

War

view of the

1949 Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that the
complementary and not alternative (see Levie, note
53 supra, at 394-96), it is difficult to understand why the resolution was phrased in the disjunctive.
66. ICRC, Reaffirmation, at 7, where the following appears:
".
Thus the wars of Italy with Abyssinia in 1935, ofJapan with China in 1937, of Germany with Poland
in 1939, of Russia with Finland in the same year, and ofjapan with the United States in 1941, opened without
a formal declaration of war."
To the same effect see ibid., 87-88.
67. Common Article 9/9/9/10 is the basic provision of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to
the activities of the ICRC. Paragraph 3 of common Article 10/10/10/11, concerning replacements and
substitutes for Protecting Powers, permits the ICRC to offer its services to perform the humanitarian functions
of the Protecting Power when there is no Protecting Power. This is probably the basis upon which the ICRC
has acted in the post- 1949 Geneva Conventions era. One of its more successful recent efforts was in connection
with the Honduras-Salvador conflict. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 493-96 (1969), 10 ibid., 95-105 (1970).
68. A/1120, para. 226. Italy suggested considering the possibility of "delegating authority to the
65. See note 28 supra. In

.

fact that the

ICRC

of the Protecting Power and of the

activities

are

.

International

Red Cross, so that that body may, in the case of armed conflict, ensure that its own representatives

are continually present in the belligerent countries throughout the duration of the conflict." Ibid., at

United Nations document.

original

by the ICRC. ICRC, Reaffirmation 107.
69. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge

et le Conflit

"The

70.

International

Committee and

the

Vietnam Conflict," 6

(1966); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1970, p. 2B, col.

Strangely enough,

.

for the protection

Rev.

de Coree: Recueil des Documents, passim

1952); British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 33-34 (1955).

(2 vols.,

71

79 of the

A somewhat similar suggestion was made by the group of experts convened

Red Cross

it

has apparently

Int'l

been permitted

ibid.,

Red

Cross 399, 402-03

no

restrictions in Israel

to function with virtually

of both prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied

18-19 (1968); 9

Rev.

1.

173-76, 417-19, 488, and 640.

territory. See, for

example, 8

Int'l

On the other hand, the United Nations

has encountered some difficulty in making an investigation of the treatment of civilians in the occupied territory

because of the

position that the resolution calling for

Israeli

International Conference of the

people. 9

Red

Rev.

Int'l

Red

Cross found

it

it

was biased and one-sided. However, even the

necessary to express concern about the plight of these

Cross 613 (1969).

The Report also makes a suggestion to this latter effect. A/7720, para. 217. It is entirely possible,
however, that some States, notably Switzerland and Sweden, which did yeoman work as Protecting Powers
during both World Wars, would not wish to shoulder these additional, and potentially controversial, problems.
This would make the solution herein suggested all the more necessary. It might be appropriate to cover this
72.

eventuality

by providing

for a possible division

of functions, where desired, the Protecting Power,

one, performing the traditional functions with respect to

wounded and

sick, prisoners

if there

of war, and

be

civilians,

and the substitute performing the function with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
73.

this is ascribed to the fact that many of the conflicts since 1949 have
what of Korea, the Yemen, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.? In none of these
has there been a Protecting Power.
In A/7720, para. 216, it is suggested that a new organ be created which could "offer its services in

In

been of an
conflicts

74.

ICRC,

Reaffirmation 89-90,

internal nature; but

do not exercise

case the Parties

their choice."

For the reasons already advanced,

other than one which operates automatically will constitute
75. This

on whose

calls

for selection

by one

territory the Protecting

State,

Power

is

a

it is

not belived that any system

solution to the problem.

acceptance by the State so selected, and approval by the State

to operate. See Levie, note

53

supra, at 383.

The Report {A/1120, para. 218) makes two suggestions with respect to the legal effect of the
designation of a Protecting Power or of an international organ as a substitute therefor: (1) that the Protecting
Power, or the substitute, should be considered as an agent of the international community and not merely of
76.

one belligerent

and

State;

(2) that

the designation, being solely humanitarian in purpose, should have

no

legal

comment is already true under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term
"Parties to the Convention" is deemed appropriate rather than "international community" (sec Levie, note
53 supra, at 382-83); and the second comment might well be accomplished by the use of a provision such as
that appearing in the last paragraph of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions: "The application of the
consequences.

The

first

preceding provisions

shall

not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This provision was eventually

applied during the French-Algerian conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
77.

The

ICRC

experts

were

also

of

international

body heretofore

investigations

of allegations of such charges

bacteriological agents in

this

opinion.

existed with such

ICRC,

powers and

Reaffirmation 89 and 91.

duties, there

Had

such an

could have been immediate

as the use of gas in the Yemen by the United Arab Republic, of
Korea by the United Nations Command, etc. In this regard, see Joyce, Red Cross

Major Inadequacies
International 201 (1959). In fact,

would never be made
78.

The

subject

in the
is

it is

first

probably safe to say that under these circumstances

159

many such allegations

place!

there discussed at length.

A/7720,

use of a political organization as a Protecting Power,

paras.

made

216-225. Despite the cautious defense of the

it would appear that,
connection with note 46 supra), the creation of a new, non-political
basically the position taken by the Report.

in the last paragraph cited,

for the reasons heretofore stated (see text in

body

is

were justified. The article, in effect, authorizes the Detaining
Power. The reservations would merely require
agreement on the part of the Power of Origin, as in the case of the selection of the Protecting Power itself.
See note 75 supra. Of course, were it a Party to the new convention which we are discussing, it would have
agreed in advance to the filling of the void by the ICEHRAC.
80. I Final Record 201. Concerning this resolution, see the text in connection with note 45 supra.
81. Once again, of course, the ICEHRAC would need a fairly large operational staff, including many
specialists, to serve as its eyes and ears to collect and sift evidence. But this is no more than an administrative
problem which should present no insurmountable difficulty.
82. There is no reason whatsoever why, under appropriate legal safeguards (see note 76 supra), these
provisions could not be made applicable to internal conflicts, and to conflicts of "national liberation," which
79. See note 57 supra.

Power

are
a

The

reservations

to unilaterally select a substitute for the Protecting

frequendy

much more

Vengeance,"
83.

The

he.

cit.,

sanguinary than are international conflicts. "Nigeria/Biafra:

Armed

Conflict with

note 64 supra.

question will undoubtedly be asked immediately

why

the present discussion concerning the

weapons does not include nuclear weapons. That matter has been, and
continues to be, one of the major subjects of discussion at the meetings of the nuclear powers themselves and
at the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (formerly the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament). The status of these various discussions and the reason for the stalemate which
has now existed for more than a decade is well known. It could not conceivably serve any useful purpose for
elimination of chemical and biological

this

paper to

make

a proposal for the

banning of nuclear weapons, with or without inspection. Probably only

some scientific breakthrough will solve that problem. In the meantime we have what some
of dissuasion."
84.

ICRC,

The Geneva Protocol

Gases and of Bacteriological

Am. J.

Int'l L.

for the Prohibition

of the Use in

Methods of Warfare, signed

at

War

well

Supp. 94 (1931)), uses the term "bacteriological." Because

as bacteria,

the

"the equilibrium

of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other

Geneva on June

have indicated the possible use in armed conflict of various living organisms
as

call

Reaffirmation 50.

more

inclusive "biological"

is

now very generally

17,

1925 (94 L.N.T.S. 65; 25
developments since 1925

scientific

(e.g, rickettsiae, viruses,

of the Secretary-General based on the Report of the Group of Consultant Experts, United Nations

A/7575/Rev.

1

,

Chemical and Bacteriological

(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 69,

and Article

I

(Biological)
I.

24), paras.

of the British Draft Convention, note 130

infra,

Weapons and

Document

the Effect of Their Possible

17-18 [hereinafter cited

which

and fungi),
Report

used. In this regard see the

refers to

as

UN, CB

Use

Weapons],

"microbial and other biological

agents."

85. In the
viii),

Foreword

U Thant quoted as
"...

The

to the

Report of the Secretary-General

(see

UN, CB Weapons,

note 84 supra,

at

follows from his 1968 Annual Report:

question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question

of nuclear weapons, which have

a destructive

power

several orders

of magnitude greater than that of

chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded

with universal horror. In some respects, they

may be even more dangerous

than nuclear weapons

because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are
required for nuclear weapons. Almost

all

countries, including small ones

and developing ones, may

have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secredy in small
laboratories or factories ..."
86.

84

A comparatively short list of some of the works in this area will be found in UN, CB Weapons, note

supra, at 99.

To

that

list

should certainly be added McCarthy,

The Ultimate

Folly:

War by

Pestilence,

Asphyxiation, and Defoliation (1969).
87.

Mention need be made of only two

have taken place: the United Nations, where
in the

it

where numerous

discussions of this subject

has been discussed at length both in the First

Committee and

General Assembly; and the United States Congress where Representative Richard D. McCarthy and

others similarly

Nov.

authoritative forums

concerned have not allowed the matter to

19, 1969, p. 9, col

pass unnoticed. See, for

example, N.Y. Times,

1.

88. One author makes the rather pessimistic evaluation that this recent concern "is perhaps an index of
growing role of such weapons in military preparations." Brownlie, "Legal Aspects of CBW" in Rose (ed.),
CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare 141, 150-51 (1968). [This collection hereinafter cited as Rose, CBW].
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FOREWORD
The

War

International

Law

Studies "Blue

College in 1901 to publish

Book"

was

series

and

essays, treatises

articles that

the broader understanding of international law. In Levie on the
series republishes selected essays

of Howard

S.

by the Naval

initiated

contribute to

Law

of War, the

Levie.

Professor Levie has contributed to the articulation and development of the

law of war for over half

Army, next

States

then

as a

a century; initially as a

judge advocate in the United

Professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, and

widely published and highly respected Professor Emeritus. In 1971

as a

Professor Levie began a long relationship with the Naval

War

College,

when

he occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law. In authoring

two volumes of the "Blue Book"
Conflict
it

and Documents on

Prisoners of

to the forefront of scholarly

fitting that

we

series, Prisoners

War

of

in International

War, he revitalized the

series

Armed

and restored

works involving international law. Thus,

again turn to Professor Levie for

this,

the seventieth

it is

volume of

the series.

The

from Professor Levie's voluminous works
the breadth and depth of his scholarship, and evidence the profound

editors' selection

illustrate

of

articles

impact he has had on the law applicable to armed

be able to remind those

who

are

new

who

conflict.

We

are pleased to

have long read Professor Levie, and acquaint those

to his writings,

of the continued

vitality

of his work. While the

opinions expressed in these writings are those of Professor Levie, and are not
necessarily those of the

United

States

Navy nor

the Naval

cannot quarrel with Professor Levie's commitment,

as

War

College, one

one of my predecessors,

Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale noted in the Foreword to

Prisoners of

War, "to

those principles of humanitarianism necessary to regulate an imperfect world."

On
the

behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and

Commandant of the Marine

Corps,

I

extend to the editors our thanks in

bringing together these outstanding examples of Professor Levie's work.
Professor Levie,

War

I

extend

my

gratitude for his

many

To

contributions to the Naval

College. His legacy at the College will be an enduring one.

JAMES R. STARK
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War College

Professor

Howard

S.

Levie
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INTRODUCTION
It is

Yet

a rare privilege in life to

do

to

so,

ascend to the top of one's chosen profession.

and then, upon reaching mandatory retirement

embark on a path

that takes

accomplishment. Professor

you

to the pinnacle

Howard

Levie

is

age, successfully

of still another is an extraordinary

just such an individual. Rising to

Army, he compiled an impressive

the rank of Colonel in the United States

military record while serving in an array of high-level legal positions, including

Chief of International Law for the United

States

Army, and Staffjudge Advocate

of the Southern European Task Force, European

Colonel Levie

also

had the

Command, and

Sixth

Army.

most notably

rare opportunity to shape history,

Korean War Armistice talks.
Following retirement from the Army, now "Professor" Levie went on

through

his participation in the

establish

himself in academia

particularly the

law of armed

as

one of the masters of international law,

conflict.

A second retirement as Professor Emeritus

from Saint Louis University only served
prolific

today

90

at

as

to accelerate that process.

he ever was; more importandy,

impact the direction the law of armed conflict takes
future. Indeed, as will
as this selection

The
is

become

of his works

is

apparent, his

his

—and

is

work

He

is

as

continues to

likely to take in the

own views continue

even

to evolve

published.

defining characteristic of Professor Levie's

work

very duality; he

this

is

neither simply an academic in uniform, nor merely a soldier in academic robes.

Too

often, academics, including

some who have served

in the military, are

divorced from the reality of the combat operations that law shapes. Their
is

to

thought provoking, but of little

real utility to the warfighter or policy

The view from the ivory tower is simply too

distant.

By the same token,

work

maker.
as

some

military officers enter the halls of academia, their output tends to the anecdotal,

While there

rather than incisive.

scholarly contemplation,

it

cannot replace the

critical

as

the subject of

thinking that characterizes
litde to

away.

Professor Levie, by contrast,
versa.

merit in the "sea story"

These individuals aptly describe the fog of war, but do

true scholarship.
clear

it

is

Thus, he brings

a

is

as

synergism to

much

the academic as soldier

his writings that sets

much else in the field. They are as relevant and useful
War College as they are at Oxford or Yale. Therein
and beauty. Perhaps
a military officer

it is fitting,

then, that his selected

at

them

together in one

apart

vice

from

so

the Pentagon or Naval

lies

their uniqueness

.

.

.

works be edited by both

and an academic.

Professor Levie's writings appear in a variety ofjournals, not
readily available.

—and

We

thought, therefore, that

it

all

of which are

would be worthwhile

to bring

volume those which we considered most valuable and thought

Levie on the

vlii

provoking.

We also

Law

of

War

thought

it

would be

fitting

recognition on the occasion of

90th birthday in December 1997.

his

Of course,

any editor

books

that includes 10

and continues

articles,

who must select 20

(several

or so writings from a body of work

of which are multi-volume works) and over 75

grow, understandably approaches that task with some

to

making our selection, we set two criteria for inclusion. First, we
include articles which remained especially relevant, to produce a book

trepidation. In

wanted

to

which would be

To

we

that end,

we

law since they were originally published. Second,

emphasize those topics in the law of war to which Professor Levie

to

devoted

practitioners.

asked Professor Levie to prepare addenda to five chapters

reflecting changes in the

hoped

and tomorrow's, scholars and

useful to today's,

his greatest attention,

primarily based. Thus, there

and upon which

is

a

his international reputation

heavy emphasis on prisoners of war, the

is

first

which he turned, and that which has been the focus of much of his
work since. There are also a number of articles discussing the legal issues
subject to

surrounding war crimes, an interest of Professor Levie's in which he has recendy
invested significant effort. Given his long

come

we have

as little surprise that

with naval warfare. The

ties to

the Naval

War College, it should

also elected to include several articles dealing

articles are

presented chronologically, both because

cut across subject-matter boundaries, and to emphasize the

several pieces

impressive temporal scope and developmental vector of his jurisprudence. As

an

aside,

we

endeavored to remain true

also

stylistically to

the original articles,

with the exception of converting foot notes to end notes. Thus,
the original article

The opening
it

a clear editing error

only altered

had been made.

piece, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement (1956),

apdy meets these
active duty,

when

we

Written while Professor Levie was on

criteria for inclusion.

reviews the history and development of the armistice

as

an

instrument governing non-hostile relations between belligerents, concluding
that formal peace treaties are being supplanted

by

armistices as the prevailing

method of ending wars. Not unexpectedly, Nature and Scope was resorted to time
and again by practitioners

and Coalition
Indeed,

it

to help ascertain the status of relations

States following cessation

was referenced

as late as

of aircrew members that might

between

of hostilities in Operation Desert Storm.

1997 by judge advocates considering the

fall

The

scholarly treatment

provided the topic in Nature and Scope is complemented neady by Across

Pan

Munjom

(1965), an account of Professor Levie's

negotiator in the Korean armistice

status

into Iraqi hands while enforcing the no-fly

zones of Operations Southern and Northern Watch.

at

Iraq

own

the Table

experiences

as a

talks.

War and the Protecting Power (1961), Professor Levie turns to a
which he has become best known, prisoners of war. Writing in the

In Prisoners of

topic for

American Journal of International Law nearly four decades ago while

still

a

Introduction

military officer,
institution

he discusses the

of the Protecting Power, arguing that

in safeguarding prisoners

which he

historical evolution

Law

and functioning of the

deserves to play a central role

from excesses by Detaining Powers.

will return time

the Existing

it

Relating

and
to

again.

ix

It is

a

theme

to

For instance, in Some Major Inadequacies

the Protection of Individuals

(1971), he singles out the non-existence of a

means

During Armed

in

Conflict

for ensuring the presence of

Power in each State party to an armed conflict as one of four major
lacunae in the law. Soon thereafter, in International Law Aspects of Repatriation of
Prisoners of War During Hostilities: A Reply (1973), an extended comment on an
article by Professor Richard Falk on repatriation, Professor Levie rejects the idea
of releasing repatriated prisoners of war to "ad hoc and self-styled humanitarian
organizations," as occurred on occasion during the Vietnam conflict. Instead,
a Protecting

he argues, repatriation

is

best accomplished

by Protecting Powers,

or, in their

Committee of the Red Cross. He returns to the topic
once more in the last work included in the book, Enforcing the Third Geneva
Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War (1997). It is there
that he labels it a "tragedy" that the sole use of Protecting Powers since the 1949
Convention occurred during the Falklands War.
As the tides just cited suggest, though the need for Protecting Powers is a
absence, the International

pervasive

in Professor Levie's

call

work, he delved into

virtually every facet

the prisoner of war theme. For instance, in The Employment of Prisoners of
(1963), he outlines the

Geneva

Prisoners of War

Convention

limitations

on

of

War
the

use of prisoner labor. In this piece, Professor Levie's "soldier" persona surfaces
in his understanding of the

prisoner labor

is

need for balance in treatment of the

certainly subject to abuse

by

a

subject, for while

Detaining Power, productively

occupying prisoners can actually enhance their morale.

Of the

reproduced here, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam
the most wide ranging treatment of prisoner of war prescriptions.

articles

(1968) offers

on the contentious issue of the applicability of the
Prisoners of War Convention to the Vietnam War. Was it an international armed
conflict thereby requiring compliance by all Parties to the Convention, or was
it a non-international armed conflict, in which case only the minimal protections
of Common Article Three to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 would apply?
In

it,

Professor Levie takes

What customary law

applies

to

responsibilities does a belligerent
ally?

the

have

treatment of those captured?

vis-a-vis

maltreatment of prisoners by an

Professor Levie then surveys allegations of mistreatment

States,

by the United

South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong. The piece

relevance, for the applicability of the

What

Convention and the

retains

its

quality of treatment

required to be accorded to prisoners were both issues that surfaced during the

Gulf War, not only with regard

to the treatment

of Coalition prisoners held by

the Iraqis, but also as to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war.
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much of

Professor Levie has also devoted

his effort to

writing about war

crimes and the appropriate enforcement regime for them. Criminality
of

War

Law

by distinguishing between the treatment accorded
pre-capture and post-capture offenses. Also setting the stage is The

(1986)

prisoners for

in the

sets

the stage

Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders

—

(1991). Superior orders

because he was so ordered by

a

would have

punishment

resulted in harsh

presented for

as

long

historical assertions

committed

a

war crime

Government) and

that refusal

the claim that the accused

superior officer (or

—

a

is

purported defense that has been

war crimes have been prosecuted. Upon review of its

as

and the

largely unsuccessful efforts to codify a denial

defense, Professor Levie concludes that "any defense counsel
professionally derelict if he failed to assert

.

.

.

that the rule

of the defense of superior orders has been rejected
It is a

conclusion that draws into question the

law of armed conflict manuals such

as the

more

US

official

would be

.

.

denying

availability

of international law."
position, as stated in

Commander's Handbook on

of Naval Operations, that no such defense
Several of Professor Levie's

as a rule

.

of the

the

Law

exists.

recent articles

on

the subject follow. In

Violations of Human Rights in

Time of War as War Crimes (1995), he emphasizes
the law of war includes much of what is in peacetime labeled "human

that

and

rights,"

that violations

of

human

rights

norms during armed

conflict

may

war criminal, as has been done in the
case of the former Yugoslavia. Writing the same year, in Prosecuting War Crimes
Before an International Tribunal, Professor Levie offers a primer on how to conduct
a war crimes prosecution. How does one accumulate evidence or determine
punishment

subject the offender to

whom

to charge?

Which

rules

as a

of evidence apply? The

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:

A

Comparison with

Statute of the International

the Past

and

a

Look

at the

mechanism by which Professor Levie looks at how
has been set up to handle such matters. The article is a

Future (1995) serves as the

one war crimes tribunal

comprehensive description of the International Tribunal and
topics range

from organizational structure and jurisdiction

and

penalties.

the

Persian

Having described an

actual

Gulf (1996) he conducts

committed by the

Iraqis

war crimes

a retrospective

political decision

to rules

procedures;

of procedure

War Crimes in
of war crimes

tribunal, in
analysis

during the Gulf War, and oudines

have handled them had the

its

been taken

how a tribunal might

to establish one. Finally,

War Crime? (1995) is a fascinating look
back in history at the question: "Is the murder of an individual committed in
wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the victim a war
Was

the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln a

Given the contentiousness of events ranging from incidents of
involvement in overseas assassination attempts cited by the Church Committee
crime?"

to speculation

concerning

remains timely despite

its

US

intentions regarding

Saddam Hussein,

use of a case study over 100 years old.

the article
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While Professor Levie may be best known as one of the world's most eminent
prisoners of war and war crimes scholars, his contributions have ranged far more
widely. Given his enduring affiliation with the United States Naval War College,

come

should

it

as little surprise that

of naval warfare.

We

much

time considering the law

have selected three noteworthy pieces on the subject.

Methods and Means of Combat
generally, serving as a primer
I

he has spent

at

Sea (1988)

is

an excellent survey of the subject

on everything from

the applicability of Protocol

Additional of 1977 and protection of the environment to exclusion zones and

He

submarine warfare.

deals

with the

latter subject

much more

Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 Protocol (1993).

thoroughly in

an exhaustive

It is

study of the development of the laws of submarine warfare from the American

Revolution through both world wars to the present.
Belligerent Personnel 'Splashed'

and Rescued by

a Neutral in the Persian

who

(1991) he addresses the status of Iranian or Iraqi personnel

hands of

US

The

Finally, in

state

US forces,

of armed conflict between the United States and either Iran or

would not be entided

under the Prisoners of War Convention, but

to basic humanitarian protections such as adequate
free

into the

engaged in escort operations during the Iran-Iraq war.

forces

Professor Levie concludes that they
status

Gulf Area

fell

Finding that there was, despite occasional hostile incidents involving

no

Status of

from

of war

to prisoner

that they

would be

Iraq,

entitled

food and water and being

torture.

We have included several articles dealing with specific weaponry which lies
at

the heart of current debates in the law of armed conflict community. Weapons

of Warfare (1975)

an analysis of three types of "weapons" that created great

is

controversy during the Vietnam

War

—lachrymatories, napalm, and

herbicides.

Finding the use of all three most likely legal during that conflict, Professor Levie
goes on to urge, on practical and humanitarian grounds, against their use in
future

wars.

In

light

of the

Environmental Modification Conventions, and Protocol

Geneva Conventions,

this piece,

Weapons,

Conventional

Chemical,

written over

I

two decades

and

Additional to the
ago,

is

particularly

prescient.

Two

articles

on

the subject explore both extremes along the

weaponry. Nuclear, Chemical, and

Biological

Weapons (1991) surveys the law

applicable to each titled category, with special emphasis

proscribed. Ultimately, he notes that

.

.

.

"one might almost regret our

in the

when

which

inability to

nuclear, chemical,

were not even a gleam in a scientist's eyes."

to the piece illustrates the extent to

naval warfare.

is

turn back the clock to the nineteenth century,
biological weapons

on

no per se prohibition on the use of
biological or chemical weapons is legally

Professor Levie concludes that while there

nuclear weapons, the use of either

continuum of

his aspirations are

and

An addendum

slowly being realized

Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, which outlaw the use

Law
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of

of either genre of weapons, and the 1996 holding of the International Court of
Justice in the Nuclear

Weapons Case, which finds the use of nuclear weapons

which the very
(The Court did not rule on the legality

generally contrary to international law, except in self-defense "in
survival

of a State would be

of use even in the

at stake."

latter circumstances.)

At the other end of the continuum of weapons
Prohibitions

and

Restrictions on the

Use of Conventional Weapons (1994) examines

Conventional Weapons Convention and

the

conventional weapons.

lie

annexed Protocols

three

its

governing non-detectable fragments, land mines, and incendiaries, respectively.
Despite

initial

US

opposition to Protocol

Levie argues that

"it is

US

(the

ratified

II),

Professor

a political

or a military nature that warrants the

of the United States and other major military powers to accept

Broader

in

its

1949 (1995), a
governing armed conflict

—

is

the Seabed Treaty, Bacteriological Convention,

Environmental Modification Convention, Protocol

I

Additional, Conventional

Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention.
piece in

which he

restates his

support of Protocol

III

It is

a provocative

(concerning incendiaries)

Conventional Weapons Convention, and then bemoans the

convention to prohibit the existence of nuclear weapons
the International

it."

The Law of War
sweeping survey of the major post-war instruments

coverage of methods and means of warfare

Since

to the

&

I

an extremely humanitarian agreement which contains

nothing irreparable of either
refusal

III

Court found

is

fact that a

unlikely (even had

their use fully contrary to international law)

due

number of actual, or potential, possessors would fail to
"or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of

to the reality that a

become

Parties,

violating their agreement

and thereafter being

in

a

position to hold the

non-nuclear world hostage."
Professor Levie's willingness to at times
positions

is

swim

against the tide of official

perhaps most evident in The 1911 Protocol I and

the

United States

(1993). In this article he serially reviews those provisions of the Protocol

the

US

US

interests,

finds objectionable, setting forth

Given

a

impressive credentials

how

very few understandings or reservations

his credibility as
as

which

they are in fact not contrary to

or in the case of those which are, explaining

be addressed with
ratification.

why

concerns could
at

the time of

an objective and insightful scholar, and

an accomplished military

expectedly influential, particularly in military

US

officer, the article has

his

proven

circles.

As should be apparent, Professor Levie has not shied away from

forcefully

expressing his opinion. That has certainly been the case with regard to Protocol

Additional and the weapons

treaties.

However,

it is

I

not a recendy emergent

propensity on his part. For instance, in Major Inadequacies (1971), cited supra

regarding Protecting Powers, he argues for a

method by which an automatic

determination that the law of armed conflict applies to

a situation

can be made,

Introduction

xiii

armed conflict
of any and all categories of chemical and biological weapons," and laments the
non-existence of a code governing aerial warfare. It was in the same year that
the need for "a complete and total prohibition of the use in

cites

he wrote

An

Civilian Sanctuaries:

Impractical Proposal. In the article, Professor

Levie takes issue with a proposal contained in two reports of the

General (prepared

at

the

request of the

sanctuaries be established during

armed

UN Secretary

General Assembly) that

civilian

conflict to ease the difficulty belligerents

experience in discriminating civilians and civilian objects from legitimate

To

military objectives.

comport with
which any activity

Professor Levie, the proposal did not

would not be willing to set apart large areas in
contributing to the war effort would be forbidden, nor willing
reality; States

to deprive

themselves of the labor necessary for defense industries. In a worst case scenario,
the areas could actually

become

nation facing total defeat. In

new

its

source of blackmail leverage for a nuclear

a

stead, Professor

Levie argues for compliance (not

norms), codification of the law of air warfare, and creation of a system of

sanctions against States (in addition to individuals)

which

violate the principle

of military necessity.

The Falklands

Finally,

Crisis

and

the

—

the collection as a capstone piece

a

Laws of War (1985) has been included in
that examines many
case study of sorts

—

of the principles discussed throughout the book, but in the context of a single
conflict. In

it,

Professor Levie considers maritime exclusion zones, protection

of fishing vessels and hospital
powers, treatment of
a classic

Levie tour

What was

We

incendiary weapons, the role of protecting

civilians, prisoners

of war, and mercenaries. The

which those involved found themselves

Indeed, a recurring experience for

and perspicacious pieces

hope

Law

is

of War was

distracted

from the

tedious editing process by the substantive brilliance of the

almost unconsciously found ourselves reading

editing.

result

deforce.

perhaps most gratifying in preparing Levie on the

the extent to

somewhat

ships,

that

were

in

some

all

when we

articles.

should have been

was rediscovering

how

cases decades old remained.

relevant
It is

our

that others will share in that experience.

When

all is

said

and done,

the invaluable assistance of

this

many

book would not have been
friends at the

Naval

Jack Grunawalt, Director of the College's Oceans

War

possible without

College. Professor

Law and Policy Department,

provided encouragement throughout the project, enthusiastically agreeing to
write the opening chapter about Professor Levie's distinguished careers.

funding was intermittendy problematic, Captains Ralph

Brennock of the Center
editors,

for

thereby giving us the

task at hand.

Naval Warfare Studies ensured

much

While

Thomas and Dan
it

never was for

appreciated luxury of concentrating

on

the

the

Ms. Carole Boiani and Ms. Allison Sylvia of the College's

Publications and Printing Division supervised the preparation of the manuscript,

Law

War
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an

onerous task that involved scanning

oft

of

and then correcting the coundess

They

technology."

less

errors

than optimally preserved
that

result

from

articles,

"miracle

this

did so with professionalism, speed, and most importantly, a

seemingly inexhaustible supply of good spirits.

We are indebted to our colleagues

—

Oceans Law and Policy Department Professor Grunawalt, Captain
Thomas, Colonel Lou Reyna, Commander Jeff Stieb, and Lieutenant Colonel
in the

—

James Duncan who willingly read page proofs to identify "typos" that had
eluded our own proofreading efforts. Colonel Duncan was especially helpful as
overall director

of the International

Law

Studies series (Blue Books) in handling

the mechanics of transforming a completed manuscript into a finished book.
course,

we would

be horribly remiss

if

we

failed to

Of

thank our families for their

understanding support throughout.

Of

course,

allowed us

we owe our

full editorial

deepest debt of gratitude to Professor Levie.

control of the project, never once providing anything

but the gendest of suggestions. In
contents, he only

He

fact,

recommended one

upon reviewing

the notional table of

addition, Across the Table at

emphasizing that the decision on whether to include

it

was

Pan Munjom,

ours, not his.

We

we should have in the first place, and the book benefited thereby. Indeed,
our sole complaint is that as we were putting the collection together, Professor
did, as

Levie continued to write high quality pieces that deserved to be included,
thereby creating
that

grew

included

as

at

a

dilemma of where

we worked.

In

to

draw the

fact, Enforcing the

the final hour, forcing us to

actually published until

line in a corpus

Third Geneva Convention was

work with

drafts

our page proofs were in their

Professor Levie was an absolute joy to

work

ofjurisprudence

because

last revision.

it

was not

Simply put,

with.

We wish Professor Levie well as he continues to guide the rest of us to better
understanding of the law of war.
this

It

was our great honor

to serve as editors for

CM.,

LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C.

labor of love.

Michael N. Schmitt, Lt Col,
Professor of International

United

States

Naval

War

USAF

Leslie

C. Green,

Law

Stockton Professor of International

College

United

States

Naval

War

College

Law

Professor

Howard

Levie and the

Professor Richard J.

Once

in a great while,

articulation

of War

Grunawalt

someone conies along who makes

lasting contribution to his or

to define the

Law

her chosen profession,

paradigm of that

With

calling.

of the law of war, Professor

a

a significant

and

contribution that conies

respect to the

development and

Howard Levie is just such an individual.

Soldier and scholar, patriot and humanitarian, Professor Levie has compiled a

most remarkable record of achievement in furthering the understanding
compliance with, the law of war over the past

of,

and

six decades.

Born in Wolverine, Michigan on 19 December 1907, Professor Levie moved
to Baltimore, Maryland in 1912. Five years later, his family moved to New York
City, where Howard graduated from Dewitt Clinton High School in 1924.
Matriculating

Cornell University that year, Professor Levie was selected to

at

participate in the "Junior Year in France"

program (sponsored by the University

of Delaware) and, in Paris, attended both the Cours de

and the

was

Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques during

later to

recount that

who became
and who was tried,

Laval,

for collaborating

among

War

II

convicted and executed by the French following the war

with the Nazis.

Howard

describes Professor Laval

New

Law School under a program

Kappa

was Professor Pierre

Premier of the Vichy Government during World

senior year as an undergraduate with his
to Phi Beta

Sorbonne

academic year 1926-27. (Howard

his instructors at the latter

excellent teacher.") Returning to Ithaca,

entered Cornell

Civilisation at the

that year

and received

Spring. In June 1930, he was

awarded

first

a

York

"an

as,

in 1927, Professor Levie

that allowed

him

year of law school.

to

combine

He was

his

elected

Bachelor of Arts degree the following

a Juris

Doctor degree from Cornell Law

School.

The young

attorney was admitted to the practice of law in

in June 1931 following a brief (six
in the private practice of law in

United

States

Army

September 1942.

It

months) mandatory clerkship.

New York City from

State

He was engaged

1931 until he entered the

through the Volunteer Officer Candidate program in

was during

that period that

he met and married the lovely

Howard joined the Army, Blanche
Women's Army Corps.

Blanche Krim in 1934. Shortly
same, enlisting in the

New York

Howard underwent

after

basic training at Fort Eustis, Virginia,

he was 15 to 18 years older than most of his fellow

soldiers. In

did the

where, aged 35,

December 1942,

Private Levie reported to the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Officer Candidate School
at

Camp

Davis,

North Carolina. Commissioned

1943, he was assigned to Battery

Camp

K

a

March
Regiment at

Second Lieutenant

of the 701st Coast Artillery

in

Miles Standish, Taunton, Massachusetts, but soon relocated to Newport,

Levie on the
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Rhode Island where Battery K was tasked to provide anti-aircraft protection
the Navy torpedo factory on Goat Island. Although his war-time sojourn

to
in

Newport was short-lived, this assignment marked the beginning of what was to
become in later years a close and enduring affinity to this lovely city by the sea.
Having completed
Fort Totten,

Maryland,

New

course of instruction for "Triple

York, and one

Howard was

further transport to a

United

a

directed to

"permanent

States, tropical climate."

Arriving in

New

Guinea

in

Lieutenant

First

Camp

Headquarters,

Army

Forces,

Camp

Richie,

Stoneman, Pittsburgh, California, for
of the

station outside the continental limits

And

"tropical climate"

March 1944,

November,

in

battery officers at

in photo-interpretation at

Western

it

turned out to be.

Professor Levie was assigned to Staff

Headquarters, Intermediate Section (responsible for
to

A"

was

he

Pacific

New Guinea). Promoted

all

subsequently

(AFWESTPAC)

reassigned

to

Manila in July

in

On 2 September 1945, the Japanese surrendered in a ceremony aboard
USS MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay.
Following cessation of hostilities, AFWESTPAC became heavily involved in
1945.

supervising the repatriation of British and American prisoners of war from China,

Korea and Japan.
in the

It

law applicable

was

this

experience that helped prompt Howard's interest

to prisoners

of war; an interest that led to

of that

discipline, to include the writing

review

articles

(many of which

of two books and innumerable law

are reprinted in this collection).

It

was

also this

assignment that initiated Howard's long involvement in war crimes
Present

at

study

a life-time

the arraignment of Japanese General

Tomoyuki Yamashita

issues.

before a

U.S. Military Commission in Manila on 8 October 1945, Professor Levie

became

in later years, an internationally recognized authority

The Law of War Crimes (1993)

Indeed, his

book

regarded

one of the best of the genre.

In

as

November

his service in the

Terrorism in War:

on war

crimes.

is

widely

1945, Professor Levie was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for

Southwest Pacific area and, more importantly

(at least

Blanche's point of view), returned to the United States (terminating

a

from

22-month

separation).

Blanche having recently been discharged from active duty, joined

Howard

Washington,

in

General Staff

as

DC

where he was assigned

to the

War Department

Executive Officer, Supply Control Branch, Requirements

Army Service Forces. A collateral duty as Recorder of the Board for
Army-Navy review of Alaskan defenses took Howard throughout the

Division,
a joint

length and breadth of Alaska in June of 1946.
In

September 1946, Howard accepted

Judge Advocate General's Corps with

a

a date

Regular

Army commission

in the

of commissioning backdated to 19

December 1932 and in the rank of Captain backdated
The following January he was promoted to Major.

to 19

December

1942.

Grunawalt

Major Levie began

March 1947
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Judge Advocate General's Corps in
Branch of the Claims Division of the Office of

his service in the

in the Legislative

the Judge Advocate General. In February 1949, he entered the Master of Law

program

George Washington University School of Law. However,

at

was interrupted by
College

at

his selection to attend the

that effort

Army Command and General Staff

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following graduation in June 1950, Major

Levie received orders to the Far East

Command. The North Korean

invasion

of South Korea on the 25th ofJune 1950, and the re-designation of the Far East

Command
substantial

United Nations and Far East Command, was

the

as

to have a

impact on Professor Levie's career. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel

Judge Advocate Division at General
Headquarters in Tokyo, Howard became involved with the legal review for

in

September 1950 while assigned

to the

General MacArthur of several Japanese war crimes

which death sentences
had been adjudged. It was in this period that he also became involved in the
issue of the status of North Koreans captured by United Nations Command
Forces. In March 1951, he was detailed to Korea to serve as Law Member of a
General Court-Martial convened by General Mathew Ridgway, which tried
several U.S. Army members for offenses involving the killing of North Korean
soldiers and, in one case, North Korean civilians.
In July 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Levie was reassigned to the staff of the
United Nations Command Armistice Delegation. That delegation initially
included Vice Admiral Turner Joy, U.S.

Navy

trials

in

(Senior Delegate);

Major General

Henry Hodes, U.S. Army; Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy; Major
General Lawrence Craigie, U.S. Air Force and Major General Paik Sun Yup,
ROK Army. As detailed in Chapter IV of this volume, Howard played a major
role in the drafting of the Korean Armistice Agreement. He completed his
Korean assignment in June 1952 and returned to Japan. Thereafter, Howard
between the Judge Advocate Division at Command
Headquarters (which had relocated to Yokohama) and other command elements
served

that

as

Liaison Officer

He also participated in several important courts-martial
of Dorothy Krueger Smith, who was convicted of

remained in Tokyo.

cases,

including that

murdering her

Army

the United States

Colonel husband; the case reached the Supreme Court of

where

it

was overturned on jurisdictional grounds.

Lieutenant Colonel Levie's next assignment was
the

Command

and General

Staff College at Fort

as Staff Judge

Advocate

at

Leavenworth, Kansas. While

Howard pursued
further his interests in the law of war. That tour of duty commenced in March
1953, but was cut short in September of the following year to permit Howard
there,

to

he and Blanche renewed many old acquaintances and

assume the

reins

of the newly-established International Affairs Division of the

Office of the Judge Advocate General in
thereafter,

Washington

he was promoted to the rank of Colonel.

It

as its first

Chief. Shortly

was during

this

tour that

Law
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Howard first met with such future international law luminaries as Richard Baxter
(then in the Office of General Counsel,
years a Judge of the International

Court ofJustice), Lou Henkin (then

Department and subsequendy

the State

affairs officer at

Department of Defense, and

in later

a foreign

of

a Professor

Law

at

Columbia Law School and President of the American Society of International
Law) and Monroe Leigh (then in the office of the General Counsel, Department
of Defense, and

immersed

Counselor of the Department of

later

in the practice

War Crimes
during

with

Rhode

branches, into a front line authority

assignment that he

this

beginning

Island,

Howard was

of public international law,

in building the International Affairs Division,

first

visited the

its

on

International

War

with

firmly

instrumental

the law of war.

Naval

a lifetime association

Now

State).

Law and

It

was

also

College in Newport,

this institution.

Another

memorable event was his participation in the presentation of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War to the United States
Senate for

its

advice and consent to their ratification.

make a lengthy visit to Europe
to assess various status of forces agreement (SOFA) issues with several NATO
nations. While in Europe, he also attended the Academy of International Law
at the Hague for which he received a Certificat d'Assiduite. In November 1955,
In July 1955, Colonel Levie had occasion to

Howard was

again in Europe, this time to participate in

NATO

meetings

regarding prisoner of war matters.

Colonel Levie's Washington assignment

also

allowed him to renew

determination to obtain a Master of Law degree from George Washington

School (with

specialization in international law).

a

Tom Mallison

Professor

during that process,

his

Law

While studying under

Howard authored

a

paper entitled

''The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement." Subsequently published
in the
as

American Journal of International Law (and included

Chapter

I),

that paper

spokesman

articulate

for,

an

and commentator on, the law of war. Despite

his

abroad and heavy work schedule

trips

Division,

Howard earned his LL.M.

period to lecture on

work
as

launched Professor Levie's life-long career

frequent

this

in this present

SOFA

as

Chief, International Affairs

degree in 1957.

He also had occasion during

matters at a variety of fora, including the

Washington Foreign Law Society, the Federal Bar Association, the National

War

College and the Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville,

Virginia.

In April 1958,

Colonel Levie was transferred to the Southern European Task

Force headquarters in Verona,

Italy, as Staff Judge

Advocate. During that tour

of duty, he often was additionally tasked to support the U.S. Sending State Office
for Italy in a variety

of

NATO SOFA matters. He also began a long and fruitful

association with the International Society of Military

attending

its first

Congress in Brussels in

May

1959.

Law and

the

Law of War,

Grunawalt
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The next stop on Howard's distinguished military career was as Military Legal
Advisor

at

the U.S.

Command (USEUCOM)

European

Headquarters, then

December 1959, he was soon
law matters for USEUOM, a number of

located in Paris, France. Arriving in Paris in
intensively involved in operational

which

necessitated multiple visits to both

Throughout

this

period,

Howard

NATO

honed

further

his

non-NATO

and

law of war

In June 1961, the Levies returned to the United States

nations.

credentials.

where Howard was

assigned to Sixth Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco, California,
as

Staffjudge Advocate.

He was

to

hold that position until January 1963, when,

having reached the age of 55, he was required by law to

On

31 January 1963,

Howard

retired in the rank

Army. Awarded the Legion of Merit by an
nation, he returned to civilian

active service.

of Colonel, United States

appreciative

Army

Professor Levie's retirement from the

Army and

a grateful

signaled not the end, but the

renewal of his journey toward international renown
faculty

from

21 years of active military service.

life after

September 1963, he joined the

retire

as a

law of war

of Saint Louis University

an Associate Professor of Law (he was to become a

full

scholar. In

Law

School

as

Professor with tenure

two years later). Although his first teaching assignment at the Law School
was Commercial Transactions, he soon assumed responsibility for instruction of
International Law. From September 1963, until his retirement from Saint Louis

just

University in June 1976

at

age 69 (pursuant to mandatory rules then in force

Howard wrote

that institution),

over 20 scholarly

of war (seven of which are reprinted in

Howard's writings during

his tenure at Saint

and war crimes matters, he

also

of war
to

issues. It

Newport

War

to

was

also

spend

during

this

While much of

Louis concerned prisoner of war

to address a

period that

a sabbatical year

pertaining to the law

present volume).

this

had occasion

articles

at

broad spectrum of law

Howard and Blanche

(academic year 1971-72)

at

returned

the Naval

College where he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International

Law.

As the Stockton Chairholder, Professor Levie

filled a

Chair which had been

held by some of the preeminent international legal scholars in the world. His
predecessors included the legendary John Bassett

on

the

Moore, one of the

first judges

Permanent Court of International Justice; Professor Manley O. Hudson,

then of Harvard

Law

Justice; Professor

School, and later a judge on the International Court of

Hans Kelsen of the University of

California at Berkeley;

Professor Leo Gross of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and Professor

Oliver J. Lissitzyn of Columbia

Law

School.

Professor Levie's retirement from Saint Louis University in 1977, and

attainment of Professor Emeritus of Law

and

a beginning. Indeed, 21 years

status,

once again marked both an end

of active military service and 14 years of law

school teaching were but the prologue to

this illustrious career.

As we

shall see,

Levie on the
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Howard's most
20 years

Law

of

War

and

prolific

Professor Levie continues to contribute to the development and

later,

of the law of war.

articulation

In 1977, the Levies established their

resumed

his

(a

role

classes, until

-

much

permanent home

Newport. Howard

Law and Oceans

Affairs

War

College

program of the Naval

as

Staff

he continued, pro bono, for 20 years, teaching 40 consecutive

voluntarily withdrawing

to the regret

of the College);

from the program
the

as

Lowry

in July

1997

age 89

at

Professor in 1982-83; and as

College elective course on the

He
Law of

Operations. For over a decade he provided instruction in the

Geneva

Law from

an Adjunct Professor of International
continues to lecture in the Naval

Combat

in

teaching of international law within the Naval

lecturer in the International

College

occurred since 1977; some

influential writing has

Conventions

to military attorneys

During 1984-1988, he was
College. In addition,

War

of all the services

1991 to the present.

at

the Naval Justice School.

also lecturer in International

Howard

honored

has been an

Law

at

Salve

Regina

participant in various

conferences and symposia on the law of naval warfare within the Naval

enormous contribution

College. His

Naval

War

when Rear Admiral Joseph

recognized in October 1994
the College,

to the

War

College was formally
Strasser, President

announced the establishment of the Professor Howard

S.

of

Levie

Law in the Joint Military Operations Department.
honor, Howard joined an elite listing of distinguished

Military Chair of Operational

Through

this singular

Americans for whom such Chairs have been established at the College, including
Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey Arleigh Burke and Raymond Spruce,
,

and Generals Tasker Howard

volume can

personally

Bliss

attest,

and Colin Powell. As many readers of this

Howard

has also been a major contributor

throughout these past two decades to the work of a wide variety of international

and domestic organizations and
Levie on the

Law of War is

a

societies

concerned with the law of war.

compilation of 25

articles

written by

Howard over

the course of his distinguished career. Selected by the editors to reflect the broad

range of topics which he has addressed with great incisiveness, they represent

some of
that

he

is

the most influential of his works.
also the

it

must be remembered

author or editor of an impressive array of books. His

written during his tenure

Naval

However,

War College.

as

the Stockton Professor of International

Perhaps the

prisoners of war, Prisoners of

finest treatise

War in

first

Law

was

at the

ever written on the law governing

International

Armed

Conflict,

was published

as

War College International Law Studies (the "Blue
Book") series. The book won international acclaim for its scholarship, including
the 1982 Triennial Ciardi Prize of the International Society of Military Law and

volume 59 of

the

Law

the Naval

of War. That monumental

effort

was supported by an exhaustive

compilation of source materials (which he edited) entided Documents on Prisoners

Grunawalt

volume 60 of the "Blue Book"
resource for law of war scholars.

of War. Published as

an essential

The

year 1979 also witnessed publication of the

edited by

series,

first

xxi

Documents remains

of a multi-volume

set

Howard recording the proceedings of the 1974-77 Geneva Diplomatic

Conference which drafted the 1977 Protocol Additional

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
International

Armed

Conflicts (Protocol

I).

to the Protection

Entided

Geneva

the

to

of Victims of

War Victims,
1981, this work was

Protection of

volume of which was published in
described by Ambassador George Aldrich, head of the U.S. Delegation

the fourth and final

Conference,

as

"an invaluable tool in interpreting and applying the

to the

new law

developed by means of the Geneva Protocol."

The second book authored by Howard was published in 1983. Entided The
Status of Gibraltar, this work examines the historical background and status of
the dispute
British

between Great

Crown Colony, making

analyzed in depth. As with

and Spain over

Britain

all

that strategically situated

extensive use of documents not previously

of his writings, Gibraltar

thoroughly researched sources and

a

reflects close attention to

balanced and honest appraisal of the

issues.

book was published. A
The Code of International Armed Conflict, it constitutes

Just three years later (1986), Professor Levie's third

two-volume work
a

entitled

comprehensive presentation of the entire law of war, both conventional and

book sets
forth each rule, identifies its source (s) and presents cogent commentary on its
meaning and application. A superb research tool, The Code of International Armed
Conflict remains an essential part of any law of war collection.
customary. Presented in the form of a code of that body of law, the

Howard next turned his

attention to the critically important and intellectually

challenging arena of non-international armed conflict. In 1987, he edited Tlie

Armed Conflict, which complements his earlier work
Protection of War Victims, and which utilizes the same effective format. Providing
the negotiating history of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva

Law

of Non-International

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to Non-International
Conflicts

(Protocol

understanding

of,

II),

this

volume provides

the

reader

with

Armed
a

clear

and appreciation for the complexities of law and policy

inherent in the regulation of non-international conflict.

1988 witnessed the publication of Howard's seventh book. Entided The Law

A

work is
remarkable for both its thoroughness and its organizational clarity. Once again,
his attention to detail, coupled with his mastery of the subject, enabled Howard
of

War and

to

produce

Neutrality:

English-Language Bibliography, this

no law of war research scholar should be without.
Professor Levie's long association with the Naval War College and his study
a

volume

Selective

that

of the law of naval warfare kindled
at sea, a subject that

his interest in the legal aspects

of mine warfare

had not previously been comprehensively addressed

in the

Levie on the
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Law

of

War

His book Mine Warfare

literature.

published in 1992, superbly

at Sea,

work

gap. Written in non-technical language, this very readable

that

provides an

and technical history of mine

overall study of the military, legal, operational

Rich with

fills

drawn from four hundred years of practice,
Mine Warfare recounts how naval mines have been employed in warfare, how

warfare

at sea.

illustrations

nations have attempted to regulate their use, and

employed in the
index, this

how

such mines will likely be

Complete with an exhaustive bibliography and extensive
a "must have" volume on the law of war research scholar's

future.

book is also

shelf.

Howard's incomparable book on

violations of the law of war

in 1993. Entitled Terrorism in

War: The

Howard's extensive experience

in

in

all

Law

war crimes

matters pertaining to breaches of the

violations of the

War

providing

the

comprehensive

Crimes,

and

trials

his

it

draws upon

unequaled expertise

Geneva Conventions and

to other

law of war. In the view of many scholars and practitioners

this field, Terrorism in

literature,

War

of

was published

analysis

in

the quintessential treatment of this subject in the

is

whether

reader,

of law of war crimes

issues

—

layman,

or

scholar

past, present

with

and

a

future.

Presented chronologically, the book examines the early history of war crimes

and war crimes

trials

through the Gulf

Crisis

of 1990-91.

It

then focuses on

procedural matters including jurisdiction, asylum and extradition, and

trial

procedures, before turning to the analysis of conventional war crimes, crimes

and crimes against humanity. The book concludes with an

against peace

examination of the accused, their victims and their defenses.
for research scholars

relevant documents,

Protocol

I.

It is

is

Of particular utility

the inclusion in the appendices of key provisions of

all

from the Lieber Code of 1863 through the 1977 Additional

in this magnificent

work

enormous contribution of Howard's

that

one

sees

scholarship

to

most convincingly the
the

articulation

and

enforcement of the law of war.
In 1995,

Howard took on

yet another major tasking, the editing of volumes

7 through 12 of Terrorism, Documents of International and Local Control. For those
serious readers not familiar with this superb series,
12, the last to

be edited by Howard,

is

I

commend it to you. Volume

a veritable

well-spring of information

pertaining to contemporary practice and problems relating to terrorism, from
the sentencingjudgment of the International Tribunal for the
in the

Erdemovic

case to the report

bombing of Khobar Towers. Here
objectivity at

Not one

Former Yugoslavia

of the Secretary of Defense concerning the
again

we

see

Howard's thoroughness and

work.
to

rest

on

his

many

laurels,

Howard

Levie continues in

his

unrelenting quest to advance the cause of respect for the rule of law in armed

volume goes to press, Howard is nearing completion of
another important treatise on the law of war. That book, entitled Capitalist

conflict. Indeed, as this

yet

Grunawalt
and Communist Prisoners of

War

draws on

Korea,

in

xxiii

extensive personal

his

War and its aftermath as a member of the Staff of the
United Nations and Far East Command and legal advisor to the United Nations
Command Armistice Delegation, and on his peerless expertise in the law
experience in the Korean

applicable to prisoners of war. This eagerly awaited

work

add

will

to the

enormous contribution of this incomparable scholar.
I would certainly be remiss if I failed to mention what is perhaps the most
significant achievement of Howard's long and illustrious career
his genius and

—

good fortune

great

been an

in marrying Blanche.

of Howard's

integral part

From

that date to this,

work. Indeed, those of us

life

Blanche has

who

have had

the privilege and pleasure of knowing the Levies over the years have

Howard

appreciate that

is

come

to

but one-half of an extraordinary team. Sixty three

years following their exchange of marriage vows, Blanche remains the vivacious
spirit

of this incomparable duo.

In the end, recounting selected highlights of Howard Levie's illustrious career
as a

man or his work.
Howard is far more.

lawyer, soldier and scholar does not do justice to either the

To those of us privileged to work with and learn from him,
He is the embodiment of knowledge and commitment in all
law of war. Always open and objective, he nonetheless

to the

matters pertaining

retains the enviable

perspective of the long view. Indeed, this sense of perspective pervades his
writing. All too acquainted with the brutal realities of war,

compassion
rules

—of

resolute

commitment

which war
appreciate

inevitably entails.

as

much

the suffering

as possible,

Those acquainted with the Levies

will surely

enormous influence of Blanche's humanity on Howard's

the

profound compassion for the victims of war. Yet, he remains
appreciative of the equation of military necessity
security during conflict.

He

and of the

volume

this

a realist, fully

dictates

of national

understands the plight of the victims of war and the

hardship of the individual soldier engaged in

compiled in

man of

a

development and enforcement of

to the

of normative behavior that mitigate,

Howard is

reflect

its

The

execution.

writings

Howard's abiding sense of balance, of fairness,

of reality.
I

will

conclude these remarks with an anecdote

Howard

Levie.

Upon

completion of

Geneva Conventions and

the 1977 Protocols to a class of

approached by an Eastern European

all

that

by what he had heard. That

Howard had

not remember

do

all

said,

that

is

the essence of

is

on the 1949

some

thirty-five

War College, Howard was
who appeared to be somewhat

Naval

officer
officer

commented

that

he

fully

endorsed

but was concerned that in the heat of batde he might

he had learned. The officer asked

in such a circumstance.

know

me,

a typically erudite lecture

international naval officers attending the

distressed

that, to

Howard

the right thing to do and

replied,

you

Howard what he

"Commander,

will not

just

should

do what you

go wrong." That

is

also the

xxiv
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underlying message in

all

of

War

of Howard's writings on the law of war: whether

national political leader or individual soldier

accountable those that do not.

—do

what

is

right

and hold

I

The Nature and Scope of the
Armistice Agreement
50 American Journal

of International

Law 880

Introduction

I.

many centuries the armistice agreement has been
For
of
frequently employed
bring about
a cessation

to

conflict, particularly

be termed

(1956)

where the opposing

a stalemate. This practice has

belligerents

method most

the

hostilities in international

have reached what might

not only continued but has probably

increased, during the present century.

The

World War ended

first

in an extended series of so-called armistice

1

During the twenty-one years which elapsed before the outbreak
of the second World War there were really only two such agreements of any
historical importance: that entered into in Shanghai on May 5, 1932, which
agreements.

brought about

a cessation

of

hostilities in

the Sino-Japanese conflict of that

Buenos Aires on June 12, 1935, which ended
hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran Chaco.
The second World War also ended in an extended series of so-called armistice
agreements; and in the comparatively short period of time since then, there
have already been no less than ten major general armistice agreements concluded
by belligerents. This increased importance in modern practice of the general

period;

and

that entered into at

armistice as an instrument leading to the restoration of peace has resulted in

having been likened to the preliminaries of peace
practically superseded),

circumstances,

it

and even

(which

to a definitive treaty

it

has, in fact,

it

of peace.

Under

the

appears appropriate to review the history and development of

the general armistice as a major international convention concerned with the

non-hostile relations of belligerents, as well as to determine

its

present status

under international law.
II.

What

General Discussion

war convention
which has properly been termed "the most important and most frequentiy
reached agreement between belligerents"? A general armistice is an agreement
is

the nature of a general armistice agreement, the

4

1

Levie on the

2

between

Law

belligerents

of

War

which

results in a

some considerable

specified period of time, usually of

indeterminate period.

applies to

It

wherever they may be located.

It

all

complete cessation of all

hostilities for a

duration, or for an

of the forces of the opposing belligerents,

may have

a political

and economic,

as

well

as

a military, character.

This definition, while adequate to describe the nature of a general armistice,
necessarily omits

many

which

defined, facets

peripheral but nevertheless important facets of the term

it is

analysis

of the problem.

does

come

it

belligerents?

essential

What

into being?

These

is

Does

are but a

should be borne in mind in any searching

the legal basis of the general armistice?
it

create a

new

How

between the

juridical status

few of the more important of the many questions

problem.

relating to this

war convention. By definition a
convention is an agreement; it is a contract; it is consensual. That this is all true
of an armistice is fully established by reference to numerous international
As has already been noted, the armistice

conventions,

11

military manuals,

12

is

a

.13

and authors of texts of international law.

Belligerents are free to enter into an armistice or to decline to
free to include in an armistice

any provisions which they may

do

so.

They

are

desire, unfettered
1

by either legal

As one author has apdy
The

stated:

contractual field for an armistice

take the place of law as

It

guided only by the necessities of war.

restrictions or precedents,

follows that there

is

is

completely open. Here again "contracts

between those who enter

no fixed

rule or

into them."

custom which prescribes what provisions

should or should not be included in an armistice agreement.
hand, there are certain provisions which,

included by the

parties,

as will

not because of any legal compulsion, but rather because
facilitate

as

is,

it

results in a cease-fire.

Without

a

would, by definition, be no armistice.

a contract,

a cessation

the

provide therefor or not, an armistice does result in a complete

cessation of active hostilities; that

Being

the purpose

And whether

of the armistice and to insure against violations thereof.

cease-fire there

the other

be seen, are very generally

experience has proven that such provisions are of a nature to

parties specifically

On

of all

it

must be negotiated. Because

hostilities,

and because

well as military provisions,

it

it

may

a general armistice results in

contain political and economic

has political significance.

It

may, therefore, be

made only on behalf of the sovereignty of the state. This sovereignty may be
expressed by either of two methods: first, the armistice may contain a specific
or second, the
provision that it is to become effective only after ratification;
representatives of the state designated to negotiate the armistice, and they may
2
Modern
be military or civilian or both, may be provided with full powers.

Armistice Agreement
practice appears to prefer the latter

method. There were no

ratifications

3

of the

so-called Armistice Agreements reached during either World War I or World
22
War II. All of the armistice agreements reached under the aegis of the United

Nations have been negotiated by representatives with
required ratification.

While

who

it

cannot be disputed that

will represent

full

None

powers.

has

23

it

expressions of opinion

a state has

complete freedom in determining

been conflicting

in negotiating an armistice, there have

the advisability of the selection of military personnel

as to

for this purpose. Gentili did not believe that the task of negotiating an armistice

should be delegated to the military.
handle matters

1-111
which belong

modern

hand, one

to

He said:

"Therefore the leaders in war should

war and not other

writer states that "it

is

clear that,

the actual negotiations should be conducted
It

cannot be said that there

24

On

the other

once the decision
military organs."

any established modern practice in

is

The Renville Truce Agreement

by the

matters."

is

made,

25

this regard.

(Netherlands-Indonesia) and the India-Pakistan

Order and Truce x\greement were both negotiated by diplomatic
representatives. The four Israeli-Arab Armistice Agreements were negotiated by
Cease-fire

on behalf of each of the Arab countries and by mixed
civiHan-military delegations on behalf of Israel. The Korean Armistice
Agreement was negotiated and signed exclusively by the military on both sides.
And the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina were
negotiated by both military and diplomatic representatives.
As a matter of fact,
with modern methods of communication, the question is no longer of very great
importance inasmuch as the decision of the negotiator, whether he be military
the

or

military

be made in each instance pursuant to instructions

civilian, will actually

received direcdy from his

"mixed team"

home

capital.

Perhaps the best solution would be

members drawn both from

consisting of

the diplomatic corps, the practice followed

Arab

states,

and by both

sides in the

by

a

the military and from

Israel in its negotiations

with the

Indo-Chinese negotiations.

A matter of major legal interest is that of the juridical status which exists during
the period while an armistice

While

there has,

on

to this question,

it

is

in effect.

occasion, been

may be

some

Is it

war, or peace, or

some

third status?

rather loose language used with regard

stated as a positive rule that

an armistice does not

terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de
facto,

and

that the state

of war continues to

exist

and

to control the actions

of

neutrals as well as belligerents.

As long ago
power,

it

as

the days

when Greece and Rome were

became accepted law

that,

resulted in a cessation of hostilities,
result in a

it

termination of the war.
•

concurred in

this

conclusion.

30

The

at

the zenith of their

although the indutiae (armistice or truce)
did not,

The

as

did the foedus (treaty of peace),

early writers

great majority

on

international law

of contemporary writers

Levie on the

4

likewise do so.

31

Law

War

of

Both the American and the

uniformly taken the position that an armistice
hostilities

The

and

is

not to be described

rule stated

is

merely

of active

a cessation

temporary or

as either a

manuals have

British military

a partial

above has received affirmative judicial approval on

peace.
a

number

of occasions. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, confronted with the
question of whether the 1918 Armistice had brought about a state of peace,
ruled that "complete peace, in a legal sense, had not

come

to pass

33

of the Armistice and the cessation of hostilities."'

by the

effect

on November

Similarly,

3,

1944, the French Court of Cassation stated that "an armistice convention

concluded between two belligerents constitutes only
of hostilities, and cannot

A

itself

put an end to the

few years ago an incident occurred
immediately

as Israel

state

of war between

was concerned.

of the belligerent

all

general armistice

is

a

change

become

a

was based upon

as

It is

indicating that a

considered

a desire to

By now

of

a

bring to an

it

has surely

obvious that the Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements did

not create even a de facto termination of the war between those

One

more

with potential danger to peace than that it was attempting

long established rule of international law.

fairly

Egypt, on the

•

a resolution calling

likely that the Security Council's action

to

effect,

The Security Council on
35
upon Egypt to lift its blockage.

kind of de facto termination of war.

a situation fraught

its

complained

Israel

parties.

This action of the Security Council has been construed

end

to maintain

legal.
•

•

1951, passed

the

of war continued despite the armistice

state

agreements and that the blockade was
1,

of

execution

the

Council asserting that the four armistice agreements had, in

other hand, contended that the

September

to

Agreement, Egypt continued

"blockade" of the Suez Canal insofar

terminated the

Council of the United

indicating a rule contrary to that

Subsequent

above.

Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice

to the Security

as

suspension

of war.

in the Security

Nations which has been misconstrued
discussed

state

a provisional

of the most frequent problems to

arise

37
states.

with regard to the interpretation

general armistice has been the determination of those acts

which

are

permitted and those which are prohibited. There have been two very definite
schools of thought

on

this

problem.

One school, long designated as the one with

it,

takes the position that during a general

armistice a belligerent cannot legally

do anything which the enemy would have

the weight of authority behind

wanted

to

and could have prevented him from doing but

The

other school, long designated

well

as

the weight of practice behind

armistice the belligerents

expressly prohibited

now

as

of

by

it.

must

the one with the weight of reasoning as
it,

refrain

takes the position that during a general

from doing only those

This dispute

historical significance only.

for the armistice.

is

apparendy

Modern

as

old

acts

which

as history,

are

and

is

discussions of the subject point

out the problem of enforcement and the invitation to charge and countercharge

Armistice Agreement
inherent in what might be termed the
belligerents have

which

are to

approach.

to an

atmosphere which will lead to

modern

a restoration

made on

be that belligerents

rule appears to

have the right to do anything which

to

In recent years the

to spell out with particularity all those specific acts
43
during a general armistice.
Whether or not this is

probably debatable, with strong arguments to be
Nevertheless, the

42

been prone

be renounced

more conducive

classical

5

of peace

either

is

side.

may be presumed

not specifically forbidden by the terms

is

of the armistice agreement; and, conversely, that the doing of an act not
specifically prohibited,

for the

even though the other side could have prevented

it

agreement on the cessation of hostilities, cannot validly be made the

but

basis

for a complaint of violation or for the denunciation of the armistice.

III.

Mention

Provisions of Armistice Agreements

has already

been made of the

fact that the

may, and frequently does, contain military,

political,

modern

general armistice

and economic provisions.

An analysis of the various provisions of a number of general armistice agreements,
using as models not only the post-World War II agreements of this category,
but also a number of older ones, will disclose the direction which the armistice
is

taking in the dynamics of international law, and will permit the drawing of

certain conclusions.

Incorporated within the hundreds of armistice agreements which have been

concluded over the course of centuries

it is

possible to discover provisions

Many such provisions

covering almost every conceivable topic.

longer relevant under conditions of modern warfare; and

because of the situation pertaining to a particular conflict.

which

are interesting for historical reasons but

legal significance,

of

this

problem

it is

will

no

many were apt only
With the foregoing,

which have no

not necessary to concern oneself.

are probably

particular present

The present-day student

be concerned exclusively with the provisions which

belligerents have, either consistently over the centuries, or at least in recent times,

believed

it

appropriate to incorporate in armistice agreements concluded by

them.
In general,

what matters should one expect

armistice agreement? Probably the

question
States

is

contained in The

Army.

46

to find included in a typical

most thorough and up-to-date answer to

Law of Land

Warfare, the

new Manual of the United

Summarized, the provisions suggested therein
and time;

(1)

Effective date

(2)

Duration;

(3)

Line of demarcation and neutral zone;

(4)

Relations with inhabitants;

(5)

Prohibited

acts;

that

relate to:

Levie on the

6

Law

of

War

(6)

Prisoners of war;

(7)

Consultative machinery;

(8)

Miscellaneous politico-military matters.

Any

discussion of the contents of an armistice agreement

with

a

may

discussion of the suspension of hostilities.

must

logically begin

That subject disposed

turn to those of the above-enumerated items

which

are

of,

one

of some particular

current interest.

A. Suspension of Hostilities
As has already been remarked, an armistice per
provision, results in a cessation of hostilities.

se,

with or without

Nevertheless, only

a specific

on very

rare

occasions have the parties failed to include such a provision.

The Truce of Ratisbonne, signed on August 15, 1684, on behalf of Leopold,
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Louis XIV, King of France, did not
specifically

suspend

hostilities. It

twenty years from the date of
have,

it

should be noted that

of Vigevano on October
.

.

7,

contained

ratification.

we

find the

between the

same

of hostilities.

and the

it

parties entering into the
later,

and

this

may

Truce

time with a

49

Emperor and an armistice was entered
French. While the brother of Louis XVIII had

Napoleon abdicated
Allies

For whatever significance

...

.

specific provision for a suspension

into

provision establishing a truce for

1696, only twelve years

.

In April, 1814,

a

as

come to France as the representative of the King, there was considerable question
as to the extent of control which he would be able to exercise over Napoleon's
Grand Army. Accordingly, the
but only
shall

if

"the

commanding

have signified to the

armistice provided for a suspension of hostilities

officers

allied troops

of the French armies and

opposed to them that they have recognized

the authority of the Lieutenant General of the
a

somewhat

similarly

confused

fortified places

Kingdom of France."

political situation existed in Italy in

Although
1943,

it

was

apparently considered unnecessary to include such a provision in the Armistice

Agreement of September 3, 1943, between the United Nations forces and the
government of Marshal Badoglio which had succeeded Mussolini.
The Armistice Protocol signed by the Russians and the Japanese at
Portsmouth on September 1, 1905, contained a clause prohibiting
bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces, but no other provision with
It directed the two governments to order
regard to the suspension of hostilities.
their military commanders to put the Protocol into effect. On September 13 an
agreement was reached by the army commanders in Manchuria which
specifically provided for the suspension of hostilities effective on September 16.'
On September 18, a "Naval Protocol of Armistice" was signed by the navy
commanders which, while it established a boundary line between the two fleets,

Armistice Agreement
again did not specifically suspend hostilities.
in

Korea were unable

to reach an

54

And

the

7

two army commanders

agreement prior to the exchange of ratifications

of the peace treaty on September 25.

On

a

number of

occasions the United Nations has adopted, apparently

without any reason therefor, terminology

new

to international

law in

its

actions

The Renville Truce Agreement uses the novel
term "stand-fast and cease-fire."' The India-Pakistan Agreement provides for
57
The Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements adopt the
a "cease-fire."
relating to armistice agreements.

procedure of omitting a specific provision for a suspension of hostilities

on

was unnecessary in view of the "truce" which had

the theory that this

previously been imposed

on the belligerents by the United Nations

established "a general armistice

The Korean

—perhaps

between the armed

—and merely

two

forces of the

58

Parties."

Armistice Agreement reverted to standard procedure, providing

for "a complete cessation of all hostilities" in Korea.

59

B. Effective Date and Time

It

has been stated that

in armistices time

the

moment of

misconception.

is

of the

first

that

Because of

be

should

termination

it is

fails

fixed

it

has,

on

occasion, been

in different areas.

In

made

deemed

by

advisable to

effective at different times

modern army

usually equipped, neither of these

is

States has

been involved in

at least

one controversy with regard

of an armistice. The Protocol of Washington (United

which was signed on August

12, 1898, provided that

the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities

between the two

countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as
possible
64
c
forces.

all

any longer occur.

to the effective date

upon

it is

view of the nature of the elaborate communications

systems with which the

,

and time,

For the same reason, the

later date.

suspension of hostilities has on occasion been

States— Spain)

of

possibility

receipt of proper notification

have the armistice become effective on a

The United

all

intended to become effective immediately upon signing.

for other reasons,

situations should

beyond

to specify an effective date

difficulties in assuring the

commands, or

The time of commencement and

60

In the event that the armistice

assumed

consideration.

by each Government

to the

commanders of

the military and naval

War

8

Levie on the

Law

The

effective date

of the suspension of hostilities was obviously not stated with

of

sufficient precision. Spain later

contended

from the date of signature. The United
render meaningless the
hostilities

had become

States

had been

took the position that

effective

this

would

of the provision and that the suspension of

latter part

effective only

and naval commanders

that the protocol

in the field.

upon

receipt of notification

More

care in the drafting of the provision

by the

military

would have obviated this dispute, which involved the capitulation of Manila.
The importance of clearly indicating the effective date and time of an armistice
agreement appears to be
covered in

all

adherence to

between

a lesson well learned, for

of the post- World

this practice will

belligerents

which

be

War

II

we find that the

subject

fully

Continued

armistice agreements.

at least a small step in

is

minimizing the

difficulties

inevitably arise during any armistice.

C. Duration

Two

agreements.

and

that

found

types of provision with regard to duration are

Some

specify a definite period. Thus, the Armistice

in armistice

of Nikolsburg

of Shimonoseki provided for durations of four weeks and twenty-one

The Armistice of Malmoe, concluded by the King of Prussia
King of Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice of

days, respectively.

and the

seven months with automatic prolongation unless one month's advance notice

was given by either

And

party.

Austrians in Vienna

on July

the agreement reached by the French and the

13, 1809,

provided for an armistice of one month,

but with fifteen days advance notice of resumption of

Others

hostilities.

provide for an indefinite duration or contain no provision whatsoever on
subject.

Where

this

is

the situation, the armistice remains effective until due

notice of denunciation has been given
It

has

been

said that "it

time during which

is

modern

by one of the

customary to

hostilities are

century, armistice agreements,
duration,

suspended."

belligerent parties.

with exactness the period of

stipulate

Although, prior to the twentieth

more frequendy than

practice seems to be otherwise.

not, specified an exact

No

duration

any of the major armistice agreements concluded since World
example, the Renville Truce Agreement provides that
binding unless, in
other party.
it

"shall

sides."

Of course

agreements are determinate, inasmuch
so,

but

it

specified in

War II.

shall

Thus, for

be considered

Agreement provides
between the

Armistice Agreement provides that

between both

an event certain. Perhaps

it

is

because of violations by the

superseded by "an appropriate agreement for

at a political level

latter

it

effect until a peaceful settlement

The Korean

effect until

one party terminates

Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice

remain in

achieved."

two

effect,

The

this

as

it

a

it

shall

that

Parties

is

remain in

peaceful settlement

may be argued

that these

they remain in effect until

can scarcely be said that there has been any

Armistice Agreement
stipulation

with exactness

circumstances.

The

as

Agreement

of the armistice under these

to the duration

Agreement is seven years

Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice

no "peaceful settlement"

old and

in sight.

is

9

And

while the Korean Armistice

only three years old, the "peaceful settlement" mentioned therein

is

looks equally remote.
It
it

been

has

stated

above that where an armistice

of indeterminate duration,

is

remains effective until "due notice" of denunciation has been given.

Sometimes an armistice

which

is

period of advance notice of denunciation

specifies the

required. Thus, the second Thessaly Armistice entered into

Greeks and the Turks on June
resumption of hostilities.

73

More

by the

1897, provided for 24 hours' notice of

3,

often,

it

does not. Article 47 of the Declaration

of Brussels admonished that "proper warning be given to the enemy, in
accordance with the conditions of the armistice";

74

and Article 36 of both of
75

Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907) said approximately the same thing.
The practical value of these provisions is dubious. It is precisely when there
the

is

no relevant condition

in the armistice

agreement that resort must be had to

general international law. In this instance, conventional international law being
lacking, resort
that notice

must be had to custom

—and custom

be given of the intention to resume

"good faith requires

says that

hostilities."

A number of authors have commented on Sherman's ire when the armistice
which he had concluded with Johnston on April
President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, and

was disapproved by

18, 1865,

upon

his

honor and

fairness in

giving 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities to General Johnston.
his ire there

can be no doubt.

Without attempting

'

Sherman's honor and sense of

to detract

78

Of

from General

point out that the

fairness, it is necessary to

armistice itself provided for 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities.

Actually,

Sherman even

giving the notice

referred to this provision of the armistice agreement in
81

which

required.

it

D. Demarcation Line and Neutral Zone

A

demarcation

accompanied by

line

between

a neutral zone, has

the

two

belligerent

long been

a

frequently

forces,

technique employed for the

purpose of preventing incidents which, even though inadvertent, might lead to
a

resumption of hostilities.

only means there
strong

is

and tends

82

The

statement that

a "neutral

zone

of preventing violations of the armistice"
to

overevaluate

the

neutral

zone.

A

83

is

actually the

-

is

probably too

neutral

unquestionably a very great aid in preventing incidents. However,

it is

zone

is

definitely

not a cure-all.

The

last

century provides a

number of historical examples of the

use of the

demarcation line and the neutral zone in armistice agreements. In the Armistice

a

Levie on the

1

Law

War

of

of Cintra (France—Allies) provision was made for the River Siandre to be the
of demarcation between the two armies with Torres Vidras

line

84
land.'"

The French-Austrian

as

"no man's

Armistice of Vienna of 1809 plotted

demarcation from point to point, but did not provide for

a

of

a line

neutral zone.

85
"

The

Armistice of Nikolsburg required the Austrians to remain 2 /4 miles from a line
!

of demarcation which had been previously established, thus creating

zone entirely

at

the expense of the Austrians.

And in

a neutral

the Greco-Turkish

of 1897 both the Armistice of Epirus and that of Thessaly provided for

War

lines

of

demarcation.

The post-World War

II

armistice agreements have, in the main, followed the

long established tradition. The Renville Truce Agreement provided for both
line

of demarcation and

this

document, the

term unique to

line

this

zone. Like so

a demilitarized

many

of demarcation was designated "the

agreement!

88

a

other novelties in

status

quo

line"

—

•

The

Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice

Agreement created a demarcation line and provided that only defensive forces
89
would be permitted "in the region" of the line.
This rather unusual
•

•

,,

.

arrangement was probably due to the

boundary

international

The Korean

fact that the

between Lebanon and

line

Armistice Agreement contains

demarcation line was the

Palestine.
a

rather elaborate series of

provisions establishing and regulating both a "Military Demarcation Line" and
a

"Demilitarized Zone."

on

Geneva

at

July

The same may be

of the agreements entered into

between

1954,

20,

said

Commanders-in-Chief of the French Union Forces
People's
It

Army

of Viet-Nam.

representatives
in Indochina

of

the

and of the

91

be noted that the foregoing enumeration does not include the

will

India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire

agreement

inasmuch

was not necessary

it

as

Order and Truce Agreement. In

that

to create a demarcation line or a neutral zone,

Pakistan agreed to withdraw her forces from the territory of the

State of Jammu

•

and Kashmir.

92

E. Relations with Inhabitants

A number
relations

of different problems

between the

include the

belligerents

movement of

belligerent to that controlled

two

territories, etc.

Article

power of
relations

arise

during an armistice with regard to the

and the

civilians

local inhabitants.

from the

territory

controlled by one

by the other, commercial intercourse between the

However,

as will

be seen, these problems are

50 of the Declaration of Brussels merely stated that
the

These problems

it

all

interrelated.

was within the

two

which

belligerents "to define in the clauses of the armistice the
93
Article 39 of both of the
shall exist between the populations."

Hague Regulations purported

to

extend the contractual freedom of the parties

1

Armistice Agreement

by

1

"what communications may be held in the
of war with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants of one belligerent

specifically including therein

theatre
State

and those of the other."

94

Lieber's corollary to the effect that "if nothing

remains suspended,

Warfare and The

as

...

•

Neither of the foregoing provisions included

during actual

stipulated the intercourse

is

Both the Rules of Land
somewhat on Lieber, pointing

hostilities."

Law of Land Warfare

elaborate

out the necessity for a specific provision in the armistice, and then
Otherwise these
exercise the

same

relations

stating:

remain unchanged, each belligerent continuing to

rights as before, including the right to

intercourse between the inhabitants within

prevent or control

all

and persons within the enemy

his lines

lines.

It is

probably also appropriate to point out here that Article 134 of the 1949

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, directs the belligerents, upon the close of hostilities, "to ensure the return
•

•

of all internees to their last place of residence, or to

facilitate their repatriation."

97

From the foregoing it is clear that the official point of view is that the parties
may include provisions concerning civilians in the armistice agreement, but that,
such provisions, the condition of civilians remains unchanged from that

failing

existing during hostilities.

The

writers of texts

on

the subject are not quite so

unanimous. The majority concur with the doctrines

one author believes

of movement

that "liberty

set forth

above.

[for the civilian

At

least

population]

is

presumed if the armistice is general and is concluded for a sufficiendy long period
of time."
No justification has been found for that statement. Another states
that

may be

it

desirable to provide in the armistice for the relaxation

prohibitions imposed

on

civilians

—but he does not even

hint that there

of the
is

any

presumption in the absence of specific provision.

What

has

been the

suggestion was that
British

Ambassadors

actual practice in this regard? Probably the

made

to the Estates General in

when

most unusual

1608 by the French and

they were attempting to use their good offices to

terminate the hostilities in which the United Provinces were then engaged with

They proposed armistice provisions which would not only have permitted
commerce and communications between the territories controlled by the two
Spain.

belligerents,

but

also

what could only be characterized as a
This proposal, perhaps understandably, was not

included

•

most-favored-nation clause!

101

included in the Truce of Antwerp, which was eventually reached by the parties
in 1609.

The
Louis

102

Armistice of Ulm, which was concluded on

XIV

and

on the other
citizens

his allies

side,

on one

side

March

14, 1647,

between

and the Elector Maximilian and

his allies

authorized a complete resumption of commerce between the

of the two

sides

except for certain specified items such

as saltpeter,

powder, arms,

103
etc.

between the two
a

Law

Levie on the

2

1

somewhat

War

of

The Truce of Ratisbonne
104

belligerents.

Then, two and

commerce

a half-centuries later,

Truce Agreement, where

similar provision in the Renville

specifies that "trade

also reestablished

and intercourse between

all

areas should

we

find

Article 6

be permitted

as far

as possible.

to

While the Korean Armistice Agreement contains no provision with regard
commercial intercourse, it does contain elaborate provisions for the

movement of civilians who were

who were

in territory controlled

permitting any civilian to cross

a step further,

over to the territory controlled by the other belligerent

being that the

to live, the only restriction

period allocated for troop withdrawals.
for the "liberation

some resemblance
Convention to which reference

F. Prisoners of

of the Geneva Civilian

been made.

has received extremely varied treatment in

and

still

remains one which can be most

Armistice of Ulm provided for the release of all prisoners of war by both

without the payment of ransom,
110

1814

after

armistice

that

this last

agreement

proviso probably having been the

as far as

the belligerents themselves

we find that the parties still considered

Surprisingly enough,

essential to specify a

waiver of ransom in the armistice agreement concluded

Napoleon's

first

However, the importance of the

downfall.

from our point of view

is

twofold:

It

provided that

all

appointment of commissioners by each
111

liberation into effect."

prisoners of

"set free";

where they would be taken
Article 20 of both of the

and

a

Malmoe

it

is

for "delivery to their officers."

Hague Regulations provided

not applicable to an armistice.

Convention changed

this considerably,

further provided that, if for

such

a

some

that

all

112

for the repatriation

As we have

of

seen, this

Prisoner of

War

providing that an armistice must, in

reason, the parties had

provision in their armistice, they

was agreed

The 1929 Geneva

principle, contain stipulations regarding the repatriation
It

provided

supplementary agreement stated

prisoners of war only after "the conclusion of peace."

phrase

it

side "in order to carry this general

In the Armistice of

war would be

latter

prisoners of war

should be "immediately sent back to their respective countries"; and
for the

108

of solution.

were concerned.
in

provision

by either side.

War

most important feature of

it

desired to go there

move had to be made during the
The latter Agreement also provides

has already

armistice agreements over the centuries

sides

if he

civilian internees held

the

to

The problem of prisoners of war

The

107

and repatriation" of all

bears

difficult

The

normally resident in territory controlled by the other.

Vietnamese Agreement went even

This

by one belligerent and

of prisoners of war.

been unable

would conclude

a separate

to include

agreement

Armistice Agreement

on

the subject

as

soon

least possible delay.

step further,

such

and

repatriate the prisoners

Prisoner of War Convention

The 1949 Geneva

a

after the cessation

of active

a unilateral

unlike Lieber's Instructions and the Rules of

war and

desired that prisoners of

exchanged, specific provisions in

a

In

that,

establish

view of the

The Law of Land Warfare,

Land Warfare,

regard should be

Prior to the Diplomatic Conference

answer

still

states that "if it is

internees should be released or

civilian

this

Power must

plan of repatriation.

foregoing, and because of the experience in Korea,

in

went

and providing further

hostilities."

provision in the armistice, each Detaining

and execute without delay

Geneva

of war with the

providing that prisoners of war should be "released and repatriated

without delay
failing

possible

as

13

which

made."""

drafted the Conventions in

1949 most writers on the subject took the position that the

to the

final

question of the return of prisoners of war was for the treaty of

They reasoned that to act otherwise would be
to give an unwarranted advantage to the side which had lost the greater number
of soldiers to the enemy and a corresponding disadvantage to the side which had
been successful in capturing the larger number of prisoners of war. It was
suggested that it would be appropriate to reach a separate agreement, after the
armistice had been signed, under which prisoners would be exchanged in equal
peace, not for the armistice.*"

numbers and corresponding
r

:

i::ions

for the

of the belligerents.

This

is

it

is

not

fully

provisions of the 1949

relative

the procedure normally followed in cartels

exchange of prisoners of war/*

position,

any change in the

grades, thus avoiding

While

there

is

much

to

be said for

this

supported by history and. in the light of the quoted

Geneva Convention,

it is

not in conformity with the

requirements of an international convention which has been so widelv accepted
as
is

already to be considered

as

not to say that the basic reason for the theory expressed above

one. \^ nen pnsoners of

war

disproportionate numbers

as

total release
sides,

This

constituting universal international law.

are held

was the

by the two belligerent

case in Korea, there

is

not

a

valid

sides in

such

is

no question but

that

and repatnation considerably changes the balance between the two

even where there

is

a

provision,

as

there

is

Agreement, against the employment in subsequent

in the
acts

Korean Armistice

of war of pnsoners of

war released and repatnated pursuant to an armistice agreement.
The Renville Truce Agreement (which, it will be recalled, was signed on
January 17, 1948, pnor to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Convention and

pnor even

to

the

Stockholm Conference where the working

draft

of the

subsequent pnsoner of war convention was prepared) contains the following
significant provision:

To accept the pnnciple of the release
commence discussions with a view of

of pnsoners by each party and to
the

most rapid

and

convenient

1

Levie on the

4

Law

War

of

implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the

number of prisoners held by

The

General

Israeli-Lebanese

immediate exchange of

122

either party.

123
'

prisoners of war.

all

Agreement provided

Armistice

The

provisions of the

Armistice Agreement with regard to prisoners of war are too well
require repetition here.
Hostilities in

Article 21

Viet-Nam provided

of all prisoners of war."
that prisoners

seem

on

that provision the

of war will be "surrendered" to the other

them

that

side

agreement

—which would

—which would seem

zone of their choice

It is

extremely doubtful

any of these unfortunates were among the horde of refugees
to the

The omission of the

states

which they have been surrendered

of self-determination by the individual.

from the Communist

to

of the principle of "forcible repatriation." However,

in proceeding to the

to indicate a right

known

generally for the "liberation and repatriation

the agreement further provides that the side to
will assist

Korean

of the Agreement for the Cessation of

In elaborating

to indicate acceptance

an

for

non-Communist

1

who moved

96

zone.

India-Pakistan Cease-Fire

Order and Truce Agreement

from the above discussion was not inadvertent. For some reason the United
Nations Commission resolution which became the Agreement made no

mention of this
it

subject;

and apparently neither of the

parties ever suggested that

be included.

G. Consultative Machinery
Provisions in an armistice agreement for the establishment of commissions

with various functions have

somewhat
literature

in

a

long history. Under the circumstances,

strange to find that the subject

on the

it

is

had not been mentioned in the

subject prior to the inclusion of a provision with regard thereto

The Law of Land

Warfare. That provision reads

Consultative machinery.

It is

as follows:

generally desirable to provide for the establishment

of a commission, composed of representatives of the opposing forces, to supervise
the

implementation

of the

composed of representatives of the

as

contained

to agree

a

commissions,

powers or both, may

the repatriation of prisoners of war.

armistice proposed by the ambassadors of France

1608 has already been mentioned
also

Additional

belligerents or of neutral

be constituted to deal with such matters

The

agreement.

armistice

127

and Great Britain

in another connection.

128
4

in

That document

provision to the effect that in the event the parties were unable

concerning the continued occupation of certain

some "notable persons" would be

villages

and hamlets,

selected to decide the question. This provision

Armistice Agreement

15

was among those which the parties omitted from the Truce of Antwerp.
However, the Truce of Ratisbonne established a commission to delimit frontiers

may be no

so that in the future there

dispute to the prejudice of the truce herein

The said Commissioners shall work together to the end
to make the promised restitutions, or to comply with any

agree upon.
party
this

fails

agreement,

it

will

own

provision of

act.

1809 Vienna agreement provided for commissioners

Similarly, the

named by both

to

be

purpose of supervising the execution of the

sides for the

And

agreement.

be

entirely his

that if either

the Finnish-Russian Armistice of 1940 called for special

representatives of the

two

sides to decide

problems

arising in the

implementation

of the agreement.
All of the post- World

War

II

armistice agreements establish commissions of

one type or another for the purpose of either implementing or supervising the
implementation of various provisions of the agreements. Thus, the Renville

Truce Agreement made use of the Committee of Good Offices created by the
United Nations and the Committee's military
incidents, supervision

Agreement

assistants for

of the withdrawal of troops,

availed itself of the services of the

132
etc.

the investigation of

The

India-Pakistan

United Nations Commission.

133

Mixed Armistice Commission and

The

Israeli-Lebanese

also

provided for the use of the personnel of the United Nations Truce

Agreement created

Supervision Organization.

a

The Korean

Armistice Agreement created a

variety of organs, including a Military Armistice

Commission,

a

Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission, a Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners ofWar,
Joint

Red

and

Civilians,

....

Cross Teams, a Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced
a

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Viet-Nam Agreement
r^

•

•

Commission.
It is

years

created

a Joint

135

Similarly, the

Commission and an

International

136

believed that on the basis of the foregoing consistent experience of recent

it

may be assumed

that the device

of commissions made up of members

of the belligerent forces and commissions made up of representatives of neutral
nations, to

which

is

assigned the mission of implementing and of supervising the

implementation of the provisions of an armistice agreement, has become an
accepted feature of such agreements.

H.

Political

It
is

has already been pointed out that

that

it

may

one of the

contain political and economic,

Law of Land Warfare enumerates
may be contained in an armistice,

a

as

characteristics

well

of an armistice

as military, clauses.

number of categories of such

clauses

"

The
which

including disposition of aircraft and shipping;

1

Levie on the

6

Law

War

of

co-operation in the punishment of war crimes; restitution of captured or looted
property;

communications

shipping,

and

facilities

public

which

administration; displaced persons; and the dissolution of organizations

may

subvert public order.

138
*

It is

obvious that

only be appropriate in an armistice such

during or

terms to the vanquished. Some, such
civilians,

it

victors

would

were

dictating

those relating to displaced persons,

as

may be

have already been

etc.,

stated that the scope

of

this

type of

limited only by the ability of the belligerents to reach agreement

is

with regard thereto. Numerous examples of such provisions
the armistice agreements of the past decade
139
u
herein.

I.

subjects

most of those which were concluded

as

commercial intercourse,

discussed. Generally speaking,

provision

number of these

end of the two world wars where the

at the

movement of

a

civil

utilities;

may be found

in

which we have been examining

Violations

The

question of denunciations has already been discussed in connection with

Now

armistice agreements of indefinite duration.

it is

appropriate to examine

the problem of violations of an armistice agreement and denunciations in

connection therewith.
In his Instructions, Lieber stated that "if either party violates any express

condition, the armistice

may be

declared null and void by the other."

Article

51 of the Declaration of Brussels also included a statement to the effect that a
violation of an armistice gave the other party the right to terminate

denoncer").

142
It

will

be noted that under either of these rules

denounce an armistice

the right to

for a violation of

even

An attempt was made to remedy this situation by Article
Regulations which authorized

a

a

("le

it

a belligerent

had

minor condition.

40 of both of the Hague

denunciation for a "serious violation," with the

additional proviso that in cases of "urgency" the violation might warrant the

recommencing of hostilities immediately.

Clearly, the failure to define the

term "serious violation" and the indefiniteness of the term "urgency"
deal to the discretion of the aggrieved party.

international conventions

left a

great

After analyzing the applicable

and the writers on the

subject,

one eminent author

arrives at this conclusion:

.

.

.

Three

rules

may be formulated from

do not even give

a right to

the other party to
hostilities at

justified in

denounce an

denounce the

this

(1)

violations

which

armistice, but not, as a rule, to

hostilities

are not serious

empower
recommence

armistice; (2) serious violations

once without giving notice;

recommencing

—

(3)

only in case of urgency

without notice.

is

a

party

Armistice Agreement
Parties negotiating armistice

17

agreements have apparently been loathe to

include any reference therein with regard to the possibility of denunciation for
violation, perhaps because they have preferred to rely on the rather vague rule
1 46
It is suggested that in these days of extremely detailed
of international law.

agreements

it

might be well

to consider the advisability

agreement which of its provisions are considered by the
importance that

a violation

would be considered

of specifying in the
parties to

be of such

either "serious" or "urgent."

One of the important problems with regard to violations is that of the violation
of

a provision

of an armistice by an individual acting independently. Grotius

stated that "private acts
act, that

is,

through

do not break

command

a truce unless in addition there
147

This

or approval.

is

is

a public

the basic tenor of Article

52 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 41 of both of the Hague
Regulations,

all

of which, in substance, provide that a violation by a private act

only entitles the aggrieved side to
•

demand that the individual offender be
148
to demand compensation for damages.
•

punished and, in an appropriate

case,

The Rules of Land Warfare defined the term "private individuals" as
excluding members of the armed forces.
The Law of Land Warfare reverses
that position, stating that in the sense of Article 41 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations a private individual is any person, including a member of the armed
forces, who acts on his own responsibility.
It is believed that the Hague
*""

Regulation intended, like Grotius, to distinguish between
acts,

and

that the definition appearing in the later

that distinction!

individuals

The Law of Land Warfare

do not

justify

manual

—and

and

unofficial

consonant with

fully

states further that violations

by

denunciation unless they are proved to have been

committed with the knowledge and consent of

commander

is

official

that consent

their

government or

may be inferred from a persistent failure to punish

the offenders.

As

far

back

as

the Armistice of Ulm in 1647

of either side

would be
Agreement

severely punished.

Agreement

are
is

152

Paragraph 13e of the Korean Armistice

commanders of the two

of their respective commands

Agreement

sides to "insure that personnel

who violate any of the provisions

adequately punished";

identical,

find a provision to the effect

who violated any provision of the armistice agreement

that officers

requires the

we

of this Armistice

and Article 22 of the Viet-Nam

except for minor differences which probably resulted

during the course of translating from English to French and then back into
•

English.

153

i

It

i

can logically be assumed that

if the parties

punishment of individual violators, they do not contemplate

provide for the

that such violations

constitute a basis for denunciation.

The emergence of the guerrilla or partisan as a potent force in modern warfare
has emphasized this problem. Irregular forces are frequently difficult to control;

but

it is

not unusual to find them specifically included, with the regular forces,

1

Levie on the

8

Law

of

War

within the restrictions contained in the armistice.

While

procedure

this

obviously appropriate, their frequent disregard of the orders of the

is

commander

who is responsible for insuring compliance with

of the organized military forces,

the provisions of the armistice, can

become an acute problem insofar as violations

of the armistice are concerned.

Naval

J.

Authorities writing

on the war conventions have, with

devoted little more than
armistice

on naval

rare

exception,

sentence or two to the subject of the effect of a general

a

warfare.

'

They

'

are,

however,

practically

unanimous with

which they do enunciate.
Naturally, a general armistice would impliedly include a prohibition against
naval bombardment or a naval battle, inasmuch as every general armistice

regard to the few rules

a

includes a complete suspension of active hostilities.

However, the problem

is

more difficult when the question involved is the maintenance of a naval blockade
with

concomitant

its

such

factors

the right of

as

and

visit

search, control over

neutral vessels, seizure of contraband, taking of prizes, etc.

One
.

.

of the more recent works on

During

.

vessels

a

general armistice, belligerents probably also have the right to capture

belonging to the enemy and to stop and

prevent them from breaking
otherwise agreed upon.
prize in particular

As

this subject states:

The

may be

a practical matter,

it is

a

visit

neutral ships as well as to

blockade and from carrying contraband, unless

question

is

not,

however,

settled

and the taking of

157

considered

as a hostile act.

difficult to see

how

a belligerent

who

continues the

maintenance of a blockade during an armistice can avoid committing
acts.

However, most

writers are far

would indicate concerning the
armistice a naval blockade

which

right

more

positive than the

hostile

above quotation

of a belligerent to continue during

a

general

which had been previously established and concerning

the armistice agreement

makes no provision.

158

There

is

some

indication

modern thinking in this direction is premised on the equally modern
the so-called
doctrine which permits a naval blockade even in time of peace
...
159
"pacific blockade."
The limitation with regard to prizes noted above is
undoubtedly based upon the statement made by one writer to the effect that
that

—

.

such an act

"is irreconcilable

apparent that the
a clear

failure, in

with

a state

of suspension of

hostilities."

It is

an appropriate case, to include within an armistice

provision with regard to naval blockade, and naval warfare generally, can

be the cause of serious
hostilities.

difficulties

Let us review

and, perhaps, even of the resumption of

some of

the armistice agreements in

which an

Armistice Agreement
attempt has been

made

19

cover the subject and weigh the sufficiency or

to

insufficiency of the provisions drafted for that purpose.

The Truce of Antwerp (Spain-United

Provinces) stated that
1

hostility

of

all

nature on sea and

on land

"all acts

of

zro

Such

shall cease."

a clause

would

—

bombardment of an enemy shore but
would it prohibit a blockade? The Armistice of Paris which followed Napoleon's
6^
It provided that the blockade of France
abdication in 1814 was more specific.
prohibit a pitched battle at sea or a naval
1

would be

lifted

and

that

all

provisions

(which allowed for

would be restored. No
should arise under such an armistice; nor under the somewhat similar
of the Armistice of Malmoe, which even went so far as to require

the time necessary for the
difficulties

prizes taken after various dates

news

to reach different areas)

the return of prizes legitimately taken and to provide for indemnification if prizes

and

1

their cargoes could not

The

be returned in kind.

64

Armistice of Versailles of 1871 (France-Germany) created a naval line

of demarcation and provided for the restoration of
conclusion of the armistice and before
to

its

all

notification.

made after the
Again, this would seem

captures

meet the requirements of precision and completeness

essential to

prevent

disputes.

The Armistice of Shimonoseki

(Japan-China) adopted the opposite approach,

specifically authorizing the seizure
is,

of any military sea movements.

of course, entirely within the power of the

parties,

some

While

this

act pursuant thereto

may cause such a public reaction as to practically compel a government to resume
hostilities

—

avail itself

and, also, a government

of an incident thereunder

which

is

looking for an excuse to do so can

as a basis

for the resumption of hostilities.

Neither the two original armistice agreements entered into on
(Epirus),

May

19,

1897

and May 20, 1897 (Thessaly), in the Greco-Turkish War of that period,

nor the amended agreements reached on June
1

relating to the naval situation.

concluded which

lifted

the

67

On June

3,

contained any provisions

4 a supplementary agreement was

Greek blockade, but prohibited Turkey from

reinforcing her armies in Greece or bringing in any munitions, limiting her to
revictualing her troops twice a

week through

designated Greek ports. These,

and certain other naval provisions of the supplementary agreement were so
indefinite as to be calculated to encourage disputes
It

has already

prohibited

been noted

that the Protocol

bombardment of enemy

territory

—which they

did.

of Portsmouth (Russia-Japan)

by naval

forces

and

that the

subsequent "Naval Protocol of Armistice" established a boundary line between
1

the

two

fleets.

6S
'

The Protocol of Portsmouth

captures will not be suspended

by the

also

armistice."

provided that "maritime

It is

to

be assumed that the

Japanese were following the precedent which they had established in the
Armistice of Shimonoseki.

Law

Levie on the

20

The

of

War

War

early post- World

armistice agreements tended to follow the

II

irregular pattern indicated above.

The

Renville Truce Agreement contains no

—

an armistice relating

reference to naval warfare or the sea

an island area.

to

169

The

a strange situation for

Israeli-Lebanese

General Armistice Agreement

provided that "a general armistice between the armed forces of the two
parties

—

and

land, sea

air

—

is

hereby established" and that "no element of the

land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party
shall commit
170
any warlike or hostile acts."
have already seen how identical provisions
.

.

.

We

have caused grave disputes between

Israel

and Egypt with regard

to their effect

on Egypt's naval blockade.
In the Korean Armistice Agreement the required precision and completeness
on this subject were almost reached. Paragraph 12 of that Agreement called for
a

complete cessation of all

hostilities,

including naval

and paragraph

hostilities;

15 provides:
This Armistice Agreement

shall

apply to

all

opposing naval

forces,

forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized

which naval

Zone and

to the

land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not

engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

This

is

172

probably one of the most complete naval provisions ever included in an

armistice agreement.
this armistice

is

However, the general

qualified in

view of the

descriptive statement concerning

fact that in negotiating

it

an attempt to

reach an agreement on the extent of the territorial waters was unsuccessful

because the United Nations
the

Communists

insisted

had established the

Command proposed the traditional three-mile limit,

on the twelve-mile

arbitrary

limit,

and the Republic of Korea

"Rhee Line" which extends anywhere from 60

200 miles from shore. According

to unofficial accounts the

to

United Nations

Command has voluntarily imposed a twelve-mile limit on its personnel in order
However, this has not been entirely successful.
Finally, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam is almost,
though not quite, as complete as the Korean Armistice Agreement. Article 24
to avoid incidents.

provides that the agreement applies to
states that

all

of the armed forces of either party and

such armed forces "shall commit no act and undertake no operation

against the other party

Viet-Nam."

It

and

shall

not engage in blockade of any kind in

also defines the territory

of

a party as

including "territorial

waters." France supports the three-mile definition of territorial waters and
to

be assumed that the

that the

Viet-Minh

state

of Viet-Nam does likewise.

will subscribe to the

It is

equally to be assumed

twelve-mile limit of territorial waters

supported by the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, here, too, there
dispute.

it is

is

a possibility

of

Armistice Agreement

The foregoing

discussion has,

it

21

believed, indicated the necessity of

is

including in an armistice agreement specific and precise provisions with regard
to naval warfare, blockades, etc. It

the right direction has

should

also

have indicated that progress in

been made in recent years and

that care

on

the part of

the negotiators of future armistice agreements can quickly and simply eliminate

problem

the naval

source of irritation during the often uneasy period of

as a

armistice.

IV.

The

general armistice

centuries of use,

dynamic war convention which, despite

a living,

is

continuing in each decade to expand

still

is

Conclusion

increase the importance of

its

scope and to

among the agreements concerning the
The elaborate armistice agreements of

position

its

non-hostile relations of belligerents.

recent years have, in effect, rendered the preliminaries of peace obsolete.

It is

not inconceivable that the formal treaty of peace will suffer the same

and

wars will one day end

that

at

fate

the armistice table.
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normal scope of even
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modern
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general armistice
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an important war convention.
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55 American Journal

One

of the more

half-century

is

Surprisingly

has

(1961)

but inadequately recognized, developments

law of war which has occurred during the past

been written,

subject of the Protecting

Power and

Law 374

Power

with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power.

that

little

of International

significant,

in the field of the

the Protecting

especially in English, either

Power or on

on the general

the specific subject of the Protecting
1

relationship to the prisoner-of-war problem.

its

endeavor, to a necessarily limited extent, to

on

being placed
responsibility,

the

but

gradual,

fill

that void,

expansion

steady,

This

article will

with the emphasis
of the

authority,

and functions of the Protecting Power in safeguarding the welfare

of prisoners of war.

The term
which

Protecting

Power

is

comparatively simple of definition.

has accepted the responsibility of protecting the interests of another state

in the territory of a third, with which, for
state

It is a state

some

reason, such as war, the second

frequendy rendered to nationals of the protected
the former

is

is

most

found in the third

state,

Because the protection

does not maintain diplomatic relations.

state

often referred to as the Power of Origin and the latter as the Power

of Residence. For obvious reasons, in the case of prisoners of

which they

are held

And while

is

known

as

war

the Detaining Power rather than

may be

as

the state

by

the Power of

misnomer in the case of
certain prisoners of war, as, for example, those who were captured while serving
in the armed forces of a state other than their own, it will be used herein for
Residence.

lack of a

more

the term Power of Origin

appropriate term.

I.

The

a

earliest indication

of what

Historical

we now term

the Protecting

Power probably

appeared in the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century.
Curiously enough, in those early days protection of non-nationals came about,

not

as a result

of agreements reached with the Power of Residence by the Power

of Origin, but

as a result

of agreements reached with the Power of Residence

by the prospective Protecting Power

itself,

the latter having probably been

own prestige and influence
in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territories of the protected
primarily concerned with the resulting increase in

its

Levie on the

30

At

persons.

centuries

Law

of

War

that period the Protecting

remained, completely

it

conventional

Power

of custom and usage, with no

a creature

or functions. As

basis, definition,

was, and in the three succeeding

a result, the

extent of the activity

of Protecting Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to
different Protecting

The

Powers, within the same country.

passage of time

resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Protecting
in a particular case

from the Protecting Power

Power

Power of Origin, where

to the

more properly belonged. It also resulted in the concept of the Protecting
Power as an international institution becoming more and more firmly intrenched

it

in international

Power

law and practice. In

back

dates

present form, however, the Protecting

its

—and

than one century

less

its

codified form

is

of even more

recent vintage.

Most

modern

writers attribute the

genesis of the Protecting

developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian
that conflict, probably for the

by Protecting Powers

first

It

to

(1870-1871). In

of the belligerents were represented

enemy. England was charged with

Germany; and the United

States, Switzerland,

German States.
expansion of the functions of the Protecting Power during

Protecting Powers in France for the various

may be said that the

this conflict
its

as

all

in the territory of the

the protection of the French in

and Russia acted

time,

War

Power

was, in large measure, due to

enemy

course: that of expelling

two

practices

and

consuls;

which originated during
of imposing stringent

that

on enemy aliens. Unquestionably, each of these practices could and
did contribute to the need for the enlargement of the functions of the Protecting
restrictions

Power.

The
in

precedents established during the Franco-Prussian

most subsequent international

own

conflicts,

same

state acting as the

as its

.

as

Going to

had, however, their

(1894—1895) each side

Power and

War

as

the Protecting

so

we

find the

Power

Turkey

for

Power

for both

(1911-1912) and in the Sino-Soviet

the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish

the Protecting

adhered to

Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory

belligerents in the Italo-Turkish

(1929)

War

Protecting

of the other. Similarly, Germany acted

acted

many of which

peculiar aspects. Thus, in the Sino-Japanese

requested the United States to act

War were

War

War (1 897), Germany

in Greece, while three other nations,

England, France, and Russia, acted jointly for Greece in Turkey; in the

Spanish-American

War

(1898),

as

the Protecting

Power

while France and Austria-Hungary acted joindy for Spain

United

States,

during

this conflict that, for

States, specifically

prisoners of

England acted

the

time recorded,

a belligerent, the

(it

was

United

requested neutral inspection of installations within which

war were being

held);

France and Russia acted joindy
practice of using

first

for the

as

more than one

and during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)

the Protecting

Power

for

Montenegro. This

friendly state as a Protecting

Power

has since

Protecting
almost disappeared, although
as

at

one time during World War

II

Power
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Spain was acting

the Protecting Power for Japan in the continental United States, while

Sweden

acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American Samoa.

The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have been, at
least to some extent, an exception to what was fast becoming a firmly established
institution

United

of international law. Early in that conflict the British requested the

States to represent their interests

with the Boers. Apparently the consent

of the Boers was not sought and they not only

Power of their own,

but, for

all

failed to designate a Protecting

practical purposes, at

first

refused to recognize

the right of the United States consular representatives to act

Subsequendy the Boers did agree

British.

their territory to

perform certain

British prisoners of war,

England would have
Thus, to

there.

upon

specific

United

to permit the

on behalf of the
States consuls in

and limited functions with respect

to

the understanding that United States consuls in

similar privileges

with respect to Boer prisoners of war held

a limited degree, the institution

of the Protecting Power was

recognized even here.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) found the Protecting Powers once
again exercising the full powers which it had become customary to allot to them.
Perhaps

as a result

of the favorable experiences of the Sino-Japanese War,

immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities Japan requested the United States
to act

on

Protecting

its

behalf in Russia; while France was designated by Russia

Power

the Protecting

war.

And once again, but to an even greater
Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of

in Japan

extent than during the

as its

and Korea.

Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of

8

Thus

it

can readily be seen that

when World War

burst

I

upon Europe,

the

designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a firmly established
international custom, although the Protecting
to

be the subject of international

legislation.

four definite items of progress occurred:

Power

an institution had yet

as

During the course of that

first, it

was during World

conflict

War

I

that

public opinion in the belligerent countries achieved an understanding of how a
friendly neutral could represent, at times vigorously, an
its

nationals;

second, the use of the Protecting Power

the welfare of prisoners of war, although at
greatly

first

enemy

and

means of safeguarding
somewhat restricted, was later
as a

extended and received rather general acceptance;

when

belligerent

10

third, the practice

Power
itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor Protecting Power would be
11
designated to fill the vacuum;
and finally, the Protecting Power received legal
recognition in a number of international agreements entered into by various of
was adopted

that

a neutral

which had been acting
•

as a

Protecting
•

the belligerents during the course of the hostilities in which, to a surprising
extent,

its

functions were spelled out with

some degree of definiteness.
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precedents established during

I

were destined

the

Red

assigned

ICRC

the

to

ICRC), while
limited purposes, would

Cross (hereinafter referred to

contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for certain

have

to bear fruit.

of war convention prepared in 1921 by the International

draft prisoner

Committee of

World War

the

for

responsibility

the

as

establishing

mobile

commissions composed of neutrals charged with assuring that the belligerents

were complying with the convention. This proposal was probably due to two
factors: first, the failure of the states which had acted as Protecting Powers during

World War I adequately

to report their activities;

and second, the belief that the

duties involved in the effective protection of the rights

of prisoners of war would
1

"\

exceed the capacity of the diplomatic personnel of Protecting Powers.

However, when the Diplomatic Conference convened in Geneva in 1929 and
drafted the convention which subsequently received the ratification of the vast
majority of

states,

the

ICRC

proposal was not adopted and, instead, the basic

Power

principle of the Protecting

received general acceptance, the former

Protecting Powers taking the position that

was

activities

became
official

the

that

was needed

distinctly set out,

Prisoner of War Convention drafted

The

defined."

"be

that their role

all

and

to assure their

their task

clearly

Conference

at that

thus

international agreement negotiated in time of peace to give

first

recognition to the institution of the Protecting Power.

However,

it

new international concept. It did not make the use of the
Power by belligerents obligatory. It did not affect the relationships

did not create a

Protecting

which had previously

between the Power of Origin, the Protecting

existed

Power, and the Detaining Power.
status

which

it

It

did give the relationship a formal and agreed

had not previously had.

It

may

well be considered that the

provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting
the

most important advance contained

in that

Powers constituted

convention over the provisions

of the regulations relating to prisoners of war contained in the Annex to the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.
I

The

lessons learned during

World War

had not been forgotten.

The advent of World War

II

implementation and testing of
belligerents

this

all

too soon, an opportunity for the

novel international legislation. Most of the

were represented by Protecting Powers and,

Convention

the provisions of the 1929
helpful.

provided,

in general, these

found

relating to their activities extremely

True, the designation and functioning of Protecting Powers on behalf

of prisoners of war had previously become an almost universally accepted custom
in international law.

But

it is

necessary to bear in

mind

U.S.S.R. and Japan, neither of which nations was

Convention, there was either complete or substantial
1

of the Protecting Powers.
countries were parties to the

that, despite this, in the
a

party

to

failure in the

the

1929

functioning

o

In general, the fact that such a large

World War II

hostilities

had two

distinct

number of
but related

Power

Protecting

results.

In the

problem

no

first

place, not only did the absence

in the selection

large neutral

of strong neutrals present
it

also

world public opinion to be affected

convention, and the
a

of Protecting Powers, but

a

meant that there was
by violations of the

power of neutral public opinion in forcing compliance with

And

humanitarian convention cannot be overestimated.

because of the small

33

number of neutrals

in the second place,

available to act as Protecting

Powers,

it

frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated to act as the Protecting

Power for two opposing belligerents.
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and on August 12, 1949, just
four years after the final termination of World War II, a new Prisoner of War
Convention
Protecting

19

was signed in which,

Power are

had been the

identified

case in the

as

we

shall see,

the functions of the

and defined with even greater particularity than

1929 Convention.

Since that time the

Korea have occurred. At the outbreak of those

hostilities

hostilities in

General Douglas

commander of the United Nations Command, immediately
announced that his forces would comply with the humanitarian principles of
the 1949 Convention. In answer to a query made by the ICRC, the Foreign

MacArthur,

the

as

Minister of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message
to the Secretary General
"strictly

War."

forces

were

Unfortunately, the provisions of the convention relating to the

Power were

"strictly

provisions

From

abiding" so that, despite

were never implemented.

all

modern

Power began

efforts

Protecting

from 1870

to take form, particularly

problem of the prisoner of war; and
the form has

become

the

subject

the principles with

expended

which they

in this regard, those

22

the foregoing brief historical survey

that during the period

become

among

evidently not

only the precursors of the
itself;

its

abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of

Protecting

were

of the United Nations stating that

to

it is

apparent that prior to 1870

Power

existed,

and not the

1914 the concept of the Protecting

with respect to

its

relationship to the

that during the period subsequent to

definite, the institution

of numerous

latter

1914

of the Protecting Power having

bilateral

and

multilateral

international

agreements, culminating in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to which most of the
nations of the world are parties.

23
It

now becomes

appropriate to analyze the

form and the character which the Protecting Power received during

this

evolutionary process.
II.

The Modern Concept

A
As
least,

will

of the Protecting

Power

Designation

have been noted, Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the

somewhat vaguely worded:
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Law

The High Contracting
Convention

of

War

will find a guaranty in the possibility

of collaboration of the protecting

Powers charged with safeguarding the interests of belligerents

There

is

Power
as

nothing mandatory here. There

Convention reads quite

the conflict.

.

.

would appear

least a

.

.

.

no requirement here
it

of this

added.)

that a Protecting

be permitted to function

The comparable

differently. Article 8

(Italics

provision of the 1949

latter

convention provides:

present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of

the Protecting

It

is

actually be designated or that, if designated,

such by the Detaining Power.

The

of the present

Parties recognize that the regular application

Powers whose duty
.

(Italics

it is

to safeguard the interests

added.)

that the designation

of Protecting Powers has

moral obligation of the belligerent; and

Power has

a

that,

now become

once designated,

duty not only to the Power of Origin,

to the conflict, to

of the Parties to

a

at

Protecting

but also to the other parties

perform the functions which have been assigned to

it

by the

1949 Convention.

What
a

Protecting Power?

must,

It

term in international law.
advisable that

although

And,

of a

are the qualifications required

it

It

first

must

state

of all, be
also,

before

a state

it

may be

designated

as

within the meaning of that

of course, be

a neutral state

—and

it is

be one which can reasonably be expected to remain neutral,

become more and more difficult to assure.
must be a state which maintains diplomatic relations with both
state (the Power of Origin) and the state in which it is being

this latter qualification has

finally, it

the requesting

requested to operate (the Detaining Power).

How

become a Protecting Power? The belligerent state
desiring the services of a Protecting Power requests a neutral state which has the
qualifications listed above to act on its behalf. If the latter is willing to assume
does a

state actually

the functions of a Protecting Power,

then obtain from the Detaining

it

so notifies the requesting state.

Power permission

It

must

to function as the Protecting

Power

for the requesting state vis-a-vis and within the territory of the Detaining
27
Power.
In other words, the actual designation of the Protecting Power is based

upon

the request of the

Protecting

As

we

state has

Power and

have seen,

it

Power of Origin and

the consent of both the proposed

the Detaining Power.
has frequently occurred in the past that

been designated

as

the Protecting

Power

more than one

for a belligerent,

and there

is

nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general international law, to preclude

—

However, the advantages of the other extreme one and the same
are many. Even a small nation, when
Protecting Power for both belligerents
acting as the Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain
a general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis of
this practice.

—

:

Protecting

Switzerland acted
sides

of the

folic"

made

This was

reciprocity.

quite

Some of the

conflict.

World War

apparent during

Power for many of the

the Protecting

as
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when

II.

belligerents

on both

summed up

advantages of this situation are

protected

power

to entrust

interests in

its

obviously desirable for the

it is

another country to only one protecting

power, and in instances involving the protection of belligerent
advantages to

indicates that a

of enemy

same protecting power.

interests

more uniform

interests

interests there are

if both belligerents entrust their interests

concerned

all

territory to the

by both

.

.

.

in the othe

The expenence of World War

II

administration and a higher standard of treatment

belligerents result

from

a reciprocal

protection of the

of those belligerents bv the same protecting power throughout the

territories

under the control of each belligeren:

limited

number of states which would be

"

available

and competent

to act as

Protecting Powers in any future world conflagration would, in

all

almost automatically bring about

World War

The

delegates

at

possibility

be no Protecting Power."
in Article

this result, just as it

did during

probability,
II.

Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949

the

Convention foresaw the

'

of numerous situations in which there would

They attempted

to solve this

problem by providing

10 of the convention for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting

Powers.

It

must, however, be emphasized that the provisions of

should not be considered

continues to

exist.

A successor Protecting Power,

the original Protecting

Pro:e:~r:g

Power

Power within

governed by the same

become

has

" It

Power

as that

term

is

as

is

as

not

and

those

must

also

selecting either

Power of Origin
a "'substitute'
its

:

:

designation

is

which govern the
be emphasized that

under the provisions of Article 10

is

used generally in international law and

used specifically elsewhere in the 1949 Convention, but
organization performing

the

this article

necessitated, perhaps, because

of international law

a state or organization designated

long

Article 10,

designation of the original Protecting Power.

Protecting

as

a belligerent,

meaning of

the

rules

method of

affecting the basic

as

Protecting Power or successor Protecting Powers

a

as

5

For uniformity and simplicity of administration

The

Power

some or many of the functions

is

merely

not

as it is

a state

Article 8 of the

.

.

.

the Protecting

staff,

delegates

Personnel

1949 Convention provides
Powers may appoint,

from amongst

their

apart

that

from

own naaonals

or

allocated to Protecting

Powers by the convention.
B.

a

their diplomatic

and consular

or the nationals of other neutral

Levle on the
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Law

of

War

Powers. The said delegates

which they

It is

be subject to the approval of the Power with

shall

are to carry out their duties.

obvious that the convention has accorded to the Protecting Power two

sources of personnel for the execution of its functions:
officers stationed
its

nationals

We shall

diplomatic and consular

its

within the territory of the Detaining Power;

and other neutral nationals

discuss each

33

and others of

appointed for the purpose.

specifically

of these sources in turn.

The normal and natural source of personnel for the execution of the functions
of the Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and consular personnel
already assigned to and stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These
officials,

working under the ambassador,

the local officials, and, perhaps
the area of operations.

curtailed

upon

While any

most important, they

many of

the advent of

to

are already present within

these functions disappear or are seriously

war (commercial, immigration,

war of lengthy duration

large-scale

known

of course, true that they already have their usual

It is,

functions to perform; but

are experienced, they are

necessary for the Protecting

Power

to

undoubtedly make

will

supplement

its

tourists, etc.).
it

regular diplomatic and

consular staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be

numerous

instances in

functions with only

which the Protecting Power

its

normal complement of

Power makes

a

staff'

for

least

at

officials,

build-up of personnel

term "diplomatic and consular

be able to perform

its

some

number of prisoners of war held by

considerable period of time and until the
the Detaining

will

essential.

Of course,

the

includes not only those officials of the

Power who were already stationed within the territory of the
Detaining Power at the time of the designation of the Protecting Power, but
also any of its other diplomatic and consular personnel who may be sent to
Protecting

replace or supplement them.

With the heavy commitments which Switzerland had during World War II,
it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made even a pretense of
performing its far-flung responsibilities as a Protecting Power without a
considerable increase in

where

it

its staffs

had consented

Government

in the territories

to function.

prisoner-of-war camps and
the Detaining

Power with

who had

work

its

many Detaining Powers
purpose the Swiss

this

various affected embassies

the function of periodically visiting

areas to assure that there

was compliance by

the provisions of the 1929 Convention.

of the second source of personnel the use of which

Article 8 of the

the

accomplish

recruited in Switzerland and sent to

and legations "camp inspectors,"

typical

To

of the

1949 Convention

—

the non-career national

government of the Protecting Power

performing

its

functions.

He may

also

solely for the

is

This

is

authorized by

who

is

selected

purpose of assisting

it

by
in

be the national of another neutral, but

Power

Protecting
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Power would resort to this type of selection only when
it has exhausted its own manpower potential. Of course, a major source of
non-career personnel is to be found among the nationals of the Protecting Power
normally the Protecting

who

and of other neutral Powers

are residing within the territory

of the

when the use of additional personnel becomes necessary. The
Protecting Power may sometimes find it more convenient, when it has exhausted
Detaining Power

the

own

of its

list

Power,

nationals residing in the territory of the Detaining

to

use neutral nationals falling within this category before resorting to the policy
: :

recruiting

territory
It

own

its

nationals in

its

own

territory

and sending them

to the

of the Detaining Power.

will have

been noted

that these non-career, or auxiliary, personnel are

subject to the approval of the Detaining Power. This has occasioned considerable
discussion,

both

perceived to
Protecting

No

and since the Diplomatic Conference.

at

The

procedure.

this

Power

objection can be

diplomatic and consular personnel of the

stationed within the territory of the Detaining

have the normal approval of the
exequatur), required for

all

state to

which they

Power must

are accredited (agretnent,

such personnel, and any one of them may,

time, be declared persona non grata by that state, the Detaining Power.
finds himself in

...

it

The
to

The writer

complete accord with the statement that

appeared to be incompatible with international usage that the occasional,

auxiliary

more

any

at

and temporary

staff

recruited

by the Protecting Power should enjoy

favorable status than the usual diplomatic or consular

fear has

been expressed

staff.

Power might

that a Detaining

a

arbitrarily refuse

approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated by the Protecting Power

and thereby make

But

a

impossible for the latter properly to perform

it

Detaining Power so minded could

decline

grant

to

the

necessary

also,

agrement

and with equal

or exequatur to

its

functions.

ease, arbitrarily

replacement

or

supplementary diplomatic or consular personnel of the Protecting Power. Either

of these

acts

would

constitute a violation of the

convention. Until the contrary
that states parties to the

The

The

individuals

functions, be required to

country

at

within its

war must

territory.

afiirmatively established,

it

letter,

of the

must be assumed

just

been discussing

concerned

will,

in

is

on

from another

the performance

do considerable traveling within

institute controls

logical

a

country

at

of their
war.

Any

the right to enter into and to travel

To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Protecting

Power, even though

it

has

good reason not

to close one's eyes to the facts

Power must

not the

convention will carry out their obligations in good faith.

which we have

restriction

standpoint.

is

spirit, if

of life.

And

retain the right to declare

to trust the particular individual,

for this

is

same reason, the Detaining

members of the

staff

of the Protecting

Levie on the
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Power

Law

of

persona non grata,

War

whether the individual concerned has diplomatic,

consular, or auxiliary status.

Power engaged
in performing its functions in the territory of the Detaining Power have a triple
responsibility: to their own government; to the government of the Power of
Origin; and to the government of the Detaining Power.
If this is another way
It

has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting

of saying that these individuals must be completely neutral and unbiased,
correct.

It

would, however, be

less

it is

controversial to state, as did William Jennings

Bryan, that they are "representatives of a neutral power whose attitude toward
the parties to the conflict

is

one of impartial amity."
C. Functions

Unfortunately, with only a very few exceptions, the drafters of the 1949

Convention apparently found
detail the functions

form of duties of the Detaining Power or

Where

the prisoners of war.

a

problem

is

rights

precedent had previously been established,

forth in appropriate detail.

established, the

necessary to avoid any attempt to specify in

of the Protecting Power. Most frequently these functions

are expressed either in the

set

it

Where no

normally

left to

of

it is

precedent had previously been
ad hoc decision.

It

was probably

would be solved by the Protecting Power through
basic power guaranteed to it, that of surveillance to

anticipated that such problems

the exercise by

it

insure that there

of the
is,

at all times, full

convention. Should the Protecting

compliance with the provisions of the

Power

performance of some particular provision,
find a
is

means of procuring

a correction

ascertain that there
it is

is

a default in the

apparently assumed that

it

will

of the situation, even though such means

not specified.
Nevertheless,

Protecting

convention does contain repeated references to the

the

Power and

merely from such

a

function

a reference. It

may
is

usually be implied in a particular instance

difficult,

indeed, to categorize these varied

references to the Protecting Power. Extremely broad categories are required,

and even then not every function
successful efforts have

been made

to

will
list

fall

within them. Several not wholly

these references

on

a functional basis.

For the purposes of this discussion they will be considered under three general
categories:

powers and

duties; liaison functions;

and miscellaneous functions

(the

functions listed in each category do not purport to be all-inclusive).

(1)

Powers and Duties:

The

basic

Convention

which

and overriding power granted
is,

to the Protecting

of course, that contained in Article

states that the

convention

8, the

Power by

very

first

the 1949

sentence of

Power

Protecting

.

.

be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting

shall

.

Powers whose duty
This
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provision

been termed, and

has

of the Parties to the

to safeguard the interests

it is

rightlv

keystone

"the

so.

conflict.

of the

conventions.
Strangely enough, the only extended debate

which took place
proper word

this

extremely crucial

article

the Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the

at

of the Protecting Power, and that

to characterize the activities

debate occurred primarily

as a result

the Diplomatic Conference

at

on

of

difficulties

were agreed

of translation. The delegates

that the Protecting

Power could not

The idea which it was desired
Protecting Power would entitle it to

give orders or directives to the Detaining Power.
to

convey was

that the authority of the

whether the convention was being properlv applied and.

verify

suggest measures

on behalf of prisoners of war.

In the draft text the

Power" were used

'"under the supervision of the Protectmg

version and the words "sous

if necessary, to

x

in the English

controle des Puissances yrc:-cc:>:ccs" in the

le

words

French.

This was acceptable to the French-speaking delegates but was opposed by those

who were

English-speaking.

were

actually in

word

"controle'''

agreement and

in French

is

that the

of words to be used

as

a

that the

either "control" or "supervision"

delegations were given

choice of a

a

number

word "controle" and
42
word "scrutiny."

counterpart for the French

unammous agreement was ultimately reached on the
The importance of Article S may. perhaps, be found
generahty of its phrasing.

two groups

seeming dispute had arisen because the

much weaker than

The English-speaking

in English.

became apparent

eventually

It

The

fact that the entire

to

he in the very

convention "is

to

be "applied

with the cooperation" of the Protectmg Power undoubtedly empowers the latter
to

make

of the

suggestions to the Detaining

lot

reference

Power with

a

view

of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas
is

made

to the Protecting

specified types of offenses

of.

improvement

m which no specific

Power might
the Detaining Power that certain

Power. Thus,

suggest to. and seek to obtain the agreement

to the

a

Protecting

committed by prisoners of war be punished by

disciplinary rather than judicial measures,

even though Article S3 contains no

reference to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the convention

is

to

be applied "under the scrutiny" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers
it

to investigate

areas.

Thus,

a

complete report

and

to request reports

Protecting
as to

from the Detaining Power

Power might

seek from the

in unspecified

Detaimng Power

a

the reasons for delays in the delivery or dispatching of mail

or for the prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with
these subjects, contains

no mention of the Protecting Power;

seek a report from the Detaining
a

complaint made by

a

Power

as to

again,

it

might

the action taken with respect to

prisoner of war, through the Protecting Power, regarding

Levie on the
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War

the conditions of his captivity, even

though Article 78, which authorizes such

complaints, does not specifically provide for such a report.

Perhaps on only

a

slighdy lower level of importance than Article 8

is

126 which empowers the representatives of the Protecting Power to
places
visit

where

prisoners of war

may

who

are being transferred;

representatives without witnesses.
is

visits;

to

have access to

so patent as to

make any

Other powers and
example,

it is

The

to interview prisoners

and arrival

and

prisoners'

of these provisions

significant nature

discussion superfluous.

duties

of the Protecting Power

directed to lend

respect to the application

"

and

premises

all

prisoners are confined; to go to the place of departure, passage,

of prisoners

visit all

be, themselves selecting the places they will

and determining the frequency of the

where

Article

its

good

are,

indeed, varied. For

offices to assist in settling disputes

and interpretation of the convention

with

(Article 11);

it is

authorized to inspect the financial records of individual prisoners of war (Article
65);

may, in the

it

interests

reduce below the specified

of the prisoners, permit the Detaining Power

minimum

the

to

number of communications which

month by each prisoner (Article 71); it may, in the interests
of the prisoners, propose a limit on the number of packages which a prisoner
may receive (Article 72); it may itself take over the transport of capture cards,

may be

sent out each

mail, packages,

and

legal

Detaining Power from

documents, should military operations prevent the

fulfilling its obligations in this respect (Article 75); it has

an unrestricted right to receive complaints from individual prisoners and from
prisoners' representatives (Article 78);
disciplinary

punishments

prisoner against

(Article 96);

whom judicial

it

has the right to inspect the record of

and

it

has the duty to find counsel for a

proceedings have been instituted, and the right

to attend the trial (Article 105).

(2) Liaison Functions:

In

its

liaison capacity the Protecting

Power

is

actually

little

more than

a

means of relaying necessary communications
between the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin. Protecting Powers are,
conduit.

It

serves merely as the

not infrequently, the sole means readily available for the transmittal of messages

between the two

belligerents.

And, of course, while

a

great

functions are specifically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this

many
is

liaison

one area

in

which the Protecting Power may safely operate, even where the particular liaison
mission which it undertakes is not among those enumerated in the convention.
to

The Detaining Power is
the Power of Origin the

required to give to the Protecting

own

for relay

geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps

so that the prisoners will not, as has happened, accidentally

of their

Power

compatriots (Article 23).

The

become

the target

reasons for any limitations placed by

Power

Protecting
the Detaining

Power on

the

amount of funds made

war from advances of pay must be conveyed

41

available to a prisoner

to

of

the Protecting Power,

presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin (Article 60). The Detaining

Power must

advise the Protecting

the rate of daily

Power, for

working pay which

it

payments by prisoners of war to their

from the Detaining Power
Protecting

Power

relay to the

Power of Origin, of

has fixed (Article 62)

own

Transmittals of

country are made by notification

Power of Origin through

to the

.

the

medium of the

with respect to the

(Article 63). Notifications

status

of the

accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65) and of prisoners whose captivity has,
for

some

reason, such as escape, death, or other means, terminated (Article 66),

are also sent by the

Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the

medium

of the Protecting Power. Claims of prisoners for injury or disease arising out of
assigned

work

are similarly transmitted (Article 68). Information

the measures taken

by the Detaining Power

with respect to

to enable prisoners to

communicate

with the exterior must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the
Protecting

Power

And

(Article 69).

Power must be informed,

the Protecting

presumably for the information of the Power of Origin,

well

as

as for its

own,

of all offenses punishable by death under the laws of the Detaining Power (Article
100).

In several instances the convention provides for the exchange of information

between the

without specifying

belligerents

Unquestionably, these are areas in which,

would

feel qualified to intervene,

example,

Article

21

provides

as

how

belligerents as to their respective laws

be accomplished.

noted above, the Protecting Power

even though

for

this is to

it

has

no

specific

mandate. For

of information between

an exchange

and regulations on the subject of parole,

and Article 43 provides for an exchange of information with respect
titles

and

ranks, but neither

of these

articles states

how

the exchange

made. The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform
function; and

it

to military
is

to

be

this liaison

may be assumed that either the Detaining Powers would request

their services for this

purpose or the Protecting Powers would, themselves, offer

of the required information.

their services for the transmittal

(3) Miscellaneous Functions:

There

are a

number of

Convention which cannot

references to the Protecting

rightly

be designated

are likewise not precisely liaison functions.

and because, for the most
they are here considered

part,

as

they bear

transferred

in the

1949

powers or duties but which

For lack of a more descriptive term,

little

or no relationship to each other,

miscellaneous functions.

Thus, Article 12 provides that

war have been

as

Power

by the

if a

Detaining Power, to

original Detaining

Power,

whom
fails

prisoners of

to carry out the

Levie on the
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War
Power

provisions of the convention, the original Detaining
notified to that effect

by the Protecting Power, either take measures

to correct

And

Article 58

the situation or request the return of the prisoners concerned.
indicates,

without

upon being

will,

some time after the outbreak
Protecting Power will enter into an

specifically so providing, that

of hostilities the Detaining Power and the

arrangement relating to the possession of money by prisoners of war.
Again, Article 79 requires the Detaining

Power of

its

reasons therefor

prisoners' representative;

the Protecting

that the Protecting
it.

alone

as a

refuses to

is

Power

duly elected

a

to

inform

will take

when

it is

contemplated

the required information

in the exercise

is

given to

of the Protecting Power's

Power of Origin,

liaison

this action

Under its right to scrutinize the application
Protecting Power would probably, in an appropriate case,

little

of the convention, the

approve

there any indication of the action

matter of routine, be passed to the

would have

inform the Protecting

reasons for dismissing a prisoners' representative. In

While the information might,

function and

it

to

and Article 81 requires the Detaining Power

Power of its

neither of these articles

whenever

Power

significance.

take issue with the Detaining Power's action with respect to the non-approval

or the dismissal of a prisoners' representative.
Further, Article 121 provides that the Detaining

make

a full report to the

prisoner of

Protecting

war caused or suspected

that if guilt

is

it is

to

where the cause of death

Power

is

unknown;

will prosecute the responsible

Power of Origin; but

Power would, on

Detaining Power,

serious injury of a

be expected that the Protecting Power will forward

the report of the incident to the
the Protecting

and

have been caused by a sentry, another

to

indicated, the Detaining

persons. Certainly

shall investigate

Power of every death or

prisoner of war, or any other person, or

and

Power

if it felt that

its

own

initiative,

it is

equally certain that

make

demarches to the

the investigation had been inadequate or that a

prosecution indicated by the investigation had not taken place.
It is

believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few types of

provisions adequately establishes that the Protecting

which cannot

Power has

certain functions

exactly be fitted into either the category of powers or duties or

the category of liaison functions, and that these miscellaneous functions can

probably become whatever the particular Protecting

Power

desires

them

to be.

(4) Limitations:

Each of the four conventions drafted

at

the 1949 Diplomatic Conference

War Convention. 45
(Prisoner of War and Civilian

contains an article similar to Article 8 of the Prisoner of

However,

in the

Third and Fourth Conventions

Conventions, respectively) the Protecting Powers are merely admonished to
"take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they

Protecting

—

Forces in the Field

Sick and Shipwrecked

"Red

the

Cross Convention"

at Sea, respectively),

when

between the two

pairs

of conventions was

drafting of the conventions

on

who

of war,

Power

rendered necessary by

is

is

drawn

the distinction

fully appreciated at the

by the convention

time of the

While

spirited debate.

plainly a victory for those

in the performance of its functions with respect to prisoners

remains to be seen whether

it

Assuming
temporary"

that the Detaining

restrictions

restrictions

on

states to exist,

visits

Power

whether or not

There

illogical to

is

was

desires to

made

actually attained.

impose the "exceptional and

of the Protecting Power which are authorized

the activities of the Protecting

the decision to be

fact, exist?

on

this result

1949 Convention, or the right

in Article 126 of the

be

be restricted "as

sought to exclude the possibility of any shackles being placed on the

Protecting

is

this

and was the occasion for some

face the solution reached

its

may

activities

The importance of

imperative inilitary necessities."

—and Wounded,

not only are they so admonished,

but they are told in an oblique fashion that their
an exceptional and temporary measure

43

and Second (Wounded and Sick of

carry out their duties," while in the First

Armed

Power

to the

even more extensive

Power which

specified in the convention,

as to

is

asserted

how

whether "imperative military

made by

the

whom

and by

necessities" do, in

would
Detaining Power

one school of thought which takes the position

permit the determination to be

by some

that

it

would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the
48
Protecting Power can validly make such a determination.
While, from a strictly
itself,

as it

humanitarian point of view, there
cannot,

deems

as a practical

it

essential to

out of an area,

compelling

much

matter, be justified.

lest military

impending

unquestionably
reciprocal

matter which

a

actions

for example, the Detaining

Power

Power what and why

it

little

was

whether imperative military

restriction

will,

would be

was

itself

the line

is

to

be drawn.

multifold operations of the

this article.

However, inasmuch

those of the

ICRC

doing

This

is

of events and through

inasmuch

as

time and
as to

49

D. Relationship to the

The

logic

necessities

really justified.

in the course

of the belligerents, adjust

so

experience will very quickly result in an informal mutual appreciation

where

it

therein inadvertendy lead to the

military actions, there

and whether the

existed

be said in favor of this position,

movements noted

in order to permit the latter to determine
actually

If,

to advise the Protecting

it

to

keep representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily

disclosure of important
in

is

as

ICRC

ICRC

are obviously not within the scope

the functions of the Protecting

often overlap insofar as prisoners of

appears appropriate to mention, at least briefly,

war

of

Power and

are concerned,

some of the overlapping

areas.

it

44
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The

War

of

basic safeguard to the activities

the 1949 Convention,

The

which

which the

activities

contained in Article 9 of

specifies:

Convention

provisions of the present

humanitarian

ICRC is

of the

constitute

no

obstacle to the

Committee of the Red Cross or

International

any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the
Parties to the conflict

and for

Despite

their relief.

provision in Article 88 of the 1929 Convention,

a substantially similar

ICRC

the

concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war

World War II,
of some belligerents

found, during

overcome the

feeling

that
that

it
it

was,

was attempting

the functions of the Protecting Powers. Apparently

them

that such

was not the

has already

It

necessary to

at times,

it

to duplicate

succeeded in convincing

case.

been pointed out

of the 1949 Convention

that Article 10

Powers

contains provisions for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting

under certain circumstances. The third paragraph of Article 10 provides
failing

.

.

.

such

a "substitute," the

Detaining Power

that,

or accept

shall request

the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International

Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed
by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.

It

must be emphasized

that

when

the

and

so as a humanitarian organization
definition,

In a

cannot be, inasmuch

it

number of areas

the Protecting Power.
its

ICRC

is

upon to serve, it does
Protecting Power which, by

thus called

not as a

as it is

not

a state.

the convention places the

As we have

ICRC

seen, Article 126

is

on the same plane

as

of major importance in

Power to go wherever prisoners of war
specifies that "The delegates of the International

grant of authority to the Protecting

are located.
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'

That

Committee of
parallel

is

article also

Red

the

Cross

enjoy the same prerogatives."

be found in Article 56 dealing with the locations

to

And

labor detachments.

it is

along with the Protecting

among

shall

not surprising that

Power in

Articles

we

find the

of,

A

and

ICRC

72 and 75, for these two

similar

visits to,

referred to
articles are

those relating to individual and collective relief shipments, a subject of

particular interest to the

an unchallengeable
conflicts.

ICRC

and one with respect

expertise as a result

to

which

it

has developed

of experience gained in innumerable

Most Protecting Powers would probably be more than

permit the

ICRC

to

pre-empt the handling of

this difficult

willing to

and complicated

function.
Articles

with the

79 and 81 authorize the prisoners' representatives

ICRC

as

well

as

to

communicate

the Protecting Power. Here, however,

it is

believed

Protecting

purpose of each such authorization to communicate

that the

The

different.

World War

The

I.

War

(1870—1871) and became

function for which

was

it

45

fundamentally

creation of the position of prisoners' representative

suggested during the Franco-Prussian

during

is

Power

was

first

a reality

originally created

was

to

However, over the course of time, the
functions of the prisoners' representatives have been greatly expanded, and
during World War II it was not unusual to find them involved in practically all
receive and distribute relief packages.

of the problems of a prisoner-of-war camp. Thus, they were frequently used by
the prisoners

the channel for the transmittal of complaints both to the

as

The

Detaining Power and to the Protecting Power.

Convention were

fully

aware of this development,

which they took were intended
of the

ICRC

Power on

on problems

this subject as

the prisoners' representative

probably

It is

to

as

is

on

now

safe to state that,

it

between

their

be extremely

in assisting
to

it. It

and with the Protecting

the myriad of other problems into

which

projected.

ICRC is not always as clearly

are such that conflicts

between them would

Conclusion

tremendous advances made in the concept of the

Power as an instrument of international law, both in the role which
upon to play and in the prestige which it enjoys and which goes far
it

to

perform the numerous functions which have

now been assigned

appears unquestionable that:

The presence of the
a

delegates

rare.

past century has seen

called

accorded to the

while the allocation of functions by the 1949

methods of operation

III.

it is

that the steps

might have been, the fundamental differences between the two and

stated as

Protecting

of the 1949

communicate with the

Convention between the Protecting Power and the

The

and it appears

relating to relief shipments

well

drafters

to insure that the privileges

would permit him

prisoners' representative
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Protecting Powers today remains the sole means of putting

brake on the excesses of Detaining Powers, the sole element of moderation and

of morality in the treatment of enemy persons, their belongings, and their interests:
this

was noted and affirmed many times

The

Geneva.

at

57

of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference reveal clearly that the nations

results

of the world were generally prepared to accept
the Protecting Power.

It

was conceded

a

a solid basis for the activities

mission of close observation of the

application of the provisions of the Prisoner of War

Conference,

a

and

to report

Convention drafted

mission which necessarily incorporates within

the attention of the Detaining

any such

failure

Power any

of

failure

it

at that

a right to call to

of performance which

of performance to the Power of Origin;

it

finds

a sizeable
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expansion was made in

of

its

made for
of war would

War

functions and, correlatively, in

provision was

substitutes for Protecting

prisoners

at all

Powers

power and authority;

in order to insure that

times benefit from the exercise of the functions of

the Protecting Power, thus correcting the situation

frequendy during World

its

War

and the use of the

II;

Power was extended not only

to the

Red

which had

institution

arisen

all

too

of the Protecting

Cross Convention

(Wounded and

Sick of Armed Forces in the Field), but also to the convention

which adapts the
Red Cross Convention to maritime warfare (Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
These few examples
at Sea), and to the completely new Civilian Convention.
alone demonstrate the great distance which has been traversed since 1907, when
the prisoner-of-war provisions of the Regulations Respecting the

Laws and

Customs of War on Land were drafted at The Hague and contained no reference
whatsoever to the Protecting Power.
In

many

respects the provisions

the Protecting

Power

of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating

to

represent compromises. Positions reached solely in order

to bring

about agreement between opposing viewpoints can rarely be considered

perfect

and the present case

is

no exception. However, these provisions

unquestionably represent a great step forward in the evolution of international

law and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement by those
the

first

Red

Cross Convention in 1864 or even by those

of the Protecting Powers

as

recendy

as in

1914,

at

who

who

acted

drafted

on behalf

the beginning of World

War
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I.

The
law.

Protecting

It is

Power is now

a generally

accepted institution of international

the subject of international agreements to

the world are parties.

There

which most of the

are clear indications that

it

has

balance and not been found wanting, with the result that
future will continue to be, requested to assume

behalf of states

at

it

states

been weighed

of

in the

has been, and in the

numerous new functions on

war.

Notes
1

.

A

fairly

complete contemporary bibliography of published items would consist of the following:

[Franklin, Protection of Foreign Interests (1946);Janner, La Puissance Protectrice en Droit International (1948;
originally published in
originally published

German); Siordet, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: The Question of Scrutiny (1953;
French); and De la Pradelle, "Le Controle de l'Application des Conventions

in

Humanitaires en cas de Conflit arme," in 2 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 343 (1956). The subject
of course, dealt with, but in a more limited fashion, in the various general treatises and articles on the 1949
Geneva Conventions such as De la Pradelle, La Conference Diplomatique et les Nouvelles Conventions de
Geneve du 12 aout 1949 (1951); Yingling and Ginnane, "The Geneva Conventions of 1949," in 46 A.J.I.L.
393 (1952); (Kunz, "The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949," in Law and Polities in the World
Community 279 (Lipsky, 1953); and Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred to as Commentary) (1960). Modern texts on international
law do litde more than paraphrase the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. See, for example, 2 Oppenheim
(Lauterpacht), International Law 374-376 and 386 (7th ed., 1952), and Stone, Legal Controls of International
Conflict 655, 658, 661, and 666 (1954). Many slightly older texts do not even include the term "Protecting
Power" in their indices. See, for example, 2 Oppenheim (McNair), International Law (4th ed., 1926), and
is,

Protecting
Wheaton

(Phillipson), International

not indicate

a

Law

(5th ed., 1916).

Power

47

to be hoped that this paucity of material does
condemned by Kunz a decade ago. Kunz, "The

It is

continuation of the neglect of the law of war

Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their Revision," in 45 A.J.I.L. 37 (1951).
2. A state is frequently called upon to represent certain specified interests of another state in the territory

of

a third,

even though normal, peaceful

relations exist

States was, in varying degrees, representing

Sendee Manual, Vol.

2,

Consular

some 25

Affairs, pars.

between the two latter. Thus, in 1955 the United
some 80 other states (United States Foreign

states in

923.31-925.32. July 13, 1955). This peacetime practice

unquestionably played an important part in the historical development of the present-day wartime concept of

The

the Protecting Power.

Protecting Power, which

the protecting state exercising powers over
3.

had occurred

Isolated instances of this practice

is

must not be confused with

the subject of this article,

protectorate.

a

earlier.

we find that in the

Thus, for example,

thirteenth

century the Venetian Resident in Constantinople was charged with the protection of Armenians and Jews.

Power has been attributed to a combination of three older institutions of
employment of foreigners as diplomatic and consular agents; and the
use of personal good offices. Franklin, op. tit. 7. It is doubtful that the concept of the Protecting Power as it
first appeared in the Turkish Capitulations had any more direct progenitor.
The appearance of

the Protecting

international law: extra-territorialiry; the

4.

Franklin, op.

tit.

29 and 39; Eroglu. La Representation Internationale en vue de Proteger

des Belligerants 10-12 (unpublished thesis (1949) graciously furnished to the writer

of Law of me Umversite de Neuchitel
in

most of the
5.

Franklin, op.

tit.

detailed information concerning the designation of Protecting P ewers

6.

Flory, Prisoners of

Franklin, op.

8.

Eroglu, op.

tit.

in this excellent srudy at pp. 10-29.

29.

7.

tit.

;

mentioned herein may be found

conflicts

War

107-108 (1942).

68.

23-24; Franklin,

Vice Consul was inspecting

op.

tit.

prisoner-of-war

a

The latter states that on one occasion when an American
camp he was permitted to sample the meal which was then

78-79.

being given to the Japanese prisoners of war. In view of

comprehend why

the 1899 and the 1907

Russia, while codifying

many customary

Siordet, op.

likewise saw
attention

tit.

them held

7.

World War

I

all

these precedents,

it is

particularly difficult to

Hague Conferences, both of which were sponsored by
rules

silence of previous international conventions
9.

les Interets

by the Dean of the Faculty

the Tsar of

concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. continued the

with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power.

saw more

men

taken prisoner than in any previous conflict; and

it

Both of these factors had the effect of focusing
situation which led to the more general public acceptance

in captivity for a longer period of time.

on prisoners of war.

It

was undoubtedly

this

of the idea of a wider use of the Protecting Power in the

interests

of prisoners of war.

Pictet,

Commentary

93-94.
10. Strangely enough, Germany, which had frequently acted as a Protecting Power, and the United States,
which had not only frequently acted as a Protecting Power, but was probably the protagonist of the extension
of the functions of the Protecting Power with respect to prisoners of war during the period prior to its own
entry into World War I, were the two most important belligerents to resist the activities of Protecting Powers.
At the beginning of the war Germany instituted rigid restrictions on visits by neutrals to its prisoner-of-war
camps. By 1916 these restrictions had, due largely to the efforts of the United States, for the most part
disappeared. Yet when the United States became a belligerent in 1917, the then Secretary of War took the
position that Germany had no right to designate the Swiss to inspect American prisoner-of-war camps unless
under treaty law. His position was apparently overruled by President Wilson and members of the Swiss Foreign
Service were permitted to make such inspections. Flory, op tit. 108-109.

27-28.

11.

Eroglu,

12.

For example, Art. VIII of the Final Act of the Conference of Copenhagen of Nov.

op.

tit.

2.

1917 (photostatic

copy on file in The Army Library. Washington. D.C.), to which Austria-Hungary, Germany, Rumania
Russia were the belligerent parties, dealt with "Arrangements concerning the Admission of the Delegates of
the Protecting

Power ... on

the Basis of Reciprocity";

An. XI of the Agreement between the British and
at Bern on Dec. 28, 1917 (111

Turkish Governments respecting Prisoners of War and Civilians, executed
Brit,

and For. State Papers 557-568),

dealt

with the subject of visits to prisoner-of-war camps by "representatives

of the Protecting Powers"; and the Agreement between the United

Concerning Prisoners of War, Sanitary Personnel, and
A.J.I.L.

Supp.

1

(1919); Foreign Relations of the

Civilians,

United

States.

of America and Germany
Bern on Nov. 11, 1918 (13

States

executed

at

1918, Supp.

2, p.

103), contains references

Power in no less than 25 separate paragraphs.
13. Rasmussen, Code des Pnsonniers de Guerre 56 (1931).
14. Siordet, op. tit. 12. Twenty years and one World War later, we again find them urging that the
Protecting Power be given the benefit of "well-defined and precise provisions." Final Record of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as Final Record), Vol. II B. p. 19.

to the Protecting
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of

War

The 1929 Geneva Convention

15.

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred

1929 Convention), 47 Stat. 2021; Treaty Series, No. 846: 27 AJ.I.L. Supp. 59 (1933). It is interesting
to note that the companion convention drafted at the same Diplomatic Conference, The Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (better known as the
to as the

Red

Cross Convention), 47 Stat. 2074; Treaty Series, No. 847; 27 AJ.I.L. Supp. 43 (1933), a
of the 1864 and 1906 Geneva Red Cross Conventions, continued to contain no reference
to Protecting Powers, a situation which was only remedied 20 years later, after World War II.

1929 Geneva

direct descendant

16.

86 of the 1929 Convention reads

Art.

"The High Contracting
a

as

follows:

of the present Convention will find

Parties recognize that the regular application

guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting Powers charged with safeguarding the interests

of belligerents; in

from among

this respect,

own

their

Powers may, besides their diplomatic personnel, appoint delegates
from among the nationals of other neutral Powers. These delegates must

the protecting

nationals or

be subject to the approval of the belligerent near which they exercise their mission.
"Representatives of the protecting

Power or

its

accepted delegates

without exception, where prisoners of war are interned. They
prisoners and

may

interview them,

"Belligerents shall so far

as a

shall

shall

be permitted to go any place,

have access to

all

by

places occupied

general rule without witnesses, personally or through interpreters.

possible facilitate the task of representatives or accepted delegates of the

as

The military authorities shall be informed of their visit.
may come to an agreement to allow persons of the same

protecting Power.
"Belligerents

permitted to take part in inspection
In addition, the Protecting

nationality as the prisoners to be

trips."

Powers were

specifically given

such functions

as:

receiving complaints from

prisoners of war (Art. 42); conferring with the representatives ("agents") of prisoners of war (Arts. 43

and

44);

who were subjected to judicial prosecutions were adequately protected (Arts.

and assuring that prisoners of war

60, 62, 65, and 66). Evidence that the drafters of the convention

perpetuate an existing status, and not to create

a

new

one,

is

were attempting merely

found

to formalize

in the use in relation to the exercise

and

of its

Power of such terms as "mediation" (Art. 31) and "good offices" (Art. 87).
Ch. 2 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War

functions by the Protecting
17.

on Land, 36
18.

Annex

Stat.

2277; Treaty Series, No. 539; 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 90 (1909).

The U.S.S.R. took
to which,

it

the position that, as

asserted,

covered

"all

the

it was a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the
main questions of the regime of captivity" (but not, as has

previously been pointed out in note 8 above, the question of the designation or functions of the Protecting

Powers), there was no need for

to consider an Italian proposal to apply reciprocally the provisions

it

1929 Convention (Report of the International Committee of the

World War
this

(hereinafter referred to as

Convention

ICRC Report), Vol.

mutatis mutandis, to

permitted to function in

all

prisoners of

a result

war were deprived of the

Germany denied

(ibid.

Whilejapan

stated

its

443), the Protecting

intention to "apply

Powers were never

manner of functioning

their

in the territories"

of the foregoing, and of the disappearance of many Powers of

ICRC

Origin during the course of hostilities, the
prisoners of

war"

Red Cross on its Activities during the Second

p. 412).

manner even remotely resembling

a

of most of the other belligerents. As

all

I,

of the

estimates that during

services

of

a

World War

Protecting Power.

the status of states to Poland, Yugoslavia, France and

De

la

Belgium

II

approximately

(after the

70%

of

cit.

226. Thus,

1940

armistices),

Pradelle, op.

Free France, and Italy (after Mussolini's overthrow in 1943), and refused to permit the intervention of

Protecting Powers

to

(1953).
a

on behalf of

their captured personnel. Pictet,

"La Croix-Rouge

et les

Conventions de

76 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 5, 87 (1950, I).
19. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred
as the 1949 Convention), 6 U.S. Treaties 3316; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135 (I: 972); 47 AJ.I.L. Supp. 119

Geneve,"

in

There were signed, on the same day, three other conventions

prisoner-of-war convention, references were

Geneva Convention

for the Amelioration

1929

Field (the successor to the

75 U.N. Treaty Series 31
the Condition of the

(I:

Red

made

3217; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 85

of the Condition of the

Sick and Shipwrecked
(I:

which, for the

time in other than

Wounded and Sick in Armed

Geneva Convention

Members of Armed

971); and Art. 9 and others of the 1949

the Protection of Civilian Persons in

first

and others of the 1949
Forces in the

Cross Convention mentioned in note 15 above), 6 U.S. Treaties 3114;

970); Art. 8 and others of the 1949

Wounded,

in

to Protecting Powers: Art. 8

Time of War,

6 U.

Forces

for the
at

Amelioration of

Sea, 6 U.S. Treaties

Geneva Convention Relative

to

75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (I: 973);
undoubtedly prove of major importance in extending
S.

Treaties 3516;

50 AJ.I.L Supp. 724 (1956). This latter convention will
the functions of the Protecting Power in any future international conflict.
20. References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of its 132 substantive

articles (4, 8, 10, 11,

12, 23, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 96, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108,

120, 121, 122, 126, and 128) as well as in

contained in Art.

8,

which

reads:

two of its Annexes The

basic charter for the Protecting

Power

is

Protecting

Power

49

"The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting
Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals
or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
"The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the representatives or
delegates of the Protecting Powers.
"The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their mission under
the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative necessities of security of the
State wherein they carry out their duties."
21. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et le Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents, Vol. I,
p.

16 (1952).

22. The UN. Command permitted the ICRC to perform its usual functions with respect to the
Communist prisoners of war held by the UNC. Pictet, Commentary 546. As we shall see many of these
functions parallel, or may be substituted for, those of a Protecting Power. Unfortunately, all efforts of the

ICRC
in

to act north

Korea 33-34

Up

of the batde

line

(British Ministry

were repulsed by the Communists. Treatment of British Prisoners of War

of Defence, 1955).

end of 1959 there had been 77 ratifications of, and accessions to, these conventions.
Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report, 1959, at p. 45 (1959). These include all of the
more important Powers except Canada and the Republic of China. The use of the institution of the Protecting
Power has since been resorted to in the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague on May 14, 1954 (249 U.N. Treaty Series 215 (I: 3511)), where it is
adopted as a means of overseeing the protection of inanimate objects which is, actually, merely a variation
of the protection furnished historically by the Protecting Power, a very large part of its energies having once
been directed towards the protection of the embassy buildings and diplomatic archives of the Protected Power.
24. As was aptly stated by one author: "What happened was that an existing usage was taken, and
transformed into a regulation. It was the organ which created the function." Siordet, op. cit. 3.
25. It must at all times be borne in mind that the Protecting Power is not a general agent of the Power of
Origin. In his book, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (1954), Castren defines the over-all relationship
between these two Powers as follows (at p. 92):
"The protecting Power does not act in its own name but rather as a kind of caretaker or intermediary.
Nevertheless, it acts independently in so far as the State whose interests it protects cannot demand, but only
request, it to perform certain services, and the protecting Power itself decides the way in which it discharges
its mission. Nor may a belligerent give instructions to those organs of the protecting Power which carry out
this mission. Instead, requests to the protecting Power have to be made through diplomatic channels. The
protecting Power may refuse to act when compliance with a request would be contrary to its own interests
23.

to the

International

—

or infringe the lawful right of the

enemy

State."

Power is no longer optional but is now "quasi
("De l'Application et du Controle des Conventions de Geneve de 1949," in 1956 Revue
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 464, 468); that it is now put in the "imperative form" (The Geneva
Conventions of 1949: The Question of Scrutiny 36); and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power
26. Siordet states that the designation of a Protecting

obligatoire"

no longer the special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the Contracting
Convention" (ibid.).
27. This is the step which the United States apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform
the functions of the Protecting Power for Great Britain during the Boer War. See discussion above.
28. The 1 949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the qualifications of a Protecting Power,
the method of designation, etc., leaving these problems for setdement under general international law.
Heckenroth, Les Puissances Protectrices et les Conventions de Geneve 62 and 224 (unpublished thesis,
Universite d'Aix-Marseille, 1951). This solution will work until one belligerent arbitrarily elects to deny its
consent to every neutral nominated by its enemy. In the light of the adamant refusal of the U.S.S.R. to permit
any type of inspection to take place on its territory during peacetime, it seems unlikely that such activity would
be permitted in time of war, even though the U.S.S.R. participated actively in the drafting of the 1949 Geneva
is

Parties to the

Conventions and has
29.

Franklin, op.

ratified
cit.

them,

164-165.

as

have

all

of its

satellites,

A similar conclusion

is

without any reservations

reached in Pictet,

as to Art. 8.

Commentary 95-96, wherein

this

statement appears:
"It

became more and more

common

authority,

and incidentally altered

belligerents,

it

became not

so

much

Powers to find themselves responsible for
one and the same time. This gave them additional

for these neutral

representing the respective interests of two opposing Parties
their role; for

once

a

at

Power

represented the interests of

two opposing

common

agent of both,

the special representative of each of them,

as

the

or

Law

Levie on the

50

of

kind of umpire. This enabled

a

it

War
to bring directly into play that powerful instrument, the

improvements desired."
In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 34 belligerents, and

argument of

reciprocity, to obtain the

belligerents in the territory of each other. Eroglu, op.

cases

it

represented opposing

For some of these possible situations see Siordet, op. cit. 49-53; and Heckenroth, op. cit. 229-236.
strongly urged that a provision be included in the 1949 Convention setting

30.

The French Delegation

31.

up an international body
Record, Vol.
2 adopted

no

many

in

144-148.

cit.

II

B, p. 27;

perform the functions of Protecting Powers

to

ibid.,

Vol.

Ill,

The

pp. 30-31).

by the Diplomatic Conference

Vol.

(ibid.,

I,

361), but, as far

p.

original

French proposal and the adoption of the resolution,

consider

this

question or to create such

a

The U.S.S.R. opposed both

stating as to the latter that

32.

at

it

"sees

body, since the problem of the Protecting Powers has been

solved by the Conventions established in the present Conference." Declaration
the U.S.S.R.

latter (Final

the writer has been able to ascertain,

as

have been taken, or are contemplated, to implement the resolution.

steps

of the

in the absence

substance of this proposal was included in Resolution

the time of the signing of the conventions.

Ibid.,

Vol.

I.

made by

the

no need

to

satisfactorily

the Delegation of

201.

n.

Commentary 117-118. All of the Communist countries (and Portugal) made reservations to
would not recognize as legal "requests by the Detaining Power to a neutral State

Pictet,

Art. 10 to the effect that they

or to

humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions performed by

a

a

Protecting Power, unless the

consent of the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war are nationals
there

and

a

is

its

not unnatural tendency to view with suspicion

the right to

make

the selection itself in the

by Soviet representatives Morosov
it clear that they merely desired to

Power

the Protecting

there should have

appears to have

first

place!

And the

Record, Vol.

(Final

II

dispute.

to act

statements

there

on

made

at

its

an existing Power of

is

behalf essential, but

it

has

the Diplomatic Conference

of the Detaining Power to

(ibid., p.

347)

make

select a substitute for

—

Power of Origin a limitation as to which
by overruling the Soviet thesis the Diplomatic
Detaining Power may, on its own, select and designate a

where there is no
It is to be hoped

establish the proposition that a

a valid basis. If

Power

B, pp. 29 and 351) and Sokirkin

limit specifically the right

to those cases

been no

Conference did not

it

consent to the designation of a Protecting

is its

obtained." While

example, Brockhaus, "Sowjetunion und Genfer Kriegsgefangenen-Konvention von

satellites (see, for

1949," 2 Ost-Europa Recht 286, 291 (1956)),
Origin, not only

is

position taken almost uniquely by the U.S.S.R.

this

existing

that

Power even though there is a Power of Origin in being.
1929 Convention nor the working (Stockholm) draft used at the Diplomatic Conference
includes the term "consular" in specifying the authorized representatives of the Protecting Power. The
authorization for the Protecting Power to use this category of personnel as representatives was proposed by

substitute for a Protecting

33. Neither the

Australia

and was unanimously approved. Final Record, Vol.

34. Janner, op.

35. Siordet, op.

cit.

would have required

II

B,

p. 58.

52.

cit.

21.

A provision of the working (Stockholm)

the Detaining

Power to

draft

of a non-career individual by the Protecting Power. Final Record, Vol.
lacking in logic, since

of a

at

the Diplomatic Conference

I,

p. 13.

This proposal was equally

need give no reasons for refusing to agree to the assignment to

a

post in

its

territory

of the diplomatic or consular service of the Protecting Power or for declaring such an individual

member

persona non grata.

36.

a state

used

give "serious grounds" for any refusal to approve the nomination

De la

The

provision was deleted

Pradelle,

"Le Controle de

1

at

Geneva.

Vol. II B, pp. 58 and 110.
Conventions Humanitaires en cas de Conflit arme,"

Ibid.,

'application des

2 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 343, 344 (1956).
37. Letter of Instructions of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, dated Aug. 17, 1914 (9 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 118 (1915)). See also, Franklin, Op. cit. 114; United States Foreign Service Manual, Vol. 2, Consular

in

924.1 and 931.

Affairs, pars.

38. "It
to

is

not the function of the Protecting Power to

comment,

to

make

command or to overrule;

unscrupulous belligerent, the presence of the Protecting Power and the

examine what

is

going on and to observe

is

p.

ability

the only preventive measure

Quentin-Baxter, representative of New Zealand,
B,

it is its

representations, and to send reports to the outside world. If

at

function to observe,

we

are faced

with an

of the Protecting Power to

which we have." Statement of

the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, Final Record, Vol.

II

344.

39. Thus, Heckenroth, op.

cit.

135, and Janner, op.

functions of the Protecting Power, but the
functional listing appears in Pictet,

lists

cit.

52, have each listed seven separate categories of

coincide with respect to only four functions!

Still a

third

Commentary 98-99.

40. Yingling and Ginnane loc. cit. 397. In the British Army Manual of Military Law (Part III, The Law
of War on Land, 1958) 92, the Protecting Power is termed "the principal organ, apart from the Contracting
Parties themselves, for ensuring the observance of the Convention." Part III of the Manual was largely the

work of the
41.

Hersch Lauterpacht.
Record, Vol. II B, p. 110.

late Sir

Final

Protecting
42.

Ibid.; Siordet, op.

43.

The

51

24-25.

cit.

of visitation granted by Art. 126

right

Power

reiterated in Arts.

is

56 (labor detachments), 98 (prisoners

undergoing disciplinary punishment), and 108 (prisoners undergoing judicial punishment).

Commentary

44.

Pictet,

45.

See note 19 above.

46.

A similar restriction

where prisoners of war may

571.

is

contained in Art. 126 of the 1949 Convention with respect to

be. This

of the Protecting Power to be

activities

important one,

not believed that

it is

except in very rare cases, such

as

a

which the 1949 Convention
by the Detaining Power. While

the only area in

is

restricted

visits to

it

is,

of course,

Detaining Power could really justify the imposition of such

prohibiting

visits

places

specifically permits the
a

very

a restriction

to extremely forward collecting points during the actual

course of an attack.

The proponents of the

47.

and reasonable
restricted,

rules

"but that

what
after

a

effect

may be

even without such

a

between the two

Power

Protecting

is

of conventions argued that

pairs

and on the

in sea warfare

is

a restrictive limitation in

the

occasioned by the

fact that the

the convention,

would

Geneva Convention

it

Even

there

of

II

battle

B, p. 344.

The

U.S.S.R. took the position

exist in fact. Ibid. 345.

for the Amelioration

Sick of Armed Forces in the Field 101 (1952).

was "obvious

it

must be
which animates those

field

the presence of the Protecting Power." Final Record, Vol.

apparent in the text

Commentary on

48. Pictet,

Wounded and

of

the Prisoner of War and Civilian Conventions" "the vital force

as to

and gives them

pessimism which
that,

distinction

that the activities

it is

of the Condition of the

admitted that "this

is

precisely

Power] would, in such a case, be debarred from doing. It will only be possible to show
the event whether or not the restriction was justified." In Pictet, Commentary, published 8 years later,
[the Protecting

it

much more

realistic

approach

is

taken

(at p.

611):

"If they are to justify the prohibition of visits, military necessities must be imperative.

or not

Powers

matter for the Detaining

a

is

is

restricted

by

this

Power

Whether they

are

alone to decide and the right of supervision of the Protecting

Such

exercise of sovereignty.

a decision

must not be

lightly taken,

however, and

any prohibition of visits must be an exceptional measure."
In Pictet, Commentary, he. cit., the following remedial procedure is suggested:
"The Protecting Powers and the International Committee will have the right to bring the temporary
nature of the prohibition to the notice of the Detaining Power and, after a certain length of time, to request
it to raise all restrictions. Moreover, the Protecting Power will be able to check afterwards whether the
prohibition of visits has been used by the Detaining Power to violate the Convention. In any case, it is not in
the interests of the Detaining Power to misuse this reservation, because it would very soon be suspected of
49.

deliberately violating the

As

50.

stated in the

Convention by evading supervision by

ICRC

Report, Vol.

I,

qualified witnesses."

p. 39:

Power

"Despite partial overlapping, the functions of the Protecting

and extent [from those of the ICRC]. The Protecting Power

is

with competency to protect the

States

Committee

is

rights

and

of the

interests

concerned exclusively with humanitarian

tasks; its

are fundamentally dissimilar in kind

the mandatory of

from which

through

a

request

made by

belligerents,

derives authority.

The

which
or which

functions are not limited to those

guaranteed by law, but embrace such enterprises in the interests of humanity
justified

one or both

it

as

appear essential,

are
are

a belligerent."

51. Ibid.

In Pictet, Commentary 119, the following statement appears:
"The Convention in this case [paragraph 3 of Article 10] no longer uses
52.

performed by

a

the

words 'undertake the functions

Protecting Power,' but speaks only of 'humanitarian functions.'

The

distinction

is

logical.

no longer any question of a real substitute, and a humanitarian organization cannot be expected to
fulfil all the functions incumbent on a Protecting Power by virtue of the Conventions." See also Final Record,
Vol. II B, pp. 61 and 63.
There

is

53. See above.
54.

ICRC

Report, Vol.

I,

pp. 342-343.

At

was

that time a prisoners' representative

known

as a

"man of

confidence." In the 1929 Convention they were called "agents."
55. See, for example, Art.

78, wherein specific provision

complaints to be transmitted to the Protecting

Power

now

is

either directly, as

contained permitting individual

had been provided in Art. 42 of the

1929 Convention, or through the medium of the prisoners' representative. Although

Art.

42 of the 1929

Convention, the predecessor of Art. 78 of the 1949 Convention, made no mention of the
authorized recipient of complaints from prisoners of war, the
to the spirit
as

fact that Art.

that article,

took the position that

of the [1929] Convention, undoubtedly meant to be placed, in

the Protecting Powers."

of the

ICRC

now be

ICRC

Report, Vol.

I,

p.

341. This conclusion

78 of the 1949 Convention again omits

even more

difficult to

accept the

all

this respect,
is

reference to the

ICRC position.

on

"it

ICRC
is,

it

Certainly, if such

an

the same footing

subject to dispute and, in

ICRC,

as

according

view

would, in interpreting

had been the intention

Levie on the

52
of the

drafters,

Law

War

they could easily have attained their objective by merely including the

along with the Protecting Power,

of the announced
56.

of

ICRC

Castren, op.

as

they did in

a

number of other

ICRC

position strongly militates against the
95; Pictet,

cit.

Le Droit International

articles.

et

Their

ICRC

failure to

in the article,

do so

in the light

interpretation.

l'Activite

Croix-Rouge en temps de Guerre 25 (1943). It is more probable that,
Detaining Power which will object where activities of the ICRC appear

du Comite International de

as in

World War

II, it

will

la

be the

to duplicate those being performed
by the Protecting Power. That the ICRC does not consider the Protecting Power to be a rival, but rather
another means of making the life of a prisoner of war a little less miserable, is apparent from the communication
sent by its President early in the Korean conflict in which he said: "The International Committee views, in

the activities of the 'Protecting Powers,'

a

implementation of the Geneva
which the Committee itself undertakes." Le
Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents, Vol. I, p. 32.

forceful instrument for insuring full

Conventions and an always desirable corollary to the

Comite

Croix-Rouge

International de

la

57.

Heckenroth,

cit.

58.

Ibid.

op.

et le

activities

229.

222.

Wounded

and Sick Commentary 101-102, the following statement appears: "As it stands,
from it. But we have to consider the huge advance which it represents in international
humanitarian law. We have to realize that, to achieve this much, the diplomats assembled in Geneva had to
cope with divergent opinions; they had to reconcile the claims of the sovereignty of their respective countries
with the claims of humanity; and they had to harmonize two opposed conceptions of the role of the Protecting
Power, viewed by some as their agent (of whom one demands the maximum), by others as the agent of the
enemy (to whom one accords the minimum )."
59.

Article 8

In Pictet,
is

not perfect,

far

Ill

The Employment

of Prisoners of

War

57 American Journal of International Law 318 (1963)*

From the days when the Romans

came

economic
value of prisoners of war as a source of labor, and began to use them as
slaves instead of killing them on the field of batde,
until the drafting and
adoption by a comparatively large number of members of the then family of
sovereign states of the Second Hague Convention of 1899, no attempt to
first

to appreciate the
1

regulate internationally the use

Power had been
dealt

successful.

made of prisoner-of-war labor by the Detaining
The Regulations attached to that Convention

with the subject in a single

Hague Convention of 1907

article,

as

did those attached to the Fourth

which, with relatively minor changes, merely

repeated the provisions of its illustrious predecessor.

A somewhat more extensive

elaboration of the subject was included in the 1929

Geneva Convention

to the

Treatment of Prisoners of

Convention). And, although

still

War

far

relative

(hereinafter referred to as the

from

perfect, the provisions

1929

concerning

prisoner-of-war labor contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred to

as

the 1949 Convention)

constitute an enlightened attempt to legislate a fairly

comprehensive code

governing the major problems involved in the employment of prisoners of war

by the Detaining Power. The purpose of this study is to analyze the provisions
of that code and to suggest not only how the draftsmen intended them to be
interpreted,

but

also

how

it

can be expected that they will actually be

implemented by Detaining Powers in any future war.
While there are very obvious differences between the employment of workers
available

even

through a free labor market and the employment of prisoners of war,

a casual

and cursory study

will quickly disclose a remarkable

similarities.

The

members

vitally interested in: (1) the

is

labor union

which

is

engaged in negotiating
conditions under

number of

a contract for

which they

will

its

work,

working hours and the holidays and
vacations to which they will be entitled; (3) the compensation and other
monetary benefits which they will receive; and (4) the grievance procedures
which will be available to them. (Of course, in each industry there will also be
numerous items peculiar to that industry.) Because of the uniqueness of
including safety provisions;

*

Reprinted in 23 MIL.

L.

(2)

REV. 41

their

(1964).

1
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prisoner-of-war

Law

War

of

status, the

1949 Diplomatic Conference which drafted the

prisoner-of-war convention

latest

necessary, in negotiating for the benefit of

felt it

future prisoners of war, to continue to cover certain items in addition to those
listed

to

above, such

work

the categories of prisoners of war

as

problem which does not normally

(a

civilian society,

although

it

may come

as these latter

problems lie

be compelled

unions in

exist for labor

into existence in a total

and, collateral to that, the specific industries in

employed. Inasmuch

who may

a free

war economy);

which they may or may not be
at

the threshold of the utilization

of prisoner-of-war labor, they will be considered before those enumerated
above.

Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the labor provisions of the 1949

Convention, and
it

how one may

seems both pertinent and appropriate to survey briefly the history

problems encountered
past century.
at

anticipate that they will operate in time of war,

which

is

selected because

its

earliest date represents the

point

exchange of prisoners of war had ceased to have any

cartels for the

considerable importance and yet belligerents were apparently
the tremendous potentiality of the
a

and the

the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor during the

in,

That period

of,

economic

which was

asset

still

unaware of

in their hands at

time of urgent need.

The American
large masses

Civil

War

(1861-1865) was the

first

major conflict involving

of troops and large numbers of prisoners of war in which exchanges
1

were the exception rather than the

rule.

As

a

result,

both

sides

found

themselves encumbered with great masses of prisoners of war; but neither side

made any
suffered

Code

13

captor's

substantial use

from labor

of

this potential
At

shortages.

that prisoners

This was

so, despite the

statement in Lieber's

of war "may be required to work for the benefit of the

government, according to their rank and condition," and despite the

valiant efforts

of the Quartermaster General of the Union Army,

unsuccessfully, although fully supported
official

pool of manpower, although both

by Professor Lieber,

The

reluctance to use prisoner-of-war labor.

Government was

that prisoners

to

who

sought

overcome the

policy of the Federal

of war would be compelled to work "only

as

an instrument of reprisal against some act of the enemy."
In 1874 an international conference,

met
deliberate on

from most of the leading European
the Tsar of Russia "in order to

which included eminent

nations,

in Brussels at the invitation of

the draft of an international

agreement respecting the laws and customs of war."
a text

to set

which, while never

down

in definitive

considered to be

a part

ratified,

representatives

This conference prepared

constituted a major step forward in the effort

manner those

rules

of the law of nations.

of land warfare which could be
It

included, in

its

Article 25, a

provision concerning prisoner-of-war labor which adopted, but considerably
amplified, Lieber's single sentence

on the

subject quoted above. This article was

Employment

of Prisoners

55

subsequently adopted almost verbatim by the Institute of International

Law

when

and 72 of its "Oxford Manual" in 1880;

drafted Articles 71

it

furnished

much of the

attached to the Fourth

article

of the Regulations

Hague Convention of 1907.

of these

all

it

material for Article 6 of the Regulations attached to the

Second Hague Convention of 1899 and the same
Despite

and

the actual utilization of prisoner-of-war labor

efforts,

remained negligible during the numerous major conflicts which preceded World

War

I.

This

was the

last

first

modern war

mobilization by the bellige rents; and there

war and

of time than during any previous

for longer periods

Nevertheless,

it

was not

until

opposition in the United
after the entry

1916

that the British

Kingdom

of the United

which there was total economic
were more men held as prisoners of
in

to the use

War Office

conflict.

could overcome

of prisoner-of-war labor;

States into the war, prisoners

17

of war held in

and
this

country were not usefully employed until the investigation of an attempted mass
escape

resulted

in

recommendation

a

prisoner-of-war labor, primarily

When

for

a

program

means of reducing

as a

the belligerents eventually did find

it

of compulsory

disciplinary problems.

essential to

tremendous prisoner-of-war manpower pools which were

make

use of the

available to

them,

Hague Convention of
numerous problems which arose, thereby

the provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth

1907 proved inadequate to solve the

necessitating the negotiation of a series of bilateral

and multilateral agreements

between the various

of the

the

belligerents during the course

Even

hostilities.

so,

Report of the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the

War and on Enforcement

of Penalties," created by the PreHminary Peace

Conference in January, 1919,
unauthorized works"

as

one of the

Central Powers during the war.

The

inadequacies in

this

"employment of prisoners of war on
offenses which had been committed by the

listed the

20

and other

areas

of the Fourth Hague Convention of

1907, revealed by the events which had occurred during the course of World

War

•

I,

led to the drafting and ratification of the 1929 Convention.

Convention which governed many of the

World War II;

22

It

was

situations

which occurred during

a

more

Moreover, the proper implementation of the provisions of any

—and

belligerents in

war

are,

parties

perhaps understandably, not motivated to

be unduly generous to their adversaries, with the
or

serious

subsequent period of

agreement must obviously depend in large part upon the good faith of the

are

of

but once again international legislation based on the experience

and complicated

thereto

this

belligerents during the course

gained during a previous conflict proved inadequate to control the

hostilities.

21

result that frequently decisions

made and policies are adopted which either skirt the bounds of legal propriety
actually exceed such bounds. The utilization of prisoner-of-war labor by the

Detaining Powers proved no exception to the foregoing. Practically

all

prisoners

Levle on the

56
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of

War

of war were compelled to work.

24

To

this there

can be basically no objection.

But during the course of their employment many of the protective provisions
of the 1929 Convention (and of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which
it complemented) were either distorted or simply disregarded.
The leaders of Hitler's Nazi Germany were aware of its shortage of labor and
appreciated the importance of the additional pool of
prisoners of war as a source of that precious wartime

committed

which, although not

itself to

apply

commodity. Nevertheless,

common

with the Communists to overcome their
in Japan,

afforded by

of time they permitted their ideological differences

for a considerable period

And

manpower

its

a party to

sense and urgent needs.

the 1929 Convention, had

provisions, those relating to prisoner-of-war labor

were among the many which were assiduously violated.
Like the other belligerents, the United States found an urgent need for
prisoner-of-war labor, both within its home territory and in the rear areas of the

embatded continents. One study even goes
Italian prisoners

made

it

so far as to assert that the use of

of war in the Mediterranean theater was the only thing which

United

possible for the

States to sustain simultaneously

both the

Italian

campaign and the invasion of Southern France, thereby hastening the downfall
of Germany.

Similarly,

'

prisoners of war for

work

it

was found

that in the

at military installations,

authorized industries, served to release both
for other types

While the

United

of

States the use

and in agriculture and other

Army

service troops

and

of work which were more directly related to the war

benefits of prisoner-of-war labor to the Detaining

civilians

28
effort.

Power

are

patent, benefits flowing to the prisoners of war themselves as a result of their use
in this

manner

are

no

less

apparent.

The

proper use of prisoner-of-war labor

reciprocal benefits resulting

from the

well summarized in the following

is

statement:

The work done by
makes

a substantial

the

PW has a high value for the Detaining Power, since

contribution to

country has to reckon that the

work

enemy, maybe indirecdy; and yet
nationals should return
health.

Work

captivity,

War

II,

at

at

the

so

economic
done

resources.

increases the

the same time

it is

is

to

The PW's home

war

its

potential of

own

its

of

a valuable antidote to the trials

of

PW to preserve their bodily health and morale.

close reappraisal

profit that

its

in the best possible state

end of hostilities

under normal conditions

and helps

During the

home

its

it

29

of the 1929 Convention which followed World

the provisions thereof dealing with the labor of prisoners of war

were

not overlooked; and the Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva in 1949
redrafted

many of those

provisions of the 1929

Convention

in an effort to plug

which the events of World War II had revealed. It is the 1949
Convention resulting from this work which will be used in the review and

the loopholes

Employment
analysis

of the
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and obligations of belligerents and prisoners of war in any

rights

future conflict insofar as prisoner-of-war labor

Categories of Prisoners of

is

concerned.

War Who May be Compelled

In general, Article 49 of the 1949 Convention provides that

war, except commissioned

officers,

may be compelled

statement requires considerable elaboration and

all

prisoners of

work. However,

to

this

number of

subject to a

is

Work

to

limitations.

The Detaining Power is specifically limited
those prisoners of war to work who are physically
a.

a nature to

maintain them "in a good

determining physical

fitness, it is

into account the age, sex,

war.

It

may be assumed

determining whether

in that
fit,

it

may compel

only

and the work must be of

of physically and mental health." In

state

prescribed that the Detaining

Power must

and physical aptitude of each individual prisoner of

that these qualities are to

a prisoner

be considered not only in

of war should be compelled to work but

be assigned. For example,

women

(and

it

must be accepted

any future

that in

major war there will be many female prisoners of war) should not be given
requiring the lifting and

reason of their

would appear

size,

tasks

men who

are

the physical aptitude for certain jobs

by

moving of heavy

work may not have

to

fit

also

of work to which the particular prisoner of war should

in determining the type

physically

take

loads; and, frequendy,

weight, strength, age, lack of experience, et cetera.

that the provisions

It

of Article 49 of the 1949 Convention require

the Detaining Power, within reasonable limits, to assure the assignment of the

proper

man

to the job.

Moreover, under the provisions of Articles 31 and 55 of the 1949 Convention,
the determination of physical fitness must not only be
qualified personnel

and

at

regular

monthly

made by

but also whenever the

intervals,

prisoner of war considers himself physically incapable of working.

noted that the

first

of the cited

articles

is

a general

medically

It

should be

one which requires the

Detaining Power to conduct thorough medical inspections, monthly

minimum,

for a medical examination at least monthly,

he

is

is

which

calls

intended to verify the physical

of the prisoner of war for work, and particularly for the work to which
assigned.

It

is

evident

that

one

simultaneously towards both objectives

imposed upon the Detaining Power.

The

a

primarily in order to supervise the general state of health of the

prisoners of war and to detect contagious diseases; while the second,

fitness

at

medical

would meet

examination
the

directed

obligations

thus

32

provision of Article 55 which authonzes

a

pnsoner of war

to

appear

before a medical board

whenever he considers himself incapable of working

grave potentialities.

can be expected that well-organized prisoners of war,

intent

upon

It

creating as

many

difficulties as possible for the

has

Detaining Power,

Levie on the
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War

be directed by their anonymous leaders to report themselves en masse and

frequent intervals

as

being incapable of working and to request that they be

permitted to appear before the medical authorities of the camp.

Power

to

be

examined by

helpless, if

thousands of prisoners of war,

available medical personnel,

all

Is

the Detaining

many more

elect at the

than can be

same time

to claim

sudden physical unfitness and to demand physical examinations? Where the
Detaining Power has good grounds for believing that such

is

the situation, and

would undoubtedly be justified in
compelling every prisoner of war to work until his turn for examination is
reached in regular order with the complement of medical personnel which had
previously been adequate for the particular prisoner-of-war camp. Thus the act
of the prisoners of war themselves in attempting to turn a provision intended
for their protection into an offensive weapon, illegal in its inception, would
actually result in their causing harm to the very people it was intended to
normally be quite apparent,

this will

protect

The

—

it

the truly physically unfit prisoners of war.

made

suggestion has been

that the medical examinations to

determine

work should preferably be made by the retained medical
33
personnel of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend.
This
suggestion is based upon the fact that Article 30, in providing for the medical
physical fitness for

'

care

and treatment of prisoners of war,

states that

Power on which they depend

preferably, of medical personnel of the
possible,

and, if

of their nationality." However, there is considerable difference between

permitting the medical personnel of the

depends to render medical assistance

believed that any Detaining
should, permit retained

Power on which

when he

personnel to say whether or not he

it

they "shall have the attention,

is

ill

the prisoner of

war

or injured, and permitting such

physically qualified to work.

It is

not

Power would, or that the Convention intended that
medical personnel to make final decisions in this

regard.
b.

In his Instructions, Lieber gave

no indication

that the labor

of all prisoners

of war, regardless of rank, was not available to the Detaining Power in some

However, Article 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 71 of
"Oxford Manual" both provided that prisoners of war could only be

capacity.

the

employed on work which would not be "humiliating

to their military rank."

The Second Hague Convention of 1 899 reverted to Lieber's rather vague phrase,
"according to their rank;" and the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 went a
step further,

adding to the foregoing phrase the words "officers excepted,"

thereby giving

a legislative basis to a practice

which had,

in fact, already

been

followed.

Both the 1929 Convention and the 1949 Convention
in this regard, the latter amplifying

provisions of its predecessor.

and

While the

are

much more specific

clarifying the already

first

more

detailed

paragraph of Article 49 of the 1949

Employment
Convention authorizes the Detaining Power
of war," the second paragraph of that
officers

(NCOs) may only be

paragraph

used in the

clear that, as

war"

is

non-commissioned

article specifies that

not be compelled to work.

paragraph of

first

of "prisoners

to utilize the labor

required to do supervisory work, and the third

may

states that officers
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intended to refer only to enlisted

this article,

men below

It

becomes

thus

the term "prisoners of

non-commissioned

the

officer grade.

During World War II
of non-commissioned

had had

problems arose with respect to the identification

officers for labor purposes. In the first place,

their identification

intelligence

for

several

many NCOs

documents taken from them upon capture (probably
and were thereafter unable

purposes)

establish

to

their

"IS

On

entitlement to recognition of their grade.

NCO

individuals apparently claimed
entitled,

higher advances in pay.

37

In a

that,

upon

number of respects

and ranks in use in

tides

"equality of treatment

exchange of information

to the ranks

new Convention makes

and

it

concerning the ranks and tides of

Further, during

World War

II

all

949 Convention attempts

would communicate

their armies in order to assure

documents

leaving the prisoner of

as

Hmiting the requirements of

tides

of commissioned

who

persons

fall

war enumerated

is

for

to

be exchanged

within the various

in the

Convention.

provide to

was not unusual for capturing personnel

official identification material.

both of these

defects. In Article

minimum,

17

The 1949
it

provides

certain specified material

concerning identity; prescribes the desirable type of card; provides that
issued in duplicate; and states that while the prisoner of war

demand of his

This

article, if

captors,

World War

Two
are

II

under no circumstances may

complied with by the

the problem of identifying

38

whatever intelligence value they might have,

war with no

to rectify

it

for an identification card containing, as a

the

this

officers. Article

if any, as that belligerent elected to

personnel. In addition, as just noted,

Convention attempts

be entitled to the

the military personnel of each belligerent carried

such identification documents,

to seize these

1

clear that information

categories of potential prisoners of

its

the

as to

between corresponding ranks of officers and persons of

equivalent status." This was construed

43 of the

well

the outbreak of hostilities, the belligerents

one another the

to

as

actually

Thus, Article 21 of the 1929 Convention provided

to obviate these problems.

only

which they were not

grades to

probably in order to avoid hard labor

number of

the other hand, a

belligerents,

non-commissioned

it

must exhibit

be

upon

be taken from him.

should do

officers,

it

it

much

which

to eliminate

existed during

and which undoubtedly resulted in many incorrect

decisions.

other problems connected with the labor of non-commissioned officers

worthy of comment.

which can be construed

On occasions disputes may arise as to the types of work
as falling

within the term "supervisory."

The

drafters

Law

Levie on the
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of the 1949 Convention made no attempt to solve

who

merit in the solution offered by one authority,

The

term

administrative tasks

which

manual

labor.

excludes

all

work"

"supervisory

The other problem

this

it

of a non-commissioned

him under both conventions

denoting

as

usually consist of directing the other ranks;
39

relates to the right

much

is

says:

recognized

generally

is

problem. There

obviously

officer,

who

work
other than supervisory, thereafter to withdraw his request. During World War
II different practices were followed by the belligerents. Thus Germany gave
has exercised the privilege given

British

non-commissioned

officers the right to

the policy of the United States

work

United
is

free

were

for the duration of captivity in the

1

States.

to

while

their requests;

was not to grant such requests for non-supervisory

in the first place, unless they
A

withdraw

to request

It

has been urged that, inasmuch as a

non-commissioned

officer

undertake non-supervisory work, he should be equally free to

discontinue such work, subject to the right of the Detaining

him with such employment only if he agrees to work for
42
may be extended upon his request. This appears to be a
solution to the problem, although

it

is

Power

to provide

a fixed term,

logical

and

which

practical

probably one to which not every

belligerent will subscribe.

Officers cannot be required to
it.

Once

they have done

so, the

do even supervisory work unless they request

problems relating to their labor are very similar
of non-commissioned

to those relating to the voluntary labor

that they

were apparently rather generally permitted

whenever they decided

to

do

so.

Scattered throughout the

enemy

working

43

1949 Convention

provisions specifically limiting the
categories of

to discontinue

except

In general, the labor of officers has not caused

any material dissension between belligerents.
c.

officers,

are

work which may be

a

number of other
required of certain

personnel, prisoners of war or others, held by a Detaining

Power. Thus, medically trained personnel who, when captured, were not

enemy armed forces and who are,
may be required to perform medical

assigned to the medical services in the
therefore, ordinary prisoners of war,

functions for the benefit of their fellow prisoners of war; but if they are so
required,

they

personnel

and

are
are

applies to ministers

entitled

of religion

accorded retained medical

treatment

who were

may not be

as

essential services in the

required to perform any other

prisoners' representatives

perform any other work, but

The same rule
such when captured

(Article 32).

not serving

of war assigned to provide

of officer prisoners of war

And

the

exempted from any other work

(Article 36). Prisoners

(Article 44).

to

may

this restriction applies

camps

work

likewise not be required to

only "if the accomplishment

Employment
of their duties

thereby

is

made more

difficult" (Article 81).

of Prisoners

While
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these various

provisions are not of very great magnitude in the over-all prisoner-of-war
picture, they can,

of course, be of major importance to the particular individuals

involved.

Types

of

Work Which Prisoners

of

War May Be Compelled

to Perform

which prisoners of war may be compelled to perform and
the industries to which they may be assigned have generated much controversy.
Long before final agreement was reached thereon at the 1949 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference, the article of the Convention concerned with the
subject of authorized labor was termed "the most disputed article in the whole
Convention, and the most difficult of interpretation."
Unfortunately, it

The

types of work

appears fairly certain that the agreements ultimately reached in this area are
destined to magnify, rather than to minimize or eliminate, this problem.

The

early attempts to draft rules

concerning the categories of labor in which

war could be employed merely authorized their employment on
"public works which have no direct connection with the operations in the

prisoners of

or stated that the tasks of prisoners of war "shall have nothing

theater of war,"
to

do with the military operations."

The

insufficiency of these provisions

having been demonstrated by the events of
elaboration was

made

World War

I,

an attempt

at

in drafting the comparable provisions (Article 31) of the

1929 Convention, in which were included not only prohibitions against the

employment of

war on labor having a "direct relation with war
against their employment on several specified types of work

prisoners of

operations," but also

("manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or

.

.

.

transporting material intended for combatant units").

During World

War

II

their predecessors in regulating prisoner-of-war labor.

with war operations" once again demonstrated
in a total

to interpret

belligerents

to
to

is

no more

successful than

The term

"direct relation

these latter provisions proved

war in which

itself to

practically every

mobilized for military purposes.

be exceedingly

difficult

economic resource of the

So each belligerent attempting

comply with the labor provisions of the 1929 Convention found itself required
make a specific determination in all but the very few obvious cases as to

whether

a particular

occupation

fell

within the ambit of the prohibitions.

many disputed decisions.
proposed new convention aimed at

As

could be expected, there were
In drafting a

obviating the

many

which had arisen during the two world wars, the International
Committee of the Red Cross attempted a new approach to the prisoner-of-war

difficulties

labor problem. Instead of specifying prohibited areas in broad and general terms,
as

had been the previous

practice, leaving to the belligerents, the Protecting

Powers, and the humanitarian organizations the decision

as to

whether a

specific

Levie on the
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was or was not prohibited,

task

decided to

it

of labor in which Detaining Powers would be

particularity the categories

permitted to employ prisoners of war,

any type of work not

Conference held

at

and with

affirmatively

list

specifically

Stockholm

impliedly prohibiting their use in

at least
listed.

52
'

The

which

in 1948, to

Red

International

Cross

new approach was

this

proposed, accepted the idea of affirmatively specifying the areas in which
prisoners of war could be required to work; but, instead of the enumeration of

which the Committee had prepared, the Conference

specifics

terms.

The Committee was

'

highly

Diplomatic Conference the United

it

was

this original text,

which ultimately became

there

is

An

Article 50 of the

considerable merit to the

much

to

draft

the substitution of the

adopted

at

Stockholm,

with certain amendments which will be discussed

later,

article leaves

At the 1949

this action.

Kingdom proposed

of that contained in the

original proposal in place

and

of

critical

substituted general

new

1949 Convention.

While

approach, the actual phraseology of the

be desired.

of the various provisions contained in Article 50 of the 1949

analysis

Convention and,

to the extent possible, a delimitation

of the areas covered, or

probably intended to be covered, by each category of work which a prisoner of

war may be "compelled"
(1)

Camp

to do,

Administration,

57

"housekeeping."

Early

prisoner-of-war labor into two

and

class

two,

58
all

been estimated

other.

broadly

classes: class

This distinction

that the use

the

II

will always

still

it

constitutes

United

their

it

demands

field

own
all

own camps;
It

has

While

of other military

this

is

believed to be

can be assumed that a very considerable portion
it

can also be assumed that in any

for prisoner of- war labor will

be conducted on an extremely austere
This

war

divided

States

be so great that

shortages will exist, requiring that the administration of prisoner-of-war

(2) Agriculture.

the

to

appears to be a valid one.

own camps and

be so engaged. However,

future major conflict

refers

one, that related to their

constituted their major utilization.

somewhat of an overstatement,
of them

in order.

of prisoners of war in the United States for the

maintenance and operation of their
installations

speaking,

World War

in

This

Maintenance.

is

the camps established for the prisoners of

other words,

in

or

Installation

management and operation of
themselves;

and the problems inherent in each,

camps

basis.

of prisoner-of-war

utilization,

with

its

collateral field

of food processing, combines with camp administration to account for the labor
of the great majority of employed prisoners of war.

There

are

no

restrictions

imposed by the Convention on the employment of prisoners of war

in

may

eventually be used in

the manufacture of a military item or be supplied to and

consumed by combat

agriculture,

the fact that the product of their labor

troops being too remote to permit

of,

or warrant, restrictions.

Employment
Production or Extraction of

(3)

Raw

compulsory employment includes

one of the

areas in

such industries

which problems

quarrying, et cetera.

It is

and in which there

are frequent disagreements

between

Powers

Detaining

and

This category of authorized

Materials.

activities in
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between

as

are constandy arising

belligerents as well as

Powers

Protecting

mining, logging,

humanitarian

or

World War II the International
Committee of the Red Cross reported that it was called upon to intervene more
frequently with respect to prisoners of war who worked in mines than with
organizations. Thus, after the conclusion of

respect to any other problem.

Inasmuch

as

the utilization of prisoners of

war

and

in this field has been,

continues to be, authorized, the problems which arise usually relate to the
physical ability of the particular prisoner of

war

to participate in

heavy and

labor of this nature, and to working conditions, including safety

difficult

precautions and equipment, rather than to the fact of the utilization of prisoners

of war in the

specific industry.

reviewed and the

first

be discussed

at

of these problems has already been
length in the general analysis of that

problem.

specific
(4)

latter will

The

Manufacturing Industries (except Metallurgical, Machinery, and Chemical).

modern

economy of

days of total warfare and the total mobilization of the

belligerent

nations,

it

has

become

increasingly

impossible

In

to

state

with

positiveness that any particular industry does not have some connection with the

war effort. Where

the degree of such connection

is

the criterion for determining

the permissibility of the use of prisoners of war in a particular industry, as

it

was

prior to the 1949 Convention, problems and disputes are inevitable. In this
respect,

by authorizing compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in most manufacturing

industries

which

and by

will

specifically prohibiting

probably eliminated

During World
its

new Convention

and progressive development in the law of war and has

many

War

II

potential disputes.

the nature of the item manufactured and, to

was determined

truck parts,

as these

its

manufacture was permissible. Thus, in the United States

that prisoners of

had

war could be used

application.

Under

in the manufacture

a civilian, as well as a military, application;

could not be used in the manufacture of tank
the 1949

parts, as these

vehicles

fall

of

but that they

had only

a military

Convention neither the nature nor the ultimate

destination nor the intended use of the item being manufactured

motor

some

intended ultimate destination determined whether or not the use of

prisoners of war in
it

in the three categories of industries

be engaged almost exclusively in war work, the

represents a positive

extent,

it

is

material. All

within the category of "machinery" and prisoners of war

may not be used in their manufacture. On the other hand, prisoners
of war may be used in a food processing or clothing factory, even though some,

therefore

Levie on the
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or perhaps

all,

Law
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of

of the food processed or clothing manufactured

armed forces of the Detaining Power.
Two sound bases have been advanced for

may be

destined

for the

Conference

to prohibit in

its

the decision of the Diplomatic

entirety the compelling of prisoners of war to

in the metallurgical, machinery,

and chemical

industries:

first,

that in

work

any general

war

these three categories of industries will unquestionably be totally mobilized

and

will

be used exclusively for the armaments industry; and second, that

engaged

factories

now

in these industries will

be key objectives of enemy

air

(and

of enemy rocket and missile) operations and would, therefore, subject the

prisoners of war to military action

The Diplomatic Conference

from which they

are entided to

apparently balanced this

be

isolated.

industry-wide

total,

prohibition of compulsory labor in the three specified industries against the
authorization

general

use

to

of war in

prisoners

every

manufacturing without requiring the application of any
relationship to the
It

war

test to

determine

should be borne in mind that the prohibition under discussion

work

its

is

directed

in the specified industries. (As

by inverted phraseology, subparagraphs

shall see,

of

type

effort.

only against compelling prisoners of war to

we

other

b, c,

and f of Article 50

also

Power from compelling them to do certain other types
of work where such work has "military character or purpose.") The question
then arises as to whether they may volunteer for employment in those industries.
Based upon the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference,
it clearly appears
prohibit the Detaining

that the prohibitions contained in Article
that a prisoner

just as he
is

is

of war

may

50 are not absolute in character and

volunteer to engage in the prohibited employments,

by Article 52

affirmatively authorized

to volunteer for labor

"of an unhealthy or dangerous nature." The problem

assuring that the prisoner of

war

is

a true

will,

of course,

which

arise

of

volunteer and that neither mental

coercion nor physical force has been used to "persuade" him to volunteer to

work

in the otherwise prohibited field

problem

particular
exists that

some

be permitted to

Convention,
is

clearly

difficult

prisoners of
justify

as to

However, the

war

will

be coerced into "volunteering") cannot

an incorrect interpretation of these provisions of the

which the indisputable

intent of the Diplomatic

preparatoires

Conference

.

Works and Building Operations Wliich Have

With

fact that this

of solution (and that the possibility undoubtedly

evidenced by the travaux

(5) Public

Purpose.

is

of labor.

No

respect to this portion of the subparagraph,

Military Character or

it is first

necessary to

determine the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase "military character or
purpose." This

is

ordinary sense,

it

no easy
will

task.

Because the term defies definition in the

be necessary to define by example. Moreover, the

discussions at the Diplomatic Conference, unfortunately, provide

helpful

on

this

problem.

little

that

is

Employment
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A structure such as a fortification clearly has, solely and exclusively, a "military
character." Conversely, a structure such as a

The

exclusively, a civilian character.

operations; hence

it

does not have

it

will

fortification

is

clearly has, solely

and

intended for use in military

has not only a "military character" but also a "military

it

The bowling

purpose."

bowling alley

alley

a "military

is

intended for exercise and entertainment; hence

purpose," even

be members of the armed

if some

or

all

of the individuals using

forces.

These examples have been comparatively black and white. Unfortunately,
is

not unusual, there

"military purpose."

is

A

easy of determination.
to

it is

This

is

its

purpose

sewer

is

is

military or civilian will not always

be so

obviously civilian in character, and the fact

be constructed between a military installation and the sewage disposal

plant does not give

dump would

On

a military purpose.

it

civilian in character,

the other hand, a road

but a road leading only from a military

certainly have a military purpose.

character, but if

a part

it is

of a military school

And

showing of military

would have

However,

a military purpose.

entertainment purposes, like the bowling

though the audience
summarize,

will

a theater

is

likewise

airfield to a

a theater

is

and

is

installation

exclusively or primarily for the

To

of the term

especially true

A structure will usually be clearly military or clearly civilian

whether

in character; but

that

also a large gray area.

as

civilian in

to

be used

training films, then

which

is

bomb

it,

too,

intended solely for

alley, retains its civilian

purpose, even

be largely military.

if the public

works or building operations

military character, prisoners of war

may not be compelled

to

have a

clearly

work

thereon; if

they do not have a military character, but are being undertaken exclusively or
primarily for a military use, then they will usually have a military purpose and

again prisoners of war

not have

may not be compelled

a military character

and

to

work

thereon; while if they do

are not being built exclusively or primarily for

a military use,

then they have neither military character nor purpose, and

prisoners of war

may be compelled

to

work

thereon, even though there

may be

incidental military use.

Having determined,

insofar as

is

possible, the

character or purpose," let us apply

it

to

meaning of the phrase

some of

the problems

"military

which have

heretofore arisen. Although the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in the

construction of fortifications has long been considered improper,

War

II a

United

States Military Tribunal at
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after

World

Niirnberg found "uncertainty" in

the law, and held such labor not obviously illegal

where

it

was ordered by

superior authority and was not required to be performed in dangerous areas.

Under

the 1949 Convention such a decision
military in character

fortification

is

labor in

construction

location

would

clearly

be untenable.

A

and the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war

prohibited,

no matter what the circumstances or

may be. The same is, of course,

true of other construction of a uniquely

its

is
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ammunition dumps,

military character such as
cetera.

On

wooded

War

of

the other hand, bush clearance and the construction of firebreaks in

areas far

from the

which have neither
If the
it

city

works and building operations

nor purpose.

military character

foregoing discussion has added but

has, at least,

the

and the clearing of bomb rubble from

are typical of the categories of public

streets

of drainage ditches,

battle fronts, the digging

building of local air-raid shelters,

that

firing ranges, tank obstacles, et

little

light to the

problem,

it is

hoped

focused attention on an area which can be expected to produce

considerable controversy; and here, too, the problem will be further complicated

by the question of volunteering.
and Handling of Stores Which Are Not Military

(6) Transportation

Purpose. Article 31

in Character or

of the 1929 Convention prohibited the use of prisoners of

war for "transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or for transporting material

The comparable

intended for combatant units."

Convention

The former
time

at

some

clarify this in

respects

provisions

and obscure

of the

1949

in others.

it

provision created problems in the determination of the point of

which material became "intended"

for a

of a "combatant unit." These problems have

combatant unit and of the nature

now been

eliminated, the ultimate

no longer being decisive.
the problem of the application of the

destination of the material transported or handled

Creating

new

amorphous term
Apparently

difficulties is the fact that

"military in character or purpose"

a prisoner

is

presented once again.

may now be compelled

of war

to

work

in a factory

manufacturing military uniforms or gas masks or camouflage netting,
items are neither

made by

of war

may

not be compelled to load them on

probably have

a military

may be compelled to
or ranches,

as it

as

a truck

may

such

not be compelled to work in

a factory

Just as
it is
is,

a prisoner

car, as

they

handle and transport

would have no

a factory

making

in the metallurgical industry; but they

is

it

where

it is

destined for use

on farms

military character or purpose. Surely, the

Diplomatic Conference intended no such inconsistent
to justify

or freight

is

character and they certainly have a military purpose.

Conversely, prisoners of war

barbed wire, inasmuch

these

the three prohibited manufacturing industries nor

purpose material; but once manufactured,

their military character or

as

results,

but

it is

difficult

any other conclusions.

was determined with respect

to public

works and building operations,

extremely doubtful that the ultimate destination or intended use of the stores

alone, sufficient to give

and food processing

them

are, as has

labor for prisoners of war.
military character;

of the armed

and the

forces,

even

a military

character or purpose. Thus, agriculture

been seen, authorized categories of compulsory

The food grown and

fact that

it

will ultimately

in a battle area,

Accordingly, prisoners of war

processed obviously has no

be consumed by members

does not give

may be compelled

it

to handle

a military

purpose.

and transport such

Employment

The same

stores.

and

reasoning

tarpaulins, to socks

and

would apply

bags, to tents

soap.

In this general category, again, the prohibition

who

and the prisoner of war

and sleeping

to blankets
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volunteers

is

may be

only against compulsion,
assigned to the

work of

transporting and handling stores, even though they have a military character or

purpose. And, once again, the problem will arise of assuring that the prisoner of

war

work

has actually volunteered for the

(7)

Commercial Business, and Arts and

which he

to

is

assigned.

doubtful whether very

Crafts. It is

many

prisoners of war will be given the opportunity to engage in commercial business.

The

prisoner-of-war barber,

shoemaker, cabinetmaker,

tailor,

et cetera, will

usually be assigned to ply his trade within the prisoner-of-war

benefit of his fellow prisoners of

However,

administration.

permitted to

set

their

owned by

shops

civilian

up

own

professional
et cetera,

among

likely.

No

and amateur,

which

will

a part

as

of the camp

shops or to engage in their trades

as

employees of

of the Detaining Power.

be permitted to engage in the

prisoner-of-war

camp

arts

has ever lacked

and

this

crafts

artists,

is

both

who produce paintings, wood carvings, metal objects,

find a ready market, through the prisoner-of-war canteen,

the military and civilian population of the Detaining Power.

normally

and

activities

conceivable that in some locales they might be

citizens

That prisoners of war

much more

it is

war

camp, for the

category of work will be done

However,

on

spare time as a remunerative

of

this

type of hobby, rather than as assigned labor.
(8)

Domestic

Service.

The

specific inclusion

category of labor merely

permits the continuation of a practice which was rather generally followed

during

World War

II

and which has

rarely caused

any

difficulty,

domestic services have, of course, never been construed
relation
to

as

inasmuch

having

as

a "direct

with operations of war." As long as the domestic services are not required

be performed in an area where the prisoner of war will be exposed to the

of the combat zone, which

is

specifically prohibited

fire

by Article 23 of the 1949

Convention, the type of establishment in which he

is

compelled to perform the

domestic service, and whether military or

is

not material.

(9) Public Utility Services

third
Its

and

final

use here

is

utility services

Having

No

civilian,

Military Character or Purpose. This

is

the

usage in Article 50 of the term "military character or purpose."
particularly inept,

such

inasmuch

as gas, electricity,

under any circumstances, be deemed

as it

is

difficult to see

how

public

water, telephone, telegraph, et cetera, can,
77
to have a military character.
With respect

to military purpose, the conclusions previously reached are equally applicable

here. If the utility services are intended exclusively or primarily for military use,

they will have a military purpose and the Detaining

Power

is

prohibited from

compelling prisoners of war to work on them. Normally, however, the same
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War

of

public utility services will be used to support both military and civilian activities

and personnel and

will

Dangerous,

Unhealthy,

(10)

not have

Convention contains

a military

purpose.

or Humiliating Labor.

special provisions

Article 52 of the

with respect to labor which

dangerous, or humiliating. These terms are not defined and
that their application will cause

some

difficulties

it

is

1949

unhealthy,

may be anticipated

and controversies. Nevertheless,

the importance of the provision cannot be gainsaid.

Employing

a prisoner

of war on unhealthy or dangerous work

"unless he be a volunteer." Assigning a prisoner of war to labor

considered humiliating for
is

prohibited.

the verb

No
it

prohibited

which would be

member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power

differences can be perceived to have resulted

"employed on"

Accordingly,

a

is

in the

first

from the use of

instance and "assigned to" in the second.

believed that the omission of the clause "unless he be a

is

volunteer" in the case of "humiliating" labor would preclude a prisoner of war

from volunteering
and

for labor

that such a clause

which

is

would be mere

considered to be of a humiliating nature
surplusage.

However,

this

is

probably not

so.

Article

32 of the 1929 Convention forbade "unhealthful or dangerous work."

In construing this provision the
first,

United

States applied three separate criteria:

the inherent nature of the job (mining, quarrying, logging, et cetera);

second, the conditions under which

it

was

to

be performed (under

a tropical

sun, in a tropical rain, in a millpond in freezing weather, et cetera); and third,
78
These criteria would be equally
the individual capacity of the prisoner of war.
•

relevant in applying the substantially similar provisions of Article 52 of the 1949

Convention.
It is

quite apparent that there are criteria available for determining

a particular

job

is

unhealthy or dangerous and

is,

therefore,

whether

one upon which

war may not be employed. Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly
be some borderline cases in which disputes may well arise as to the utilization
of non-volunteer prisoners of war. However, there unquestionably will be more
jobs in clearly permissible categories than there will be prisoners of war available
to fill them. Accordingly, the Detaining Power, which is attempting to handle
prisoners of

prisoners of war stricdy in accordance with the provisions of the Convention,

can easily avoid disputes by not using prisoners of war on labor of a controversial
character.

The

third paragraph of Article 52 specifies that "the removal of

similar devices shall

the

Diplomatic
80

discussions,

Conference,

made

on mine removal

be considered

is

it

as

dangerous labor."

after

one of

its

By

this

mines or

simple statement

most heated and lengthy

completely clear that the employment of prisoners of war

prohibited unless they are volunteers.

of prisoners of war on

this

type of

work was one of

The compulsory

use

the most bothersome

Employment
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particularly after the

II,

termination of hostilities.

The application of the prohibition against the assignment of prisoners of war
to work considered humiliating for members of the armed forces of the
81
Certainly the existence or
Detaining Power should cause few difficulties.
non-existence of a custom or rule in

Detaining

Power should

in the main,

problems in

applied in the
the

armed

armed

rarely

be

a

this

regard in the armed forces of the

mater of controversy.

It is

probable

because the standard adopted

this area will arise

forces of the Detaining

forces of the

82

Power upon which

Power

that,

is

that

rather than that applied in

the prisoners of war depend.

While

which the Diplomatic Conference
could logically have reached, it is not unlikely that prisoners of war will find this
difficult to understand and that there will be tasks which they consider to be
humiliating, even though the members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power do not, particularly where the prisoners of war come from a nation having
this

a

decision was indubitably the only one

high standard of living and are held by a Detaining

Power which

has a

considerably lower standard.

Conditions of Employment

We

have so

far

considered the two aspects of prisoner-of-war labor which

are peculiar to that status:

work

who may

be compelled to work; and the

which they may be employed. Our

in

discussion

now

fields

of

enters the area in

which most nations have laws governing the general conditions of employment
of their
to the

own

civilian citizens

—laws which,

as

we

shall see, are

often applicable

employment of prisoners of war.

General Working Conditions. Article 51 of the

broad code covering working conditions.
Prisoners of
regards

war must be granted

Convention

Its first

suitable

constitutes a fairly

paragraph provides

working conditions,

that:

especially as

accommodation, food, clothing and equipment; such conditions

shall

not

be inferior to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in
similar

work; account

shall also

be taken of climatic conditions.

These provisions, several of which derive

directly

from adverse experiences of

World War II, are, for the most part, so elementary as to require little exploratory
discussion. However, one major change in basic philosophy is worthy of note.
The 1929 Convention provided, in Articles 10 and 11, that the minimum
standard for accommodations and food for prisoners of war should be that
provided for "troops
equally

applicable

at

to

base camps of the detaining Power." This standard was

working prisoners of war.

Article

Convention contains an analogous provision with respect

to

25 of the 1949

accommodations

Levie on the
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for prisoners

makes

it

Law

of

War

of war generally

abundantly clear

—but

the quotation from Article 51 given above

minimum

of working prisoners of war, the

troops of the Detaining Power, but

employed

work.

in similar

to a national standard,

it is

and equipment

that, as to the lodging, food, clothing,

"

is

While

that

standard

probable that the
as

that

of base

of "nationals of the Detaining Power
continuation of adherence

this represents a

than the one previously used, inasmuch

no longer

is

new national standard will be higher

workers are frequendy

a

favored

class

under wartime conditions.

With

somewhat

regard to a

paragraph of the same
paragraph,
legislation

making

article,

applicable

similar provision contained in the

optimism appears

less

be warranted. This

working prisoners of war "the national

to

concerning the protection of labor and, more particularly, the

regulations for the safety of workers,"

U.S.S.R.

to

second

was the

result

of a proposal made by the

which received the immediate support
This support was undoubtedly premised on

the Diplomatic Conference,

at

of the United States and others.
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would increase the protection
afforded to working prisoners of war. Second thoughts indicate that this
provision may constitute a basis for reducing the protection which it was
intended to afford prisoners of war engaged in dangerous employments. The
International Committee of the Red Cross has found it necessary to point out
the assumption that, if adopted, the proposal

that national standards

may

minimum

established

standards

not here be applied in such

by

the

way

a

Convention.

"

as to

It

reduce the

now

appears

unfortunate that the Diplomatic Conference adopted the U.S.S.R. proposal
rather than the suggestion of the representative of the International Labor

Organization that
for

it

be guided by the internationally accepted standards of safety

workers contained in international labor conventions then already in being.

Moreover, the

safety laws

and regulations

are tied to national standards.

prisoners of

work

in

war receive

which they

The

training

are to

are not the only safety measures

third paragraph of Article 51 requires that

and protective equipment appropriate

war "may be submitted

be

a potential

"normal

upon
little

to

to the

as

normal

risks

run by these

that

civilian

the test as to

breeding ground for disagreement and dispute, particularly

risks"

which

civilian nationals

the

will probably bear

under normal conditions.

reference to the climatic conditions under

which the labor is performed,

contained in the portion of Article 51 quoted above,
deriving from the experiences of

as

of the Detaining Power may be called

undergo under the pressures of a wartime economy

relationship to the risks permitted

The

same paragraph likewise provides

what are "normal risks" is based upon the
standards of the Detaining Power, this provision, too, would appear to

workers." Inasmuch
national

to the

be employed "and similar to those accorded to the

87
nationals of the Detaining Power."'
This

prisoners of

which

World War

88
II.

is

one of the provisions

The 1929 Convention

Employment
provided, in Article

9, that

of Prisoners

war captured "where

prisoners of
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the climate

is

coming from temperate climates, shall be transported, as
soon as possible, to a more favorable climate." It is well known that in a large
number of cases this was not done. The 1949 Convention contains a somewhat

injurious for persons

similar general provision (in Article 22)

recognized

that, despite the best

a position to arrange the

areas in

which they

concerning evacuation; but

it

was

of intentions, belligerents will not always be in

immediate evacuation of prisoners of war from the
Conference

are captured. Accordingly, the Diplomatic

wrote into the Convention the quoted additional admonition with respect to
climatic conditions

Power

and prisoner-of-war labor.

It

follows that,

where

cannot, at least for the time being, evacuate prisoners of

unhealthy climate, whether tropical or

arctic, it

must,

a

Detaining

war from an

if it desires to utilize the

make due allowances

labor of the prisoners of war in that area even temporarily,

them proper clothing, the necessary protection from
the elements, appropriate working periods, et cetera.
Article 51 of the 1949 Convention concludes with a prohibition against
In other
rendering working conditions more arduous as a disciplinary measure.
words, the standards for working conditions, be they international or national,
established by the Convention may not be disregarded in the administration of
for the climate, giving

disciplinary
act for

punishment

which he

apart from, his

is

of war, and

it is

immaterial whether the

being punished occurred in connection with, or completely

work. Thus,

requirements

avoid

to a prisoner

for

withhold required extra

a

Detaining Power

may not lower safety

lengthen working hours,

equipment,

protective

rations, et cetera, as

standards,

punishment for misbehavior.

more than two hours a
both of which are authorized as

On

the other hand, "fatigue details" of not

day, or the

withdrawal of extra privileges,

disciplinary

punishment, undoubtedly could be imposed,
the terms of the prohibition;

entided under Article 26,

and the extra

when

undoubtedly be withheld from
as

as

they obviously do not fall within

rations to

which

prisoners of war are

they are engaged in heavy manual labor, could

a prisoner

of war who refuses to work, inasmuch

he would no longer meet the requirement for entitlement to such extra rations.
In the usual arrangement contemplated by the Convention for the utilization

of the labor of prisoners of war, the prisoners, each working day, go from their

camp

to their place

of employment, returning to the camp upon the completion

of their working period. However, another arrangement
Convention. Thus, where the place
too

far

at

from any prisoner-of-war camp

which the work

to permit the daily

is

authorized by the

to be accomplished

round

trip, a

is

so-called

may be established. These labor detachments, which were
widely used during World War II, are merely miniature prisoner-of-war camps,
"labor detachment"

established in order to
Article 56

meet more conveniently

a specific labor

requirement.

of the 1949 Convention requires that it be organized and administered

Law
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in the

same manner

as,

of

War

and

prisoner-of-war camp. Prisoners of

as a part of, a

war making up a labor detachment are entided to all the rights, privileges, and
protections which are available under the Convention to prisoners of war
92
assigned to, and living in, a regular prisoner-of-war camp.
However, the fact
that local conditions render

it

impossible to

make

detachment an exact

a labor

of a prisoner-of-war camp does not necessarily indicate

replica

Convention. As long

Convention

the provisions of the

as

respect to the particular labor detachment,

are observed

must be considered

it

of the

a violation

with

to be properly

constituted and operated.

One

worthy of note. While
prisoner-of-war camps be under the "immediate

other point with respect to labor detachments

39 requires that

Article

is

authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to the regular
forces

of the Detaining Power," there

no such requirement

is

detachments. Although each labor detachment
military
will,

commander of

of course, be

against

the

the prisoner-of-war

commissioned

a

assignment of

large

officer, there appears to

number of

probably be established by each belligerent,

officer

it

safe to

who

depends,

be no prohibition
as

the

labor detachments

it is

labor

as to

under the authority of the

camp on which

non-commissioned

a

commander. In view of the

is

armed

immediate

which

will

assume that the great

majority of them will be under the supervision of non-commissioned officers.

A situation under which the

utilization

of prisoner-of-war labor will usually,

although not necessarily, require the establishment of labor detachments

is

they are employed by private individuals or business organizations. This

where
is

the

method by which most of the many prisoners of war engaged in agriculture will
probably be administered. During World War II, prisoners of war performing
labor under these circumstances were frequendy denied the basic living standards

guaranteed to them by the 1929 Convention. Article 57 of the 1949 Convention
specifically provides,

for private

not only that the treatment of prisoners of war working

employers

"shall

not be inferior to that which

present Convention," but also that the Detaining Power,

and the commander of the prisoner-of-war camp
all

to

is

provided for by the

its

military authorities,

which

the prisoners belong,

continue to be responsible for their maintenance, care, and treatment; and

that these prisoners

of war have the right

to

representative in the prisoner-of-war camp.

communicate with the
It

prisoners'

remains to be seen whether the

changes made in the provisions of the applicable international legislation will be
successful in accomplishing their purpose.

One problem which may
employers

Power
does

is

that

arise in the use

of guarding the prisoners of war. Frequendy, the Detaining

will provide military personnel to

so, the

of prisoner-of-war labor by private

guard such prisoners of war.

problems presented are no different from those which

prisoner-of-war

camp

itself.

If paroles

When

it

arise at the

have been given to and accepted by the

Employment
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war concerned, there are likewise no problems peculiar to the
But suppose that civilian guards are used. What authority do they
situation.
have to compel a prisoner of war to work if he refuses to do so? Or to prevent
a prisoner of war from escaping? And to what extent may they use force on

prisoners of

prisoners of war?
If a prisoner

of war assigned to work for

a private

employer

refuses to

do

so,

would unquestionably be to notify the military
commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which he belongs. The latter is in
a position to have an independent investigation made and to impose disciplinary
the proper action to take

or judicial punishment,
If a prisoner

if

and

as

appropriate.

of war assigned to work for

a private

employer

who

provided with military guards attempts to escape, the authority of the

is

not

civilian

extremely limited. That they may use reasonable force, short of firearms,

guards

is

seems

fairly clear.

That the guards may use firearms

highly questionable.

any prisoner of war to

to prevent the escape

is

Detaining Powers would be well advised not to assign
type of labor, where he

this

to

is

be completely unguarded

or guarded only by civilians, unless the prisoner of war has accepted parole, or

Power has evaluated the likelihood of attempted escape by
prisoner of war and has determined to take a calculated risk in his

unless the Detaining

the particular
case.
It

would not be

without
field

at least

appropriate to leave the subject of conditions of employment

passing reference to the possibility of special agreements in this

between the opposing

belligerents. Strangely

enough, despite the

fact that

prisoner-of-war labor has been the subject of special agreements (or of attempts
to negotiate special agreements)

occasions during both

between opposing

World War I and World War II,
Convention

references elsewhere in the 1949

agreements, nowhere in the

prisoner-of-war labor

belligerents

is

articles

on

number of

a

and despite numerous

to the possibility of special

of the Convention concerned with

there any reference

made

to this subject. Nevertheless,

such agreements, provided that they do not adversely affect the rights of prisoners

of war,
as

well

may be
as

negotiated under the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention,

under the inherent sovereign

rights

of the belligerents.

Working Hours, Holidays, and Vacations. Article 53 of the 1949 Convention
covers

all

aspects of the time periods

of daily work,

it

provides that

exceed the work hours for

of prisoner-of-war labor. As to the duration

(1) this

civilians in the

from the job must be included; and
civilian nationals receive
It

must not be
same

(4) a rest

excessive; (2)

district; (3) travel

of

at least

it

must not

time to and

one hour

(longer, if

more) must be allowed in the middle of the day.

thus appears that the

new Convention

predecessor against daily labor which

is

contains the same prohibition as

of "excessive" duration. Here, again,

its

we

have the application of the national standard, and in an area in which such
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standard had proved to be disadvantageous to prisoners of
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War

II.

The Greek Delegation

to the

Diplomatic Conference attempted to

—

maximum of eight hours
maximum of ten hours would

obtain the establishment of an international standard
a

day for

work except

all

where

agriculture,

war during World

a

a

have been authorized. This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected.
already been pointed out with regard to other problems,

where

a national rather

than an international standard has been adopted, very few nations
afford to grant to prisoners

accorded their

own

With

respect to hours of daily work,

that the limitations contained in the article

circumvented by the adoption of piece work, or some other
of a

specific

war could

at

of war more favorable working conditions than those

civilian citizens.

must be noted, too,

As has

number of working

hours.

The Convention

it

cannot be

task system, in lieu

specifically prohibits
102

rendering the length of the working day excessive by the use of this method.

The

minimum

provision for a midday rest of a

subject to the national standard if the latter

war than the

is

more

international standard established

Power

necessary for the Detaining
prisoners of war, if

one hour, but

it

own

its

may

not,

of one hour

new and is

only

favorable to the prisoner of

by the Convention.

to increase the

civilian

is

midday

workers receive

rest

may be

It

period given to

a rest period in excess

under any circumstances, be shortened to

less

of

than

one hour.
Article 53 further provides that prisoners of war shall be entided to a

on Sunday "or

holiday every week, preferably

the day of rest in their country

of origin." Except for the quoted material, which was adopted

the request of

at

but which should be of equal importance to the pious Moslem,

Israel

provision was contained in the 1929 Convention. This provision
to national standards,

And
for

finally, this

one year

and

is

of

whether or not the national standard

same

a vacation

is

every prisoner of war

article grants to

who

minor problems,

permitted to the prisoner of war during

required to do during

this

as,

for example,

lengthy period of detention

not subject
liberal.

worked

has

a

Benefits.

The comparable
less

new

whether normal

what

activity

and what he may be

despite these administrative

to every person

who

undergoes

a

The 1929 Convention

provided,

of war would be "entitled to wages to be fixed by

agreements between the belligerents."

provides for "working pay"

boon

is

prisoner of war.

as a

Compensation and Other Monetary
in Article 34, that prisoners

his "vacation,"

However,

period.

problems, the provision should prove

which may not be

a similar

of eight consecutive days with pay. This provision

a nature to create

concluded.

is

more

days of rest are excluded from the computation of the eight days,
is

24-hour

No

such agreements were, in

fact,

ever

provision of the 1949 Convention (Article 62)

105
in

an amount to be fixed by the Detaining Power,

than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for

a full

working

Employment
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day.

The amount

informed of it,

With regard

as

so fixed

must be

and the prisoners of war must be

"fair"

must the Protecting Power.

by the Detaining Power of a

to the establishment

of pay," several matters should be noted.

rate
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attempting to determine what

working

can be seen for

basis

by endeavoring to compare the "working

"fair"

is

no

First,

"fair

many
extremely nominal minimum

pay" of prisoners of war with the wages of civilian workers. There are too
diverse
set

and unequal

by the Convention

on

and the

factors involved;
is

of the

clearly indicative

fact that there

was no intention

the part of the Diplomatic Conference to establish any such relationship.

Second, while there appears to be nothing to preclude a Detaining Power from
establishing a fair basic

"working

of pay," and then providing for amounts

rate

in addition thereto for work requiring superior skill or heavier exertion or greater

exposure to danger, or
establishing different

as

a

production incentive, no authority

working

rates

exists for

of pay for prisoners of war of different

who have the same competence and are engaged in the same types
And finally, the rate established as "fair" may not thereafter be

nationalities

of work.

by having

administratively reduced
administration.

The

of

part

a

camp

"retained" by the

it

which was contained in Article
been specifically and intentionally deleted from

authority for this procedure,

34 of the 1929 Convention, has
the 1949 Convention.

There

is

one provision of the new Convention which could render this

subject moot.

An individual

account must be kept for each prisoner of war. All

of the funds to which he becomes entitled during the period of
including his working pay, are credited to this account and

made on
Article

behalf or

his

at his

entire

all

his captivity,

of the payments

request are deducted therefrom (Article 64).

34 of the 1929 Convention

Under

then became the obligation of the

it

Detaining Power to deliver to the prisoner of war "the pay remaining to
credit" at the

upon

end of his

Under

captivity.

Article 66 of the

his capture,

and

not

Power in whose armed

forces he

of the Detaining Power, to

these circumstances, there appears to be

settle

little

In effect,
part of

it

its

between

will, for the

part,

of

a

specific

provision

—agreements which,

for

as has

1929 Convention where there was

A

"fair

a

working

the time of

rate

of pay."

a future liability

"working

such

at

Detaining Power

result in the negotiation

belligerents fixing mutually acceptable

lack

its

why

merely be creating

enemy! This factor may

Convention
the

most

was serving

be the

will

it

any balance due him. Under

reason

should not be extremely generous in establishing

the

1949 Convention,

the termination of the captivity of a prisoner of war,

responsibility of the

his

rates

agreements

on

the

of agreements
of pay," despite
in

the

1949

been noted, were not reached under

specific provision for

them.

number of changes have been embodied in the 1949 Convention with
regard to the types of work which entitle a prisoner of war to working pay. Of

Law
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the fact that, while Article 34 of the 1929

is

provided that "prisoners of war

shall

Convention

not receive wages for

work

connected with the administration, management and maintenance of the
[prisoner-of-war] camps," Article 62 of the present
specific that prisoners

Convention

of war "permanently detailed to duties or to

is

equally

a skilled

or

semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration, installation or

maintenance of camps"
a specific

32),

be entided to working pay. This

will

And

pay.

no such

Finally,

assigned as orderlies in officers' camps are specifically

from performing any other work

(Article 44),

it

are,

funds, these individuals,

working pay from the Detaining Power.

too, are entitled to

men

(Article 33) are entided to

while the prisoners' representative and his advisers

primarily, paid out of canteen funds, if there are

enlisted

contains

provision under which non-medical service medical personnel (Article

and retained medical personnel and chaplains

working

article also

because

exempted

appears that they should be

entided to working pay from the Detaining Power.

What of the

prisoner of

war who

contracts an industrial disease

and

the victim of an industrial accident or

is

thereby incapacitated, either temporarily or

is

permanently? Does he receive any type of compensation, and,

if so,

what, when,

from whom, and how?

The Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention of 1899 and to
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 were silent on this problem. The
multilateral prisoner-of-war agreement negotiated at Copenhagen in 1917
adopted a Russian proposal which placed upon the Detaining Power the same
responsibility in this regard that

it

had towards

own

its

British-German agreement, which was negotiated

citizens;

The Hague

at

but the
in 1918,

provided merely that the Detaining Power should provide the injured prisoner

of war with
at

a certificate as to his

Copenhagen was subsequently incorporated

Convention, and in 1940,

Germany enacted
subsequently

a

considered that

it

this

was only required

as

27 of the 1929

this

procedure.
112

policy,

but

111

the

The United States
United Kingdom

to furnish the injured prisoner of

war

ever, in fact,

made to injured prisoners of war
114..

after their repatriation,

drafting the pertinent provisions of the

it is

not surprising that in

1949 Convention the Diplomatic

Conference replaced the 1929 procedure with one more nearly resembling

which had been adopted by the
It

may

British

actually be asserted that there

practice

and the present policy.

all

113

no payments were

by the Detaining Powers

in Article

abortive negotiations with the British,

same

required medical and other care.

Inasmuch

some

after

law implementing

established

The procedure adopted

occupational injury.

and Germans

is little

at

The Hague

difference

that
115

in 1918.

between the previous
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The procedure established by the 1949 Convention is contained in the
somewhat overlapping provisions of Articles 54 and 68. When a prisoner of
war sustains an injury as a result of an industrial accident (or incurs an
industrial disease), the Detaining Power has the obligation of providing him
7

with

all

required care, medical, hospital, and general maintenance during the

period of his disability and continuation in the status of a prisoner of war.

The only other
of war with

obligation of the Detaining

Power

is

provide the prisoner

to

statement, properly certified, "showing the nature of the injury

a

or disability, the circumstances in

or hospital treatment." Also,

Central Prisoners of

War

a

which

copy of

Agency. This

it

arose

this

and

particulars of medical

statement must be sent to the

latter action insures its

permanent

availability.
If the prisoner

of war

desires to

make

a

claim for compensation while

still

in

may do so, but his claim will be addressed, not to the Detaining
Power, but to the Power on which he depends and will be transmitted to it
through the medium of the Protecting Power.
The Convention makes no
that status,

he

provision for the procedure to be followed
reason that the problem

is

a

beyond

domestic one which would be inappropriate for

inclusion in an international convention. Nevertheless,
the long run, the present policy,

which he depends, upon the

more value

probably for the

this point,

by

it

may

well be that, in

transferring responsibility to the

Power upon

repatriation of the prisoner of war, will prove of

to the disabled prisoner

of war than the apparently more generous

policy expressed in the 1929 Convention.
Grievance Procedures. In general, any prisoner of
rights

guaranteed to him by the

war who

1949 Convention

are,

whatsoever, being violated in connection with his utilization

would have
established
(Articles

in

as a

any manner

source of labor,

the right to avail himself of any of the channels of complaint

by the Convention:

to the representatives

78 and 126); to the prisoners' representative

and, perhaps, to representatives of the International
(Articles 9, 79, 81,
it

believes that the

and 126).

119

provision or that
to the prisoner

it

and

81);

Committee of the Red Cross

lists

felt

the classes of authorized labor)

permitting prisoners of war to exercise their right of

complaint, should they consider that a particular

prohibited industry.

(Articles 78, 79,

Nevertheless, the Diplomatic Conference

advisable to include in Article 50 (which

a specific provision

of the Protecting Power

It is

somewhat

difficult to

work assignment

is

in a

perceive the necessity for this

adds anything to the general protection otherwise accorded

of war by the appropriate provisions of the Convention. In

the clanger always exists that

by

this specific

provision the draftsmen

fact,

may have

unwittingly diluted the effect of the general protective provisions in areas where

no

specific provision has

been included.

Levie on the

78

Law

of

War
Conclusion

Utilization of prisoner-of-war labor

and

a

means increased availability of manpower

reduction in disciplinary problems for the Detaining Power, and an active

occupation, better health and morale, and, perhaps, additional purchasing power
for the prisoners
all

of war.

obvious that both sides will have

It is

much

to gain if

of the belligerents comply with the labor provisions of the 1949 Convention.

On

the whole,

improvement
conflict.

it

believed that these labor provisions represent an

is

be accorded prisoners of war in any future

in the protection to

True, they contain ambiguities and compromises which can serve any

belligerent

which are
and which

which is so minded as a basis for justifying the establishment of policies
contrary to the best interests of the prisoners of war detained by it
are probably contrary to the intent

be assumed that nations which have

Convention Relative
capabilities,

be.
this

And,

in

implement

in

its

it as

any event, two

However,

of

it

must

or adhered to the 1949 Geneva

drafting, will, to the

maximum

extent within their

which it was intended to
always present which tend to call forth

the humanitarian charter
factors are

type of implementation: the presence of the Protecting

doctrine

120

reciprocity.

Power and

the

•

Information

implementation of the Convention by
side

drafters.

Treatment of Prisoners of War, many of which

to the

were likewise involved

ratified

of the

to

as

a belligerent

is

the

interpretation

made known

and

to the other

through the Protecting Powers and thus becomes public knowledge with

the resulting effect,

good or bad, on world public opinion.

perhaps complying with a

strict

interpretation of the Convention, are obviously

overly restrictive in an area where a

and could

easily

equally or even

more humanitarian attitude

be employed, will undoubtedly

more

restrictive policy

during

World War

II,

which

sides.

adoption of an

Such

belligerent.

are outlawed,

whether or not justified, can only

of the prisoners of war held by both

appears justified

result in the

by the opposing

retorsion can easily lead to charges of reprisals,
create a situation which,

Policies which, while

result in

and thus

harm

appeared to be disinterested in the effect that their

personnel detained by the enemy,

it is

to

doctrine

pacta

of its

sunt

own personnel will

servanda

own

be hoped that in any future war, even

one which represents the "destruction of an ideology,"
fate

all

While there were nations which,

treatment of prisoners of war was having on the treatment received by their

concern for the

to

scrupulously

121
at

the very

least,

cause each belligerent to apply the
in

establishing

policies

which

implement, among others, the labor provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War

Convention of 1949.
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Prisoner of War," 7 A.J.I.L. 521, 523 (1913).

Employment

79

of Prisoners

Stat. 1803; U. S. Treaty Series, No. 403; 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 129 (1907).
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the requirement to work. Ariga, La guerre russo-japonaise au point de vue de droit international 114 (1907).
But compare Takahashi. who s:aced that Japan did not impose labor on any Russian prisoners ::
,:
International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War 125 (1908).
36. The ICRC states that 26,000 German non-com missioned officer prisoners of war, whose iden:.~
papers had been taken from them in England, were compelled to work while interned in the United States
because of their inability to prove their status. 1 ICRC Report 339. The German General Staff urged Ge rman
the Detaining
35.

non-commissioned officer prisoners of war to work, probably

in order to avoid the deterioration,

and mental, which comes to the completely inactive prisoners of war. Ibid
37. Early in 1945 the U. S. military authorities discovered that many German prisoners

both phy; ical

war had false
documents purporting to prove non-commissioned status. They thereupon required all German prisoners :
war who claimed to be non-commissioned officers to produce proof of such status in the form of a "soldbuch"
or other official document. Thousands were unable to do so and were reclassified as privates. A Brief History
::"

:"

of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, World

War II, 516

(rnirneo., 1946).

To some

extent these

may

have been the same prisoners of war referred to in the preceding note.
38.

It

appears to the writer that the

U.

Army has created problems for itself in this respect by the
men who, although grouped in the same statutory grades
stated not to be such. U. S. Army Regulations 600-201, June
S.

establishment of a "specialist" classification of enlisted
as

non-commissioned

20, 1956.
is

The

strict

evidenced by

army

officers, are specifically

interpretation of the term

"non-commissioned

officers"

contemplated by the U.S.S.R.

expressed desire to limit non-commissioned officer labor exemption privileges to regular

its

("re -enlisted") personnel. Final

Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949

(hereinafter

referred to as Final Record), Vol. IIA, pp. 348, 361, 566.

Commentary 262.
German Regulations, Compilation of Orders No. 13, May 16, 1942. The apparent
this
provision is somewhat nullified by the last two sentences thereof, which indicate that "the
magnanimity of
employment of British non-commissioned officers has resulted in so many difficulties that the latter have by
far outweighed the advantages. The danger of sabotage, too, has been considerably increased there:
41. U. S. War Department Technical Manual 19-500, Enemy Prisoners of War. Q::. 5, 1944, Ch. 5,
39. Pictet,

40. Sec. 59,

Sec.
die

para. 4c.

I,

A draft revision

Army, provides

that "a

of this Manual, which

non-commissioned

is

officer

currently under consideration in the

may,

at

any time, revoke

his

Department of

voluntary request for

work."

Commentary, loc. cit. The Commentary continues with the statement that "during the Second
:cr.:ri;: ::: sn
War, however, prisoners of war were so~e::~es more :: less :rmpe„ei :c sign
indefinite period which bound them throughout their captivity; that would be absolutely contrary to the
present provision. " The present writer confesses himself unable to identify the portion of Art. 49 of the 1949
Convention which so provides, or to deterrnine wherein, in this respect, it differs from the provisions of the
42. Pictet,

Wodd

1929 Convention..

ICRC

Report 337-338.

43.

1

44.

Note 33 above.

45. Statement of Mr. William E. Gardner (U.K.),
Brig.

U.

S.

UA Final Record 442.

Gen. Joseph V. Dillon, then the Proves: Marshal General of the U.
Delegation at Geneva, later wrote:
"Perhaps no section of the Convention gave

rise to

S.

more debate and

than that dealing with 'Labour of Prisoners of War.' At the outset,

it

In a statement in a similar vein,

Air Force, and

a

member of the

expressions of differences c: view

appeared that

all

that could

be agreeu

upon was the fact that the 1929 treatment of the subject was inadequate and ambiguous." "The Genesis of
the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
5 Miami Law Quarterly 40, 51 (1950).
46. Baxter, Book Review, 50 A.J.I.L. 979 (1956).
:

Law

Levie on the

82

Conference of Brussels (1874), note 4 above; Art. 71, "Oxford Manual"

Art. 25, Declaration of the

47.

War

of

(1880), note 4 above.

Second Hague Convention of 1899, notes 2 and 5 above. The only changes incorporated in
Hague Convention of 1907, note 6 above, were periphrastic in nature.
"What constituted a direct relation with war operation was a matter of personal opinion or, indeed,

48. Art. 6,
Art. 6, Fourth
49.

guess." Dillon,
1,

note 45 above,

for. cit.

the Military Tribunal said (8

ibid.

at 52. Similarly, in

the

I.

G. Farben Case (U.

S. v.

Carl Krauch), 7 Trials

1189):

"To attempt a general statement in definition or clarification of the term

'direct relation to war operations'
and students of international law have found highly controversial...."
50. Flory, "Vers une nouvelle conception du prisonnier de guerre?" 58 Revue generale de droit

would be

to enter a field that the writers

international public 58 (1954); Janner, La Puissance protectrice en droit international d'apres les experiences
faites

par

Suisse

la

note 29 above,

pendant

which was

found

States

upon

called

United

op.

cit.

at 13.

The United

51.

seconde guerre mondiale 54 (1948; original in German); Feilchenfeld,

la

make

to

39

a

necessary to establish

it

a

number of decisions

great

Prisoner of
in this area.

War Employment Review

Board,

Mason, "German Prisoners of War

198 (1945). Postwar researchers have collated lists which include literally
which specific decisions were made. Lewis, History 146-147, 166-167, 203;
Tollefson, "Enemy Prisoners of War," 32 Iowa Law Review 51, note on 62 (1946).
52. Draft Revised or New Conventions for the Protection of War Victims 82-83 (Art. 42) (XVIIth
in the

States,"

hundreds of occupations

International

Red

"...

53.

A.J.I.L.

as to

Cross Conference, Stockholm, 1948).

work which

of human beings ..."

normally required for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation and health

is

Final

1

Record

83.

It is

of interest that

this

was

substantially the policy

which had been

followed by the United States in interpreting the provisions of Art. 31 of the 1929 Convention. MacKnight,
loc. cit.

note 31 above,

at

54.

Remarks and Proposals submitted by

54.

Committee of

the International

the

Red

Cross (Diplomatic

Conference, Geneva, 1949) 51-52.

50

55. Art.

reads:

work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance,
compelled
to
be
do only such work as is included in the following classes:
"Besides

(a)

agriculture;

(b)

industries

may

connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and manufacturing

with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical

industries,

prisoners of war

which have no military character or purpose;
transport and handling of stores which are not military

industries; public

works and building

operations
(c)

(d)
(e)
(/)

commercial business, and

and

arts

in character or purpose;

crafts;

domestic service;
public utility services having

no

military character or purpose.

"Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war

shall

be allowed to exercise their right of

complaint, in conformity with Article 78."
In

56.

its

Report

Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference, Committee

to the Plenary

II

(Prisoners

of

War) characterized this article as one which "clarifies [it] by a limitative enumeration of the categories of work
which prisoners may be required to do." 2A Final Record 566. On the contrary, the expression "military
character and purpose" used in subparas.
the basic problem,

Commentary
57. The
Art.

50 were

which

existed

b, c,

when

and/, of Art. 50,

the words

is

almost indefinable. As to these subparagraphs,

"war operations" were used, remains unchanged.

Pictet,

266.
difficulties

typical

experienced in selecting the appropriate verb to be used in the opening sentence of

of the over-all drafting problem. The following terms were contained in or suggested for

the various texts, beginning with the original

ICRC

draft,

which was submitted to the 1948 Stockholm
drafts, amendments, and discussions, until

Conference, and continuing chronologically through the various
final

approval of the

article

by the Plenary Assembly: "obliged to" (note 52 above); "required to"

Record

83); "obliged to" (3

(ibid, at

344); "compelled to" (2B

58.

Par. 77, Prisoner

ibid.

70);

"employed on" (2A

ibid.

176);

ibid.

272); "engaged in"

and "compelled to"

of War Circular No.

1,

(Art. 50,

"a.

That which

is

area. Class

necessary for

one labor includes:
the maintenance or

including barracks, roads, walks, sewers, sanitary

Final

470); "obliged to"

note 55 above).

note 31 above. Para. 78 of the same Circular contained the

following informative enumeration:
"78. Labor in class one is primarily for the benefit of prisoners.

of war camp or to the camp

(ibid, at

(1

facilities,

repair

It

need not be confined to the prisoner

of the prisoner of war camp compounds

water pipes, and fences.

Employment

Labor incident to improving or providing for the comfort or health of prisoners, including work

"b.

connected with the kitchens, canteens,

Work

"c.

fuel,

garbage disposal, hospitals and

within the respective prisoner companies

as

company commander

consideration will be given by the

camp

dispensaries.

cooks, cook's helpers,

and other persons connected with the interior economy of

clerks

83

of Prisoners

cobblers, barbers,

tailors,

their companies. In apportioning

work,

to the education, occupation, or profession

of the

prisoner."

The

59.

of prisoner-of-war labor for the operation and maintenance of military

utilization

occupied by the armed forces of the Detaining Power does not

While many such

administration referred to in the Convention.

uses

of domestic services (cooks, cook's helpers, waiters, kitchen police,
that

fall

installations

within the classification of camp

would probably come within the category
which are authorized, it would seem

etc.),

many others are no longer permitted. (Employment in the Prisoner of War Information Bureau maintained

by the Detaining Power

specifically authorized

is

note 28 above,

60.

Fairchild, op.

61.

In the spring of 1940

employed

tit.

more than 90% of

and while

in agriculture;

by

Art. 122.)

190. See also MacKnight,

at

this figure later

loc. tit.

dropped considerably,

it

note 31 above,

at 57.

war held by the Germans were

the Polish prisoners of

always remained extremely high.

Anon., "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Germany," note 24 above,

50% of the man-months worked

even though more than

work, the demands for such labor could never be

agricultural

to the foregoing occurred in

industry.

in industry
fully

at 317. In the United States,
by prisoners of war were performed in

An exception

met. Lewis, History 125-126.

Canada, where the great majority of prisoners of war were used in the lumbering

Anon., "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Canada," 51 International Labour Review 335,

337 (March, 1945).
62. Pictet,

ICRC
to the
that

it

Commentary

(note 52 above),

266.

which was

It is

Conference, did not include agriculture

be

specifically listed,

and

enumeration originally prepared by the
Convention at the behest of the U.K. Delegation

interesting to note that the

ultimately restored to the
as a separate

item.

A member

of the U.S. Delegation urged

proposal was adopted without discussion or opposition.

his

2A

Record

Final

470.
63.

1

ICRC Report 329.

concerning the
activities,

even

activities

For

example, see note 30 above. Unfortunately,

a specific

of Protecting Powers in

this regard, as

little

data

is

available

they rarely publish any details of their wartime

conclusion of peace (Levie, " Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power, " 55 A.J.I.L.
An unofficial report of Swiss activities as a Protecting Power during World War II is contained

after the

374, 378 (1961)).

injanner, note 50 above.

The

64.

source of some of the wording and punctuation of subpara.

As submitted by Committee

II

(Prisoners of War) to the Plenary

(b)

of Art. 50

is

somewhat obscure.

Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference,

it

read:
".

.

.

manufacturing industries, with the exception of iron and

and of public works, and building operations which have
585-586). Although

this

a military

steel,

machinery and chemical industries

character or purpose" (2A Final

Record

portion of Art. 50 was approved by the Plenary Assembly without amendment, in

the Final Act of the Conference (which

is,

of course, the

official,

signed version of the Convention), the same

provision reads:

"... manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries;
public works and building operations

which have no

military character or purpose" (1 Final

These changes in wording and punctuation (made in the English version only) represent
clarification

and should eliminate many disputes which might otherwise have

interesting to

know

arisen.

Record
a

254).

considerable

However,

it

would be

their origin!

World War

at Nuernberg held:
armament factories and factories engaged
in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war effort." The Milch Case (U. S. v. Erhard Milch), note 25
above, at 867. The decision would, in part, probably have been otherwise had the defense been able to show
that the airplanes were intended exclusively for civilian use.

65. Lewis, History 77. After
".

.

.

as a

matter of law that

66. Pictet,
67.
Art.

it is

illegal to

II

one of the U.

S.

Military Tribunals

use prisoners of war in

Commentary 268-269.

As indicated

in note

50 was reached only

"prisoners of war

may

Power from using

57 above, the decision to use the words "compelled to" in the

after the consideration

and rejection of numerous

alternatives.

first

sentence of

Words such

as

only be employed in" were strongly urged because they would preclude the Detaining

pressure to induce prisoners of

war

to "volunteer" for

work which

they could not be

compelled to do (2A Final Record 343); and words such as "prisoners of war may be obliged to do only"
("compelled to do only") were just as strongly urged on the very ground that the alternative proposal would
preclude volunteering

(ibid,

at

342).

The proponents of

phraseology accepted by the Plenary Assembly.

the latter position were successful in having their

Law

Levie on the

84

See Levie, "Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War," 56 A.J.I.L. 433,

68.

(1962).

The ICRC

in these industries

stores

War

of

which

at

450, note 71

appears to be inconsistent in asserting that the prohibition against prisoners of war working
absolute (Pictet,

is

Commentary
purpose

are military in character or

268), but that prisoners of

(ibid, at

prohibited from compelling prisoners of war to do.
against the voluntary renunciation

of

rights

278),

The

work which

war may volunteer

the Detaining

to handle
is

likewise

statement that the absolute prohibition of Art. 7

by prisoners of war was necessary "because

impossible, to prove the existence of duress or pressure"

Power

89)

(ibid, at

is,

it is

difficult, if

of course, equally applicable to

not

all

of

the prohibitions of Art. 50, but the Diplomatic Conference obviously elected to take a calculated risk in this

regard insofar

prisoner-of-war labor

as

is

concerned.

General Dillon showed considerable restraint when he said
many delegations believed that the phrase "will create some difficulty in future interpretations. "
He had been much more vehement at the Diplomatic Conference! (2A Final Record 342-343.)
70. The test is whether it is intended for military use, and not whether it is intended for use by the
In his article (note 45 above,

69.

merely

at p. 52),

that

A

military.

bowling

clubhouse might be intended, perhaps exclusively, for use by

alley or a tennis court or a

the military, but such structures certainly have

no

military use perse and, therefore, they

do not have

"military

a

purpose."

The

71.

foregoing position closely resembles the legal interpretation of the phrase in question proposed

by the present author and approved by The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army in an
unpublished opinion written in 1955 (JAGW 1955/88). It differs from the ICRC position, which is that
"everything which is commanded and regulated by the military authority is of a military character, in contrast
to what is commanded and regulated by the civil authorities." Pictet, Commentary 267.
72. Flory, op. cit. note 29 above, at 74.
73. The High Command Case (U. S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb), 1 1 Trials 534. No such uncertainty existed
in the minds of the members of the Tribunal with respect to the use of prisoners of war in the construction
of combat zone

field fortifications. Ibid.

74.

Lewis, History 89.

75.

Sec. 738,

76.

Pictet,

city streets

German Regulations, Compilation of Orders No. 39, July 15, 1944.
Commentary 267-268, where a distinction is justifiably drawn between

and clearing

In Pictet,

77.

538.

it

from an important

Commentary
where they

character "in sectors

defile

268, the statement
are

clearing debris

from

used only for military purposes.
is

made

that these public utility services

under military administration." The present writer

finds

have
it

a military

impossible to

agree that the nature of the administration of these public services can determine their inherent character. If
this
is

were

possible, then public utility services administered

normally the

would be

case,

military in character,

by the

military authorities in an occupied area, as

even though originally constructed for and then being

used almost exclusively by the civilian population of the occupied territory.
78. Lewis, History 112;

MacKnight,

loc. cit.

note 31 above,

at

55.

The

latter

continues with the following

statement:

"... The particular task

The specific conditions attending
may be made safe by the use of a proper
circumstances in which the work is required

considered, not the industry as a whole.

is

each job are decisive. For example, an otherwise dangerous task
appliance, and an otherwise safe job rendered dangerous

Work which

by the

may be

safe for those whose training and experience
mentioned in the text has already been discussed above.
79. In determining whether an industry was of a nature to require special study, The Judge Advocate
General of the United States Army rendered the following opinion in 1943:
".
If in particular industries the frequency of disabling injuries per million man-hours is:

to

be done.

have made them adept in

is

dangerous for the untrained

it."

The

third criterion

.

.

"a.
"b.

—

Below 28.0 prisoner-of-war
Between 28.0 and 35.0 the

—

labor

is

generally available therein;

industry should be specifically studied, from the point of view of

hazard, before assigning prisoner-of-war labor therein;
"c.

—prisoner-of-war

Over 35.0

80.

.

Those

Conference

interested in the history

unavailable, except for the particular

and background of

are referred to the following sources:
ibid.

290-295, 298-299;

1

essential thing

Commentary

work

therein

which

is

Pictet,

this

problem and the debate

is

Power and not

the Diplomatic

;

Commentary 277-278.

the personal feelings of any individual

that the prisoner

at

ICRC Report 334; 3 Final Record 70-71 2A ibid. 272-273,

"This rule has the advantage of being clear and easy to apply.

enforced by that

82.

is

.

443-444, 345; 2B
81.

labor

."

not dangerous.

The reference is to objective rules
member of the armed forces. The

concerned may not be the laughing stock of the those around him."

Pictet,

277.

Although prohibitions

against the use of prisoners

Art. 25 of the Declaration of Brussels

of war on humiliating work were contained in

and Art. 71 of the Oxford Manual (note 4 above), there was no similar

Employment

85

of Prisoners

World War II the United States recognized the
employment of prisoners of war on degrading or menial work as a "well settled rule

provision in the 1929 Convention. Nevertheless, during
prohibition against the

of the customary law of nations" (MacKnight,

employment
is

other than their

prohibited for personnel of the U.

than

upon

same

rule

found

is

being prepared by the U.

S.

in the draft

it is

of the

cit.

note 31 above,

such additional rations

as

While

believed that the prohibition

new

directive

on the

and even prohibited

at 54),

(Lewis, History 113).

is

this latter

based upon policy rather

settled policy for the

is

their

type of work

United
which

subject of prisoner-of-war labor

Army.

In addition, Art. 25 prescribes specific

83.

are

Army,

S.

he.

own officers

the "humiliating" nature of an orderly's functions. Apparently this

States, as the
is

as orderlies for

may be

minimum

standards for accommodations; Art. 26 provides for

necessary because of the nature of the labor

employed; and Art. 27 provides that prisoners of war

shall receive

on which

the prisoners of war

work

clothing appropriate to the

to

been asserted that not only must the living conditions of prisoner-of-war laborers
not be inferior to those of local nationals, but also that this provision may not "prevent the application of the
other provisions of the Convention if, for instance, the standard of living of citizens of the Detaining Power

which they are

is

assigned.

It

has

minimum

lower than the

Commentary

standard required for the maintenance of prisoners of war." Pictet,

(2A Final Record 401), at least as to
clothing, it is difficult to believe that any belligerent will provide prisoners of war with a higher standard of
living than that to which its own civilian citizens have been reduced as a result of a rigid war economy.
271. While the draftsmen did intend to establish

two

separate standards

84. Ibid. 275.
85.

Pictet,

86.

2A

87.

It

Commentary 271-272.
Record 275.

Final

could be argued that

a

proper grammatical construction of the provision of the Convention makes

only the protective equipment and not the training subject to national standards. However,

this

is

debatable,

would merely result in the application of an international standard in the very area where
the national standard would probably be highest.
88. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (note 26 above, at 1002)
mentioned "forced labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun" as one of the atrocities committed
against prisoners of war by the Japanese. The motion picture, "The Bridge on the River Kwai," graphically
and, even if true,

it

portrayed the problem.
89. Art. 27 of the

1949 Convention

work

(without regard to the

the climate of the region
90. Art.

at

specifically

mentions

that, in issuing

which they

where

are employed), the Detaining
"
the prisoners are detained.

clothing to prisoners of war

Power

"shall

make allowance

for

89 of the 1949 Convention contains an enumeration of the punishments which may be

administered to a prisoner of war

as a disciplinary

measure for minor violations of applicable

and

rules

regulations.

At the Diplomatic Conference Mr. B.J. Wilhelm, the representative of the International Committee
stated that experience had indicated that the majority of all prisoners of war were maintained
in labor detachments. 2A Final Record 276. This is confirmed by the series of articles which had appeared in
the International Labour Review during the course of World War II. See 47 International Labour Review
169, note 23 above, at 187 (general); 48 ibid. 316, note 24 above, at 318 (Germany); Anon., "The Employment
of Prisoners of War in Great Britain," 49 ibid. 191 (Feb., 1944); and MacKnight, he. cit. note 31 above, at 49
91.

of the

Red Cross,

(United

States).

92.

In addition to the requirements of Art. 56 for the observance of the present Convention in labor

detachments, specific provisions

as

to these detachments are contained in Arts.

33 (medical

services),

35

and 79 and 81 (prisoners' representatives), among others.
93. For example, Art. 25 provides that the billets provided for prisoners of war must be adequately heated.

(spiritual services),

The

fact that the

parent prisoner-of-war

camp

has central heating, while the billets occupied

the labor detachment have separate, but adequate, heating

facilities,

does not constitute

by the

men

a violation

of

of the

Convention.
94. This latter provision

is

included in order to enable them to register

to the representatives
(Arts.
are.

of the

56 and 126), but these

During World

War

II,

above,

at

complaint concerning their

it is

latter are

not always immediately available, while the prisoners' representatives

both Great Britain and the United

military authorities of the treatment of prisoners

"The Employment of

a

below Convention standards. Of course, complaints may also be made
Protecting Power, who may visit these detachments whenever they so desire

treatment, should they believe that

Prisoners of

War

of war

States

provided for inspections by their

who were working

for private employers.

in Great Britain," note 91 above, at 192;

Mason,

he. cit.

own

Anon.,
note 51

212.

95. Members of the U. S. Armed Forces may not accept parole, except for very limited purposes. Code
of Conduct, Exec. Order No. 10631, Aug. 17, 1955, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057; The Law of Land Warfare, FM

Levie on the

86

Law

of

War

S. Army, July, 1956, sec. 187. The British rule is substantially similar. Manual of Military Law, Part
The Law of War on Land, 1958, sec. 246, note 1.
96. In Pictet, Commentary 296, the argument is made, and with considerable merit, that escape is an
of war and that only military personnel of the Detaining Power are authorized to respond to this act of

27-10, U.
III,

act

war with another

act

—

of war

the use of

weapons

against a prisoner

of war. This theory finds support in the

safeguards surrounding the use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially those involved in escapes, found
in Art.

42 of the 1949 Convention.
See, for example, the World

War I agreements listed in note 19 above, and Lauterpacht, "The
Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War," 29 Brit. Yr. Bk. of Int. Law 360, 373 (1952).
98. By becoming parties to the Convention they have given up their sovereign right to enter into special
agreements adversely affecting the rights guaranteed to prisoners of war by the Convention.
99. Statement of Mr. R.J. Wilhelm, the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
97.

2A

Final

Record 275.

100.

2B ibid. 300.
The Conference of Government

101.

Experts called by the

ICRC

in

1947 had

originally considered

maximum working hours, but finally decided against it as being "discrimination in favour of PW, which
would not be acceptable to the civilian population of the DP." Report on the Work of the Conference of

setting

Government Experts 176
note 23 above,

"The

(1947).

As

stated in

Anon., "The Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War,"

194:

at

prisoner cannot expect better treatment than the civilian workers of the detaining Power.... His

depends upon the extent to which the standards of the country where he
through the exigencies of the war."
fate

During World

102.

at

imprisoned have been lowered

War

II, many countries used the piece or task-work method of controlling
Commentary 282; Anon., "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Canada,"

prisoner-of-war labor. Pictet,

note 61 above,

is

337. In the United States the piece-work system was used, but to control pay rather than

below the minimum prescribed by the
Convention, there would appear to be no objection to this procedure.
103. Nor was it subject to national standards in the 1929 Convention, but the Germans refused to accord

work

hours. Lewis, History 120-121. As long as the pay does not drop

prisoners of

war

weekly day of rest on the ground

a

that the civilian population did not receive

it.

Janner,

note 50 above.

op.cit.

104.

Pictet,

ICRC Report 286.
"working rate of pay" twice and to "working pay" four times, while Arts.
"working pay." The term "indemnite de travail" is used in the French version of all

Commentary

313;

105. Actually, Art. 62 refers to

54 and 64
of these
Experts

refer only to

articles
at

"It

and the difference in English appears to be an error in

the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (2A Final

his

drafting.

The

report of the Financial

states:

appeared that the expression 'wages' was inappropriate and might give the impression that prisoners

of war while fed and housed

work

Record 557)

at a rate

at

the cost of the Detaining

Power were

in addition

being remunerated for their

corresponding to the remuneration of a civilian worker responsible for maintaining himself and

family out of his wages. For this reason,

it

was decided

to substitute the terms

'working pay' wherever

this

was necessary."
106.

The inadequacy of the minimum set by the Convention, which amounts to approximately six cents
money of the United States (approximately 5 d. in British money), is illustrated by the fact that almost

a

day in

a

century ago, in 1864, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government set the rate of prisoner-of-war

pay

at

War II

ten cents

a

day for the

skilled

and

five cents a

day for the unskilled! Lewis, History 39. During World

the United States paid prisoners of war 80 cents a day.

Ibid, at

77.

Under the

incentive of the piece-work

was possible to increase this to $1.20 a day. Ibid, at 120.
107. For some of these differences, see the quotation in note 105 above, and Mojonny, The Labor of

system

it

Prisoners of

Commentary

War 24

(unpublished

thesis,

Indiana University,

1954).

For

a

contrary view, see Pictet,

115.

108. During World War II the Germans habitually paid Soviet prisoners of war as little as one-half of the
amount paid to prisoners of war of other nationalities. Dallin, note 25 above, at 425. Art. 16 of the 1949
Convention specifically prohibits "adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria."
109. This was the policy followed by the United States during World War II. Prisoner of War Circular
No. 1, note 31 above, sec. 85.
110. Flory, op. cit., note 29 above, at 79-80. The prisoner-of-war agreement concluded between France
and Germany in 1915 had still a different approach: it provided that, upon repatriation, prisoners of war who

had suffered industrial accidents would be treated

Concerning Accidents

to

War

Prisoners

Employed

as

wounded

combatants. Rosenberg, "International

in Private Enterprises,"

36

A.J.I.L. 294,

297 (1942).

Law

Employment
111. Lauterpacht,

"concerning the

loc.

cit.

note 97 above. Lauterpacht

ofWar

Circular

No.

1,

the negotiations

as

"elaborate" and

as

of the interpretation of Article 27."

relatively trivial question

112. Prisoner

labels

87

of Prisoners

note 31 above,

sees.

91 and 92; MacKnight,

loc. cit.

note 31 above,

at 63.

113. Lauterpacht,

loc. cit.

114. E.g., Lewis, History 156.

Manual of Military Law, op. cit. note 95 above, sec. 185, note 1, the statement is made
World War II negotiations the United Kingdom "considered that its domestic workmen's
compensation legislation was too complex and so bound up with the conditions of free civilian workmen as
to make it impracticable to apply it to prisoners of war." That position has become no less valid with the
115. In the British

during the

that

end of that war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (6 U. S. Treaties 3516; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (1:973); 50 A.J.I.L. Supp. 724 (1956)) place
upon the Detaining Power the additional burden of providing compensation for occupational accidents and
diseases. The variation between the two conventions was noted by the Co-ordination Committee of the
Diplomatic Conference (2B Final Record 149), but Committee II, to which had been assigned the
responsibility for preparing the text of the prisoner-of-war convention, determined that such a provision was
not necessary for prisoners of war (2 A Final Record 402).
117. The suggestion has been made that, "since under Article 51, paragraph 2, he [the prisoner of war]
is covered by the national legislation [of the Detaining Power] concerning the protection of labour," a prisoner
of war disabled in an industrial accident or by an industrial disease would, while still a prisoner of war, be
entitled to benefit from local workmen's compensation laws. Pictet, Commentary 286-287. It is believed that
the application of this general provision of the Convention has been restricted in this area by the specific
passing of the years since the

116. Arts. 40 and 95 of the 1949

provision

on

this subject.

118. Anon.,

"The Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War." note 23 above,

at

182; Pictet,

loc.

cit.

119.

The

availability

of the

latter as a

channel of complaint

is

not clearly defined. Levie, "Prisoners of

War

and the Protecting Power," loc. cit. note 63 above, at 396.
120. The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross

are likewise a

major deterrent

to the

improper application of the Convention.
121. Statement of German General Keitel, quoted in the "Opinion and Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal," 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 228-229 (1947).
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Mun Jom

Magazine 10 (March 1965)'

July 1951 the writer, then an Army legal officer stationed in Tokyo, was
Insuddenly
ordered to an undisclosed destination in Korea, for an undisclosed

purpose, for about two weeks. In view of what was being discussed
length over the radio and in the press,

it

was not

assigned mission was to help negotiate with the

Communists

for an armistice to

was the

of the original

last

difficult to

opening of the

conclude that the

North Korean and Chinese

end fighting in Korea. One year later the writer

staff to

return to Tokyo, and there

agreement with the Communists on such an armistice. In

was not reached

at great

until July, 1953,

two

years rather than

still

fact, that

was no

agreement

two weeks

after the

talks!

To write with purported authority on the basis of experiences which occurred
more than a decade ago would be presumptuous in most areas of human conduct.
Not so with respect to the negotiating techniques employed by the Communists.
In this regard they

all

wear the same old school

or Chinese, Bulgarian or North Korean.
reports concerning negotiations with

tie,

whether they

are

Russian

A perusal of both official and unofficial

Communists conducted

ago, or a decade ago, will quickly reveal the use of some or

all

yesterday, a year

of the definitely

non-diplomatic methods early adopted by Soviet negotiators. Subsequently they

have been developed and refined until they have become standard operating

procedure for any self-respecting Communist

who

is

given the

task

of

negotiating with representatives of a "decadent" capitalistic system.

Without attempting
things

which impressed

armistice

negotiations

representative,
inferiority

attitude

is

to

be

a psychiatrist,

the United Nations

was

that,

from senior delegate

it is

safe to say that

Command (UNC)

without

exception,

one of the
personnel

every

first

at

the

Communist

to substitute interpreter, suffered

from an

complex. This "chip-on-the-shoulder," "I'm-as-good-as-you-are"

undoubtedly one of the many things which makes negotiations with

Communists

so difficult. Perhaps Soviet successes in space

and Chinese nuclear

successes will mitigate this, but psychiatrists will probably agree that a complete
*

Revised and reprinted from

Sidelights

on

American Bar Association Journal 730

the

Korean Armistice Negotiations,

(1962).
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change

in

Law

of

War
many more

mental attitude will require

this

and

successes

a

considerable period of time.

The
the

publicly expressed

UNC

provide

a

walks around

its

lift

side

opposition to the use of helicopters by

was unquestionably motivated by

representatives

helicopter

Communist

own

for their

their inability to

When the UNC put in gravel
Pan Mun Jom, the Communists
When the UNC lined the sides

personnel.

of the conference area

at

immediately put in gravel walks on their

side.

of its walks with rocks, they lined the

of their walks with bricks and painted

sides

When the UNC planted small fir trees in its area, they planted big
ones in theirs. When the UNC installed green sentry boxes to protect its military
them white.

police

from the weather, they countered with sentry boxes for their guards which

were painted

barber poles

like

—

until jokes

by the Western correspondents

caused them to reconsider and repaint. Similarly,
inferiority

complex which caused the almost

negotiators

stop

referring

hysterical

Communist

the

to

was undoubtedly

it

demands

side

"North

as

Communists" and "Chinese Communists" and give them

that the

this

UNC

Korean

their "rightful' names,

"Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea" and "Chinese Peoples' Volunteers."

Another
a

characteristic

which appears

be endemic

to

among Communists

complete lack of a sense of humor and an accompanying marked

is

inability to

be on the receiving end of a joke. The incident of the sentry boxes which has
just

been mentioned was one example of this. Another involved

Nations

who

claimed that he was

a spy for the

United

Command. The UNC liaison officers demanded and obtained his return

and the Western

press treated the

whole thing as

references to the ten-year-old "master spy."

the

ten-year-old

UNC convoy into the neutral zone. He

Korean boy who one day followed the
was arrested by the Communists

a

a

There were no further attempts by

Communists, except behind the bamboo

particular incident. Similarly,

of Korea

Army

Communists,

when

in returning the

men

curtain, to capitalize

on

that

anti-epidemic team of the Republic

a small

inadvertently drove

huge joke, making numerous

truck into the neutral zone the

its

to the

UNC

liaison officers, labeled the

incident a "very serious violation" of the agreement creating the neutral zone.

The Western
zone by

press

soldiers

wrote humorous

armed

to the teeth

stories

with

about the "invasion of the neutral

DDT spray guns," and nothing further

was heard about the matter from the Communists.

When

the meetings began at Kaesong, the

possible to create the impression that they

personnel

were

the

visiting

suppliants.

Communists did everything

were the

hosts

Communist

and

that the

guards

sub-machine guns swarmed around the entire conference

area.

armed with
Packages of

Chinese cigarettes and decanters of Chinese wine were on the conference

And

the

Communists attempted

party and refused to pass a

to dictate

who

UNC

could be included in the

table.

UNC

UNC convoy which included news correspondents.

Pan Mun Jom
Within

twenty-four

General

hours

Matthew

Ridgway.

B.
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UNC

the

Commander, ordered the conferences halted and laid down the terms upon
which he would permit them to be resumed. The Communists quickly agreed.
This was the first of a number ot occasions upon which an immediate display
of

and irrevocable intent brought quick acquiescence from the

firm

a

Not

Communists.
disappeared.

armed guards but the cigarettes and wine
perhaps appropriate to add that none of the UNC personnel

It is

only

the

had ever availed themselves of the

more

or

less

conference

intentionally,

Amencan

"hospitality"

were

cigarettes

and

that

when,

overnight on the

left

would be found untouched the following day.
advent ot the Communist era, the agenda was something upon
they

table,

Until the

Commumst

which agreement was normally reached during
diplomatic conference if not before hand.

Now,

the

first

few minutes of

a

reaching an agreement on the

agenda sometimes has become harder than reaching agreement on substantive
matters. This

is

primarily because of the Communists' attempt to tnck the other

by means of the wording on agenda items.

side into concessions

For example, both

sides

were agreed

the very outset that there should be

at

an item concerned with the selection of a military demarcation
line

The

between

UNC

the opposing military forces once the cease-fire

"Establishment of the thirty-eighth parallel

Obviously,

have been

after

little

The Communists

military demarcation line."

a

proposed terminology, submitting

this

became

dividing
effective.

delegation proposed that this subject be included under the rubric

"Establishment of
accept

line, a

refused to

as a

counter-proposal the phrase

a

military demarcation line."

as

agreement on such wording for the agenda item, there would

need

tor substantive discussions.

Any

the military demarcation line at a point other than

attempt to discuss locating

at

the thirty- eighth parallel

would have met with an immediate complaint by the Communists that the
discussion was not within the framework of the mutually accepted agenda and
with absolute refusal to take part in negotiations which would "violate" the now
sacrosanct agenda. Here, again, the
the

UNC

Communists eventually accepted

the

make any concession and
UNC-proposed terminology which
refused to

thus permitted the substantive discussions to cover a

demarcation

lines

Parenthetically,

with the

it is

battle line finally

whole range of suggested

being agreed upon for that purpose.

interesting to recall that while

it

took

many months

to get

Commumsts to abandon the thirty-eighth parallel, some months thereafter,
when the UNC suggested using that line for determining which civilian refugees
would be entitled to be sent to the other side, the Commumsts asserted that the
the

UNC
It is

was attempting

to revive the "obsolete" thirty-eighth parallel.

comparatively simple to trace the continuity over the years of the use ot

the agenda technique

by the Commumsts. The problem of China

has,

of course,

plagued the United Nations since early in 1950. The difference between the

Levie on the
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traditional

approach

Law

of

War

approach to the establishment of an agenda item and the Communist
is

well illustrated by the

two items

Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1961.

Zealand,

worded so

as to

on the agenda of the

inscribed

New

The item proposed by

permit complete discussion of all aspects of the problem,

was: "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations."

item proposed by the

USSR

(which was then

still

acting as

Communist

The

China's

sponsor in the United Nations), was: "Restoration of the lawful rights of the
Peoples' Republic of China."

The

use of tactful language in international negotiations

decadence

of bourgeois

in

so

far

(Khrushchev's shoe-pounding performance

Nations

General

representatives,

Assembly,

was

which

probably

so

the

UNC

United

concerned.

are

astounded

most

non-Communist

be

quite

normal

to

Any

and reasonable." Just

by

the

made was
any proposal made by

proposal that they

as invariably,

was labeled "absurd and arrogant." Libelous statements about the

States, the

Republic of Korea and the Republic of China were the

Communist order of

the

day.

Every

"barbarous" and "criminal" and every
"fabrication."

the

merely evidence

the 1960 meeting of the United

at

considered

representatives of the satellite nations.)

invariably labeled "fair

Communists

the

as

is

It

was obvious

that

all

UNC action was characterized as
UNC statement as "deceitful" and a

of this was part of a strategy aimed

UNC negotiators lose their tempers,

at

making

the theory probably being that

when

emotionally disturbed, unintended statements might be inadvertently made. But

whatever the theory, the plan

failed to

work

as

the

UNC representatives, naive

some of them may have been when the negotiations began, quickly came to
appreciate what was being attempted and had no difficulty in avoiding the pitfall
which had been so carefully prepared for them. In fact, the Communists soon
as

found

it

necessary to completely reverse their tactics and to attempt to induce

reciprocity

by purported loss of temper on

be turned on and off like water from

amused
less

their side, loss of temper

a faucet. After a

few

polite but patently

requests that they stop yelling across the table, this tactic

abandoned, especially

yelling in Chinese or

when one of the

Korean served no

which could
was more or

UNC staff officers pointed out that

useful purpose since

it

was

in a language

he did not understand.

Major General

(later

General)

Henry

I.

Hodes, one of the original members

of the United Nations

Command Delegation and the senior member of the first

UNC sub-delegation

(the other

was Rear Admiral Arleigh. A. Burke,

Admiral and Chief of Naval Operations), had

a

faculty

for

later

rubbing

an
his

Communist counterpart, Chinese Major General Hsieh Fang, the wrong way.
The informal sub-delegation meetings on the military demarcation line had
come to a complete halt. After both sides had maneuvered for some time with
no perceptible progress being made, General Hodes suggested that a coin be

Pan Mun Jom
tossed to determine

who would

"break the ice." Hsieh Fang indicated great

astonishment that General Hodes would be willing to
matter be determined by the

employed was

a

toss

93

of a coin.

To him

let

such an important

the negotiatory technique

matter of the utmost importance. General Hodes was just

interested in getting the discussions

attempted to indicate

his

moving.

low regard

On

for the

another occasion, Hsieh Fang

United Nations

Delegation by referring to Admiral Joy (almost a Chinese name)

as

Command

"your Senior

whose name I do not recall." General Hodes answered him by
referring to the Communist Senior Delegate and adding the phrase "whose name
I trust you do recall." That ended that interchange very quickly.
When the UNC negotiators had no objection to something proposed by the
Communists they would unhesitatingly so state. Not so the Communists. They
would concede that their views were generally the same as those expressed by
the UNC representative, or that they could see no reason why agreement should
not be reached on the matter under discussion. It was just plain impossible to
get them to say a simple "yes." Naturally, there was much speculation on the
UNC side that this difficulty arose because the Communist representatives were
not permitted on their own initiative to agree on even a minor administrative
matter. No such difficulty was encountered when it came to getting them to
Delegate,

say

no.

Over the course of time both sides became very reticent about the manner
in which they proposed compromises. The UNC negotiators soon found that
if they offered a compromise position somewhere between the announced
positions of the two sides, the Communists would reject it out of hand, but that
for all subsequent negotiations the two extremes were the original Communist
position and the UNC compromise proposal. The UNC negotiators evened the
score when the Communists made a proposal calling for agreement to a demand
made by UNC on one matter in return for UNC agreement to a Communist
demand on an entirely unrelated matter. The UNC accepted the Communist
concession on its demand and declined to agree to the Communist demand on
the other matter. It worked
but only once.
The Communists were either amazingly unimaginative or severely restricted
when it came to administrative matters. Every suggestion without exception for
expediting the progress of the negotiations was made by the UNC
representatives. And that wasn't because they jumped the gun, either. On a
number of occasions the UNC representatives would ask the Communists for
a suggestion as to how some administrative matter should be handled. The
Communists would come right back and ask for the UNC opinion. It would
be given to them, and the next day they would agree to it, usually with some
minor and unimportant modification made just to show that they had had a
hand in reaching the decision. Incidentally, Navy Lieutenant Horace G.

—
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Underwood,

the senior

to adopt the policy
all

Law

interpretations

of

War

UNC interpreter, stated that he had found

of intentionally inserting

at least

one

fairly

it

necessary

obvious error in

on which agreement was required, because then the

Communists would be satisfied when they corrected the error, whereas, if there
was no error, they invariably proposed some change in substance. More
inferiority
If

complex?

any reader of

chore

of negotiating with

undoubtedly
to say that

nature.

this article

will

encounter

Communist

should ever have the necessary but exhausting
representatives

many of the

of

a

Communist

nation,

techniques discussed here. For

it is

he
safe

negotiating techniques are as immutable as the laws of
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Law Review 323

University

After the adoption of the

War

(1968)'

Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by

the Congress of the United States in August, 1964,

American

increase in the

and

parallel increases in

accordance with
Cross

its

Vietnam

In

military presence in

there was a substantial

South Vietnam and consequent

the range and extent of belligerent activities. In

customary practice, the International Committee of the

(hereinafter referred to as the

ICRC) thereupon

addressed a letter to the

pointing out that they had

several parties to the conflict,

Red

all

ratified

or adhered

and were bound by, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of

to,

Victims of War.

The

ICRC

reminded the

parties

of their

and requested information

under the Conventions,

as to

specific obligations

the measures being

upon them.
concerned. The United

taken by each of them to conform to the duties devolving

Replies were received from
advised that

it

all

of the

parties

States

"has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in

Geneva conventions and will continue to do so." Specifically, it affirmed
that it was "applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions [in Vietnam]

the

and

we

expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise."

of Vietnam (hereinafter referred to

was

"fully

as

'

The Republic

South Vietnam) assured the

ICRC that it

prepared to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and

to contribute actively to the efforts

of the International Committee of the

Red

Cross to ensure their application."

The

reply received

referred to as
to

from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

North Vietnam) was the

usual propaganda tirade

(hereinafter

which appears

be endemic in Communist documents, thus making it rather difficult to

any truly responsive portions. However, the

would "regard

the pilots

who

letter did state that

have carried out

isolate

North Vietnam

pirate-raids, destroying the

property and massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of

major [war] criminals caught in flagrante delicto and

Vietnam,

as

judgment

in accordance with the laws

although

captured pilots

are

well

(hereinafter referred to as the
*

Reprinted in 2

ed., 1969).

liable for

of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

treated."'

NLF), the

The National
political

Liberation

arm of the Vietcong,
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Law
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of

refused to apply the Conventions, stating that

which others beside

international treaties to

however, affirmed

above

enemy wounded were

all,

This

that the prisoners

article has

it

"was not bound by the

it

itself subscribed.

.

.

.

[T]he

NLF,

held were humanely treated and that,

collected and cared for."

well-defined limitations in scope.

will

It

be concerned solely

with some of the instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war which constitute
violations of several of the

more important humanitarian

provisions of the 1949

Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention, or of customary international law, which
appear to have occurred during the course of the fighting in Vietnam.

NLF

Unfortunately, the positions taken by North Vietnam and the
at

some

least

discussion of the problems created

by

10

necessitate

toward

their attitude

compliance with the humanitarian aspects of the law of war and by the question
of the applicability of the Convention under the circumstances which

exist in

Vietnam.
I.

Past

Communist

Practice With Respect to the Treatment
of Prisoners of

Inasmuch

as

the long

War

of States which have

list

ratified

or adhered to the 1949

Geneva Conventions contains all of the Communist countries, including the
major sponsors of North Vietnam and the NLF, viz the USSR and the People's
Republic of China, it is obvious that the refusal of North Vietnam and the NLF
to consider themselves bound by even the limited humanitarian provisions
enumerated in Article 3 of the Convention cannot be because these provisions
The
are in any manner contrary to the Communist concept of the law of war.
only alternative

is

to

assume that they consider that

it is

in their

own self-interest

not to be under any of the constraints imposed by a requirement to comply with
these purely humanitarian aspects of the law of war.

armed

even

hostilities,

as a rebel in a civil

However, one engaged

in

war, cannot thus divest himself of the

requirement to comply with those portions of the law of war which constitute
a part

of the customary

nations

—

and, as

we

rules

of international law recognized by

shall shortly see in

of the Convention, for the most

A. The

USSR

during World

During World

War

II,

the
15
"

part,

more

fall

detail, the

within

all

civilized

provisions of Article 3

this category.

War II

USSR

acknowledged

that

it

was bound by the

Geneva Wounded-and-Sick
Convention, and took the position that the provisions of these two agreements
covered "all the main questions of captivity."
Based upon this statement the
1907

Hague Regulations

and

the

1929

\(\

ICRC

assumed

prisoners of war

that there

would

and of mail and

be,

among

other things, exchanges of lists of

relief packages,

and

that

its

delegates

would be

Maltreatment of Prisoners
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permitted and enabled to enter Russia and to inspect prisoner-of-war camps
located in that country. This was also the assumption of the enemies of the

USSR.

Despite continuous efforts on the part of the

these things ever eventuated.

by the
into

USSR

to the alleged

enemy hands was

ICRC, however, none of

18

One author ascribed this negative policy adopted
"official Soviet position, that any soldier who fell

ipso facto

traitor

a.

and deserved no protection from

his

government."
B. North Korea

During the Korean
its

to

forces

were

hostilities the

"strictly

Prisoners of

North Korean Government announced that

abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect

War";

and in the lengthy dispute during the armistice

negotiations regarding "forced repatriation" of prisoners of war, the

Korean and Chinese Communists

North

on certain articles of the
Despite this, only two lists of American prisoners of war,
1949 Convention.
totalling just 110 names, were ever sent to the Central Tracing Agency of the
ICRC in Geneva (in August and September 1950, shordy after hostilities began),
relied very heavily

21

death marches occurred, prisoners of war were inadequately fed, and mail was

allowed only on an irregular

Repeated

efforts,

negotiations,

some propaganda

purpose).

which continued even during the course of the

armistice

basis (usually to serve

were unsuccessful

a delegate into

North Korea

in obtaining permission for the

to inspect the prisonerof-war

camps

ICRC

to send
22
located there.

C. North Vietnam

Now,

in Vietnam,

we

have

a third instance

of a Communist regime (North

Vietnam) which has agreed to be bound by a humanitarian war convention but
which,

when

declines to

the conditions arise under

comply with

its

provisions.

provide the names of persons held

as

which the convention
North Vietnam

is

to

be applied,

persists in refusing to

prisoners of war, refusing to permit

correspondence between the prisoners of war and their families, and refusing to

ICRC

permit the neutral
to

delegates to inspect the prisoner-of-war

be able to determine whether the prisoners of war

humane treatment

to

committed

provide. Similarly, the

in

itself to

any way, even by
It

would seem,

which they

are entitled

camps

so as

are, in fact, receiving the

and which

that

regime long ago

NLF

refuses to consider itself bound
23
the limited provisions of Article 3 of the Convention.

at this point, to

countries, while ready to

become

be

fairly

well established that the

parties to

Communist

humanitarian war conventions, are

not ready to comply with their provisions, for they are either not concerned

about obtaining reciprocal treatment for their captured personnel,

or, possibly,

Law
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War

of

may assume that by their present method they will
treatment for Communist personnel without any need to
they

is

what

result

humane

reciprocate

—which

Korea and Vietnam. Unfortunately, the

has actually occurred in both

of this procedure can only be that eventually the other side in international

armed

conflicts,

and the established government in

Convention

refuse to apply the

applied by the

much

obtain

still

until confirmation

Communist side.

Although

this

armed

civil

of the

conflicts, will

fact that

procedure certainly would leave

be desired from the immediate humanitarian point of view,

to

being

it is

it

might,

in the long run,

prove to be more humanitarian to the greater number of persons.

Of course,

argument would undoubtedly be made,

the

in opposition to such a

procedure, that the obligation to comply with the Convention does not depend

upon
and

reciprocity, but

upon

the undertaking

made

to

all

the other parties thereto,

withdrawn

creates individual rights
25
because of the failure of one side to comply.

be

is

true,

it

unquestionably going to be increasingly

country engaged in armed conflict with

a

government engaged

a

Communist

in civil strife

prisoners of

war

with

international law.

They

the benefits of the

must be

which the

point

at

provisions of the

Convention

releases

benefits

its

own

of customary

to take the position that there

of the Communist

refusal

persuade a

Convention while

minimum

undoubtedly tend

will

difficult to

Communist country, or an established
Communist uprising, that it must give

captured personnel do not even receive the

a

which may not be
While this may well

Convention

that the

also

side to

comply with the

from

the other side

obligations

its

thereunder.

II.

Does

Whether

Article

2 of the 1949 Convention Apply

the fighting

which

is

war

armed

dispute.

the official position of the United States that

in

Vietnam

is

conflict or a civil

has been the subject of considerable

an international armed conflict.

support from unofficial sources.

28

it is

what

is

taking place

This position has received

'

Opponents of United

the Vietnamese hostilities assert that

Vietnam?

taking place in Vietnam constitutes an

international
It is

in

a civil war.

States participation in

Before proceeding to

a

discussion of specific instances of the improper treatment of prisoners of war,
let us

examine the law applicable under the various

The

first

paragraph of Article 2 of the 1949 Convention provides

[T]he present Convention
armed

possibilities.

conflict

which may

shall

arise

Parties, even if the state of war

The meaning of the quoted
of the Convention

in

is

apply to

all

cases

of declared war

or of

that:

any other

between two or more of the High Contracting
not recognized by one of them. (Emphasis added).

provisions

1949 has any

is

clear;

and

at

no time

since the drafting

state indicated the existence

of any question

Maltreatment of Prisoners
with respect to that meaning. In

fact,

it

is

among

99

those provisions of the

Convention which have been given both uniform interpretation and general
,

approval.

30

The only

specific legal

excuse ever advanced by North Vietnam for

Convention

insistence that the

is

its

not applicable, and that persons captured by

it

by the Convention,
beyond dispute that there

are not entided to the humanitarian protections afforded

no "declared war." It is surely
an "armed conflict" in Vietnam between two or more of the

has
is

been

that there

is

Convention. Under these circumstances, the
declaration of war, or that a state of

war

parties to the

that there

fact

not recognized

been no

has

existing,

is

completely irrelevant to the requirement to apply the Convention. There

is,

then,

no

Vietnam

validity

to justify

its

its

present

Article 2 leaves

refusal to apply the

legal reason

as

put forward by North

Convention by which

it

voluntarily

number of years before the armed conflict in Vietnam
32
The wording used in drafting the first paragraph of
status.

bound

elected to be

reached

whatsoever to the sole

is

a

no doubt

that

it

was the intent of the Diplomatic Conference

which approved it that the Convention be applicable in every instance of the
and, beyond any shadow of doubt,
use of armed force in international relations
this intent was attained. It appears equally clear that the refusal of North Vietnam
apply the Convention under the circumstances which exist in
to
Vietnam whether or not the United States is "waging a war of

—

—

aggression"

33

—

constitutes a blatant disregard of an international obligation,

freely accepted.

III.

Does

Article 3 of the
35

miniature,"
in

single

a

or

Article 3 of the

Convention

in

Vietnam?

34

sometimes referred to
"convention in
-36
"mini-convention."
The draftsmen attempted include
as a

is

to

as a

article

those

manner,

humanitarian

basic

prisoner-of-war status somewhat
a relatively simple

Convention Apply

less

provisions

horrendous than

calling to the attention

it

inherently

their actions

from the very

outset.

is

render

—

thus, in

of the participants in

non-international armed conflict the specific humanitarian rules
'

which

Unfortunately, even

a

which control
this

minunum

approach has frequently proven unsuccessful.

The
civil

idea of including in an international convention a provision regulating

wars was extremely novel.

While the

ICRC

had been aiming for such

an extension of the Geneva-type Conventions for
successful in this respect until the

many

years,

1949 Diplomatic Conference.

it

was not

The main

objection voiced during the discussions in committee and in the plenary sessions

of the Diplomatic Conference was that under

number of

the proposals the

government would seemingly be required to apply the Convention
cases of brigandage.
The other problem that had to be solved was the

established

even in

a

1

Levie on the

00

determination

as to
4

case be applied.

'

Law

of

War

which provisions of the Convention should in an appropriate
The compromise ultimately adopted left the term "armed

of an international character" undefined

conflict not

determination to

make

the other hand, the

minimum provisions which

application of the entire

enumerated

Convention

the effect of Article 3 of the

working

the

is

concerned,

if it is a party to

much

Article 3 just as

Convention
is

in

The foregoing

How,

is

—

theories

is

it is

would be bound by

is

the established

bound by
all

an "armed

parties to

government

the provisions of

of the provisions of the

And

the same

to support either side in a civil war.

Where

with respect to the obligation of the insurgents.

was even contemplated,

this

USSR had proposed).

Convention, an action perhaps taken many years before the

the position taken

basis

the

be asked, can the action of the established government in becoming

a party to the

rebellion

conflict

caused comparatively few legal problems.

has

however,

arise,

will

it

far as

Convention

which intervene

On

had done) or of all

an armed conflict of an international character.

true of third states

problems

as it

the

(as

draft

Convention on the

of an international character?" As

conflict not

armed

a

length, rather than providing for the

at

(as

the parties to the

provisions falling within certain broad categories
is

was

in effect,

the term as broad and all-encompassing as possible.

are obligated to apply are

What

—which,

the

by the NLF.

most

under which

of Article 3 can be

now
48

be held to bind the insurgents
•

While

that can be said for

it

may have some minimum

it

—

•

3, that

number of valid legal
bound by the provisions

-50

49
fully justified.

by the provisions of Article

bound
conclusion which

specifically state that insurgents

is

legal

there are a

a finding that the insurgents are

While Soviet legal writers do not

This

'

?

certainly the only logical

are

can be drawn from their writings. Thus, their widely distributed textbook

states:

[T]he Soviet delegation secured the [1949 Diplomatic] Conference's recognition

of

a

number of important humane

clauses

which were included

in the

new

Conventions. For example, the obligatory character of the application during

armed
the

conflicts

of an international character of such principles

has

as

taking a direct part in military operations or

have ceased to take part in these operations

captivity,

as a result

of sickness,

illness

or

was recognized ....

been

said that the established

applying Article

make

are not

humane treatment of persons not

who

It

which

3, "for

government cannot be prejudiced by

no Government can

possibly claim that

it is

entitled to

inhuman acts prohibited by the Convention as a
52
It would certainly seem that this argument
means of combating its enemies."
is equally applicable to the insurgent party, for how can armed conflict be
conducted with different rules controlling the actions of the two contending
sides

use of torture and other

?

Maltreatment of Prisoners
Finally, there

is

much

Convention

interpretation of Article 3 of the

If an insurgent party applies Article 3, so
conflict.

regard

No one will complain.

its

actions as

made

merit in a further statement

mere

acts

If it

101

ICRC

in the official

to the effect that:

much

the better for the victims of the

does not apply

it, it

will

prove that those

who

of anarchy or brigandage are right ....

Certainly, any insurgent force or alleged "national liberation

does not comply with the provisions of Article 3 requiring

movement" which
humane treatment,

and prohibiting violence, murder, torture and maltreatment of prisoners of war
falls

within the category of brigands and

What

if,

bound by

terrorists.

despite the foregoing, insurgents take the position that they are not

the provisions of Article 3, and this position gains acceptance? Except

for the rare case such as Algeria, where the insurgents themselves sought
55
Article 3 will become a dead letter. Unusual,
application of the Convention,

would be

indeed,

benefits flowing

the

government willing

to grant captured insurgents the

from Article 3 while knowing

that

own

its

personnel,

when

captured, are tortured, otherwise maltreated and slaughtered. Although the

requirement for granting these benefits to captured insurgents

and not

absolute,

extremely
unilateral

We

to

be dependent upon reciprocity,

difficult to

is

stated to

once again

convince any governtnent and

its

it

will

be
be

people that such a

compliance should be expected of them.

may then be

legislation

which

in a position in

there

is

no

applicable international

governing the actions of the insurgents and we would, therefore, have

need to resort

to the

What

customary law of war.

are the customary rules

accepted by the civilized nations of the world? Are they binding upon insurgents?
IV.

The

Pertinent

Customary Law

of

War

Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
IMT), which all Communist nations seemingly regard

In the opinion rendered by the
(hereinafter referred to as
as a

revelation second only to those of Marx, Engels and Lenin (and,

assumed, of

Regulations

Mao

57

in

China),

it

stated

is

that

it is

to

be

by 1939 the 1907 Hague
58

were "declaratory of the laws and customs of war."'

there confirmed that an individual

is

not held

as a

It is also

prisoner of war for purposes

of revenge or punishment, but merely to prevent him from further participation
in the conflict

and

that

he

is,

therefore, a helpless person

military tradition to kill or injure.

Tribunals, in deciding The High

opinion

as

One

whom it

is

contrary to

of the subsequent Nuremberg Military

Command

Case,

correctly construed the

IMT

holding that by 1939 both the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929

Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention

"were binding insofar

as

they were in

substance an expression of international law as accepted by the civilized nations

1

Law

Levie on the
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Every military force engaged

of the world."

international in character,
established

War

of

in

armed

conflict,

and whether representing an old or

government or an insurgent

party,

bound

is

whether or not
a

new

comply with

to

established rules of the "civilized nations of the world." Failure to

which

do

an

state,

these

so places

that military force,

and the

which

orders and policies, in direct violation of the foregoing

takes

it

its

principles enunciated at

The Tribunal
statement

the

represents

and from

Command Case did not limit itself to the general
Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva

1907

now

Prisoner-of-War Convention

were obviously provision

there

it

Nuremberg.

The High

in

that

political organization

represented customary law. Inasmuch

two Conventions dealing with

in those

as

details

which could not be construed as customary law, the Tribunal assumed the task
of designating exactly which provisions of the two agreements did fall within
that category.

It

proceeded

to

review the

specific provisions

of each of the two

Conventions and found that those provisions requiring humane treatment of
prisoners of war,

and those protecting them from

punishment and

curiosity, corporal

acts

acts

of violence,

insults,

public

of cruelty, were "an expression of the

accepted views of civilized nations."

Of course,

the Tribunal in The High

Command

Case was concerned only with

those aspects of the law accepted by civilized nations of the world under
violations

had been proven in the case before

all-inclusive.

Some

Convention,

in Article 3 of the
that in

writers have extended

rejecting both

the

it

civil

Its

list

is

probably on the extremely plausible theory

ICRC

and

USSR

the Diplomatic

proposals
(to

be binding on both

sides

war) only those humanitarian principles which already had received

demonstrable acceptance by the civilized nations of the world.
that

not, therefore,

to include the four groupings listed

Conference had selected for inclusion in Article 3
in a

it.

which

It

also appears

both the Tribunals and the writers have definite ideas with respect to the

imposition

upon

prisoners of

war of

vicarious

punishment in the form of

68

i

reprisals.

Do
doubt

these customary rules of warfare apply to insurgents?
that they do,

in the breach.

The

even though the

rules

little

have so frequendy been honored only

Soviet textbook states that "the laws and customs of

apply not only to armies in the

strict

existing circumstances,

war

sense of the word, but also to levies,
69

voluntary detachments, organised resistance

is

There seems

movements and partisans. "

Under

where every insurgent movement other than one which

avowedly anti-Communist immediately becomes

a

"national liberation

movement" enjoying full Communist support, further citation of authority
would appear to be redundant.
From the foregoing, it may be properly concluded that apart from any
international legislation represented by the Hague or Geneva or other
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minimum customary law
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requires that prisoners of war be treated

humanely; forbids the use against them of all forms of violence including corporal
punishment, torture, cruelty and
public curiosity.

With

this in

killing;

mind,

and protects them from

we may now proceed

to

insults

and

an examination of

the incidents reported to have occurred or to have been threatened in Vietnam,

applying the provisions of the Convention generally, those of Article

3,

or

customary international law where appropriate.
V.
has already

It

the

ICRC

Charges Made Against the United States

been pointed out

letter

that the

United

States

responded-prompdy

to

concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions in

.71

This
Vietnam and committed itself to apply the 1949 Convention.
commitment was thereafter adopted by the various nations which have furnished
military forces to support

appropriate occasions.

South Vietnam and

it

has been reiterated

on

several

Although, strangely enough, no report has been found

of a Vietcong or North Vietnamese charge of improper treatment of their
captured personnel by United States niilitary forces in Vietnam,

one charge of improper action in

As

early as 1964,

as advisers to

States

this respect

when American

made

there has been

United

in the

States.

personnel were serving in Vietnam solely

South Vietnamese military units, reports began

to reach the

United

of the maltreatment of Vietcong prisoners of war by members of the South

Vietnamese combat

American photographers and newsmen were

forces.

present during these episodes and, presumably, American military personnel

were

also present.

American

more

press

rarely,

Photographs of

from time

this

to time during

during subsequent years.

nature continued to appear in the

1965 and occasionally, although

much

In a few instances American personnel

were pictured standing by while the maltreatment of the prisoners of war
These incidents apparently took place either

occurred.

fighting or during evacuation

from

the scene of the

at

it.

Humanitarian reaction to these clear indications of violations of the
77

Convention quickly appeared in the United

States.

The

'

legal

problem

presented by these incidents, in view of the nature of the United States position
in

Vietnam,

is

whether the United

more than remonstrate with
There

is

no provision

responsible for violations

States

had

a

duty or was in a position to do

the South Vietnamese authorities.

in the

Convention making

committed by one of its

captured and held by that

ally.

A

allies

a

contracting party

against prisoners

search of the Final

Record of

of war

the 1949

Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Convention has failed to bring to
light
this

even

a suggestion to this effect

lacuna are obvious.

To

made by any

have included such

79

The reasons for
would have created

delegation.

a provision

'

vicarious responsibility for a situation which, in the great majority of cases, could

1

Levie on the

04

Law

War

of

not be remedied by the

which could well bring

willingly accept a responsibility

with one or several of its

There was, then, no

Convention

full

during the course of a life-or-death struggle.

it is

under

equally clear that the United States (and every
a

moral obligation to exert

-80

•

new

units of the

United

conflict.

States

armed

forces

were committed

situation arose, because, unlike the earlier period just

United

influence to

all its

compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention by

any other party engaged in armed

When

into sharp conflict

South Vietnamese troops did not maltreat personnel

Of course,
is

it

would

duty imposed upon the United States by the 1949

legal

other contracting party)
bring about

allies

to ensure that

captured by them.

held responsible. Moreover, no state

state so

began

States itself then

to

combat

a

mentioned, the

of war. These prisoners were

to take prisoners

turned over to the South Vietnamese for detention in prisoner-of-war camps.

At

the transfer of custody was

first,

made

in the field

immediately upon capture.

But apparently because most of the incidents of maltreatment occurred
time and in

this area, in

mid-1966 the United

States

changed

Thereafter, prisoners of war captured by United States units

and from there

divisional headquarters

camps

by

maintained

the

its

at this

procedure.

were evacuated

to

directly to the rear-area prisoner-of-war

South

Vietnamese.

The

United

States

Commander-in-Chief in Vietnam has stated categorically that "these prisoners
are not being mistreated. They are handled in accordance with the provisions
82
tiis
There is no evidence to indicate that his
of the Geneva Conventions."
83
statement is not correct, nor have any claims been made which contradict it.
Of course, even after prisoners of war captured by United States forces reach
the

camps and

United

are turned over to the custody

States remains

under

a

of the South Vietnamese, the

contingent responsibility for their

humane

treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
VI.

There appears

combat troops
torture,

These

to

be

little

doubt

that at least well into

regularly maltreated captured

and other

acts

Charges Made Against South Vietnam

acts

1966 South Vietnamese

enemy personnel by

using threats,

of violence in order to obtain intelligence information.

were and remain

of the law of war, whether

direct violations

considered from the point of view of the entire Convention, Article

customary international law. The combined pressure of the

United

made

States (and, perhaps,

itself felt, at least at

has complied with the

of other

ICRC

3,

or

and the

allied countries) has apparently gradually

the official level.

Convention by

The Government of South Vietnam

a liberal interpretation

of the provisions

of Article 4 defining the categories of persons entided to prisoner-of-war status,

by supplying

lists

of persons detained

Agency of the ICRC,

as prisoners

by disseminating

to

its

of war to the Central Tracing

troops information concerning

Maltreatment of Prisoners
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imposed upon captors by the Convention and by other methods of
and by permitting unlimited inspection visits to the
instruction of its troops,
prisoner-of-war camps by delegates of the ICRC.
The fact that reports of
the duties

'

further instances of maltreatment of prisoners of

war by South Vietnamese

combat troops have become more sporadic probably indicates that the campaign
of education has had some degree of success. However, it may also mean that
South Vietnamese combat commanders have been able to conceal most of such

from those

incidents

To

summarize:

substantially
it,

an

who might

report them.

while

South Vietnamese

the

Government

now

has

complied with the obligations which the Convention imposes upon

during the course of a period extending over several years there was apparently
officially

countenanced practice of the use of torture on newly-captured

war by South Vietnamese combat troops for the purpose of
extracting information from them. The South Vietnamese Government appears

prisoners of

now to

accept the fact that such conduct constituted a direct and major violation

of the Convention and, therefore, in 1966 instituted a campaign of education

which seems

have been

to

grossly illegal practice.

prisoners of war

The

at least partially successful in

However,

putting an end to

instances of maltreatment of newly-captured

by South Vietnamese combat troops continue

individuals responsible for such incidents, both soldiers

actual violence

and commanders

this

who permit and even

to

be reported.

who commit

encourage these

the

acts, are

of violations of the Convention and of the customary law of war.

guilty

VII.

Charges Made Against North Vietnam

A. Parading Prisoners of

With

War

North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of
91
i
war we have only the information which they have seen fit to disclose.
However, even this limited source of information has revealed one major
respect to the

-

violation of the

Convention and the

While

was apparently prevented by an unprecedented mobilization of

this latter

world opinion by the United

On July 6,
American
these

94
releases

it

will

was

asserted to

pilots as

"war

Word

criminals,''

the

North Vietnamese

in pairs, to be paraded

trial

and photographs

of captured

authorities caused

through the crowd-lined

of the incident was broadcast by Radio Hanoi
95

be another.

be discussed below in section VII B.

1966, presumably to whip up local support for the

men, handcuffed

of Hanoi.

States,

threat of what

were issued by the

official

streets

and

press

North Vietnamese

press

agency.

The United

Government immediatelv charged that this constituted a
violation of the Convention.
The ICRC clearly was of the same opinion, for
on July 14, 1966, it drew the attention of the North Vietnamese Government
States

1

Levie on the

06

War

of

Convention

to the fact that the

of war to public

Law

curiosity.

specifically prohibited the subjection

The North Vietnamese

'

of prisoners

did not deny the occurrence

of the incident; they merely called attention to their previous communications
concerning the nonapplicability of the Convention.

May, 1967, Agence France

In

Hanoi

suffering

from an

the streets of
in

Hanoi.

charged that
that

it

injury,

99

Once

pilots,

whom

one of

"put on display"

later

again the United States

at

was sending

a protest to

the International Press

Government immediately

constituted a "flagrant violation" of the

this

was apparently

"were paraded through angry, shouting crowds" on

Hanoi and were
•

Club

American

that three captured

news agency) reported from

Presse (the French

Convention and

stated

North Vietnam through the ICRC.

Over a century ago Francis Lieber's first codification of the customary law of
war included a statement to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be
101
subjected to any "indignity."
The 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
102
Convention,
the predecessor of the Convention with which we are here
concerned, had (in its Article 2) a prohibition against subjecting prisoners of war
"

and public

to "insults

World War

curiosity." In interpreting this provision in the course

the Judge Advocate General of the

II,

which

curiosity' against

Article 2
103
.

scornful gaze of the crowd. ..."
prisoners of

.

.

protects

them

During World

war was marched through

Army

"The

'public

the curious and perhaps

is

War

the streets of

said:

of

II a

group of American

Rome

by the Nazis

as a

propaganda measure. After the war the Nazi commander responsible for the

march was
of war in

tried
his

and convicted of the war crime of failing

custody from insults and public curiosity.

to protect prisoners
104

The

International

Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Pacific counterpart of the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg fame, included in

its

opinion

a

heading entitled

"Prisoners of War Humiliated" and listed thereunder various episodes in
prisoners of

war had been marched down

city streets

and exhibited

.

crowds, specifically labeling such treatment
It

Command
insults

by

been noted

has already

Case

at

as a

and public curiosity was

a part

to jeering
105

violation of the law of war.

that the Military Tribunal

Nuremberg found that the

which

which heard The High

protection of prisoners of war from

of the customary law of war recognized

civilized nations.

Both

Articles 3

and 13 of the Convention contain provisions which prohibit

the exhibiting of prisoners of war

would appear

that this rule has
107

of the customary law of war.

by parading them through

most probably attained the
It

on the two occasions mentioned (and on other

occasions)

were

war.

violations of the

status

and

it

of being part

follows that the actions of North Vietnamese

authorities

108

city streets;

less

well publicized

Convention and of the customary law of

107
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War
It

Crimes Trials
be recalled that in answering the

will

ICRC

from the

letter

1965, North Vietnam referred to captured American pilots
criminals caught in flagrante delicto

import were subsequently made by the

that trials
112

were

States.

which

It

definitely

was then

109

Many statements of similar
North Vietnamese.
By mid-July,
'

'

Communist newsmen

planned

that the

111

in

who

who opposed it, and

Hanoi were mentioning

and tension began

United

to build in the

mounted

States

a diplomatic offensive

sided with the United States position in Vietnam, those

those

who were

113

neutral.

On July 23,

Vietnamese Government announced the appointment of
investigate

United

Vietnam President

States 'war crimes'"

Ho

pilots.

and then, on

to state that there

few days

later

were not captured

criminals"
there

A

114

Ho

same day, North

pilots,

"but the

as

trial

view" for the

who

persons

are the ones

in

saying that the "main

who

subject throughout the world, with claims, counterclaims,

and purported

legal authorities for

Actually, the statement

August 31, 1965,

and

allegations

letter to the

and

sent

them

should be brought

made by

ICRC

the

them

two questions

for alleged

citation

this

of legal

trial.

North Vietnamese

in

and frequendy thereafter pose two

entided to the status of prisoners of war? and
the right to try

and

against the

interwoven questions concerning the captured American

these

committee "to

For ten days in July, 1966, there was excitement and debate on

to trial."

their

a

that

was "no

was quoted

—Johnson, Rusk, McNamara—these

authorities

1966, the North

Chi Minh took advantage of a cabled inquiry from the

Columbia Broadcasting System
American

United

from around the world,

resulted in the intervention of personages

including those

"major [war]

and liable for judgment in accordance with

the laws of the Democratic Republic ofVietnam.

1966, press dispatches from

as

in August,

war crimes

(2)

pilots:

(1)

are they

do the North Vietnamese have

? It

will

be appropriate to discuss

in the order stated.

The captured pilots are all members of the United States Navy and Air Force.
They were captured when forced to eject from their planes while flying combat
missions over North Vietnam. They were wearing American flight uniforms
when captured and made no attempt to hide their identity. (Of course, this series
of statements includes a number of assumptions but they all appear to be
reasonable ones and there is no indication that any one of them is really disputed.)

—

These

facts

being accepted, the American

pilots are

entided prima facie to

the 1929 Geneva
Hague Regulations,
Prisoner of- War Convention,
and the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
1 19
Convention.
In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more clear-cut case

prisoner-of-war status under the 1907
1

of entitlement to such

status.

18

1

Levie on the

08

Law

War

of

The North Vietnamese

apparently do not contest the facts stated and assumed

above, but they attempt to avoid the conclusion which necessarily flows from
these facts

The

by asserting that the Convention does not apply

would

syllogism

be:

Convention; American

war

to

"war criminals."

1

20

criminals are not entitled to the protection of the

war

pilots are

criminals; therefore,

American

pilots are

not entitled to the protection of the Convention. Both the major and the minor
premises of that syllogism are incorrect.

The North Vietnamese

position

therefore necessitates a brief review of the events preceding and following the

of Article

approval

of the

85

Convention

by

1949

the

Diplomatic

c
r
Conference.
When the

war

commanded

the unsuccessful Japanese defense of the Phillipine Islands, was

121

ended

in the Pacific

in 1945, General Yamashita,

who had

number of war crimes and was brought to trial before an
American Military Commission in Manila. His counsel contended that he was
charged with

a

entided to

of the

all

trial

protections contained in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War

Convention. These protections were denied to him and on appeal to the United
States

Supreme Court

affirmed

on

the

applied only to

ground
trials

conviction and death sentence) the denial was

(after his

that the

trial

protections contained in that Convention

—not pre-capture—

for post-capture

122
offenses.

work which preceded the 1949 Diplomatic Conference,
convened a group of "Government Experts" who recommended, as

In the preparatory
the

ICRC

one variation from the 1929 Convention,

of war

a provision that prisoners

prosecuted for pre-capture offenses should enjoy the benefits of the Convention
until convicted after a regular

International

which was
prepared,

it

When

trial.

this

was submitted

Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in

to

be the working

was decided

to

draft for the

to the

1948, where the

XVIIth

final draft

1949 Diplomatic Conference was

change the provision drafted by the Government

Experts so that prisoners of war would continue to benefit by the provisions of
the

Convention even

after

conviction of a pre-capture offense.

At the Diplomatic Conference, the
draft provision

under which once

crime (apparendy

this

meant

USSR

a prisoner

proposed an amendment

a conventional

return to the

as

to the

of war had been convicted of a war

war crime) or
.

.

humanity, he could be treated

123

an ordinary criminal.

124
'

a

crime against
•

•

This was, in

effect, a

recommendation made by the Government Experts. General

Slavin, chief delegate

of the

USSR,

stated to the

committee charged with the

preparation of the Prisoner-of-War Convention, that the
applied only to prisoners of war
report to the Plenary

Meeting

who

had been convicted.

USSR

committee considered

USSR proposal,
that

even

proposal

The committee's

called attention to the difference

represented by the Stockholm draft and the
great majority of the

4

and

of approach

stated that the

after a prisoner

of war had

been convicted of a pre-capture violation of the laws and customs of war, he

Maltreatment of Prisoners
1

?&

should continue to enjoy the protection of the Convention.

1

The Diplomatic

Conference rejected the Soviet proposal and approved the Stockholm
provision.

The

draft

127

of Article 85 of the Convention was, then, to change the rule

effect

expounded in Yamashita and other similar cases.
the benefits of the

and

release

09

128

Now a prisoner of war retains

Convention from the moment of capture

repatriation.

If,

while in captivity, he

pre-capture violation of the law of war he

is

is

moment

of

and convicted of

tried

entided to

to the

a

the judicial safeguards

all

of the Convention.

USSR

The

and

of the other Communist countries, both those present

all

the Diplomatic Conference in
to the

Geneva and those which subsequently adhered

Convention, have made reservations to Article 85.

some concern
and consent

to the

United

States Senate

to the ratification

to the Senate the

at

when

it

130

was asked

This

to give

its

advice

its

report

of the Convention by the President. In

Committee on Foreign Relations

caused

fact

said:

of the practice adopted by Communist forces in Korea of calling

[I]n the light

prisoners of war

"war

criminals," there

is

the possibility that the Soviet bloc might

adopt the general attitude of regarding a significant number of the forces opposing

them

war

as ipso facto

prisoners of war.

criminals, not entitled to the usual guaranties provided for

As indicated above, however, the Soviet reservation expressly

deprives prisoners of war of the protection of the convention only after conviction
in accordance with the convention.

131

When North Vietnam advised the

Government of its adherence to the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions in June 1957, the communication included a
Swiss

reservation to Article 85 reading as follows:

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners of war prosecuted
for

and convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with

the principles laid

down by the Nuremberg Court ofJustice shall not benefit from

the present Convention, as specified in Article 85.

Having made

this reservation, it

understood

authorities fully

ambiguity in
pilots

it

its

132

must be assumed

—and

meaning

so far as the present

problem

is

that the

it is

North Vietnamese

difficult to find

concerned.

133

any

real

The American

have not been "prosecuted and convicted." Under Article 85 of the

Convention and the North Vietnamese reservation to
benefits

it,

they are entitled to the

of the Convention until prosecution and conviction for war crimes or

crimes against humanity have occurred.
the

American

the

Convention

pilots are
is,

The North Vietnamese contention

"war criminals" and not

therefore, without merit.

that

entitled to the protection
It is,

in

and of itself,

a

of

major

Law

Levie on the

1 1

War

of

Convention

violation of the

to

deny prisoner-of-war

arbitrarily

North Vietnamese

individuals entitled to that status. If the

desire to

commitment which they have made by

the international

to

status

comply with

voluntarily adhering

to the

Convention, they are under an obligation to recognize that American

pilots

captured while flying combat missions over North Vietnam are entitled

war and

the status of prisoners of

to

Convention which flow from

The

first

that status.

question posed above, are American pilots entitled to the status of

must be answered

prisoners of war,

question,

by the

the protections provided

to

in the affirmative. This leads us to the

do the North Vietnamese have the

right to try

them

second

war

for alleged

crimes?
In the discussions
85,

it

was

at

which took place

in connection

no time suggested by any delegation

with the drafting of Article
that prisoner-of-war status

should protect an individual from prosecution for an alleged pre-capture offense

which constituted

of the law of war. In

a violation

engaged in the discussion apparently assumed that

fact, all

this

of the parties

was the

rule.

who

As we have

on this subject concerned the regime under which
detaining power would be entitled to place the individual after his trial and

just seen, the only dispute

the

conviction for

be

little

pre-capture offense.

a

committed prior

However,

American

pilots for

to capture, should also

this

for an offense

which he

that there

is

war crimes

been

alleged to have

be answered in the affirmative.

answer requires amplification, because standing alone

subject to misconstruction. In the
is

first

committed prior

him prior to

treated after

trial

trial

inherent in the discussion and resolution of the

first

is

to capture does not

and conviction

and conviction.

it

of war

place, the right to try a prisoner

alleged to have

a right to treat

which he might be

in

the circumstances, there seems to

doubt that the second question posed, do the North Vietnamese have

the right to try the

mean

Under

in the

(This,

question

manner

of course,

on

is

this subject

discussed immediately above.) In other words, a prisoner of war retains the status

of prisoner of war, and

all

the protections incident thereto, at

least until

he has

been finally convicted.

In the second place, while
the

American

such

pilots

is

it

that they

appears that the North Vietnamese charge against

have been guilty of bombing nonmilitary

as civilian residential areas,

of war, there
"target-area"

may be

bombing,

135
*

at this stage in the

targets,

development of the law

considerable doubt expressed as to whether even
a

much more

indiscriminate and

apparently charged against the American airmen,

War

law.

During World

who

lived through that period or has read

II

both

sides

engaged
its

is

inhumane

a violation

in this type

act than that

of international

of warfare.

No

one

history could have forgotten the

German bombing of such targets as Warsaw, London, Coventry and Rotterdam,
and the Allied bombing of Berlin, Essen, Cologne and Tokyo. No political

1

Maltreatment of Prisoners
leader,

no

commander, and no airman was ever convicted of anv

military

war crime arising out of these
of the LY1T or of the LMTFE
a

a

modicum of

ICRC

years the

governments.

to the

forbids target-area

such

a

would seem

new

a

And,

oudawed, then

levelled against the

we

to a point

draft international

convention on the law of war

charge of being

a

pilots

to

attacks

on

flying in

for their

available

levelled against every captured

Certainly, there

is

the

to

others

own

?

North

Why

is

the

American airman

no evidence

available to

bombing

participated in

acts.

or other

Some of the airmen were probably shot down
first missions before they could drop a bomb. Some were probably
unarmed reconnaissance planes, perhaps as photographers. Some were

on purely Chilian

their

might be

American airman

have been

to

road from the era of vicarious

some of the airmen, what of the
"

not

is

prohibited category.

pumshed only

individuals are

war criminal

that every captured

a

presently

is

bombing

which appears

come within

does not

moved far along the

held by the North Vietnamese?

them

no such prohibition

stated, if target-area

"confessions,"

as

Vietnamese with respect

been

has

where

While evidence, such

Article 10, specifically

considered necessary to include

that

certainly the lesser charge

have

its

it is

as

American

In the third place,

punishment

war and which would be acceptable

to indicate rather conclusively that

included therein.
definitely

The fact

so far

convention which would

This proposed Convention, in

bombing.

prohibition in

the opinions

been endeavoring.,

has

success, to evolve a

protect the civilian populations in time of
'

alleged

for any reference to such activities as constituting

war crime. For more than ten

with not even

One will look in vain in

activities.

1 1

targets.

probably flying fighter protection armed only with air-to-air weapons. These,

and probably many others,
war-crimes charge can be

laid,

Finally, there arises the

within categories against

are

even assuming that

it

whom

no legitimate

can against the others.

problem of whether prisoners of war accused of

pre-capture war crimes can be or should be tried during the course of hostilities.

On

this subject the

author has previously

said:

While there was never any concrete proposal made
Conference
postponed

that trials of prisoners of
until

the

cessanon of

war

the Diplomatic

for pre-capture offenses should

hostilities,

inconclusive discussion during the debate

at

on

the

be

matter was the subject of

Article 85.

two

delegates (Lamarle

of France and Slavin of the U.S.S.R.) expressing the opinion that such

trials

should

not be put offuntil the close of hostilities, and one delegate (Gardner of the United

Kingdom) expressing the opposite view. The
Goss has long taken the posiuon

International

that, if such a trial

of hostiliaes, an accused does not have

a fair

is

Committee of the Red

conducted during the course

opportunity to produce

all

of the

evidence which might be available to disprove or lessen his responsibility.

As we have already seen,
pre-capture offenses

number of pnsoners of war were tried for alleged
during the course of World War II. The patent unfairness of
a

1 1

2

Levle on the

these

trials

Law

of

War

glaringly reveals the danger of trials for pre-capture offenses

conducted

during the course of the war.

To

summarize: captured American airmen are entitled to the

status

of

prisoners of war until such time as they have been prosecuted and convicted of

may

pre-capture violations of the law of war; while they

legally

be tried during

the course of hostilities, there are serious practical objections to such a procedure;

and, if they are tried, they must be afforded

of the judicial safeguards contained

all

Convention.

in the

VIM.

Charges Made Against the Vietcong

how many prisoners of war, American
or South Vietnamese, are held by the Vietcong; even less is known as to how
they are being treated. However, there is reason to know that they do hold some
Very little information

is

available as to

—and

American prisoners of war
instances of

have been

that there

at least

two

identical

major violations of the law of war in the treatment of prisoners by

the Vietcong.

As

we

have seen, despite Vietcong insistence to the contrary, the generally

accepted position appears to be that insurgents such
•

by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention;
are at a
to

minimum bound by the

and
1

customary law of war.

that, in

any event, they

44
Specifically,

it

appears

be well established that customary international law prohibits the use of

violence and acts of cruelty against prisoners of war and, in

making them the

prohibits

On April
death by
if

bound

the Vietcong are

as

143

a

9,

•

objects of reprisals.

1965, a Vietcong terrorist was

South Vietnamese court. At

all

probability, also

145

tried,

convicted and sentenced to

that time the

Vietcong announced that

the sentence of execution was carried out, Gustav C. Hertz, a kidnapped

civilian

American

aid officer,

would be

146
shot.

The

terrorist

Whether or not the threat against Hertz was
clemency shown the terrorist has not been disclosed.
executed.

was apparently not

the reason for the

On

June 22, 1965, another Vietcong terrorist was executed by a South
Vietnamese firing squad in Saigon after he had been tried, convicted and
sentenced for

Three days

acts

later

of terrorism by

a

South Vietnamese

both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio announced that

an American soldier held

as a

prisoner of war by the Vietcong (Sergeant Harold

G. Bennett) had been executed in
148
terrorist.

released

The United

States labeled the act as

by the Department of State

On September 22,
after a trial,

1965, three

execution of the Vietcong

reprisal for the

said that

help but be appalled and revolted by this

Nang

special military court.

"murder"; and

a

statement

"people around the world cannot

show of wanton inhumanity."

more Vietcong

terrorists

conviction and death sentence by

a

were executed

in

Da

South Vietnamese court.

Maltreatment of Prisoners
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on September 26, the Liberation Radio announced that the
Vietcong had retaliated by the executions of two American prisoners of war,
Captain Humbert R. Versage [Versace] and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback.
Once again the United States labeled these reprisal executions as "murder" and
151
It filed a protest with the ICRC which was
as violations of the Convention.
152
transmitted to and rejected by the NLF.
A "reprisal" is defined as an otherwise illegal act committed by one side in
an armed conflict in order to put pressure on the other side to compel it to
abandon a course of illegal acts which it has been committing and to comply
Four days

later,

•

For

with the law of war.

are three requirements: the act

been
war,

illegal; it

of the

state against

must not be directed

it is

against an individual

reprisal will take;

and

it

must be directed

legal there

directed must have

who, by the law of
of the nature that the

against the state

which

reprisal

is

mentioned above

the alleged acts of reprisal of the Vietcong

applications of the rules governing reprisals?
that the act or acts against

acts against

which

these reprisals

which

The

it is

According

to the

first

requirement for

directed have been

valid

a valid

illegal.

The

were directed were the June 22 and September

22, 1965, executions of the Vietcong terrorists.

Were

those executions illegal?

newspaper accounts, in each instance the individuals had been

convicted and sentenced by a South Vietnamese court in accordance with

tried,

the law of South Vietnam.

June 22 execution

"[a]

154

While the National Liberation Front

men"

crime of bloodthirsty

same about the September 22 execution,
executions constituted a crime

it

155

and presumably

has never indicated in

— other than

called the

the implication that

feels the

what way the
it is

a

crime to

convict and execute a Vietcong apprehended in the course of committing

what was probably

The
that

which

be

violated the law of war.

Were

try,

illegal act) to

specifically protected against reprisals or against acts

is

contemplated
first

normally

a reprisal (a

it

Vietcong approved and ordered

a

reprisals, then, failed to

be called forth by an

second requirement for
be directed against

meet the

illegal act

a reprisal to

a specifically

first

act

of terrorism.

requirement for

by the other

side.

a valid reprisal,

Now let us examine the

—

be valid under the law of war

that

it

not

protected person. Shortly after the Second

Hague Peace Conference of 1907 the German War Office issued a War Book
which escaped general attention until some years later. During the course of
World War I, it became well known and widely condemned because of its
emphasis on the the principle of military necessity and its disregard for the
customary and conventional law of war. Concerning
of war the War Book
As regards the

reprisals against prisoners

said:

admissibility

of

reprisals,

it

is

to

be remarked that these are

objected to by numerous teachers of international law

on grounds of humanity.

1 1

Levie on the

4

To make

this a

Law

War

of

matter of principle and apply

however,

to every case, exhibits

it

"a misconception due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings of

humanity, of the significance, the seriousness and the right of war.

overlooked that here
first

also the necessity

of war, and the

consideration, and not regard for the unconditional

It

must not be

of the State are the

safety

freedom of prisoners from

molestation."

That prisoners should only be

killed in the event

of extreme necessity, and that

only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's
a

proceeding of this kind

Thus, even

a directive

is

World War

which was subjected

war

and the security of the

to almost universal

to

helpless prisoners

of war that

condemnation

of "extreme necessity,"

cases

State.

so vividly demonstrated the

I

State can justify

today universally admitted.

limited reprisals against prisoners of
self-preservation,

own

restrictions

on

inhumanity of

reprisals against

were

the use of this procedure

number of agreements reached by
of prisoners of war during the course of those

incorporated into a

the belligerents for the

protection

hostilities.

157

A specific

*

provision completely prohibiting reprisals against prisoners of war was thereafter

included in the 1929 Convention.

158

Writing in 1942, an American scholar stated that
assume that
limits in

reprisals,

with prisoners of war

customary international law.

'

was considered

against civilian hostages

decision
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'

seems reasonable to

"it

the objects, are permissible within

as

A few years later the legality of reprisals
at great

length in The Hostage Case, a

by one of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. The Tribunal

It is

taken.

a

fundamental rule ofjustice that the

A

fair trial

It is

of persons

may not be

arbitrarily

before a judicial body affords the surest protection against

arbitrary, vindictive, or

in reprisal.

lives

said:

a rule

whimsical application of the right to shoot

human beings

of international law, based on these fundamental concepts

of justice and the rights of individuals, that the

lives

of persons

may not be

taken

in reprisal in the absence of a judicial finding that the necessary conditions exist

and the

essential steps

have been taken to give validity to such action.

.

.

.

We

have no hesitancy in holding that the killing of members of the population in
reprisal

Inasmuch

without judicial sanction

as

members of the

specially protected persons,

is

itself

unlawful.

general public had not then been recognized as
it

would appear

Tribunal said about the protections to which
to prisoners

that, a fortiori,

were

civilians

everything the

entitled

would apply

of war.

In considering the opinion quoted above, another

Tribunal, which

would probably not have permitted

any circumstances, stated in

its

opinion in The High

Nuremberg

reprisal

Military

executions under

Command

Case:

Maltreatment of Prisoners
In the Southeast Case [Hostage Case], United States v.

No.

(Case

Wilhelm
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List, et al.,

the Tribunal had occasion to consider at considerable length the

7),

law relating to hostages and
restrictive conditions

reprisals. It

and subject

was therein held

under certain very

that

to certain rather extensive safeguards, hostages

may be taken, and after a judicial finding of strict compliance with all preconditions
and as a last desperate remedy hostages may even be sentenced to death. It was
held further that similar drastic safeguards, restrictions, and judicial preconditions
apply to so-called "reprisal prisoners." If so inhumane a measure as the
innocent persons for offenses of others, even

when

drastically safeguarded

and

killing

limited,

is

of

ever

permissible under any theory of international law, killing without full compliance with all

requirements would be murder. If killing
killing with full compliance with all the

is

not permissible under any circumstances, then a

mentioned prerequisites

... In the instance of so-called hostage taking and
reprisal killings

we

with which

have to deal in

still

would be murder.

killing,

and the so-called

this case, the safeguards

and

preconditions required to be observed by the Southeast judgment were not even

attempted to be met or even suggested

as necessary. Killings

with such preconditions are merely terror murders.

and

reprisal killings are

never permissible

reprisal killings in this case are

And
II

at

all,

law is in fact

that hostage

also the so-called

hostage and

If the

then

without compliance

merely terror murders.

war crimes program which followed World War
law which evolved from it, the United Nations War Crimes

in reviewing the overall

and the

Commission, in publications issued in 1947 and in 1949,

stated

without

equivocation that the killing of prisoners of war without due cause violated both

customary and conventional international law.
Undeniably, then, there are compelling arguments to support the position
that reprisals against prisoners

law.

But even

if one is

of war are prohibited by customary international

unwilling to accept these arguments, certainly customary

international law does specifically prohibit

prisoners of war,

of treatment

is

—who

concerned.

civilized countries killing
a prisoner

who

is

of war

is

are, therefore,

And

all

acts

of cruelty and violence against

protected persons in so

with equal certainty

type

can be stated that in

all

an act both of cruelty and of violence. Hence, killing

as a reprisal constitutes cruelty

and violence

against a person

protected from such treatment by customary international law.

meet the second requirement

reprisals,

then, also failed to

that they

not be directed against a protected person.

The

it

far as this

third requirement for a legal reprisal

The

for a valid reprisal,

under international law

is

that

it

be

which had first violated the law of war.
The "crime"
charged by the NLF as the basis for the reprisal was, beyond dispute, an act of
the South Vietnamese authorities, and not of the American authorities. The
alleged acts of terrorism were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
South Vietnam, the culprits were tried by South Vietnamese courts which

directed against the state

reached the decisions finding guilt and ordered the death sentence imposed, and

Levie on the

6

1 1

were

the executions

Law

of

War

carried out

were justified, and no ground

by the South Vietnamese

for

them

has so far

of war they should have been directed against the

come
state

authorities. If reprisals

which had by

conduct created the need for and the right to take

illegal

obviously not done

To

—and

the reason

why

it

was not done

summarize: to be authorized by international law,

otherwise

illegal acts,

must meet

facts clearly disclose that the

is

international

a cruel or violent character,

binding

legislation

international law.

Under

upon

The undisputed

so heavily rely, those

them out

are

all

were

whom reprisals,

specifically prohibited

Vietcong and by

both by

customary

less

than murder and constituted war

Nuremberg

who

principles

upon which

ordered the executions and those

the

who

subject to penal sanctions.
IX.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions have been reached in the
To

who were

these circumstances, the reprisals taken against the

crimes for which, pursuant to the

carried

are

legal justification for taking reprisals

the

American prisoners of war were nothing

Communists

This was

which

reprisals,

protected persons under customary international law and against

of

alleged

equally obvious.

and, moreover, that the reprisals were taken against prisoners of war

especially

its

reprisals.

certain specific conditions.

Vietcong had no

under the law

to light,

course of this discussion.

recapitulate:
1.

There

is

no

position taken

legal justification for the

by the North

Vietnamese that they are not bound by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention. At the very

least,

bound by

they are

the provisions of Article 3

thereof.
2.
is

While there

is

some

legal basis for the position taken

by the

NLF

that

it

not even bound by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, on balance

the decision probably should be that

so

it is

bound. In any event,

it is

bound by

the customary law of war.
3.

A state which is a party to hostilities

violates the provisions

persuade

its

Convention.

ally to
It

4.

ally for

conform

it is

morally

to the obligations accepted

bound

when

an

ally

to attempt to

by adhering

to the

does have a contingent responsibility for the proper treatment
its

armed

forces

and turned over

to the custody

detention.

Torture or other maltreatment of prisoners of war in order to obtain

intelligence information

from them, or

constitutes a serious violation
5.

not legally responsible

of the Convention, but

of prisoners of war captured by

of an

is

for

any other reason, or for no reason,

of the Convention.

Parading prisoners of war before

a hostile

populace constitutes

a violation

of the prohibition, contained in conventional and customary international law,

Maltreatment of Prisoners
against subjecting

them to insults, public

curiosity
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and humiliating and degrading

conduct.

Even under a reservation to Article 85 of the Convention, such as that
made by North Vietnam, it is a serious violation of the Convention to deny
captured enemy personnel prisoner-of-war status on the ground that they are
war criminals prior to their prosecution and conviction of a pre-capture war crime
by a trial court in which they have been accorded all of the required judicial
6.

safeguards.

There

7.

pre-capture

is

no

legal

impediment

war crime while

to the trial

being conducted. However,

as

of war continues to be entided to

all

hostilities are

noted immediately above, such

a prisoner

of a prisoner of war for an alleged

still

of the protection of the Convention, including the judicial safeguards therein
contained.
Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited

8.

by the Convention and,

which includes
a corporal act, such as killing, against a prisoner of war is prohibited by Article
3 of the Convention and by customary international law, both of which prohibit
cruelty and acts of violence against prisoners of war.
And finally, although the application of the Convention is presumably not
dependent upon reciprocity, persistent and regular refusal by the Communist
nations to be bound by it during actual cases of armed conflict in which they

probably, by customary international law. In any event, a reprisal

are involved

which

may compel other countries to give second thoughts to the doctrine

requires compliance without reciprocal compliance.
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International

Law and

its

Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare, 341 Annals 30, 31 (1962))

and that

"all international svar

note 25,

at

30.

455

is,

to

some

extent, cisil

.

.

Art. 2, para.

of the resised Prisoners of

1,

applicable not only to declared svar but also to 'any
a belligerent

(1960) [hereinafter referred to
belligerents, in advance,

no need for a formal

to the application

"...
forces
a state

is

cisil svar, international ssr ar."

all

Pinto, supra

Any

armed

War

Cons-ention, 1949, declaring

conflict

.

.

.

es-en if a state

of svar

is

its

prosisions

not recognized'

is a welcome recognition of the need to place the point beyond doubt."
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 22-23
as Commentary], it is stated: "By its general character, this paragraph deprives
pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There

Contracting Party,

And in Pictet. Commentary on

is

and

See Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 313 n.85 (Rev. ed. 1959), svhere the follosving

appears: ".

by

ss-ar,

(translation mine).

of the

the

declaration of svar, or for the recognition of the existence of a state of svar,

of the Cons-ention. The occurrence of de facto

difference arising

between

tsvo States

and leading

an armed conflict ssithin the meaning of Article

of svar." And,

finally, in Institute

hostilities

is

to the intervention

2, es-en if

one of the

of Lasv, Academy of Sciences of the

as

preliminaries

sufficient.

of members of the armed

Parties denies the existence

USSR,

of

International Lasv 420

1

(ca.

Law

Levie on the

20

1960) [hereinafter referred to

of

as

War

Soviet International Law],

declaration of war does not deprive hostilities

which have

this

in fact

statement

is

made: "The absence of a formal

begun, of the character of war from the point

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that their
which are a component part of the laws and customs of war, in the event
any armed conflict, even if one of the parties to the conflict does not recognize

of view of the need to observe

its

laws and customs.

signatories apply these Conventions,

of a declaration of war or in

the existence of a state of war."

A

31.

news

from Cairo which appeared

article

in the

"The sources quoted the [North Vietnamese] Ambassador
United

airmen captured

States

in attacks

N.Y. Times, Feb.

1966

12,

at 12, col. 3, stated:

having rejected the American contention that

as

on North Vietnam should be

war under the

treated as prisoners of

terms of the Geneva conventions.

He was
no war

32.
is

reported to have told influential Egyptians that

by

has been declared"

applicable in an

armed

between two or more High Contracting

conflict

recognized by one of them. In Vietnam

a state

involved. 52 Dep't State Bull. 403 (1965).

To answer

Article 2?

of war,

Does

this

question in the affirmative

this

in the legal sense,

note 30,

Pictet, supra

at

23. Lauterpacht believed that

Convention applicable even

Oppenheim,

One

33.

if a state

Law 369

International

this

is

a case

where

is

Parties

states that the

even

if a state

Convention
of war

is

not

not recognized by any of the parties

remove the armed conflict in Vietnam from the reach of
would seem to be direcdy contrary to the intent of the

and to the object and purpose of the Convention. The

Article

was impossible "because

have been noted that the Convention provision quoted in the text

will

It

this

either country.

it

ICRC

states that

does not avoid Article

it

2.

was the intention of the draftsmen to make the

of war was not recognized by "one or both of them." 2 Lauterpacht's

n.6 (7th ed. 1952).

of the major purposes of the provision was to preclude

a State

from indulging

in the excuses

Germany during World War II as a basis for not
had been no declaration of war, that legally a state of

put forward by Japan during the China Incident and by Nazi
applying earlier humanitarian conventions: that there

war did not

war was not recognized,

existence of a state of

exist, that the

that the

armed

conflict

was only

a

"police action," etc. See the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1008-09 (mimeo.

1949) [hereinafter referred to

as

IMTFE Judgment],

the Protection of Victims of War, 7

The

Latyshev;

Soviet State and

Law

The 1949 Geneva Conventions Concerning
121 (1954) (original in Russian).

34. Article 3 states:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one

of the High Contracting

Parties,

each Party to the conflict

be bound to apply,

shall

as a

minimum,

the

following provisions:
(1)

have

Persons taking no active part in the

down

laid

their

other cause, shall in

on

hostilities,

all

end the following

this

members of armed

forces

who

circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded

race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or

To

including

arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any

acts are

and

shall

any other similar

remain prohibited

at

criteria.

any time and in any place whatsoever

with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a)

and

violence to

torture;
(b)

taking of hostages;

(c)

outrages

(d)

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment

pronounced by
as

and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment

life

upon

a regularly

personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

constituted court affording

all

the judicial guarantees

which

are recognized

indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2)

An
offer

its

The wounded and

sick shall

be collected and cared

for.

impartial humanitarian body, such as the International

Committee of the Red

Cross,

may

services to the Parties to the conflict.

The

Parties to the conflict should further

agreements,

The

all

endeavor to bring into

force,

by means of

special

or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the

conflict.

35.

Statement of Mr. Morosov (USSR), Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. IIB,

Commentary, supra note
36. Pictet,

Comm'n Jurists
37.

thought

The XXth
3,

Pictet,

International Conference of the

Red

Cross: Results in the Legal Field, 7

J. Int'l

15 (1966).

"[F]uture generations
it

325-26;

at

30, at 34.

may

consider

it

a

sad

commentary on our times

that the nations

of the world

necessary in these conventions to provide that in case of an internal conflict, murder, mutilation,
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and other cruel treatment should not be practiced on prisoners and other noncombatants...." Yingling

torture

&
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Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 393, 396 (1952).
38. Greenspan, supra note 29, at 40; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the

Vietnamese Conflict, 5 Va. J. Int'l L. 243, 249 (1965).
39. Pictet, supra note 36; de la Pradelle, Le Controle de L' Application des Conventions Humanitaires

en

cas

de Conflit Arme, 2 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 343, 364 (1956).
Commentary, supra note 30, at 28-34.

40. Pictet,

During the debate General Slavin (USSR) made the following statement: "[T]he United
alluded to the fact that colonial and civil wars were not regulated by international
law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This
theory was not convincing, since though the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point, some
Id. at 32.

41.

Kingdom Delegation had

were of the view that civil war was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the Organization of
the United Nations this question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter provided that Member States must
Colonial and civil wars therefore come within the purview of international
ensure peace and world security.
.

.

.

law." Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. IIB,

The Stockholm (working)

42.
73.

The

conflict

at 14.

would have made

draft

the entire

not of an international character to

"humane treatment of

prisoners of

prisoners of war." Id., Vol.

war" and "the application of

Annex

Ill,

43. In construing the provision

which was adopted,

Pictet,
.

.

at

the assisting States have a

.

strict

obligation to

.

"When the parties to the civil war receive foreign assistance,

comply with and

the United States and the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam

to require

war on the

territory

Of course,

established

governments have not infrequently

under Article 3
a

—but

this

matter of fact,

was not

when

47.

In Yingling

&

Compare

Ginnane, supra note 37,

its

Thus

.

of

comply with

failed to

their obligations

ICRC

to function in Algeria,

it

24

was

provisions,

its

la

Convention de Geneve de 1949,

in 43

35, 45 (1966).

at

396, the authors, both lawyer-members of the United

1949 Diplomatic Conventions,

party to the conflict to apply

.

was taken "in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."

International et de Droit

States delegation to the

.

necessarily because they considered Article 3 invalid per se. See note

LeClercq, L' Application du Statut du Prisonnier de Guerre depuis

Revue de Droit

3.

of South Vietnam." (Translation mine).

the French finally agreed to permit the

specifically stated that this action

compliance with Article

are equally responsible for the application

Article 3 in the civil

As

states:

248 (1965).

L. 243,

46.

30, at 42,

the Parties to the conflict are legally only

.

."
and may ignore all the other Articles.
37; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict, 5 Va.

45. Pinto, supra note 25, at 529. Pinto says:

supra.

I,

established rules for the treatment of

all

Commentary, supra note

to observe Article 3,

44. Id. at
J. Int'l

applicable. Id., Vol.

15, at 28.

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character

bound

Convention

by the USSR would have obligated each party to an armed
implement all of the provisions of the Convention which guarantee

provisions of the draft article proposed

said:

legal efficacy

"Insofar as Article 3 purports to bind the insurgent

may be doubted."

48. See text in connection with note 9 supra.
49.

For

bound by

a

discussion of the several theories

which have been advanced

the provisions of Article 3, even though

had never

it

itself

for holding a rebel organization

agreed to be bound, see Note,

The

Geneva Convention and the Treatment ofPrisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 856-58 (1967).
See also Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206, 213 (1953),
where that noted authority said: "The effect of these provisions [relating to armed conflict not of an
including the party which is not a recognised
international character] is to subject the parties to a civil war
belligerent

50.

—

—

to important restraints of the

The

52.

would be "national liberation movements."
Law, supra note 30, at 410; and see the further quotation from

this

textbook in

infra.

Pictet,

would dare

Commentary, supra note

to claim before the

wounded uncared
observing, in
rules

."
.

correct jargon, of course,

51. Soviet International

note 69

law of war.

which

its

it

world

for, to torture

.

.

30, at 38 (emphasis in original).
.

that, Article

He

and mutilate prisoners and take hostages?

dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict

in fact observes daily,

under

Unfortunately, experience shows that

its

also states:

"What Government

was

entitled to leave the

3 not being applicable,

No

it

Government can

between

it

own laws, when dealing with common

some governments do just what

is

and them,

a

object to

few

essential

criminals." Id. at 36-37.

described, but without any such bald

admission
53. Several years ago the suggestion was made that in any armed conflict in which United Nations forces
were involved, they should not be bound by the law of war, but their opponent should be. The reaction to

1

Levie on the

22

this

Law

of

War

proposal was violent and caustic, and properly

so.

See Bothe, Le Droit de

la

Guerre

et les

Nations Unies

(1967).
54.

Pictet,

Commentary, supra note

55.

It is

30, at 37-38.

Of course,

if

they are mere brigands, they are not

of the Convention.

entitled to the protection

mind

essential to bear in

that the last paragraph

complies with the provisions of the Article "shall not

of Article 3

affect the legal status

specifies that the fact that a party

of the Parties to the conflict." This

provision was obviously included in order to permit the established government to

without recognizing the existence of

who

was the insurgents themselves
Paper, supra note 24,
56.

1949

at

a state

comply with

called attention to this provision

17-18.

See note 25 supra;

Pictet,

Commentary, supra note

30, at 35, Draper,

The Geneva Conventions of

114 Hague Recueil des Cours 59, 96 (1965).
57. See note 15 supra.
59.

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83 (1947).
Id. at 61-62. In speaking of Nazi violations of the law of war, the IMT

war were

said (at 57): "Prisoners

and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. ..."
60.

ill-treated

United

States v.

von Leeb

(1948) [hereinafter cited
61.

846,

it

of the Article. Algerian Office White

at

58.

1

Article 3

of belligerency with the insurgents. Paradoxically, in Algeria

63.

al.,

of

of

10 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals

This opinion carries over into Vol. 11 of the

series.

1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47

118L.NT.S.
62.

et

as Trials].

rules

Stat.

2021, T.S. No.

343.

United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 532-34 (1948).
Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War

Rev. 851, 858 (1967).

A

known French

in

Vietnam, 80 Harv. L.

"These obligations [enumerated in
Article 3] correspond to those which the domestic public law of civilized States recognizes, even in cases of
insurrection, riot or civil war.
The summary execution of prisoners is prohibited." Pinto, supra note 25,
well

.

at

532

.

expert in

this field has said:

.

(translation mine).

64. United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 535-38. But see Draper, supra note 56, at
where he states: "Undoubtedly, the prohibition of murder, mutilation or torture is absorbed in the
customary prohibitions of the law of war. On the other hand the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal
dignity, the passing of sentences by irregular tribunals, unfairly conducted, are not yet prohibited by the

90,

customary law of war.
65.

."
.

.

See note 34 supra.

66. See text in connection with notes 42
67.

An

Appraisal,
68.

and 43 supra.

Commentary, supra note 30, at 39 and 141; Smith, The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention:
42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 880, 889 (1967); Pinto, supra note 63.

Pictet,

See text in connection with notes 156-163

infra.

Law, supra note 30, at 423. Elsewhere
laws and customs of war must be observed in any armed conflict."
69. Soviet International

70.

It is

more gory

not unusual to find,

after hostilities

have ended, that

(at

407) the statement

many

incidents (or

is

made

at least

that "the

many of the

which have been reported during the course of hostilities, were basically figments
of the imagination: perhaps a minor incident which has been built up out of all proportion to the actual facts
by the addition of horrendous details, perhaps an entirely imaginary incident conceived by a public relations
officer or a reporter when headline news was lacking. However, the major violations to be discussed herein
are in the nature of admissions against interest: actions constituting, or allegedly constituting, violations by the
United States and the South Vietnamese, reported by the American news media, and actions constituting, or
allegedly constituting, violations by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, reported by Radio Hanoi and
the Liberation Radio, or by other sources in Hanoi. (As the alleged violation mentioned in note 9 supra does
not meet this criterion, it will not be discussed. It is, however, one of the most heinous violations not only of
details thereof)

the Convention, but also of the customary law of war).
71.

See text in connection with note 6 supra.

Communique of the Honolulu Conference, Feb. 8, 1966, at 54 Dep't State Bull. 304, 305
Communique of the Manila Summit Conference, Oct. 25, 1966, at 55 Dep't State Bull. 730,
Text of Communique of the Washington Meeting, April 21, 1967, at 56 Dep't State Bull. 747,

72. Joint

(1966), Joint

731 (1966),

749 (1967). The nations involved in the latter two meetings were Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States.
73. That incidents of maltreatment of prisoners of war by American personnel have occurred is beyond
dispute. There will never be a war fought in which there are not, at the very least, isolated instances of
maltreatment of prisoners of war on both sides. The general moral environment in which the individual soldiers
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have been raised

may be judged, and

1

23

may be
Laymen Concerned About

the training which they have received while in military service

measured, by the frequency with which such incidents occur. While Clergy and

Vietnam in their book, In the Name ofAmerica

(issued in February,

1

968

after this article

had been substantially

completed), allocates a chapter of 45 pages to the reprinting of published items about the maltreatment of
is only an occasional, and frequently misleading, indication (usually based on hearsay)
of such misconduct by American troops. The weakness of the "evidence" quoted to support the organization's
thesis of misconduct is, in itself, extremely persuasive of the inaccuracy of the conclusion reached by one of

prisoners of war, there

commentators (at 23) that "these combat practices are so widespread in their occurrence as to suggest that
commission is a direct result of decisions reached at the highest levels of civilian and military
command." When Ambassador Harriman sent the ICRC a Department of Defense report on the methods
used by the several military services of the United States to disseminate information concerning the
the

their systematic

requirements of the Conventions, the

ICRC President replied: "We

are

convinced that in the context of the

Vietnam the U.S. Forces are devoting a major effort to the spread of knowledge on the Geneva
Conventions." Letter from Samuel A. Gonard to W. Averell Harriman, January 5, 1968, on file in the
Department of State.
74. A series of photographs and extracts from news stories recording maltreatment of prisoners of war
by the South Vietnamese which had appeared in a number of respected American publications were collected
and published in a brochure entitled What are we tied to in Vietnam? by Massachusetts Political Action for
Peace, Cambridge, Mass. (1964).
75. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 22, 1965, at 3B; id. Nov. 3, 1965, at 2A; id. April 27, 1966, at 2A; id.
war

in

Feb. 9, 1968, at IB.

have

Dec. 30, 1965,

76.

Id.

also

appeared

(id.

at

Mar.

1A. Photographs indicating kind and generous treatment by American personnel

5,

1966,

at

2A, Mar.

6,

1966

at

12A), but these are suspect

as

they are self-serving

have been posed for an enterprising photographer.
77. The brochure referred to in note 74 supra is a good example of this reaction.

and could
78.

easily

A

letter to the editor

Problems of War and Peace

at

of the N.Y. Times from the Chairman of the University Committee on

the University of Pennsylvania said: "Responsible

reports

W. W.

by

American journalists have

South Vietnamese captors. Because of these
Rostow, chairman of the foreign policy research division of our State Department, was asked

frequently reported the torture of Vietcong prisoners

their

'why does the United States not abide by the Red Cross Convention in the treatment of Vietcong
prisoners?' His reply was that the United States does not take prisoners in Vietnam, and that we were merely
advisers to the South Vietnamese Government, which bore the responsibility for dealing with prisoners.
Because of this immoral apathy, and narrow legalistic position taken by our State Department, neither the
United States nor the South Vietnamese, nor the Vietcong, nor the North Vietnamese are committed to
adhere to any of the 'sanctions established by international law for the protection of war prisoners.'" N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1965, at 36, col. 5. The writer of the letter erred in both his assumptions and his conclusions,
.

.

.

but he certainly raised the moral

issue.

—

one context at the Diplomatic Conference in connection with Article
which concerns custody of prisoners of war transferred from one ally to another. Under Article 12 the
transferring state retains some residual power with respect to prisoners of war it transfers, because it can request
return of the prisoners to its custody where the transferee state is guilty of violating the Convention in their
regard. Article 12 requires that this procedure be followed where the Protecting Power finds violations of the
Convention and the Detaining Power does not correct them. The Communist countries have all reserved as
to this Article, insisting that the capturing power remain fully responsible for any maltreatment suffered by
prisoners of war at the hands of the transferee Detaining Power. See, for example, the USSR reservation made
at the time of signing (75 U.N.T.S. 135, 460) and maintained at the time of ratification (191
N.T S. 367).
80. "The major United States effort, besides setting up its own procedures, has been to persuade the
South Vietnamese to go along. [South Vietnamese] Government officials, once openly hostile to the
convention, now grudgingly accept the American position. Much remains to be done, however, to persuade
the average South Vietnamese soldier to stop using torture. Each soldier will soon be shown a training film
prepared with American help. Most have already received booklets outlining the proper treatment of
prisoners." N.Y. Times, July 1, 1966, at 6, col. 3. See also Pinto supra note 45.
81. "United States ofmcials are quietly putting into effect an important change in their handling of
prisoners of war. Vietcong and North Vietnamese fighters captured on the battlefield will no longer be turned
over to the South Vietnamese Army immediately after the fighting has died down. Instead, they will be sent
to American divisional headquarters and kept in American hand [sic] until they can be transferred to new
Vietnamese prisoner-of-war compounds.
The system has been adopted to enable the United States to
meet its responsibilities under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 governing the treatment of
79. This

problem did

arise in

12,

U

.

prisoners of war.

The

article requires the

.

.

country turning prisoners over to another country to guarantee their

1

Law

Levie on the

24

well-being." N.Y. Times, July
is

United
82.

83.

1,

State

War

1966,

States Military Assistance

55 Dep't
As stated

of

at 6, col. 3.

Command,

The

Directive

current official directive establishing

No. 190-3,

this

BuU. 336, 338 (1966).
73 supra, there have without doubt been some

in note

war by American personnel. Thus,
Levy there was defense testimony

acts of maltreatment of prisoners of
was reported that in the trial by court-martial of Captain Howard B.
that American Special Forces ("Green Beret") personnel maintained a
it

"permissive policy toward the torture of Vietcong prisoners by the South Vietnamese" and that

$10 was paid

to the

procedure

April 6, 1967.

Montagnards

for every right ear

brought

N.Y. Times, May 25, 1967,
context in which it was given,

in.

a

bounty of

at 2, col. 3.

In

view of the hearsay nature of the testimony, and the partisan
it does not fall
within the criterion adopted for this article. For another incident of alleged maltreatment see St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb.

1968,

9,

See note 79 supra.

IB, col.

at

1.

The United States

has officially acknowledged its contingent responsibility. Dep't
Vietnam Information Note, No. 9, Prisoners of War, Aug. 1967, at 3. It maintains small detachments
of American military police at each South Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp, apparently to ensure that its
84.

State

responsibility

85.

is

being met.

See text in connection with note 74-76 supra.

When

the

ICRC considered that

evidence to warrant raising the issue with the South Vietnamese authorities, the

latter

there was sufficient

responded by conveying

ICRC

"a file on atrocities attributed to NLF forces. It also invited the Committee to investigate the
Vietnam prisoners held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." ICRC, The International
Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 6 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 399, 405 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as ICRC, Vietnam]. It does not appear that there was a denial of maltreatment by the South Vietnamese;
rather there was a defense of tu quoque aimed at the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. Whatever the merit
of the cross-complaint, it is no excuse for violating the Convention.
to the

plight of

86.
4,

404-05; 7

Id. at

United

188. For the categories of persons being given prisoner-of-war status, see para.

id.

Command, Directive No.
Red Cross 189 (1966).

States Military Assistance

87. E.g., 7 Int'l

Rev. of the

188 (1967). See

88.

6

id.

141 (1966); 7

89.

5

id.

300, 470, and 481 (1965); 6

id.

id.

also

20-5, Sept. 21, 1966.

note 80 supra.

98, 405, 542, and

597 (1966); 7

id.

125 126, 188, 189, and 246

by an American newsman to Pleiku, one of the
largest prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the South Vietnamese, see Gershen, A Close-Up Look at Enemy
Prisoners, Parade, Dec. 10, 1967, at 10. These ICRC inspection visits to the camps which have uniformly
included private and unsupervised consultations with selected prisoners of war designated by the ICRC
delegate, do not appear to have brought to light any instances of major violations of the Convention once
(1967). For a report of an unofficial and unauthorized

visit

had reached the camps.
Wyant, Barbarity in Vietnam Shocks U.S., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1968, at IB, col. 1. The
televised shooting of a just-captured Vietnamese by the head of the South Vietnamese National Police during
the attack on Saigon early in 1968 served to highlight this problem.
91. The sources of this information have included broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, information released
by the official North Vietnamese press agency, and an occasional dispatch from foreign reporters based in
Hanoi. Information in depth, the complete accuracy of which is questionable, has been disseminated through
the medium of newsmen from other Communist countries. East German journalists and photographers were
the source of the material used in the article, U.S. Prisoners of War in North Vietnam, Life, Oct. 20, 1967,
at 21-33. These East German sources likewise provided the motion picture material purchased and televised
by NBC late in 1967. Information concerning the treatment of South Vietnamese prisoners of war by the
North Vietnamese is of insufficient reliability for discussion.
that captured personnel

90.

92. See text in connection with notes 109-1 15 infra.
93.

N.Y. Times, July

94.

Id.

July 13, 1966,

95.

Id.

July

96.

Id. at 3, col. 1.

97.

ICRC, Vietnam,

of war "against

8,

1966,

8,

1966,

at 3, col. 1.

at 1, col. 7,

and

5, col. 1.

at 3.

supra note 85,

at

404. Art. 13 of the Convention requires the protection of prisoners

and public curiosity." Para.

insults

1

(c)

of Art.

3,

quoted

at

note 34 supra, prohibits "outrages

and degrading treatment."
of these communications, see text in connection with note 8 supra. The

against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating

98.

For the

first

of the Government of the

stated that "the policy

new

reply also

as regards

enemy

humane policy. " (Emphasis added). The ambiguous italicized words could be interpreted
meaning "we have a policy of being humane to prisoners of war captured during a war, but this is not a

captured in time of war
as

DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]

war and,
99.

is

a

therefore, there

N.Y. Times,

is

May

no
9,

obligation

1967,

on our

at 15, col. 1.

part to

be humane"!
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100. 56 Dep't State Bull.

825 (1967).

101. Instructions for the

Government of

No.

1

25

the Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders

100, Apr. 23, 1863, Art. 75.
102. See note 61 supra.
103.

2Bull.JAG299(1943).

104. Trial of Lt. Gen. Kurt Maelzer, 11

War Crimes Rep.].
105. IMTFE Judgment,

Law Reports

of Trials of War Criminals 53 (1946) [hereinafter

cited

supra note 33,

1092-95 and 1030-31.

at

106. See text in connection with note 64 supra.
107.

As we have seen, in
Convention is

so far as

is

North Vietnam

applicable and, that at a

that the entire

is

concerned there are strong arguments for the position

minimum,

not even necessary to find that

this particular

customary law of war in order to find that

Convention (note 34 supra)
by North Vietnam. It is therefore,

Article 3 of the

certainly applicable despite the untenable position to the contrary taken

humanitarian rule has attained the

it is

status

of being

a part

of the

binding on North Vietnam.

It has been mentioned that in the parade conducted on July 6, 1966, the prisoners were handcuffed
During the World War II commando raid on Dieppe the manacling of German prisoners of war by
Canadian troops was itself challenged by the German Government as a violation of the law of war and resulted
in a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals. For differing versions of this affair see British War Office, The
Law of War on Land (Part III of the Manual of Military Law) 53 n.2(a) (1958); Castren, The Present Law of
War and Neutrality 159 (1954); and ICRC Report, supra note 17, at 368-70.

108.

in pairs.

109. See text in connection with note 8 supra.
110.

1966,

N.Y. Times,

at 1, col.

authorities

of the

humanely, but
fact

7 and

Sept. 30, 1965, at 1, col. 6
at 5, col. 1.

DRVN

An ICRC

have made

that they cannot,

known

and

at 3, col. 3; id.

report stated:
to the

ICRC

however, be considered

of the opinion that the bombing

as

Feb. 12, 1966,

that the captured

prisoners of war.

attacks constitute crimes for

which

ICRC, Vietnam,

supra note 85,

at

July 13,

American

The

the

pilots are treated

DRVN Government

is

in

these prisoners will have to answer

before the courts and that the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war)
them...."

at 12, col. 3; id.

"The [North Vietnamese] Red Cross and

is

consequently not applicable to

403.

N.Y. Times, July 15, 1966, at 1, col. 3 and at 3, col. 1; id. July 19 1966, at 3, col. 1; id. July 20,
The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong had begun in June, 1966.
112. Between July 15 and July 25, 1966, the newspapers in the United States carried several stories on
this subject every day. Questions were asked of the President and statements were made which indicated that
any trials, convictions, and executions would be followed in short order by severe retaliatory action by the
United States. Id. July 19, 1966, at 3, col. 3; id. July 21, at 14, col. 2.
113. Neutrals who sought to dissuade the North Vietnamese from their proposed course of action included
U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations (id. July 17, 1966, at 8, col. 3), the Pope (id. July 21,
1966, at 1, col. 5), and the ICRC (id. July 23, 1966, at 2, col. 6). Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam
who interceded with the North Vietnamese included Norman Thomas, The National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy (id. July 20, 1966, at 1, col. 8) and the so-called Senate "doves," spearheaded by Senator Frank
Church of Idaho (id. July 16 1966, at 1, col. 1 and at 3, col. 2). Many competent observers of the international
scene consider that this latter appeal was probably the most effective on Communist pragmatism.
111.

1966,

at 1, col. 8.

114. Id. July 24, 1966, at

1, col. 1.

115. Id. July 25, 1966, at

1, col. 8.

116. Id. July 26, 1966, at 3, col. 2.

117. Supra note 15, Art.

1.

118. Supra note 61, Art.

1.

119. Supra note 4, Art.

4.

May

9,

120.

N.Y. Times,

1967,

This

at 15, col. 1.

is

also the

placed on the letter of Aug. 31, 1965, from the North Vietnamese

See also the

ICRC

only logical interpretation which can be

Government

to the

ICRC,

note 8 supra.

report quoted in note 110 supra.

Convention reads as follows: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present

121. Article 85 of the

Detaining

Power

for acts

Convention."
122. Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S.

crimes tribunals and national courts after

1,

21, 22, 24 (1946). This position was adopted generally

World War

Soviet legal writer took the same position, stating:

(1945).

a

4

even before he was seized by units of the Red Army, and consequently did not
war prisoner when he was seized. ..." Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility under Criminal Law 88

Ritz ceased to be

become

"On

by war

War

Crimes Rep. 78 (1948). At least one noted
account of these inhuman crimes committed by him,

II.

a

soldier

1

Levle on the

26

123. Statement

War

of

ofRJ. Wilhelm representing the ICRC. Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. IIA, at 318-19.
stated: "Prisoners of war convicted of war crimes and crimes against

The proposed amendment

124.

humanity under the

of the Detaining Power, and in conformity with the principles of the

legislation

be treated in the same way
of the Detaining Power." Id. at 319.

Nuremberg
territory

Law

125.

Trial, shall

321. In

Id. at

made

statement

a

as

persons serving

a

sentence for

criminal offence in the

a

to the Plenary Meeting, General Skylarov, another Soviet delegate,

under the Soviet proposal prisoners of war guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity, "once their
has been established and they have been sentenced by a regular court, " should no longer enjoy the benefits of

said that
guilt

the Convention. Id. Vol. IIB, at

303 (emphasis added).

570-71. In supporting the Soviet proposal in the discussion

at

the Plenary Meeting,

the delegate from Czechoslovakia pointed out that "it concerns those prisoners of

war who have been

126.

Id.

convicted"

Vol. IIA,

at

Vol. IIB,

(id.

been pronounced" and
127. Id. at 311.

at

305) and the Bulgarian delegate stated that

that

The

"we

are dealing

is

with war criminals convicted

Soviet proposal was rejected by

Diplomatic Conference in the Stockholm (working)

word "enjoy"

"it

such."

as

that sentence has already
(Id. at

307).

The only change made by
substitution of the word "retain" for

vote of 8-23-7.

a

was the

draft

assumed

the
the

in the English version.

& Ginnane, supra note 37, at 410; Public Prosecutor v. Oie Hee Koi et al., [1968] 2 W.L.R.

128. Yingling

715, 727.

Commentary, supra note

129. Pictet,

30, at 425.

of the Convention. After World

War

Those

safeguards are found in Arts. 84-88 and 99-108,

commanders were

tried and convicted of
Gen. Shigeru Sawada, 5 War
Crimes Rep. 1 (1948); Trial of Lt. Gen. Harukei Isayama, id. at 60; Trial of Gen. Tanaka Hisakasu, id. at 66.
The IMTFE reviewed and condemned, by implication, the Japanese trials and executions of American airmen.

inclusive,

being responsible for unfair

IMTFEJudgment,

trials

supra note 33,

of captured American airmen. Trial of

at

1024-31. In

(The Justice Case), 6 War Crimes Rep.
enumerated the requirements for a fair trial,
et

several Japanese

II

its

1,

al.

its

Lt.

"Notes on the Case" dealing with United States

v. Alstotter

War

103 (1948), the United Nations
conclusions being drawn from

a

Crimes Commission
number of sources and

representing customary international law.
130.

The

reservation to Article 85

made by

the

USSR

at

the time of signature (75 U.N.T.S. 135, 460)

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of
the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in
accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being
and maintained

at

the time of ratification (191 U.N.T.S. 367)

does not consider

states:

itself

understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country

who undergo

in question for those

their

punishment." In response to an inquiry concerning the meaning of

the foregoing reservation, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said, in

Council,

that:

"[T]he reservation

.

.

.

signifies that prisoners

a

May 26,

note dated

1955, to the Swiss Federal

of war who, under the laws of the

USSR

have

been convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the
USSR for all other persons undergoing punishment in execution ofjudgments by the courts. Once the sentence

do not enjoy the protection which the
Commentary, supra note 30, at 424 (emphasis added).
131. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, S.
Exec. Rep. No. 9, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1955). For some of the factors which caused Senate
perturbation, see Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War, 56 Am. J. Int L. 433, 443
has become legally enforceable, persons in this category consequently

Convention

affords." Pictet,

1

n.37 (1962).
132.

The

original

accompanied by

a

The French

31, 1968.

adherence, including the reservations, was in the Vietnamese language.

French

translation. Letter to the

translation includes the

It

was

author from the Swiss Federal Political Department, Jan.

words "poursuivis

et

condamnes"

—"prosecuted and convicted."

274 U.N.T.S. 340 (emphasis added).
133. It has been suggested, for example, that the "and" in the words "prosecuted for and convicted of
might have been intended to be read disjunctively. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of
Prisoners of War in Vietnam, supra note 63, at 862. Under this interpretation it is said that a prisoner of war
could be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by the mere filing of a charge against him alleging a war
crime or

crime against humanity. But "et"

a

"and" were to be construed disjunctively

is

this

not given

a

would mean

disjunctive intendment in French,
that a prisoner

of war

possible

if

"et" or

still be denied the benefits of the Convention because one of the two
under the disjunctive construciton would have been met he would have been

(prosecuted and acquitted) could
alternatives

and

prosecuted but not convicted

—

make sense!
The argument might be made that absent the Convention we are

prosecuted. This obviously does not
134.

law

—and

that this

is

what the courts applied

in

relegated to customary international

Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S.

1,

and other similar

cases.

But

Maltreatment of Prisoners
as

we

have already seen in so

far as

North Vietnam

concerned,

is

applicable (see text in connection with notes

27-33 supra) and,

applicable (see text in connection with notes

34-45

any event

at a

minimum,

of Art. 3 (note 34 supra)

supra). Para. 1(d)

27

undeniable that the Convention

it is

that in

1

Article 3

is
is

specifies the

protections to be accorded persons charged with offenses.
135. See Dep't State Memorandum to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Entitlement of
American Military Personnel Held by North Viet Nam to Treatment as Prisoners of War, etc., July 13, 1966.
Charges that the use of napalm bombs is a violation of the law of war have also been heard with some frequency.
An Indian scholar has said, in this regard: "[Djuring the Second World War and during the hostilities in Korea
the use of flame-throwers and of napalm and incendiary

Nuclear Weapons and International

Law

bombs appear

have been regarded

to

151 (1959). While the question

certainly sufficiently controversial to preclude unilateral decision by the

may

as legal."

Singh,

not be free from doubt,

it is

North Vietnamese with respect thereto.

During the course of the July, 1966, excitement Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, who had
member of the prosecution at Nuremberg, issued a statement in which he pointed out: "No Luftwaffe
or Luftwaffe commander for example, was brought to trial because of his participation in the bombing

136.

been
pilot,

a

of London despite the

Cong. Rec.

16,

224

fact that

London bombings were

directed primarily at the civilian population...." 112

(daily ed., July 25, 1966).

137. After several years of preparatory drafting by the

ICRC,

the Draft Rules for the Limitation of the

Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War were published and distributed in 1956 so that
they could be discussed and acted
1957.

They were

their status as

discussed

at

accepted

the

XlXth

International

Red

New Delhi

Cross Conference in

in

and they have been the subject of much discussion since then, but

to Art. 10 states, in part: "It

was ...

regular practice, or even condoned, that the

as a

Article 10

at

an unofficial proposal has not changed.

The commentary

138.

upon

New Delhi,

ICRC

to prevent target area
felt it

bombing from being

desirable to insert the relevant rule in

and thus to lay emphasis on the prohibition of indiscriminate bombing."

Id. at 91.

One expert in this field takes the rather paradoxical position that target-area bombing was legal during
World War II, and so remains, but that indiscriminate bombing is a violation of the law of air warfare. Spaight,
Air Power and War Rights 271, 272, and 277 (3d ed. 1947).
139.

140.

It

has been intimated that the

North Vietnamese

of making "aggressive war," the airmen are
specified in Article 6(a)
against peace:

all

treaties,

is

United

States

is

guilty

the category of war crime

of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which

Namely, planning, preparation,

of international

take the position that as the

of crimes against peace. This

guilty

reads:

"Crimes

or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation

initiation,

agreements, or assurances, or participation in a

common

plan or conspiracy for the

accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 3 (1947).
Article 5(a)

of the

Apart from the

IMTFE

trials

differs

only in minor respects.

of the major Nazi leaders by the

IMTFE Judgment,

supra note 33,

Annex 5-A,

at 21.

IMT and by some of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals

and of the major Japanese leaders by the IMTFE, no one has ever been tried for this war crime which, obviously,

who have the power to make war, and not by those who do the fighting. In
von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1, at 11 Trials 489 (1948), the Military Tribunal said: "If and as long
as a member of the armed forces does not participate in the preparation planning, initiating or waging of
aggressive war on a policy level his war activities do not fall under the definition of Crimes against Peace. It
is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the policy of his State, which is the relevant
issue for determining his criminality under the charge of Crimes against Peace." This is the real meaning of
the announcement by Ho Chi Minh that no trials of American airmen were then contemplated, but that Rusk,

can only be committed by those

United

States v.

McNamara and Johnson were in a different category. See text in connection with note 116 supra.
141. One American sailor, Apprentice Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, who fell overboard from his
some hours

later

was rescued by North Vietnamese fishermen and made

receiving exactly the same treatment as the alleged

ICRC,

462

criminals

—no

mail,

no

prisoner of war,
relief packages,

postponed

until after the cessation

A footnote to

the

last

of hostilities the deterrent

no

ship and

apparendy

visits

sentence quoted points out that
effect

of widespread publicity

by the

is

when

trials

lost. Id. at

n.115.

143. See text in connection with notes 47-56 supra. Certainly, the 59 nations

which

drafted and signed

Convention and the 117 which have ratified or adhered to it had no qualms about the validity of Article
Only Portugal made a reservation to that Article at the time of signing, but its reservation did not question

the
3.

is

etc.

142. Levie, supra note 131, at 461-62.
are

war

a

the validity of Article 3 and

was not maintained on

ratification.

144. See text in connection with notes 57-70 supra.
145. See text in connection with notes 64-68 supra, and 156-163 infra.
146.

N.Y. Times, June 22, 1965,

at 6, col. 1.

1

Levie on the

28

147. Id.

at 1, col. 7.

have exploded

five

He

minutes

Law

of

War

had been apprehended

in

Saigon while attaching

a fuse to a

bomb which was

to

later.

Id. June 25, 1965, at 1, col. 6; id. June 26, 1965, at 1, col. 8 and at 2, col. 7.
53 Dep't State Bull. 55 (1965). The statement also said that "these Communist threats to intimidate,
of course, will not succeed." Subsequent events have revealed that this portion of the statement was incorrect!

148.
149.

150.

N.Y. Times,

1965 at 1,
635 (1965).

Sept. 28,

151. 53 Dep't State Bull.

col. 1.

ICRC, Vietnam,

supra note 85, at 411. Despite the American statement concerning no intimidation,
no Vietcong terrorist has been executed since September, 1965, and when three Vietcong
terrorists were convicted and sentenced to be executed on November 17, 1967, they were given a last minute
reprieve by South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Can Loc. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1967.
153. 2 Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, International Law 561 (7th ed. 1952). An example of a legitimate act
of reprisal is given in United States Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 177 (1956), where
it is stated: "For example the employment by a belligerent of a weapon the use of which is normally precluded
by the law of war would constitute a lawful reprisal for intentional mistreatment of prisoners of war held by
the enemy."
154. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1965, at 6, col. 1; and id., Sept. 28, 1965, at 1, col. 1. It should be borne in
mind that at no time have the Vietcong or the NLF ever contended that the executed Americans had committed
any act warranting execution or that their executions were pursuant to the sentence of a court.
155. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1965, at 2, col. 7.
156. Morgan, The German War Book 74 (1915).
157. See, e.g., para. 20 of the Anglo-German Agreement of July 2, 1917 (111 Brit. & For. State Papers
257, 263); Art. XXI of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of Dec. 28, 1917 (id. at 557, 566); and para. 42 of the
Franco-German Agreement of Apr. 26, 1918 (id. at 713, 721).
158. Supra note 61, Article 2. It is repeated in Article 13 of the 1949 Convention.
159. Flory, Prisoners of War 44 (1942).
160. United States v. List et al., 11 Trials 757, 1252-53 (1948). This case is sometimes referred to as The
152.

supra note 149,

Southeast Case.

von Leeb et al., 11 Trials 528 (1948) (emphasis added).
on The Dreierwalde Case, 1 War Crimes Rep. 86 (1947); Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 War
Crimes Rep. 99 (1949). In the former the statement is made that "the killing of prisoners of war constituted
a war crime under the customary International Law even before the promulgation and ratification of the
Conventions of 1907 [Hague] and 1929 [Geneva]." (Emphasis added).
161. United States v.
162. Notes

163. See text in connection with note 64 supra.
164. "According to the existing international law, reprisals against an ally of an enemy-state for acts of the

enemy-state are not permissible
therefore,
state."

may, according

Moritz,

(July 1961).

(1948).

The

To

as

they are not directed against the state responsible for the

act.

Reprisals,

of the laws of war, only be employed against the responsible
Application of the Laws of War Within the NATO-Forces, 13 Mil. L. Rev. 1

to the existing rules

Common

the same general effect, see United States

v. List et al.

(The Hostage Case), 11

Trials
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I

the Existing

ed.,

7

1971

book published in 1954 the author said: "By 1907 the proportion of the
laws of war embodied in general convention(s) far exceeded, and still exceeds
n

a

to this day, that

of the law of peace."

What he failed to mention was

from the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning

gas

that, apart

and bacteriological warfare,

the conventional law of war relating to the conduct of hostilities dated (and

from 1907;

dates)

and

that there

was not (and

is

still

not) a single piece of

what might well be considered
war in and from the air!
a fairly important aspect of modern warfare
Shordy after the end of World War I an anonymous article appeared in the
prestigious British Yearbook of International Law the thesis of which was that, the
League of Nations having been established, it would be a "disastrous mistake"
international legislation dealing specifically with

—

for the

governments of member nations to use

this

new machinery to

codify (or

expand?) the law of war; and that the past failure of international law to provide

due

viable solutions to the problems of peace was, at least in part,

to the

preoccupation of writers and statesmen with the law of war and their consequent
neglect of the law of peace.
as

war had been

abolished, there

and second,

regulate;

Two arguments were advanced: first, that inasmuch

that in

was no longer anything for the law of war

to

any event there was no point in wasting time and

energy on rules of war because such rules would only be broken.

arguments did not go unchallenged;

These

but that they prevailed with the majority

of statesmen and international lawyers of the day

is

evident from the fact that

Hague Peace Conference, which had not been convened because of
advent of World War I, was never called into session and, despite the

the Third
the

tremendous

technological

advances

demonstrated

during

that

Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907

be the

Thus

latest

it

weapons

as

the

hostilities.

in 1907, prior to the advent

tank and the airplane,

the

continued to

expression of States with respect to the conduct of

was these Regulations, drafted

war,

of such

weapons which had completely

1

Levie on the

30

Law

of

War

revolutionized warfare, which constituted the basic rules governing hostilities

during

World War

could

It

easily

II.

War II would have caused

be assumed that the events of World

a less antagonistic attitude

towards

efforts to

modernize the law of war.

However, such was not the case. In a statement which could have been written
by our anonymous post-World War I author and his adherents, the International

Law Commission made

the following decision at

1949 organizational

its

meeting:

The Commission considered whether

"18.

was suggested

a topic for codification. It

of its conduct had ceased
that,

to

be relevant.

.

The

majority of the

problem

On the other hand,

—

the regulation

the opinion was expressed

legitimate or illegitimate

Commission declared

the present stage.

at

beginning of its work, were
as

war having been outlawed,

although the term 'laws of war' ought to be discarded, a study of the rules

governing the use of armed force
.

that,

the laws of war should be selected as

It

undertake

to

showing lack of confidence

opposed

itself

was considered that
this study, public

in the efficiency of the

—might be

if the

to the study

Commission,

at the disposal

.

of the

at the very

opinion might interpret

means

useful.

its

action

of the United

(Emphasis added.)

Nations for maintaining peace. "

of that decision, and despite strong arguments in support of the need

As

a result

to

modernize the law of war advanced by many of the leading international

lawyers,

13

•

Commission

the

i

has,

more than twenty

At the present time,

volition considered any aspect of the law of war.
are

compelled

to apply to wars

•

own
then, we

years later, never of its

being fought in the eighth decade of the 20th

century rules governing the conduct of hostilities which were drafted in the

decade of that century.

Just imagine the chaos if

we were

using the

regulations of that earlier horse-and-buggy decade to regulate today's

Imagine Broadway and Forty-second Street with no
policemen, no stop
rules

signs,

and

a five-mile

traffic lights,

per hour speed

under which the world community of nations, by

limit!

its

no

But such

first

traffic
traffic!

traffic

are the

ostrich-like attitude,

has permitted and continues to permit wars to be fought.

World War I and like

Like the anonymous writer after

Commission

after

World War

II,

the International

Law

the United Nations itself has long been

extremely reluctant to exert any effort toward modernizing the law of war for
fear that public

opinion might interpret such action

approach to
having an

Teheran
Assembly

this

effect.

in

problem and

The

May

is

of confidence in that

But more recently there

organization's ability to maintain the peace.

evidence that the General Assembly

as lack

becoming

increasingly realistic in

that humanitarian considerations are, at

International Conference

1968, adopted

a

resolution

long

is

its

last,

on Human Rights, meeting in
which requested the General

to invite the Secretary-General to study

.

Major Inadequacies

131

"the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible
revision of existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians,

prisoners and combatants in

all

armed

and the prohibition and limitation

conflicts

of the use of certain methods and means of warfare."

This Resolution, in turn, resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of
the preparation of the study Respectfor Human Rights

Resolution 2444 (XXIII);
in

Armed

Conflict

by the Secretary-General;

Assembly on December

16, 1969,

operative portions of which read

1.

19

and the adoption by the General

of Resolution 2597 (XXIV), the pertinent

as follows:

by resolution

Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study initiated

2444 (XXIII), giving

need

special attention to the

for protection of the rights

of civilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles of peoples

under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to
the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and
rules to

2.

such

conflicts;

Requests the Secretary-General to consult and cooperate closely with the

Committee of the Red Cross
undertaken by that body on this question;
International

in regard to the studies being

Decides to give the highest priority to this question at the twenty-fifth session

5

of the General Assembly;

6.

Invites the

Secretary-General to present a further report

General Assembly

As

it

will

at its

twenty-fifth session.

on

this subject to the

20

have been noted from the foregoing, there

is

another powerful force

—

work in this area the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Even during the arid period in the codification of the so-called "Hague" law of
22
war after World War I, the ICRC was successful in obtaining the convening
of a diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1929 which not only redrafted the 1906
at

Geneva Convention,

23

but

also drafted the first

with the subject of prisoners of war.

24

And

convention dealing exclusively
i

in 1949, just shortly after the

International

Law Commission had

of war on

agenda, another diplomatic conference was convened

at

its

the instance of the

the

ICRC,

the

first

it

drafted

ICRC

reached

and, based

its

decision not to include the law

on many

years

Geneva
of preparatory work by

and adopted four humanitarian conventions,

ever to deal exclusively with the protection of

when Resolution 2444

civilians.

at

2S

including

Moreover,

(XXIII) was adopted by the General Assembly,

its

basis

1

Levie on the

32

was

resolution

a

Law

War

of

which had been adopted

at

the

XXth

International Conference

Red Cross at Vienna in 1 965; and at the XXIst International Conference
of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September 1969, a number of relevant
of the

were adopted.

resolutions

ICRC

28

Assuredly, with the General Assembly and the

acting together in a concerted effort to reach the identical goal, the

prospect for the revision and modernization of the law of war

Of course,

viewed with some minimum degree of optimism.
from proposals,

international road to travel

may now be

there

is

to draft convention, to diplomatic

conference, to signed convention, to ratification by a sufficiently large

of

States,

including the

modernization meaningful;

acknowledge

to

It is

offered in order to

make work

heretofore opposed

it.

will

It

exists

is

perhaps appropriate to mention

at this

This suggestion

is

this field,

more

palatable to those

"laws of war" be discarded.
proposals and practice and

30

in the context

is

The same
stated to

of rules governing

suggestion

is

therefore
a

less

change appears to be

to

essentially

to

Law Commission
term

be found in the ICRC's

31
installed."'

is

"war."

32

And

for the perhaps

more

a considerably

subject to dispute, than

hostilities.

be based upon the need "to take account

A/7720, makes the same suggestion, but apparently
is

have

that decision suggested that the

of the deep aspiration of the peoples to see peace

reason that "armed conflict"

who

term "armed conflict" be used

that the

who opposed

those

mankind."

all

point a suggestion which has been

be recalled that in the 1949 decision of the International

not to enter

and

revision

"a giant step forward for

in this area

word "war"

the

as a substitute for

make any such

to

number

but the very willingness of the General Assembly

problem

that the

powers,

great
29

long

a

the Report,

more

logical

all-inclusive term,

and

Whatever the motivation, such

one of semantics, and there does not appear

be any substantive objection to

it.

Moreover,

if it will

reduce opposition to

the project for the revision and modernization of the applicable law, it will have
33
Accordingly, the balance of this paper
served a useful and beneficial purpose.
will use the terms

"armed conflict,"

conflict," and, except

"rules

where speaking

of armed

conflict,"

historically, will

and "law of armed

pointedly refrain from

the use of such antiquated terms as "war," "rules of war," and "law of war"!

Assuming then

that the time

is

approaching

when

affirmative steps will be

taken to revise and modernize the law of armed conflict, the question
as to

the specific areas in

which such

revision

and modernization

is

is

presented

needed.

attempt to answer that question completely would probably necessitate a

which would cover many pages and explanatory matter which would
tomes. This paper,

as its

title

indicates, will

fill

Any

listing

many

be limited to several matters

considered to be the major inadequacies relating to the protection of individuals

during armed conflict which presently exist and require correction.

They

are:

Major Inadequacies

The

1.

non-existence

of and the need for

method

a

for

the
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automatic

determination that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application

of the law of armed

conflict;

The non-existence of and

2.

presence in the territory of each party to

Power

or an international

with the law of armed

method which will ensure the
an armed conflict of a Protecting

the need for a

body with adequate authority

use in

compliance

conflict;

The non-existence of and the need for a complete and

3.

to police

total

prohibition of the

armed conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological agents;

and

4.

The non-existence of and the need for a complete code governing the use of
air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition of any
type of bombing which has as its basic target the civilian population.

In the discussion of each of these inadequacies in the present law governing

armed

conflict,

inadequacy and

an

why

it

exists

and

to suggest possible remedies,

with the caveat

remedies are not intended to exclude other, possibly more

that the suggested

and practicable,

practical

be made to show the nature of the particular

effort will

solutions. In

view of the very nature of the inadequacies

would appear to be little need to advance arguments as to why
deemed of sufficient import to be considered a major inadequacy

discussed, there

each

is

requiring a remedy.

The non-existence of and

1.

the need for a

method for

the automatic determination

that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application of the

One
there

and

is

law of armed conflict.

of the major inadequacies of the present law of armed conflict

no method

in existence

Under
instituted

Article

1

where

that

between two or more

of the Third Hague Convention of 1907
...

discussion

honored

hostilities

were

an ultimatum with conditional

and under Article 2 of that Convention the belligerents had

the duty to notify neutrals of the existence of a state of war.
these provisions

States

law should be applied.

by a "reasoned declaration of war or

declaration of war";

that

for the automatic issuance of an authoritative

effective determination that the relationship

has reached a point

is

uniformly complied with by

would not

exist.

Unfortunately,

more

States,

legislation,

war and started

a policy

Germany

which

has

Of course, were

the problem

under

often than not they have been

in the breach. In 1914, just seven years after they

of international

35

had become

a part

attacked Belgium without a declaration of

been followed

all

too frequendy since then.

1
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Moreover,

a

Law

War

of

number of nations have denied

the applicability of the law of war

by the use of subterfuge or perversion of the
conflict

of the

1930s was designated by Japan

late

was claimed, did not bring the law of war into
cases the applicability

Thus, the Sino-Japanese

facts.

as a

"police action" which,

effect;

and

in

it

numerous other

of the provisions of the 1907 Hague and of the 1929

Geneva Conventions was rejected on the mere basis of a denial of the existence
of a state of war despite clear and undeniable evidence to the contrary.
Concerning this situation the ICRC later said:

—

shown that many armed conflicts, displaying all
the characteristics of a war, may arise without being preceded by any of the
formalities laid down in the Hague Convention. Furthermore, there have been
many cases where Parties to a conflict have contested the legitimacy of the enemy
Government and therefore refused to recognize the existence of a state of war. In
"... Since 1907 experience has

the same way, the temporary disappearance of sovereign States as a result of

annexation or capitulation has been put forward
or other of the humanitarian Conventions.

It

as a

pretext for not observing one

was necessary

to find a

remedy

to

of affairs ..."

this state

As the problem had thus long been recognized,

Stockholm

in preparing the so-called

conventions (the working papers for the 1949 Diplomatic

draft

Conference which drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) the

by proposing the employment of

ICRC

making each
Convention applicable "to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them." This proposal was adopted
attempted to solve

it

a phrase

by the Diplomatic Conference without change and without debate.

A great feeling of accomplishment was engendered by the acceptance of this
supposedly all-inclusive phrase by the Diplomatic Conference. The same ICRC
study quoted above said of it:

"By

its

general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the

pretexts they

no need
as

might in theory put forward

for a formal declaration

of war, or for the recognition of a

preliminaries to the application of the

facto hostilities

is

sufficient

.

.

.

for evading their obligations.

Any

Convention

.

difference arising

.

.

. .
otf
a state

war.

even

if one

of war,

between two
is

States

and

an armed conflict

of the Parties denies the existence

of

" 39
.

.

Unfortunately,
for example, in

2,

state

is

The occurrence of de

leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces

within the meaning of Article

There

.

it

has not uniformly

worked out

this

way

in practice. Thus,

Vietnam, where thousands of planes have been shot down, tens

of thousands of human beings have been

killed,

and millions of rounds of
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ammunition have been expended, the position has been taken by North Vietnam
that the humanitarian conventions

governing armed

conflict, to

which she long

ago acceded, do not apply.

World War II it was considered necessary to evolve a method
which would make it impossible for States to engage in armed conflict and
attempt to justify non-compliance with the then law of war by denying the
existence of a state of war through some subterfuge such as labelling it a "police
Thus,

after

Now, once

action," alleging the lack of a declaration of war, etc.

necessary to seek a
in

armed

conflict

and attempt

law of armed

future)

the

as labelling

an

method which
conflict

armed

make

it

it is

impossible for States to engage

non-compliance with the present

to justify

(or

by advancing the same or new subterfuges, such

conflict as "legitimate self-defense," or as "assistance to

an internal conflict," or

ally in

will

again,

as "assistance to

peoples engaged in a national

movement aimed at throwing off the yoke of imperialism," etc.
And contriving new phrases of limitation will probably be no more successful
in solving the problem than they have in the past as they would merely serve as
liberation

a basis for future evasions
It is

the

of a different type.

suggested that a true and effective solution could be attained by assigning

power to make a determination as to

to a pre-selected international body;

body as

of a

to the existence

involved, as well as

on

all

state

the existence of a state of armed conflict

by making the decision reached by

of armed conflict binding on the

decision

is

States direcdy

other Parties to the Convention; and by providing for

the automatic imposition of total sanctions
its

that

whenever

this

body determines

that

not being respected by a State party to the armed conflict in that

such State has, despite such decision, continued to deny the applicability of the

law of armed

conflict, or

any part of it, or

is,

in fact, violating such law.

At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference two proposals were made which can be
related to this problem.

of a

state

Nations.

The Greek

representative suggested that the existence

of belligerency should be decided by the Security Council of the United

He

later amplified this proposal

by explaining

he had meant that

that

such recognition of belligerency should be given by a majority of the countries
represented

on the Security Council.

43

A French proposal,

which was

actually

concerned with the problem of a substitute for the Protecting Power, would
have established on a permanent

becoming

effective, a

"High

Humanity," consisting of

basis,

immediately upon the Conventions

International

thirty

Committee

members

elected

for the Protection of

by the

Parties

to

the

Convention from nominations made by the Parties, by the Hague "International
[Permanent] Court of Arbitration," and by the "International
Standing Committee." Nominations were to be

made from

Red

Cross

"

"

1
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War

"amongst persons of high standing, without distinction of nationality, known for
their moral authority, their spiritual and intellectual independence and the services
they have rendered to humanity

may be

"In particular, they

political, religious, scientific

Peace Prize

While

this

of

subject

—

—

selected

from amongst persons distinguished

proposal was not incorporated into the Conventions,

a

recommended

adopted by

resolution

that consideration

be given

as

soon

in the absence

methods of attempting
political

are

as possible to

the advisability

Protecting

mentioned here because they suggest

alternative

a

Power.
our problem: one by the use of an established

to solve

new body

body; the other by the use of a

purpose and which

is

made

was the

a

of such

These two proposals

it

Conference which

Diplomatic

the

of setting up an international body to perform the functions of

Power

in the

and legal domains, and amongst winners of the Nobel

as neutral

and

created specifically for the

apolitical as

it is

possible to

do

in these

days of hypernationalism.

The
is

suggested use of the Security Council

not considered to be

a feasible solution.

on the
made on

representatives of States, voting
Offices, decisions

which

are

basis

(or,

indeed, of any political body)

That body

is

composed of

the

of decisions reached in Foreign

the basis of self-interest and political

expediency, and which are not necessarily consonant with the

facts.

It

is

would ever reach a
decision, over the opposition of North Vietnam (and, more important, of the
Soviet Union), that the situation in Vietnam demands the application of the
humanitarian conventions which govern the law of armed conflict.
On the other hand, a specially constituted body of perhaps twenty-five

inconceivable, for example, that the Security Council

individuals, each

above

politics

principles

of

whom

and would

dictated,

is

of

act as

sufficient personal international stature to

an individual and

as his

or her moral and ethical

detached and unaffected by instructions,

constitute an acceptable

and

effective international

members of this body

be

body.

The

could well

provisions for the

Commission for the
Enforcement of Humanitarian Rights during Armed Conflict" ICEHFJ\.C)
would be sufficiendy restrictive to ensure the choice of the type of individual
selection of the

(the "International

—

described, without regard to nationality, race, religion, color, or geographical

The ICEHP<AC would be selected as soon as the constitutive
convention had become effective and would be a permanent body, perhaps
self-perpetuating.
Any Party to the convention, whether or not itself involved,
distribution.

could, at any time, request a determination by
relationship

between two or more

application of the law of

armed

States

ICEHFLAC

was such

conflict; the States

as to

as to call

whether the

into effect the

involved would be invited

Major Inadequacies
any

to present

facts

would not otherwise
an affirmative decision would
States involved, but on all of the

or arguments they desired but

participate in the decision-making process;

immediately be binding not only upon the

other Parties to the Convention; and a subsequent finding by

would

decision was not being complied with

its

ICEHRAC

automatically,

further action of any kind, require the application of complete

communications sanctions against the violating
to the

Convention.

To many

this
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State

by

that

and without

economic and

of the other Parties

all

49

proposal will undoubtedly appear Utopian,

idealistic,

and

However, upon reflection this reaction may appear somewhat less
There are today more than one hundred States which are not presendy

impractical.
valid.

involved in the type of armed conflict under discussion. Each and every one of

them considers that should it become involved in such activities in the future,
so the provisions of any such convention
it would be on the side of the angels
would naturally apply in its favor and against the opponent. Moreover, to what
will it have agreed? Merely that a neutral, internationally-created body, which

—

may determine

finds itself calls for the application

which that State unexpectedly
of the humanitarian law of armed conflict.

What would

that

it

helped create,

that

mean

to

protected persons such

as

noncombatants, and that

methods of conducting
refuses to ratify

such

a

it?

that a situation in

Only

the sick and
it

convention because

the possibility of using
is

wounded,

Can any

hostilities.

and maltreat these people

such a convention

could not

kill,

prisoners of war,

it

at will

State

it

does not wish

civilian

its

and

that

it

Moreover, once

and presented for signature and

certain States

power

wishes, for example, to retain
50

weapons which have been banned?

drafted

sovereign

it

wishes to retain the unfettered ability to

tremendous and there would be an excellent

While

and

advance the argument that

moral and humanitarian pressure to bring about

acceptance.

or otherwise maltreat,

could not have recourse to certain prohibited

of action limited in these respects,
kill

it

ratification, the

ratifications

possibility

of

would be
its

which have adopted obsolete

general
attitudes

magnifying national sovereignty might well oppose such a proposal from
beginning to end,

it is

predictable that they

in the diplomatic conference

which was convened

and would eventually, rather than
to

would participate,

risk international

albeit reluctantly,

to draft such a

convention

opprobrium, become Parties

it.

This, then,
for the

is

the suggested

remedy

to the

problem of establishing

a

method

automatic determination that an existing situation necessitates the

application of the law of

armed

conflict.

While

somewhat broader delegation of authority than
willing to

make,

it is

believed that the time

is

it

would,

States

past

it is

true, entail a

have heretofore been

when

States

may

argue

"national sovereignty" as an excuse for refusing to participate in the creation of

1
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of

an international institution the sole function of which will be to limit the

and nonhumanitarian conduct of hostilities in armed
The non-existence of and

2.

the territory of each State party to

body with adequate authority

the need for a

conflict

to police

that there has

is

determine the

facts

method which

will ensure the presence in

compliance with that law.

in the old

law of war and in the present law of

never been an "umpire" with sufficient authority

of the law, to investigate alleged or possible violations,

to oversee the application
to

conflict.

an armed conflict of a Protecting Power or an international

Another major inadequacy

armed

illegal

with respect thereto, and to take the necessary action to

ensure the correction of the default.

For many centuries there has existed in customary international law an

known as the Protecting Power. By the time of the Spanish- American
War (1898), the traditional functions of that Protecting Power had come to
53
include some aspects of the protection of prisoners of war.
During World War
institution

number of formal agreements were entered into confirming the existence of
the Protecting Power and its activities with respect to prisoners of war, which
54
had until then rested entirely on custom, and specifying a number of functions.
Subsequendy, in Article 86 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention
I

a

this institution

received formal recognition in a general multilateral treaty

concerned with ensuring humanitarian treatment for one

The

class

of victims of war.

four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm the Protecting

international humanitarian institution.

There

is

now,

Power

as

an

therefore, binding

Power as an international
institution during time of armed conflict and specifying a number of its duties
and powers with respect to the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of
international legislation establishing the Protecting

war, and civilian noncombatants. Unfortunately, the provision concerning the
original designation

apparently relying

of Protecting Powers by belligerents

on customary

great deal of time, effort,

is

less

and controversy were expended at the 1949 Diplomatic

an original Protecting Power.

one hundred armed

World War

II,

period been called into being.

irrelevant

such

a

and

Power

57

conflicts

of various

'

it

has resulted

sorts

and

Power

sizes since the

end of

has not once during that

While the Report advances a number of possible

59

that, for the

have on their territory

58

substitutes for

In any event, although there have probably been

the institution of the Protecting

reasons for this failure,

clear,

international law in this respect, although a

Conference with respect to the designation of replacements and

close to

than

is

believed that

most

are completely

part, the failure to secure the designation

from the

a neutral

many of them

fact that the States

of

involved did not wish to

presence concerned with the problem of the
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which

extent to

there

was compliance with the provisions of the

humanitarian conventions governing the law of armed

The

failure

of the Protecting Power

effective system

answer

139

specifically

conflict.

an institution and the need for some

as

of supervision appears to be very generally admitted. Thus in
7

to the Secretary General's inquiry

Report, India stated that
perhaps be found

it

concerning the preparation of

his

believed that the solution to the problem "would

more through

the complete implementation of the existing

conventions than through the search for

new

And

legal instruments."

the

response of the United States acknowledged "a strongly held conviction that

urgendy needed

steps are

to secure better application

international conventions to

"there

would be

armed

of existing humanitarian

Similarly, the

conflicts."

Report

states that

pressing need for measures to improve and strengthen the present

system of international supervision and assistance to parties to armed conflicts in
their observance

And
said,

of humanitarian norms of international law. ..."

another organization concerned with preserving humanitarian rights

with respect

"Certainly

to the Protecting

time that

it is

Power:
custom was revived

this valuable international

in the

modem context of armed conflicts. An initiative of this kind by the United Nations
would

precedent

set a

as a

means of lessening the

brutality

of conflicts, and would

accord with the aim expressed in the Charter. ..."

And,

Resolution XI of the XXIst International Conference of the

finally,

Red

Power or the International
Committee of the Red Cross free access to prisoners of war and to all places of
Further, it should be borne in mind that nowhere in either
their detention."
customary or conventional international law is there any rule which would
Cross "calls

upon

all

parties to allow the Protecting

7

authorize the Protecting Power, even if it were designated and functioning, to
supervise the compliance of a belligerent with that area of the law of
conflict

armed

governing the conduct of hostilities.

Although,

as

has

been

stated,

no Protecting Power has been designated

any armed conflict which has occurred since World
occasions the

II,

on

a

number of

ICRC has been permitted to perform its humanitarian functions.

Perhaps because of this, the Report

concerned with respect for human
history, past experience,

impartiality,"

War

in

and

its

and recommends

its

calls it

most

the

rights in

armed

established

its

conflict, ascribes this to "its

and well deserved reputation of

strengthening.

been uniformly successful in having

effective private organization

But not even the

services accepted.

ICRC

Thus, while

it

has

was

permitted to perform humanitarian functions in the prisoner-of-war camps

maintained in South Korea during the period of

hostilities in that

country

1
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was never permitted

in

no "guardian" of the Conventions;

North Korea where,

69

Vietnam;

70

and

its trials

and

it

there was

it

has functioned in South

has never

been permitted in North

similarly,

Vietnam over a considerable period of time,

while

as a result,

and Nigeria

tribulations in Biafra

are too recent to

require elaboration.

method which
will ensure the existence of a "third" presence, either a Protecting Power or
some substitute therefor, on the territory of each State party to an armed conflict;
There

and

is,

(2) a

then, a double need in this area: (1) a need to devise a

need

to grant to that Protecting

Power, or the

adequate authority to ensure compliance with

of the law of armed

all

...

72

including that relating to the conduct of hostilities.

Geneva Conventions
73
at all effective

partially successful. It

would

once

is

Powers have not been
Powers have

apparent, then, that the only real solution

again, to have a provision in a

convention which would, in

ICEHFA.C.
that, when the

appropriate cases, automatically trigger action by

convention creating that institution could provide
a state

of armed conflict

is

conflict,

provisions of the 1949

relating to substitutes for Protecting

been only
be,

The

for the designation of Protecting

and those

substitute therefor,

acknowledged by the

decision to that effect has been reached by

Thus

existence of

when

States involved, or

ICEHRAC in

the

a

accordance with the

other provisions of the convention, and no Protecting Powers have been
designated in accordance with customary international law
thereafter,

ICEHP^AC would automatically begin

a substitute for the

been, or which

Protecting Power, with

may

all

the rights and duties

be, granted to such Powers.

and should not be

within one

week

to function in the capacity

And

should include the supervision of the application of
conflict

75

all

of

which have

such rights and duties

of the law of armed

restricted to the protections afforded

under the 1949

Geneva Conventions. After all, a human being, combatant or noncombatant,
suffers just as much, or is just as dead, be his improper treatment due to a violation
of those conventions or to the use of dum-dum bullets

Hague

of the 1899

Declaration), or the use of poison (in violation of the 1907

Regulations), or the use of gas (in violation of the 1925
In

(in violation

many
7R

Hague

Geneva Protocol),

77
etc.

respects the foregoing proposal parallels suggestions contained in the

Nor

Communist
countries would necessarily oppose such a solution merely because they made
and because the Soviet Union made a
reservations to Article 10/10/10/11,

Report.

is

it

believed that the U.S.S.R. and the other

statement indicating that

Conference necessary.

80

it

1
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Events subsequent to 1949 have demonstrated the need

for an institution capable

and competent

did not consider Resolution 2 of the

of performing the functions of the Protecting Power

to take such functions

upon

itself

immediately

when

the need

Ml

therefor becomes apparent.

community of

It is

believed that only in

this

fashion will the world

nations provide a satisfactory and effective

method of ensuring
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conflict the presence
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of an impartial agency with the

function of making certain that the law of armed conflict

is

fully

and properly

applied.

The non-existence of and the need for a complete and total prohibition of the
armed conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological agents.

use

3.

in

A

major inadequacy in the existing law

third

individuals during

armed

accepted ban on the use

and biological

the lack of a comprehensive and generally

is

weapons of all types and

as

categories of both chemical

agents.

While there
this earth

conflict

of

relating to the protection

probably no

is

real

equal to the disaster that

would descend upon

should an all-out nuclear war occur, potentially the use of other

uncontrollable methods of mass destruction could be almost equally disastrous
for
all

mankind.

83

84

.

Dozens of chemical

agents,

and numerous biological

agents,

with varying degrees of lethality, that have been determined to be the most

"useful" are

now included in the arsenals of a number of nations for possible

in the event

of armed

85

Hundreds of books and

conflict.

articles

use

have been

07

ozr

on

and millions of words have been spoken

written

the subject. For the

most part they have been concerned with the questions of whether there is today
any customary rule of international law which prohibits the use of chemical
agents

armed

in

conflict

and whether biological agents

well-established prohibitions against the use of "poisons"

weapons which cause "unnecessary

and

suffering"; but also, in

fall

within the

against the use

more

of

recent days,

with the inhumanity of these weapons and the highlighting of the moral and
ethical basis for the universal acceptance

ban on the use in armed
biological agents.

A

conflict

by nations of a

of any and

all

strict

and

all-inclusive

types of both chemical and

88

very brief history of the attempts to ban the use of chemical (and

bacteriological) agents as

problem

as

well

as

weapons

will probably serve to clarify the current

the suggestion for solving

Although the 1868 Declaration of

varieties has existed for centuries.

Petersburg

90

Chemical warfare of differing

it.

St.

.

actually dealt with explosive bullets,

it is

often cited as the beginning

of the attempt to ban the use of chemical agents in armed conflict because of a

preambular clause which deplored "the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the suffering of disabled

men, or render

Chemical agents,

within

it is

contended,

fall

this classification.

The 1899 Hague Peace Conference adopted
are said to

Thus
that

their death inevitable."

a

number of provisions which

have indirectly, or which did direcdy, ban the use of chemical agents.

the Regulations attached to the

Second Hague Convention

drafted

by

Conference stated that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring

1
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enemy was not unlimited (Art. 22) and they especially prohibited the
employment of poison or poisoned weapons (Art. 23a) and of arms, projectiles,
the

or material of

nature to cause unnecessary suffering (Art. 23e). In addition, a

a

Declaration concerning the Prohibition of Using Projectiles the Sole Object of

which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases was drafted. While
this Declaration was not repeated at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the
provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth

were

1907

identical

World War I saw
by its use by the
that the "use

with those cited from

1899 predecessor.

its

the use of gas introduced by

Allies.

Hague Convention of

Germany, followed

The Treaty of Versailles contained an article which stated

of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and

materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture

forbidden in Germany."

strictly

say that

when

thereafter

Nevertheless,

it

all

analogous liquids,

and importation are

would be an exaggeration

to

the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 there was in existence

any generally accepted rule of international law prohibiting the use of chemical
agents in

armed

1922 the

conflict. In

(France, Italy, Japan, the

five great

maritime nations of that time

United Kingdom, and the United

States) drafted

and

signed the Treaty of Washington relating to the use of submarines and noxious
gases

which contained

other gases, and

condemned by

all

a provision that, the use

analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly

the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of

such use having been declared in

While

treaties to

a majority

of the

never became effective (France failed to

provisions relating to submarines),

law of armed

conflict.

And

it

three years later, at the Conference

to establish controls

Washington and,

in

ratify it

on

were 68

lifted

contained an

addition,

States parties to this

majority, however, have ratified
as

regards other States

inapplicable in the event

it is

it

admitted

justify

it

this

As of October

it

great

applicable

and which make

it

by the enemy.

Italy against

Ethiopia in the 1935-36 war.

other alleged violations of international law by Ethiopia.

Japan used gas against China in their

Union contended

that

in

hostilities

of the

late 1930s;

and the Soviet

Japan used bacteriological agents against China in the

1930s. This was never established

no use

The

1925 Geneva Protocol.

it;

this

use in the League of Nations and unsuccessfully attempted to

as a reprisal for

there was

Protocol

agreement "to extend

are also Parties to

violated

a

in

bodily from the Treaty of

with reservations which make

which

Gas was subsequently used by
Italy

which met

international trade in munitions,

prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare."
30, 1969, there

because of the

constituted an important landmark in the

was drafted which contained wording

only

civilized
95

are parties," the signatories "declare their assent to such prohibition."

this treaty

Geneva

which

.

.

Powers

of "asphyxiating, poisonous or

armed

conflict

by acceptable evidence and,

so far as appears,

of either chemical or bacteriological weapons

.
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During the Korean hostilities the
by any belligerent during World War II.
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea all contended that the
United

The United

weapons.

which was

Moscow

refused.

in

It is

States

The

criticized.

Egypt used

a

is

denied

Command had used bacteriological
and demanded an investigation

this

interesting to note that in an official

1967 no mention

against the Japanese

that

United Nations

States forces in the
102

is

reiterated

made of these

allegations,

book published

in

although the charge

and the use of defoliants in Vietnam

strongly

is

charge was also made, and apparently verified by the

chemical agent against the Royalists in the Yemen.

ICRC,

104

Egypt

denied the charge and invited an investigation. As in the case of the similar

demand made by

no such

the United States in Korea,

investigation ever took

place.

The

ICRC Draft Rules contain a blunt and broad prohibition against the use

of "incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents";

number of occasions
strict

105

on

a

the General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for

observance of the "principles and objectives" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

and inviting non-Parties to accede to

it;

and on

at least

one occasion

it

has

declared the use of chemical and biological agents of warfare "as contrary to the

embodied in the Protocol."

generally recognized rules of international law, as

107

Some

writers also urge that the use of these weapons is prohibited by customary
108
international law.
It appears however that, particularly in the fight of recent

developments,

When the

this is a sterile

approach to the problem.

1925 Geneva Protocol was sent to the United

States Senate for

its

advice and consent to ratification, this was refused; and accordingly, the United
States

is

not presendy a Party to the Protocol.

has long taken the position that, while

it

109

will not

prohibited by that international agreement,

As

be the

it "is

United

a result, the
first

user of the

not a party to any

in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare

weapons

treaty,

of toxic or nontoxic

of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare."

States

now

gases,

Although

the United States has not used any toxic chemical, or any bacteriological agent,
since the Protocol

became

between the

effective as

refused to ratify the Protocol has not only caused
111

diplomatic

field,

from becoming

but has
Parties to

On November 25,

A

2.

An

to
a

it,

the fact that

it

have problems in the

number of other

States

it.

this subject.

Nixon made an announcement of major
This announcement included:

112

reaffirmation of the renunciation

lethal

it

undoubtedly deterred

1969, President

importance concerning
1

also

Parties to

by the United

States

of the

first

use of

chemical weapons;

extension of this renunciation to the

first

use of incapacitating chemicals;

1
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3.

An intention to resubmit the
and consent to

4.

War

of

1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice

ratification;

Renunciation by the United

States

of the use of lethal biological agents and

weapons;

5.

Confining biological research to defense measures;

6.

Disposing of all stocks of bacteriological weapons; and

7.

Associating the United States with the principles and objectives of the United

Kingdom
It is

assumed

the 1925

Draft Convention

on

biological weapons.

by the United

that this action

Geneva Protocol, and

its

States,

1

13

prospective ratification of

its

convention banning biologicals will lead the way to the
Nations General Assembly has long sought to reach
prohibitions
it

on chemical and

appears that there

status

become a party to a
goal which the United

expressed willingness to

biological agents

—

universal acceptance of
114

and weapons.

Unfortunately,

one major problem which requires solution

is still

—

the

of the use of certain types of chemical agents. For while diplomats,

scientists,

and international lawyers

that lethal gases

law of armed

and

conflict, there
as

is

part, in general

agreement

no such concordance with respect to: the

Moreover, the use of

all

of these weapons by the United
this

so-called

States in

problem.

difference of opinion with respect to both the legal

and the moral

of the problem of the use of non-lethal or incapacitating chemicals such
gas (lachrymatories)

evidenced by the division

is

by the

(CS); incendiaries, such as napalm; and

tear gas

Vietnam has considerably exacerbated

The

most

biologicals either are, or should be, prohibited

all

non-lethal gases, such
defoliants.

are, for the

among

aspects
as tear

the group of experts

convened by the ICRC:
"...

Some

[experts]

.

.

.

wondered whether the employment

against the

enemy

of chemical agents involving no serious danger for health might not in the
issue

be of a more humanitarian character than

employment of means such
on the national

level:

why

as police gases

many

other means of warfare.

(lachrymatory and others)

could they not a

fortiori

is

final

The

admitted

be admitted against the

enemy?"
"Other

experts,

on the

contrary, considered that the prohibition in the 1925

Geneva Protocol should be taken

as

covering

all gases,

including those not direcdy

poisonous, in virtue of the deliberately broad terms of

Protocol

."
.

.

this

prohibition in the

Major Inadequacies
In 1930 the United

Kingdom took

the position that the use of smoke did not

violate the Protocol but that the use

of tear gas

for that country stated that today's tear gas

1930 smoke; that
that

its

use

is

fact that

even

harmful to

man

than was the

and

riot control;

when
117

its

a non-lethal, incapacitating gas will occasionally

two major objections voiced

conflict: first, that as a practical

weapons,"

is less

used widely for domestic purposes for

there are

fatality,

debatable

but recendy a spokesman

did;

not prohibited by any international convention.

Apart from the
cause a

it is

145

purpose

matter the legality of their use becomes extremely

is

"to enhance the effectiveness of conventional

from protective covering

"to force persons
1 1

bombs

fragmentation

";

o

armed

against their use in

and second, and more important,

to face attack

by

of any

that the use

chemical, albeit non-lethal, results inevitably in escalation: "except perhaps

when they are first used,

non-lethal chemical weapons are unlikely to have

much

119

more deadly CBW operations."
The second chemical weapon in the controversial area is napalm an
120
extremely effective weapon and hence one which is much feared,
and much
effect

except to

set the stage for

—

121

Once again there is no general agreement as to whether this
chemical weapon is prohibited by the Protocol.
And because the answer to
this question is even more difficult to ascertain than is that with respect to
lachrymatories, the position has been taken that it may be used, but only in a
123
discriminating manner.
The suggestion is made in A/7720 that in measures
denounced.

of control and disarmament incendiary weapons such

as

napalm should be

considered separately from chemical and biological weapons and that a

convention

is

needed

an admission that

to clarify the situation;

this is presently a

124

a suggestion

which

is

new

probably

gray area of the law.

Prior to Vietnam defoliants had never been used in warfare. As a result, there
is

no

real

experience

upon which

ecological effects of their use.
has

been made

while
it

it

125

that the legality

scientists

Here,

as in

permissible to use

civilian population.

impossible to

make

as to

a forest area

them on farm

Apart from the

the

the case of napalm, the suggestion

of their use depends upon the purpose or

might be permissible to use them on

would not be

can base their opinions

fact that it

target:

used by combat troops,

lands raising crops to feed the

would

frequently be

all

but

the correct determinations, if the use of defoliants does

change the ecology, then

it

would appear

be the determining factor in reaching

that the purpose or target should not

a decision

on

their use.

Because the use of non-lethal, or incapacitating, chemical agents will
inevitably lead to the use of other,

more

lethal,

chemical agents; because napalm

can cause both asphyxiation and unnecessary suffering; because defoliants

may

well change the entire ecology of an area and could lead to the starvartion of
the civilian population; because of these
that to

and many other reasons,

it is

believed

be successful any prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed

1

Law

Levie on the

46

must comprise

conflict

mentioned.

need

on

It is

War

of

types of chemical agents, including those just

all

this basis that it

urged that there

is

is

for a universally accepted understanding that the prohibition of the use in

armed

conflict

of chemical agents includes any and

all

categories of such agents,

not excluding incapacitating gases, incendiaries, and defoliants.

There

on

is

armed

that, like a

grave problem in

conflict.

As has been noted, there

nuclear war, a biological war

mankind, belligerent and

all

127

comparatively little dispute on the need for a far-reaching prohibition

the use of biologicals in

agreement
to

humanitarian

a vital

this area

is

that

a small,

constitute a disaster
128

One

comparatively undeveloped nation

could conceivably mass the necessary resources to enter

this field

considerable dispute as to whether an inspection system, even

The United Kingdom

function effectively.

general

combatant and noncombatant.

neutral,

even

would

is

—and

there

is

adopted, could

if

Draft Convention

on

the subject

of biological weapons does not provide for inspections except in the context of
130
"

complaint.

a specific

But, while every effort should most certainly be

means of ensuring

to devise

or undeveloped,

this

treaty completely

and storage of

against the illegal production

biological agents of military relevance

by any nation,

made

large or small, industrial

should not be permitted to unduly delay agreement on

outlawing the use in armed conflict of any and

all

a

biological

agents.

The non-existence of and

4.

in

armed

has as

conflict

its

The

the needfor a complete code governing the use of air power

with emphasis on the outright prohibition of any type of bombing which

basic target the civilian population.

was

airplane

first

successfully

Second Hague Conference of 1907;
sizable proportions

became obvious

War

was

it

it

World War

during

that

flown in 1903, just shordy prior to the

a

developed into
I;

in the military arsenal

and yet

its

use in

is

power had

"the day

may not be

(except for the nuclear

still

II, it

ballistic missile);

already evolved the theory that

far off

when aerial

the principal operations of war."

War

importance

in swaddling clothes, exponents of the

operations with their devastation of enemy

lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres

strategic

its

conflict remains essentially unregulated!

In 1917, while the airplane was
use of air

it

major military weapon; during and since World

now unequalled

armed

weapon of

during the between-wars period

technological advances in this field have been such that

II

While

a military

bombing was probably not

certainly played a

on a vast scale may become

131

most important

the "principal operation" of World
role in that

war and

will

do

so again

Major Inadequacies
any future non-nuclear armed conflict

in

—and perhaps even

in

147

one involving

the use of nuclear weapons.

As
is

in the case

of the discussion of chemical and biological weapons, while

unproductive to argue about whether or not the

War II violated international law,
past will

a brief survey

strategic

of what has transpired in the

When the Second Hague Peace Conference met in

was more than

The Conference adopted

balloons or

Article 25 of the

time only four years

bombing "from

and Conventions

a similar nature"

on land bombardment and naval bombardment.
135
Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War
provided:

restrictions

bombardment by whatever means, of towns,
which are undefended is prohibited." (Emphasis

attack or

buildings

The

first

a Declaration prohibiting

by other new methods of

which included

1907 the balloon

and had already been used for military purposes,

a century old

while the airplane had been successfully flown for the

"The

bombing of World

prove helpful in approaching the problem from the point of view of

the future.

before.

it

villages, dwellings,

or

added.)

records of the Conference indicate that the words "by whatever means"

were included in the

article in

order to cover

2 of the Convention on Naval Bombardment

air

137

bombardment.

1

36

And Article

excluded from the prohibition

bombing of undefended places "military works, military or naval
establishments, depots of arms or war materiel, workshops or plants which could
be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army." The argument has been
against the

advanced, not without justification, that
air

bombardment

this

provision provides a basis for the

in the "hinterland" of objectives such as those enumerated.

This was the extent of the

efforts

which had been made

to control the use

of

power when World War I began; and during its course the airplane became
a full-fledged weapon. However, apart from a few incidents its use was restricted
air

to the battlefield and, usually, to air-to-air duels.

In

view of the technological

made and foreseen, it is indeed strange that although a number of efforts
were made in the between-wars period to obtain an international agreement on
139
such matters as air bombardment none was successful.
The most authoritative
140
of these failures was the drafting of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.
Two articles of those Rules are particularly relevant: Article 22, which would
have prohibited aerial bombardment which was "for the purpose of terrorizing
progress

the civilian population ... or of injuring noncombatants";

would have limited

it

and Article 24, which

to specified military objectives in the vicinity

of land operations and then only

if it

would result in

of the zone

a distinct military advantage

and if it could be accomplished without "indiscriminate" bombing of the
population. These
distinction

two

articles

were intended:

(1) to

between combatant and noncombatant; and

civilian

preserve the traditional
(2) to limit

the allowable

1

Law

Levle on the
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of

War
combat zone

military objectives to those in the area of the

"occupation bombardment" because

it

is

—

the so-called

normally preliminary to physical

occupation.

bombardment in the House of Commons on June
1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain made the following statement:
In a discussion of air

think

"I

we may

say that there are, at any rate, three rules

three principles of international law
air as

they are to war

law to

bomb

civilians as

populations. That

are

aimed

a violation

from the

at

first

make

such and to

air

of international law or

are as applicable to warfare

or on land. In the

undoubtedly

is

which

place, targets

at sea

which

place,

21,

it is

from the

against international

upon

deliberate attacks

civilian

of international law. In the second

must be legitimate military objectives

and must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be
taken in attacking these military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian

population in the neighborhood

When World War

II

is

not bombed."

erupted in September 1939, President Roosevelt

immediately sent the belligerents

The

populations.

British, French,

bombing of

plea against the

a

and Germans

all

replied that their planes

an appeal to the belligerents "to

were

ICRC made

March 1940 the
confirm general immunity

instructed to attack military objectives only.

civilian

In

for peaceful

populations, to define their military objectives, and to refrain from indiscriminate

bombardments
affirmatively

been made

were

144
raids!

Once

reprisals."

—but continued

again

the

belligerents

responded

The

estimate has

to act as they felt necessary.

World War I caused 10 million deaths, of which 500,000
World War II caused 50 million, of which 24 million were

that while

civilians,

civilians;

and

and

that half

of the

civilian deaths (12 million)

were caused by

air

/-

•

worthy of note,

It is

too, that such air attacks

were not

specifically

included in the definition of war crimes in the Charter of the International

were no post-war

Military Tribunal and that there

indiscriminate

bombardment of

the

civilian

trials

based on a charge of

population.

Nevertheless,

Spaight takes the position that "nothing that has happened in the second world

war
It

has shaken the legal objection to indiscriminate
is

apparent from

bombardment juridically
of land

and

sea

noncombatant; and

Much

the

foregoing that the attempt to

been based on analogy

has

warfare:
(2)

bombing."

(1)

the

distinction

to

two

between

1

46

control

aerial

classical principles

combatant

and

the restricting of lawful targets to military objectives.

147

of the humanitarian law regulating armed conflict which has been

accepted during the past century has been based upon the distinction between

combatant and noncombatant.
hospitalized, the sailor
his ship has

who

has

been sunk, the

The airman who

has

been rescued from the

soldier

who

has

sea

crashed

and been

by the enemy

been captured on the

after

field

of

Major Inadequacies
battle

—

of these have been removed from combatant

all

status

and

149

are therefore

entided to the humanitarian protection afforded by international law. But they
are but a comparatively small percentage

the vast majority of
the

armed

whom

are simply civilians, persons

forces of a belligerent.

concerned.

The

of the overall group of noncombatants,
with these

It is

are not a part

are presendy

civilian has
148

been termed,

But air warfare

and properly so, "the fundamental principle of the law of war."
in

and

general,

strategic

and

distinction

its

bombing

validity has

Let us take three examples.

in particular,

of

we

latter that

between combatant and

distinction

who

has tended to

blur that

been questioned.

First, a city

of 500,000 population located in the

"hinterland" (deep inside the country and far from the scene of actual land

combat) has no factories making any product in support of the country's war
effort. Is

same

bombardment? Second, suppose that this
employing 1000 workers making a very

the city a proper target for air

city has in

its

midst a factory

important instrument of war.

the factory, or the city, a proper target for air

Is

bombardment? And third, suppose that the same city has within its area a number
of factories making important instruments of war, and employing the entire
work force of the city. Are the factories, or is the city, a proper target for air
bombardment?

Under

the classical rules discussed and enumerated above, to

bomb

the city

with no war production factories would be terror bombing, pure and simple,

and would be

a violation

a non-military objective

of the law of armed

which could be of no

except the possible demoralization of the

conflict. It

would be an

attack

on

military advantage to the attacker

enemy

civilian population.

With

respect to this type of activity Lauterpacht has said:

".

.

.

it

in that prohibition,

which

—or

the civilian population as an

is

terrorization

destruction

object of attack that lies the
at

all.

Without

— of

last

is

a clear rule

of law, of intentional

avowed or obvious

vestige of the claim that war can be legally regulated

that irreducible principle

of restraint there

is

no

limit to the license

and depravity of force. ..."

Even

the proponents of more "liberal" rules of air

bombardment do not

assert

the legality of bombing of this type.

What of the large
of value to

its

city

with only one small factory in which

country's war-effort? Certainly the

such a factory would meet the
to the attacker. It

operations

—but

is

test

of resulting in

would not meet

is

made

bombing and

a

product

destruction of

a distinct military

advantage

the test of being located in the zone of

that test, originally established

when

only

cities in

the zone

bombardment, a valid test to be
applied to air bombardment which can reach anywhere in the world? Moreover,
it would meet the test of the requirements for naval bombardment. It would
of land operations could be reached by

artillery

1

Law

Levle on the

50

probably not meet the

of being located where the bombing can take place

test

without clanger to the

War

of

However,

civilian population.

World War

it

appears that practice

would permit the factory to be subjected to air
attack. As the Report points out, in recent armed conflicts belligerents have
frequendy made accusations of attacks upon non-military objectives and the
during and since

enemy

II

belligerent has denied the fact without either side questioning the

propriety of the distinction as to types of objectives.

what of the large city with many factories and most of the work force
engaged in the war effort? Let us assume that in time of armed conflict 40% of
Finally,

the population constitute the
civilian population,

aged, sick, etc.
objectives?

he blanket the entire

worker and nonworker,

—but

is

There

.

are in

also

city

still

means

that

with bombs, thus ensuring that

He

would answer

this latter

says:

any given enemy

city

thousands of civilians, of 'noncombatants'

who cannot be called 'noncombatants'

meaning of the term. The former

suffer inevitably

because the

have, quite properly, to be prevented from pursuing their lethal activities.

tragedy ofjuxtaposition which

all

ensuring that a large part of the population,

in the old sense, but there are also thousands

in any true

city,

60% of the
is made up of women, children,
that

likewise destroyed? Spaight

question in the affirmative.

.

—but

the attacker pick out individual targets, the real military

of the plants are destroyed

".

force

300,000 people of this

Must

Or may

work

is

latter
It is

a

not entirely without precedent. Noncombatants

have often suffered in bombardments by land and naval forces, but their suffering
154
has never been held to make the bombardment illegal. ..."

And he

repeatedly asserts that so-called "target-area

usage" and that

it

The problem which then

"

~

1

have returned to the doctrine of "total war,"

itself

the besieged city

was put

is

an "established

"cannot be considered to offend against the principles of the

international law of war."

when

bombing"

fell, all

S6

war

confronts us

as

conducted on

fought centuries ago:

of its inhabitants were slaughtered and the

the

With

this

a target-area basis that "(it)

would seem

and the question of defining

modest proposal there can be no

then presents

city

itself

is,

what

of these possible solutions

bombing

suggestion with respect to strategic
that measures to

the effects of this kind of military operations within their legal context
desirable,

we

that

to the torch.

The Report makes

be

is

limits

may now

might be usefully studied."

possible dispute.

are possible solutions to the

offers the greatest

examine

The

question which

problem? And, which

amount of protection

to the civilian

population?

Air bombardment could, of course, be limited to areas where combat
actually taking place
effect,

means

—

tactical

is

the old concept of the "zone of operations." This, in

bombing, and would preclude

strategic

bombing. While
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this

would, in large

part, solve the

problem,

it is

151

extremely doubtful that it would

be possible to secure the agreement of Governments to such a stringent

Moreover, even
that there

agreement of Governments were obtained,

if the

would be compliance with such

The Report proposes

much

it is

rule.

doubtful

a rule in practice.
159

the establishment of safety zones,

apparendy similar

to,

Annex I to the First and
Presumably there would be no bombing
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949.
whatsoever permitted within the safety zones and no restrictions on bombing
elsewhere. While this might work for small groups and in small areas, it appears to
but

be

larger than, the hospital zones referred to in
160

totally impractical for the protection

of tens or hundreds of millions of civilians.

The logistic problem alone would be insurmountable; and with thousands of square
miles within a safety zone, the unlawful use of such areas for the protection of

important military matters would probably be inevitable.

The

ICRC and submitted to
of the Red Cross at New Delhi in 1957

Draft Rules prepared by the

1

International Conference

number of provisions intended

to provide

XlXth

the
61

contain a

maximum protection for the

civilian

population.

An examination of the various provisions of these Draft Rules makes

why

they were received by the Governments with a "crushing silence."

it

clear

would be possible
to draft such rules, they are also impractical to the point where it is extremely
doubtful that any armed force would be able to comply with them in time of
armed conflict. While this, as we shall see, is not true of all of these Draft Rules,
a much more practical set of general principles was drafted by the ICRC for
consideration by its group of experts in 1968. These principles would limit air
bombardment to identified military objectives; would place upon the attacker
the duty to use care in attacking the identified military objective; and would
While they

are, as

would be expected,

apply the principle of proportionality

and any possible harm

which

clear

now,

as it

has been in the past, that

as

moon

it

no

if he has

Terror

exactly

Bombing

Prohibited.

if

man

be any reason

set out.

rule has as yet

been conceived

and yet

not already done
basis

will

be

can devise instruments to send a

so,

its

target,

instruments which will

of this premise, the following rules

Attacks directed against the civilian population,

whether with the object of terrorizing

prohibited.

to

land within a matter of yards from

on target. On the
bombardment are suggested:

bomb

such,

However,

and have

can certainly devise,

aerial

1.

These principles would

will give full protection to the civilian population

spaceship to the

on

'""

bombing; but there does not appear

acceptable to Governments.

put a

as it

between the identified military objective

as

such an important rule should not be specifically

It is

man

humanitarian

to the civilian population.

clearly prohibit target-area

why

as

it,

or for any other reason, are

1

Law

Levie on the

52

Target-Area

2.

War

of

Bombing

Prohibited.

It

is

forbidden to attack,

as

a

single

from one
located between such

objective, an area including several military objectives at a distance

another where members of the civilian population are
military objectives.
Military Objectives.

3.

(a)

Before bombing

sufficiently identified
(b)

In

as

it

a military objective,

the attacking force must have

such.

bombardments

against military objectives, the attacking force

take every possible precaution in order to avoid inflicting
166

damage on

must

the civilian

i

population.
(c)

To

constitute a military objective a target

categories listed in the

It is

must

fall

within one of the

annex hereto.

believed that these rules will, under present and foreseeable technological

standards, provide a

maximum

placing acceptable limitations

of protection to the

civilian population,

while

on the scope of strategic bombing.

Conclusion

Armed

conflict

humanitarian
is

rules,

by

is,

very

its

nature,

properly applied, can do

unhumanitarian.

much

However,

to mitigate this situation.

It

believed that were the proposals

made

herein to be adopted

would go

far to

provide additional needed protection

of armed
for

conflict,

they

both combatant and

As has been

civilian

stated, this

as part

of the law

noncombatant.

paper represents an attempt to deal with only some of

the present major inadequacies of the law of armed conflict; and their selection

and priority must be ascribed

number of other

to the personal predilections

of the author. There

which might well have been included and which
may well be considered by some to have equal, or even greater, importance.
These might include: enforcement of the law of armed conflict; combat at sea,
are a

particularly

areas

submarine warfare; the

The

status

of

guerrillas

and

partisans; the use

of

made of the subjects to be discussed
should certainly not be considered as in any way denigrating the importance to
the cause of humanitarianism in armed conflict of many other such subjects.
starvation as a

weapon;

etc.

selection

Major Inadequacies

APPENDIX

153

1

Twenty-third session

Agenda item 62

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/7433)]

2444 (XXIII).

Respect for

human

rights in

armed

conflicts

The General Assembly,

armed conflicts,
adopted on 12 May 1968

Recognizing the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in

all

Taking note of resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts,
by the International Conference on Human Rights,
Affirming that the provisions of that resolution need to be implemented
Affirms resolution

1.

XXVIII of the XXth

as

soon

International Conference of the

Red

as possible,

Cross held

at

Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following principles for observance by all
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited;

That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible;
(b)

(c)

Invites the

2.

Secretary-General, in consultation with the International

Committee of the Red

Cross and other appropriate international organizations, to study:
(a)

Steps

which could be taken

international conventions
(b)

The need

and

to secure the better application

rules in

all

armed

of existing humanitarian

conflicts;

for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate

of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare;

legal instruments to ensure the better protection

conflicts

3.

Requests the Secretary-General to take

all

other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions

of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly
the steps he has taken;
4.

Further requests

Member

States to

extend

all

at its

twenty-fourth session on

possible assistance to the Secretary-General in

the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 above;

5.

Calls upon

all

of 1899 and 1907,

which have not done so to become parties to the Hague Convention
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

States

the

1

748th plenary meeting,

19 December 1968.

FOOTNOTES
1.

Sales

See Final Act of the
No.: E. 68. XIV.2),

International Conference on

Human

Rights (United Nations publication,

p. 18.

2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Convention and
1899-1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918).
3. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.
4. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973.

Declarations

1

Levie on the

54

Law

of

War
Notes

1.

Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 335 (1954, reprinted 1959).

codified law of

war

exceeds the law of peace

still

unanticipated success of the International

conventions such
2.

as

See note 84

To

infra.

a limited

3.

Customs Applicable
is

a

it

in

The

statement that the

longer true in view of the perhaps

in securing the acceptance

of a number of its

draft

extent

it

might be considered

Armed

that the

1954 Hague Convention

Conflict (249 U.N.T.S. 215) also

falls

for

in this

attempts to protect property, not people.

Committee of

International

now no

Sea, Diplomatic Immunities, Consular Relations, and Treaties.

the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
category; but, of course,

probably

Law Commission

on the Law of the

those

is

Armed

the

Red

Cross, Reaffirmation and

Conflict 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited

XXIst International Conference of the

report submitted to the

Development of the Laws and

ICRC, Reaffirmation]. This document
Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September

as

1969.
4.

It

has at times

been suggested

that the condition for the termination

of the 1907 Hague Declaration

Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (36 Stat. 2439, 2
(1908)) has never occurred and that, therefore, the Declaration
prior to, during, and since

is still

in force. In

Am. J.

view of the

Int'l L.

Supp.216

practice of nations

World War II, there would appear to be little merit to such an argument. Moreover,
Kingdom are the only major powers which ratified it.

the United States and the United
5.
6.
7.

"The League of Nations and the Laws of War," 1920-21 Brit. Ybk. Int'l L. 109, 114-15.
Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Societe des Nations 528 (1930).
Constantopoulos "Les raisons de la crise du droit de la guerre," 7 Jahrbuch fur Internationales Recht
,

22, 25 (1957). In this regard, see note 11
8.

infra.

Writing in 1931 one author pointed out that neither the Pact of the League of Nations, nor the

Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, could guarantee that there would be no future wars. Rasmussen,
Prisonniers de Guerre 72 (1931).

"... Doctors and lawyers

had been adopted in

And commenting on

the 1934

Monaco Conference,

de

la

Code

des

Pradelle said:

denounced the conspiracy of silence which, lest public opinion be frightened,
and which consisted of not speaking about the laws of war." (Translation

official circles

mine.)

La Conference Diplomatique
9.

36

Stat.

2277; 2

et les

Am. J.

Nouvelles Conventions de Geneve du 12 aout 1949,

Int'l L.

at

13 (1951).

Supp. 90 (1908).

some limited aspects of the law of war were made,
were held in Washington in 1922 and in London
in 1930 and 1936. However, these conferences, which were not even always successful in producing an
effective result, merely scratched the surface of the work which needed to be done.
11. It is essential to bear in mind that to a considerable extent the existing law of war was observed during
World War II. True, there were many well publicized violations of that law, the so-called "conventional war
crimes." But see Baxter, "The Role of Law in Modern War," 1953 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 90, 92 where the
10.

It is

true that occasional attempts to further codify

despite the inhospitable atmosphere. Thus, naval conferences

following appears:

"Those who are most scornful of the attempts which the law of war makes to mitigate human suffering
war inevitably point to the barbarities which were practiced in the second World War. These accusations
overlook the extent to which states did comply with the law of war, the advantage of a fixed standard against
which to measure the conduct of those who were the most flagrant in the violation of all international law,
and the subsequent vindication of the validity of the norms of international law through the imposition of
sanctions in the war crimes proceedings. ..."
12. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the First
Session, 1949 Ybk. Int'l L. Comm'n 281. And the International Law Commission did not stand alone. See,
in

for

example, the position of Scelle,

set forth in Francois,

"Reconsideration des principes du droit de

de Droit International 491, 493 (1957); and Fenwick's
"Forces for Compliance with the Law of War," 1964 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 82, 97.

47

(I)

Annuaire de

13.

l'lnstitut

See, for example,

Revision," 45

Am. J.

Kunz, "The Chaotic

Status

guerre,"

la

comment on

Baxter,

of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for their

37 (1951); Lauterpacht, "The Problem of the Revision of the
360 (1952); Coudert, Francois and Lauterpacht, "La revision du droit de
Int'l L.

Law of War," 29

la guerre," 45 (I)
Ybk. Int'l L.
Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International 555 (1954); Jessup, "Political and Humanitarian Approaches to
Limitation of Warfare," 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 757, 759 (1957); Accioly, "Guerre et neutralite en face du droit des
gens contemporain" in Melange Basdevant 1-2, 7 (1960); and Pictet, "The Need to Restore the Laws and
Customs Relating to Armed Conflict," Rev. Int'l Comm'n Jur., No. 1 (March 1969), 22, 37.
1 4.
Actually, the 1 907 Hague Regulations (note 9 supra) were in large part a comparatively minor revision
of the Regulations attached to the 1899 Second Hague Convention, 32 Stat. 1803; Am. J. Int'l L. Supp.

Brit.

1

129 (1907).

Major Inadequacies

155

"The XXth International Conference of the Red
Comm'njur., 3, 11 (1966):
"... whereas the ruined cities [of World War II] have been rebuilt, the States have done nothing to
While the techniques of offensive action
restore the Hague Rules, which vanished under the same ruins
have taken giant strides forward, the only rules which can be invoked date from 1907. Such a situation is

The

15.

following very apt statement appears in Pictet,

Cross: Results in the Legal Field," 7

J. Int'l

.

flagrant in

The

its

.

absurdity."

Secretary-General's Report

the same

.

on Respect

effect, stating that military-technical

for

Human Rights

Armed

in

Conflict,

A/7720,

para. 131,

is

to

developments "have brought major changes which the authors

of existing international instruments could not envisage." And that many governments share the belief that
is needed in this area is demonstrated by a number of the answers received by the

affirmative action

Secretary-General in response to his inquiry regarding the preparation of A/7720. See the replies of Finland
(at 76 of the original United Nations document); Hungary (at 77); Morocco (at 82); Norway (at 82); and
Romania (at 85). This Report is, of course, the basis for this paper and for the Fourteenth Hammarskjold
Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It will be referred to simply as "the Report"

or as A/7720, and will be cited
16. This reluctance

the United Nations,

on

its

as

A/7720.
and a

part,

noted in A/7720,

is

similar reluctance

Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on

17.

(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68.
18.

See Appendix

19.

See note 15

20.

It

will

XIV

that this will
is,

ICRC

of the various subsidiary organs of

Human

Rights, Teheran, April-May 1968

2), at 18.

hereto.

1

be noted

that operative paragraph

not be to the detriment of

1

all

a revision

has now been given a somewhat different emphasis, an
United Nations actions in recent years. It is to be hoped

and modernization of the general law of war which, of

or should be, largely applicable in both international and internal conflicts.

"Powerful" in the sense that

21.

with and

part

supra.

emphasis of a type which has tended to permeate

course,

on the

para. 19.

who welcome

its

it

has strong support

methods and

objectives. Apart

from people all over the world who are acquainted
from its dedication to humanitarian endeavors, the

has found that "belligerents necessarily consider this law [of war] as a single whole, and the inadequacy

of the rules relating to the conduct of

ICRC,

Conventions."
22.

It

Reaffirmation

been the

has

hostilities has a

negative impact

the observance of the

practice to refer to the rules governing the conduct of hostilities as

governing the treatment of people (wounded and

to the rules

on

Geneva

8.

sick, prisoners

of war,

"Hague" law and
"Geneva"

civilians) as

no merit to such a distinction. The 1899 and the
war and military occupation. Those subjects are
now covered in whole or in part by the Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, respectively (see note
25 infra). And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol (see note 84 infra) as well as the ICRC's Draft Rules (see note
26 infra) are both concerned with permissible weapons, methods of attacks, etc., subjects which are basic to
the Hague Regulations. Were it not for the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention (see note 2 supra), it might well
be assumed that, the Netherlands no longer having the neutral status which it enjoyed prior to World War
II, the nations of the world prefer to discuss subjects dealing with hostilities in still-neutral Switzerland. In any
event, whether it is "Hague" law governing the conduct of hostilities or "Geneva" law governing the treatment
law. See, for example, Pictet, note 13 supra, at 23.

1907 Hague Regulations dealt with,

of persons,

its

ultimate objective

23. This

new

is

inter alia,

There

is

prisoners of

humanitarian in nature.

version was the 1929

Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field,

Geneva Convention
47

Stat.

for the Amelioration

2074; 118 L.N.T.S. 303; 27

Am. J.

of the Conditions of the
Int'l L.

Supp. 43 (1933).

The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021; 118
L.N.T.S. 343, 27 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 59 (1933).
25. The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditon of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (the "First" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the 1949 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea (the "Second" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3217; 75 U.N.T.S. 85; the 1949 Geneva
24.

Convention Relative

to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War

(the

"Third" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75

U.N.T.S. 135; 47 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 119 (1953); and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the "Fourth" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 50 Am.
J. Int'l

L. Supp.

"The
in 1949,

which,

724 (1956). Regarding

historians

and the

if

this

achievement Spaight

is

reported to have

of the future will be puzzled by the conclusion of three

failure

of the powers

continued, will

make

who

[sic]

said:

new Geneva Conventions

agreed to them to do anything to regulate those methods of war

the humanitarian provisions of those Conventions read like hypocritical

nonsense."

Quoted

in

Dunbar, "The Legal Regulation of Modern Warfare," 40 Trans. Grot. Soc. 83, 91 (1955).

1

Law

Levie on the

56
26.

This

successful in

is

its

of

War

the Fourth Convention, note 25 supra.

humanitarian

New

Cross, meeting in

In 1957

efforts.

Delhi,

it

even the

XlXth

ICRC

is

not always immediately

International Conference of the

Red

Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian

its

Time of War. The Conference adopted

Population in

Of course,

presented to the

a

resolution requesting the

ICRC

to transmit the Draft

Rules to the Governments. To quote the ICRC Director-General:
"[T]heir replies took the form of a crushing silence, with the exception of a few well-disposed countries.
."
The great powers, in particular, remained silent
.

Pictet,

note 15 supra,

27.

Red

Operative subparagraphs

Cross resolution which

resolution.

.

at 12.

and

(a), (b),

1

itself cited in

is

The General Assembly omitted

of A/RES/2444 (XXIII) were taken verbatim from the

(c)

the opening part of operative paragraph

a

Red

fourth paragraph of the

of the United Nations

1

Cross resolution which stated "that

Law of War apply to nuclear and similar weapons."
X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVII, and XVIII, 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 613-19 (1969).
the following extract from Resolution XIII, in which the Conference
on the basis of its report [ICRC, Reaffirmation] to pursue actively its efforts in this

the general principles of the
28. See Resolutions

Of particular

relevance

regard with
1.

meet

which would supplement the

possible, concrete rules

governmental,

the world to
3.

view to:
as soon as

a

proposing,

2. inviting

is

ICRC

"requests the

Red

existing humanitarian law,

Cross and other experts representing the principal legal and social systems in

with the

for consultations

ICRC

on

these proposals,

submitting such proposals to Governments for their comments, and

4. if

it is

deemed

advisable,

recommending

the appropriate authorities to convene

one or more diplomatic

conferences of States parties to the Geneva Conventions and other interested States, in order to elaborate
international legal instruments incorporating those proposals."

29. As of October 15, 1969, just over 20 years from the date on which they were signed, the four 1949
Geneva Conventions had 125 ratifications and accessions. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 646 (1969). (The data

contained in note 49 of A/7720

observed that

all

incorrect.

is

of the great powers

of Governments

is

text in connection

That contained in Annex IIB of A/7720

are Parties to these

Conventions.

It is

apparently contrary to the decision of the International

with note 12

supra. Ratifications

and accessions

those to any of the conventions drafted by the Commission,

as

correct.)

Law Commission

to these

important

is

It

should be

interesting to note that the practice

as

discussed in the

"war" conventions

far

exceed

these latter are.

30. See text in connection with note 12 supra.
31.

ICRC,

Reaffirmation 11

32. Para. 21.
33.

noted

As further evidence of the post-World War II antipathy to the use of the word "war," it might be
from Article 107 referring to World War II, it is not used anywhere in the Charter of the

that, apart

we

United Nations; instead

find such terms as "international disputes," "breaches of peace," "acts of

aggression," etc. Universal adoption of the term

"armed

term already familiar to those acquainted

conflict," a

with the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention, will certainly

—even

uniformity of language
twice and then say
34. This

if

some who

"Oh, you mean

problem

is,

are less able to accept

new

ideas will, for a time,

result in

have to think

the law of war!"
also of major importance with respect to internal conflict (civil war) and
one of the so-called "common" articles (Article 3) of the 1949 Geneva

of course,

the question of the application of

Conventions.

36

35.

Stat.

36. "...

2259; 2

Thus

Am. J.

Int'l L.

Supp. 85 (1908).

the wars of Italy with Abyssinia in 1935, ofJapan with China in 1937, of Germany with

Poland in 1939, of Russia with Finland in the same year, and ofJapan with the United
without

States in 1941,

opened

formal declaration of war."

a

2 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International

compliance during both World

War

Law 292-93

I (ibid.,

Commentary on

at

(7th ed., 1952).

294, footnote 2) and

But there were

World War

a

number of cases of

II (ibid., at

295, footnote

3).

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War 19-20 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Pictet, Third Commentary].
38. I Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 47 [hereinafter cited as Final
37.

Pictet (ed.),

Record]. This
four 1949

is

the

first

the 1949

paragraph of common Article 2 and

Geneva Conventions.

It is

also

employed

is,

therefore, identical in Article 2

in Article 18

(1)

of each of the

of the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention,

supra note 2.

Third Commentary 22-23.

39.

Pictet,

40.

Levie, "Maltreatment of Prisoners of

"The Geneva Convention and
(1967).

War

in

Vietnam," 48 B.U.L. Rev. 323, 330 (1968); Note,
Rev. 851 858-59

the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam," 80 Harv. L.

,
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41.

ICRC,

42.

this proposal jumps squarely into the problem of the enforcement of the law of
which is, without question, another area requiring major action.
IIB Final Record 11 and 16. Further amplification of the proposal, which was clearly required, was

armed

Reaffirmation 94.

obvious that

It is

conflict

43.

not forthcoming and

Annex

44.

In addition,

46.

a decision; that

a cessation

adoption was not pressed.

its

Record 30.
Record 361. So

21, III Final

45. Resolution 2,

such

157

it
it

I

Final

might be noted

has heretofore, in effect,

of the armed conflict so found to

the Security Council states

of all military

far as

its

this resolution has never been implemented.
Council undoubtedly already has the power to make

made such a decision, but always in the context of a call for
S/RES/233 (1967), adopted June 6, 1967, in which

exist (e.g,

concern "at the outbreak of fighting" in the Middle East and

the area"); and that

activities in

known,

is

that the Security

the context of the proposal under discussion

it

calls for

"a cessation

has not, and probably will not, ever exercise such

as to

do so would be an admission of its

power

in

inability to eliminate

completely the breach of the peace involved.

To

47.

over

gain support at the outset and to ensure complete impartiality,

The General Assembly

48.

use of existing

facilities

merely create

a

new

the First
first

has,

on

a

number of occasions,

for fact-finding" (e.g.,

specialized fact-finding

specified facts are found.

It is a

it

might be denied jurisdiction

time of its creation.

fact situations existing at the

variation

Hague Convention of 1899

A/RES/2330

upon its Members "to make effective
The present proposal would, in effect,

called

(XXII)).

body and provide

for certain results to flow automatically if

and expansion of the Commission of Inquiry originally created by

(32 Stat. 1779;

1

Am. J.

Int'l L.

Supp. 107 (1907) and applied for the

time in the Dogger Bank Incident (Scott,

Of course, many

49.

additional details

convention establishing such

a

Hague Court Reports 403 (1916)).
of creation and operation would necessarily be included

body; but these appear to be unnecessary for the purposes of

in any

this paper.

it should be mentioned that, as in the case of the Protecting Power in the 1 949 Geneva Conventions,
would have to be made for the ICEHRAC to use, when needed, an operational staff.
50. While it is true that the provision for automatic economic and communications sanctions goes even
somewhat beyond the comparable provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, it is suggested that the
majority of law-abiding States have come to realize that there will always be a few delinquents among them
and that only the absolute knowledge of automatic, effective, and universal sanctions will tend to keep the

However,
provision

delinquent States in

line.

(The sanctions against Rhodesia can scarcely be described with those adjectives!)
and accessions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which were

Certainly, the 125 ratifications of

51.

drafted before

many of the

acceding States were even in existence

as

members of the

were not obtained merely because of an overwhelming urge on the

international

of nations to be

part

community,

Parties to

it;

they

were obtained because of moral and humanitarian pressures and because few nations were willing to be pointed
at as

not having accepted these great humanitarian expressions.

Can there be any great doubt that President Nixon's announcement concerning his intended actions

52.

3 infra) was motivated not only by humanitarian
which the United States was being compelled to
diplomatic pressure from friends, resolutions of the General Assembly,

with respect to chemical and biological warfare
considerations but also

endure in

by the increasing
well

this respect, as

ICRC,

resolutions of the

as

(see section

feeling of isolation

etc.?

53. Levie, "Prisoners of War

and the Protecting Power," 55

Am J.

Int'l L.

374, 376 (1961).

54. Ibid., 377-78.
55. See note

The

56.

References to
there

is

a

list

supra.

this institution

of 36

articles in

Common Article

57.

countries
58.

24

basic article relating to the Protecting

all

59.

the Prisoner-of-War

10/10/10/11 covers

reserved to these

A/7720,

Power

is

one of the

common

articles, Article

appear throughout the Conventions. See Levie, note 53 supra,

at

8/8/8/9.

380-81, where

Convention containing references to the Protecting Power.
The U.S.S.R. and the other Communist

this latter subject.

articles.

para. 213.

Ibid.

probable that the United States has not even attempted to secure the designation of a Protecting
Vietnam because such action would appear to constitute a legal recognition not only of North
Vietnam as a State, but also, and perhaps more important, of the existence of a state of war.
61. A/7720, at 78 of the original United Nations document.
60.

Power

It is

in

62.

Ibid., it

91.

63. Ibid., para. 215. See also para. 203.
64.
10, 13.

"Nigeria/Biafra:

Armed

Conflict with

a

Vengeance," Rev.

Int'l

Comm'n Jur., No.

2 (June 1969)

Law

Levie on the

58

1

of

War
Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that the
complementary and not alternative (see Levie, note
the resolution was phrased in the disjunctive.

65. See note 28 supra. In view of the fact that the 1949

of the Protecting Power and of the

activities

53

supra, at

".

.

Thus

.

difficult to

it is

Reaffirmation,

understand

are

why

where the following

at 7,

appears:

the wars of Italy with Abyssinia in 1935, ofjapan with

of Russia with Finland

in 1939,
a

394-96),

ICRC,

66.

ICRC

same

in the

year,

China

in 1937,

and ofjapan with the United

of Germany with Poland

States in 1941,

opened without

formal declaration of war."

To

the same effect see

ibid.,

Common Article

67.

87-88.

9/9/9/10

ICRC.

the activities of the

is

the basic provision of the four 1949

Paragraph 3 of

Powers, permits the

substitutes for Protecting

when

common

ICRC

Article

to offer

its

Geneva Conventions

relating to

10/10/10/11, concerning replacements and
services to perform the humanitarian functions

no Protecting Power. This is probably the basis upon which the ICRC
has acted in the post- 1949 Geneva Conventions era. One of its more successful recent efforts was in connection
with the Honduras-Salvador conflict. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 493-96 (1969), 10 ibid., 95-105 (1970).
68. A/1120, para. 226. Italy suggested considering the possibility of "delegating authority to the
International Red Cross, so that that body may, in the case of armed conflict, ensure that its own representatives
of the Protecting Power

there

is

throughout the duration of the conflict."

are continually present in the belligerent countries

United Nations document.

original

Ibid., at

79 of the

A somewhat similar suggestion was made by the group of experts convened

by the ICRC. ICRC, Reaffirmation 107.
69. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et le Conflit de Coree: Recueil des Documents, passim
(2 vols., 1952); British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 33-34 (1955).
70. "The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict," 6 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 399, 402-03
(1966); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1970, p. 2B, col.

1.

been permitted to function with virtually no restrictions in Israel
for the protection of both prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied territory. See, for example, 8 Int'l
Rev. Red Cross 18-19 (1968); 9 ibid., 173-76, 417-19, 488, and 640. On the other hand, the United Nations
has encountered some difficulty in making an investigation of the treatment of civilians in the occupied territory
71

.

Strangely enough,

because of the

has apparently

it

position that the resolution calling for

Israeli

International Conference of the

people. 9

Red

Rev.

Int'l

The Report

Red

Cross found

it

it

was biased and one-sided. However, even the

necessary to express concern about the plight of these

Cross 613 (1969).

makes a suggestion to this latter effect. A/7720, para. 217. It is entirely possible,
some States, notably Switzerland and Sweden, which did yeoman work as Protecting Powers
during both World Wars, would not wish to shoulder these additional, and potentially controversial, problems.
This would make the solution herein suggested all the more necessary. It might be appropriate to cover this
eventuality by providing for a possible division of functions, where desired, the Protecting Power, if there be
72.

however,

also

that

one, performing the traditional functions with respect to

wounded and

sick, prisoners

of war, and

civilians,

and the substitute performing the function with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
73. In ICRC, Reaffirmation 89-90, this is ascribed to the fact that many of the conflicts since 1949 have

what of Korea, the Yemen, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.? In none of these
been a Protecting Power.
74. In A/7720, para. 216, it is suggested that a new organ be created which could "offer its services in

been of an

internal nature; but

conflicts has there

case the Parties

do not exercise

their choice."

For the reasons already advanced,

it is

not belived that any system

other than one which operates automatically will constitute a solution to the problem.
75. This calls for selection

on whose

by one

territory the Protecting

State,

Power

is

acceptance by the State so selected, and approval by the State

to operate. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 383.

The Report (A/1120, para. 218) makes two suggestions with respect to the legal effect of the
Power or of an international organ as a substitute therefor: (1) that the Protecting
Power, or the substitute, should be considered as an agent of the international community and not merely of
76.

designation of a Protecting

one belligerent

and

State;

(2) that

the designation, being solely humanitarian in purpose, should have

no

legal

comment is already true under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term
"Parties to the Convention" is deemed appropriate rather than "international community" (see Levie, note
53 supra, at 382-83); and the second comment might well be accomplished by the use of a provision such as
that appearing in the last paragraph of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions: "The application of the
consequences.

The

first

preceding provisions

shall

not

affect the legal status

of the Parties to the conflict." This provision was eventually

applied during the French- Algerian conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
77.

The ICRC

experts

were

also

of

international

body heretofore

investigations

of allegations of such charges

bacteriological agents in

this

opinion.

existed with such
as

ICRC,

powers and

Reaffirmation 89 and 91.

Had

such an

duties, there

could have been immediate

Yemen by

the United Arab Republic, of

the use of gas in the

Korea by the United Nations Command,

etc. In this regard, see

Joyce,

Red

Cross

Major Inadequacies
International 201 (1959). In fact,

would never be made
78.

The

subject

in the
is

it is

first

probably safe to say that under these circumstances

159

many such allegations

place!

A/7720,

there discussed at length.

216-225. Despite the cautious defense of the

paras.

use of a political organization as a Protecting Power,

made

for the reasons heretofore stated (see text in connection

with note 46 supra), the creation of a new, non-political

body

it

would appear

that,

by the Report.
were justified. The article, in effect, authorizes the Detaining
substitute for the Protecting Power. The reservations would merely require

basically the position taken

is

79. See note 57 supra.

Power

in the last paragraph cited,

The

to unilaterally select a

reservations

agreement on the part of the Power of Origin,
See note 75 supra.

Of course,

agreed in advance to the
Final

80.

I

81.

Once

specialists, to

were

filling

a

it

of course, the

again,

serve as

its

new

convention which

are discussing,

Power itself.
would have

it

the text in connection with note 45 supra.

this resolution, see

ICEHRAC

we

ICEHRAC.

of the void by the

Record 201. Concerning

the case of the selection of the Protecting

as in

Party to the

would need

eyes and ears to collect and

sift

a fairly large operational staff,

evidence.

But

this

is

including

no more than an

many

administrative

problem which should present no insurmountable difficulty.
82. There is no reason whatsoever why, under appropriate legal safeguards (see note 76 supra), these
provisions could not be made applicable to internal conflicts, and to conflicts of "national liberation," which
are
a

frequendy

much more

Vengeance,"
83.

The

he.

cit.,

sanguinary than are international conflicts. "Nigeria/Biafra:

Armed

Conflict with

note 64 supra.

question will undoubtedly be asked immediately

why

the present discussion concerning the

weapons does not include nuclear weapons. That matter has been, and
continues to be, one of the major subjects of discussion at the meetings of the nuclear powers themselves and
at the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (formerly the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament). The status of these various discussions and the reason for the stalemate which
has now existed for more than a decade is well known. It could not conceivably serve any useful purpose for
this paper to make a proposal for the banning of nuclear weapons, with or without inspection. Probably only
some scientific breakthrough will solve that problem. In the meantime we have what some call "the equilibrium
elimination of chemical and biological

ICRC, Reaffirmation 50.
The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use

of dissuasion."
84.

Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed

Am. J.

at

in

War

of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other

Geneva on June

17,

1925 (94 L.N.T.S. 65; 25

Supp. 94 (1931)), uses the term "bacteriological." Because scientific developments since 1925
have indicated the possible use in armed conflict of various living organisms (e.g, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi),
as

Int'l L.

well

as bacteria,

the

more

inclusive "biological"

is

now

very generally used. In

this

regard see the Report

of the Secretary-General based on the Report of the Group of Consultant Experts, United Nations Document

A/7575/Rev.

1

,

Chemical and Bacteriological

(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 69,

and Article

I

(Biological)
I.

24), paras.

of the British Draft Convention, note 130

infra,

Weapons and

the Effect of Their Possible

17-18 [hereinafter cited

which

refers to

as

UN, .CB

Use

Weapons],

"microbial and other biological

agents."
85. In the

Foreword

to the

Report of the Secretary-General

(see

UN, CB Weapons,

note 84 supra,

at

U Thant quoted as follows from his 1968 Annual Report:

viii),

"...

The

question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question

of nuclear weapons, which have

a destructive

power

several orders

of magnitude greater than

that

of

chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded

with universal horror. In some respects, they

may be even more dangerous

than nuclear weapons

because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are
required for nuclear weapons. Almost

all

countries, including small ones

and developing ones, may

have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secredy in small
laboratories or factories ..."
86.

84

A comparatively short list of some of the works in this area will be found in UN, CB Weapons, note

supra, at 99.
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list
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The Ultimate

Folly:

War by

Pestilence,

Asphyxiation, and Defoliation (1969).
87.

Mention need be made of only two

have taken place: the United Nations, where
in the

authoritative forums
it

where numerous

discussions of this subject

has been discussed at length both in the First

Committee and

General Assembly; and the United States Congress where Representative Richard D. McCarthy and

others similarly concerned have not allowed the matter to pass unnoticed. See, for example,

Nov.

19, 1969, p. 9, col

N.Y. Times,

1.

88. One author makes the rather pessimistic evaluation that this recent concern "is perhaps an index of
growing role of such weapons in military preparations." Brownlie, "Legal Aspects of CBW" in Rose (ed.),
CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare 141, 150-51 (1968). [This collection hereinafter cited as Rose, CBW].

the

1

Levie on the
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For

89.

Law

of

War

short but comprehensive history of the use or alleged use of chemicals in warfare,

a

from the

Peloponnesian Wars to Korea, see Kelly, "Gas Warfare in International Law," 9 Mil. L. Rev. 3-14 and passim
(1960).

Renouncing the Use,

Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868

90.
1

Am. J.

Int'l L.

in

Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles,

Supp. 95 (1907).

See note 14 supra.

91.

Am. J.

1

93.

See note 9

Am.

1939; 16

States did not sign or ratify this Declaration.

supra.

94. Article 171, Treaty of Versailles, 3

While the United

151, 230 (1919).

The United

Supp. 157 (1907).

Int'l L.

92.

Malloy (Redmond), Treaties, 3331, 3402; 13

States did

not

ratify this

Treaty,

Am. J.

Int'l L.

Supp.

did ratify the Treaty of Berlin (42 Stat.

it

Supp. 10 (1922)), which incorporates by reference Article 171 of the Treaty of

J. Int'l L.

Versailles.

95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
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first

reprisal

3 Malloy (Redmond) Treaties 3116; 16 Am J. Int'l. Supp. 57 (1922).
A/7720, para. 53.
See note 84 supra.
A/1120, note 31 and Annex II, Tables I and II.
This latter reservation preserves the right to use chemical and bacteriological agents as a reprisal for
use by the enemy. Some writers would not even permit this use; and there is no doubt that an alleged

can be the excuse for

100. Spaight, Air

a first strike.

Power and War Rights 192-93
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102.

(3d ed., 1947).

CBW,"

101. Meselson, "Ethical Problems: Preventing

CBW
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in

163.

the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Carter Burgess, later said:
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that following the

Red Chinese

'germ warfare' propaganda of the

Korean
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conflict there

effective that
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flies

in China. Allegedly, the

incited a universal attack

it

on

these insects

by the Chinese people."
"Foreword: Prisoners of War," 56 Col. L. Rev. 676 (1956).
103. Viney, "Research Policy: Soviet Union," in Rose,
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The Yemen,"

in
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A/RES/2603A (XXTV), 16 December 1969.
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1966;
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108. See, for example, Brownlie, note 88 supra, at 143-44, and O'Brien, "Biological/Chemical Warfare

and the International
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109.
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Law

of War," 51 Geo.

1949 Geneva Conventions
110. U.S.

36 (1962).

L.J. 1,

68 Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
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after

after

45
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to
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Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, para. 38

(1956).

While there

is
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denial of the existence of a customary prohibition, this appears inherent in the tenor of the phraseology used.

For an elaboration of the United States position, see 10 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 455-56 (1968).
111. See note 52 supra.
112.

N.Y. Times, Nov.

113.
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produced

for

weapons purposes.
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114.
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26, 1969, p. 16, col.
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61 Dept. State Bull. 541 (1969).
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in the original
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ratified the Protocol, the

Soviet

St.

Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 15, 1970,

all

as

though,
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is

after years

now
on

of exploiting the

fact that the

the use of biological weapons. In addition to
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proposed by the British and accepted by the United
latter
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with

States. St.
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new

ICRC,

its

a
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new agreement

biological weapons, rather
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Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 17, 1970,
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N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1970, p.
117. UN, CB Weapons, para. 20.

3, col. 6.

118. Meselson, "Ethical Problems: Preventing

119.

had not
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2A,
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col.
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116.

Ibid.

on

treaty prohibiting biological
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115.

States
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objection to any treaty calling for verification procedures,
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These apparendy had

announcement.

the United States to accept a prohibition

1.
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p. 1, col. 1.

See

120. Sidel,
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UN, CB Weapons,

"Napalm,"
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Ramundo,
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Peaceful Coexistence 138-39 (1967).
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Dow Chemical Co., formerly the chief manufacturer of napalm for the United States armed forces,
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against the
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War
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a certain
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150.
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The U.S. Army
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Manual 27-10,
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far
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not
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Reaffirmation 62-63; Brownlie, note 88 supra,

The Law of Land Warfare
124.
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note 120 supra.

CBW 62; UN, CB Weapons, para.
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scientific

the current problem in the United States arising out of the use of

DDT
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and other

pesticides.
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The tremendous capabilities of modern weapons of mass destruction, however, make the
objective of their effectively sanctioned abolition much more urgent than was weapons abolition at the time
126.
127.

.

.
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Mallison,

"The Laws of War and

the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and

Limited Wars," 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 308, 321 (1967).
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The Stockholm
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"whether
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"Ethical Problems: Preventing

International Peace Research Institute
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technically possible to discover production of biological agents
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See

a scale

of military relevance."

Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare," A/7720, at 87 of
United Nations document; N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1969, p. 16, col. 5.
131. Memorandum presented to the British War Cabinet on August 17, 1917. Quoted in "Air Power,"
Enc. Brit. 449, 450 (1970).
132. The possible use of nuclear weapons, whether delivered by ballistic missiles or by bombers, merely
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the original

1

emphasizes the gravity of the problem under discussion.
133. Lauterpacht, note 13 supra, at 365-66.
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136. Stone, note
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1 supra,
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1868 Declaration
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Supp. 146 (1908).
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9 supra.

621, footnote 91.

Int'l L.

of St. Petersburg (note 90 supra) which outlawed explosive and incendiary
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prohibition does not apply to

139. Spaight, note 100 supra, at

aircraft.

projectiles.
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See Article 18 of the Hague Air Rules, note 140

41-42 and 244-50. The disillusioned
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infra.
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140.
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J. Int'l

L. Supp.
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Int'l L.

Supp. 12 (1938); Greenspan,

The Modern
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by resolution of the Conference

at
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the Treaty of Washington, note 95 supra, was drafted.
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by the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 28, 1938. Ibid., at 258.
142. Actually, the Germans had already bombed Warsaw, obliterating much of it.
143. Pictet, note 13 supra, at 30. After the Germans had disregarded the principles of the military objective
and of the protection of the civilian population in Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium in April-May 1940,
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141.
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in Spaight, note 100 supra, at 257.

resolution adopted
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populations." Spaight, note 100 supra,

at

264-266.
144. Pictet, note 13 supra at 30.

145. Lauterpacht, note 13 supra, at 366, footnote
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International

1.
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same course of conduct, unrestricted submarine warfare, the
Military Tribunal refused to assess any punishment on this score against German Admiral Doentiz.
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146. Spaight, note 100 supra, at 277.
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Pictet,

note

13 supra, at 39.
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War
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A/7720,
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364.
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at
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151. Lauterpacht, note 13 supra, at 369. See also Pictet, note 13 supra,
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so.

Vengeance," note 64

more

supra, at 10-11.
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The Report, A/7720,
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frequently than not counterproductive."

152. See Spaight, note 100 supra,

at

43.

Of course,

if every bomb dropped by an
mention only the deaths of a woman
and her two children who had had the misfortune to pick that time to hawk botded pop to the tank crews.
154. Spaight, note 100 supra, at 47. Other apt quotations from this authoritative, but frequendy

A/7720,

153.

para.

140-141.

propaganda purposes, even

for

attacking airplane landed in the middle of a tank park, the

—

controversial,

"The

work

enemy

will

are (at 43):

position was that, for the

to strike not only at the user

first

time, belligerents had

of armaments but

at

at their

disposal an instrument enabling

the makers of armaments.

The

them

possession of such an

instrument had the effect of calling in question the hitherto accepted distinction between armed forces
and civilians, between combatants and noncombatants. ..."

was a praiseworthy principle in the circumstances of the pre-air age of war, but it was not one
which could survive the arrival of the bombing aircraft. For, objectively considered, it was not a logical
"It

principle. ..."

155.
156.

Ibid. 254,270,271.
Meyrowitz "Reflections on the Centenary of the Declaration of St. Petersburg," 8

Int'l

Rev. Red

Cross 611, 620-21 (1968).
157.

A/7720,

para. 143.

158. Unfortunately,

as stated

by one author,

"(i)t is far easier to

and to offer soothing verbal solutions, and to dismiss
rules for mitigation

Stone, note

1

target area

moralize about

bombing

as

air attacks

on

civilians,

probably unlawful, than to frame

of human suffering with some hope of belligerent observance amid the

realities

of war."

supra, at 627.

159.

A/7720,

paras.

160.

supra.

161.

Note 25
Note 26

162.

ICRC,

145-150.

supra.

Reaffirmation 73.

on Article 6 of the ICRC Draft Rules and Article 22 of the Hague Air Rules.
on Article 10 of the ICRC Draft Rules.
Based on one of the ICRC principles.
Based on one of the ICRC principles.
Based on Article 7 of the ICRC Draft Rules and on a proposal of the Institut de Droit

163. Based
164. Based
165.
166.

167.

Some

Major Inadequacies

in

Law
During Armed

the Existing

Protection of Individuals

International.

Relating to the
Conflict

Addendum
This

Working Paper

for the 14th

Association of the Bar of the City of

Hammarskjold Forum conducted by

New York was written in

time there has been no change in the status of the

first

the

1970. Since that

problem mentioned, the

absence of "a method for the automatic determination that a particular State
relationship requires the application of the

law of armed

conflict." Article

1

of

Opening of Hostilities requires a "previous
and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons,
the

1907 Convention

(II)

Relative

to the

Major Inadequacies

163

or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." This provision has become
a nullity. Article

2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for

Conventions become applicable "in

Victims provides that these

declared

the Protection of

war or of any other armed

which may

conflict

more of the High Contracting Parties, even

if the state

of

cases

all

between two or

arise

of war

War

is

not recognized

by one of them." The lack of value of this provision was demonstrated during

Vietnam where the North Vietnamese disregarded it by merely

the hostilities in
asserting that

all

captured American personnel were war criminals captured

There have been innumerable international armed

flagrante delicto.

1970 but in not one instance has there been

a formal declaration

in

conflicts since

of war or any

other affirmative action indicating that the international law of war was

deemed

The last known compliance with the cited provision was when
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 during World War
The second item discussed was "the need for a method which will ensure
applicable.

the
II.

the

presence in the territory of each State party to an armed conflict of a Protecting

Power or an

international

body with adequate authority

to police

compliance

The international community had an opportunity to correct this
but failed miserably, The Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva

with that law."
defect

from 1974

to

1977 before completing the 1977

Conventions of 8 August 1949, and Relating

to the

Protection of Victims of International

Armed

Conflicts (Protocol I) drafted provisions (Article 5 thereof)

mean

that there will usually

in

as

yet ratified that Protocol.) In the

Korea there were no Protecting Powers. The International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
United Nations

Command (UNC)

100 inspections of

offered

services to

its

accepted the offer and the

UNC prisoner of war

nothing in the 1977

is

dependent upon the willingness of the Party to the

Protocol I which, will

may be

instituted,

services as a substitute,

Power

but

its

is

conflict.

probably

but the functioning of the

ICRC as

—

a

as

Thus,

every action
if the

will, a sort

dubious; and the

subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict"
like

The

ICRC made over

change that situation

as it

fails,

value

sides.

The North Koreans and the
answer the ICRC's offers. There

is

for designating a Protecting

both

facilities.

Chinese Communists never even deigned to

system

which once again

be no Protecting Power and no substitute for a

Protecting Power. (The United States has not
conflict

Geneva

Protocol Additional to the

system

of lottery

ICRC may

offer

such a substitute

its

"is

consent which countries
a

number of other

complete and

total prohibition

North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and

nations, will not give.

The

third item discussed

was "the need for

of the use in armed conflict of any and

weapons."
Weapons in

An

addendum to the

this collection

article

all

a

categories of chemical

and biological

entided Nuclear, Chemical and Biological

updates the subject.

1

64

Levie on the

The

final

Law

of

War

item discussed in that paper was "the need for

a

complete code

governing the use of air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright

bombing which has as its basic target the civilian
population." Some progress has been made in this area. Article 51(2) of the 1977
Additional Protocol /prohibits making the civilian population the object of attack,
prohibition of any type of

Articles 54(2)

and 56 thereof contain provisions aimed

at

protecting the civilian

population from attack. Article 2(1) of the Protocol on Prohibitions
on the Use

if Incendiary

or Restrictions

Weapons

(Protocol

HI to

the

or Restrictions

1980 Convention on

on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which

may

Prohibitions

be

Deemed

to

be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects) specifically prohibits attacks

on

the civilian population

prohibits attacks
civilians

by

air

on

a military

Article 2(2) thereof

objective located within a concentration of

delivered incendiary weapons. (The United States has not

ratified this Protocol,
II thereof.)

by incendiary weapons; and

although

it

as

yet

has ratified the. convention and Protocols I and

VII
Civilian Sanctuaries:

1 Israel

Certainly, one
practical

An

Impractical Proposal

Year Book of Human Rights

335 (1971)

should always take a positive stance with respect to any

and workable proposal aimed

at increasing the

protections

afforded the civilian population in time of armed conflict. Despite that premise,

which

is

basic to

any consideration of the law of armed

conflict,

or perhaps

because of the restrictive adjectives "practical and workable" which have been,

and must be, used,

it

appears necessary to cast a negative vote with respect to a

well-intentioned, but impractical, proposal

of the United Nations in 1969 and greatly

On December 19,

made by the Secretary-General
elaborated upon by him in 1970.
first

1968, by Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the General Assembly

of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to study and prepare a
report

on

the subject of "Respect for

Human

Rights in

Armed

Conflict."

He

November 20, 1969 (hereinafter referred to
On December 16, 1969, by Resolution 2597 (XXIV),

did so, his staff producing A/7720,
as

the "1969 Report").

the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his study and
to submit a further report

on the same

subject.

Once

again he did so, his staff

producing A/8052, September 18, 1970 (hereinafter referred to

as

the "1970

Report").
In the 1969

Report eight paragraphs (145-52) were devoted

to the subject

of "civilian refuges or sanctuaries." In March, 1970, during the course of a Panel

which included the United Nations
preparation of that

United Nations
practicality

—

Report

Secretariat,

official

the Director of

really did

Human

responsible

for

the

Rights Division of the

the present writer, in passing, questioned the

of the proposal for large-scale

comment, which

actually

not

rise to

civilian sanctuaries.

the category of criticism,

inadvertently contributed to the fact that the 1970

This adverse

may

well have

Report expanded the

coverage on the subject from eight to forty-three paragraphs (45-87).

It is

the

purpose of this paper to demonstrate the impracticality of the proposal for such
civilian sanctuaries

and the actual lack of need for such

a device if there

compliance with already well-established norms of the law of armed

is

conflict,

perhaps amplified in the light of currendy available and foreseeable methods of

conducting such

conflict.

.
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Some

War

of

discussion in depth of the proposal contained in the

essential for

an understanding of the problem.

The

two Reports

basic proposal

was

is

originally

advanced in the following language:

The

which

difficulties

of what constitutes

are attendant

on

arriving at a practically useful definition

have led to the consideration

a legitimate military objective

of other solutions which might effectively increase the protection afforded to
civilians in

armed

One method might

conflicts.

shelter as large a part

of the

civilian

children, the elderly, the sick

population

and those

be to gather and place under

women,

as possible, especially

who do

not participate in the armed

nor contribute in any way to the pursuit of military operations. This

conflict,

might be achieved by adopting and developing, on
present, a system of safety zones

immunity from

which would

a larger scale

than provided

offer special protection

at

and even

attack.

The purpose of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries was
subsequendy more clearly drawn when the 1970 Report stated:
The

would

civilian sanctuaries

therefore be established to

of the belligerents to the presence in a given area of persons

draw the attention

whom they are already

obligated to respect, protect or refrain from injuring. In effect, refuges or
sanctuaries

might

obligations

incumbent upon them.

assist

in facilitating the observance

Both of the Reports recognized the need
to ensure the successful operation

misuse.

of the

for

by the

numerous

civilian sanctuaries

belligerents

of the

safeguards in order

and to prevent

their

These safeguards were gathered together into the following four

propositions:

1

The

necessity for the designation

peacetime before

on

have aroused animosity and suspicion;

the selection and use of such sanctuaries;

4

5

2.

Restrictions

3.

Special identification markings for the sanctuaries and the personnel serving

in them;

4.

It

hostilities

and recognition of civilian sanctuaries in

A

and
system of control and verification.

appears to the present writer that the

requirements, which

of the proposal.

is

far

mere enumeration of

these

few

from exhaustive, demonstrates the lack of feasibility

Civilian

The

Secretary-General's brow.

norms

to a totally

existing system

new

•

It is

concept.

not even the application of existing ideas and
It is

merely the elaboration and extension of an

of protection, which was designed for comparatively small groups

of individuals and for comparatively small areas of real
large segments

estate, to potentially

the doctrine of

which has been elsewhere defined as "an undefended city, open
10
occupation by enemy forces without harm to the inhabitants,"
originated
the customary law of war and was codified in the Fourth Hague Convention

the

in

very

of the population and potentially enormous portions of the land

mass of a belligerent nation. As the 1969 Report points out,

to

167

did not emerge full-blown from the

idea of civilian sanctuaries
8

Sanctuaries

"open

of 1907.

city,"

11

Thus, the entry of the Germans into Paris in June, 1940, during

World War II, has been termed "a classical example of the application of the
12
During that same War, the "open
[1907] Hague Rules of Land Warfare."
city" doctrine failed to provide protection to the civilian populations in the cases
•

of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana in 1941 and in the case of Rome in 1943.

13

Three very small neutralized zones were apparendy established in Jerusalem in
1948, but these probably did not result from an application of the "open city"
doctrine.

Elaborating

on

Geneva Conventions, each of

earlier

Conventions provides for protected
zones;

prisoner of war camps;

The 1954 Hague Convention

areas

and internment camps.

contains provisions setting up an elaborate

system for the protection of areas containing cultural monuments. And,
the so-called Draft Rules disseminated

Red

Cross in 1956

1949

four

of one character or another: hospital

neutralized zones;
19

the

finally,

by the International Committee of the

have a number of provisions on the subject of sanctuaries.

In summary, various types of protected zones for different categories of

noncombatants, emerging from the "open city" doctrine, have existed for

a

considerable period of time. All of these protected zones have been restricted
to comparatively small land areas, perhaps a
at

most

and

its

a

few thousand square yards or meters,

few square miles or kilometers, intended

civilian population, to a hospital,

war or internment camp and

its

Secretary-General's proposal

would

protected zones on a grand

its

patients,

inmates, to a

scale:

to afford protection to a city

and

staff,

museum and

its

to a prisoner

attendants.

greatly enlarge this concept.

It

of

The

proposes

not thousands of square yards or meters, but

thousands and hundreds of thousands of square miles or kilometers; not the

noncombatant personnel of

museum, or even of a
engaged in

hostilities.

city,

a hospital,

or of an internment camp, or of a

but a very large part of the population of the nations

Laudable and

idealistic as the

proposal obviously

unfortunately appears to be completely impractical in the world in
live.

is, it

which we
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of

The problems involved

War

in obtaining acceptance

of and in implementing the

Can anyone

proposal appear to this writer to be insurmountable.

and

nations

today's

governments could reach agreement, even

their

peacetime, either on

a bilateral

or on a multilateral

portions of their respective territories from

war?

22

Can anyone

believe that

all

believe that such nations

exempting

basis,

in

large

types of attack in the event of

would remove from, and

prohibit

the subsequent introduction into, the zones so designated of every type of

industry and activity

anyone believe
would,

at

which could

in

any way contribute to

a

war

of nuclear weapons and "quick" wars,

that in this age

Can

effort?

a nation

the outset of hostilities, be in a position to devote the necessary energy,

manpower, and equipment

of moving millions of its

to the task

Can anyone

civilians into

war would be in a
position to devote the necessary energy, manpower, and equipment to the task
of providing logistic support for millions of its citizens who would necessarily
be nonproductive insofar as the war effort is concerned?
Can anyone believe
that, human nature being what it is, the worker who stays on his job in support
of the war effort can be successfully separated from his wife and children?
Can
anyone believe that any nation at war will voluntarily and actually deprive itself
of an urgendy needed resource by moving into a neutralized zone a great mass
the neutralized zones?

of potential labor, even though

anyone believe

that today's

be

it

believe that nations at

women,

children,

and the elderly?

27

Can

nations will accept "a system of control and

verification" in the persons of foreign observers stationed within their territory

Can anyone

in time of war?

believe that the

impossibility of really effective control

wartime requirements, would not

and

huge

verification,

areas involved,

and the pressures of

result in massive evasions

of the

Can anyone

and improper usage of the neutralized zones?

the

restrictions

believe that the

would accept any such proposal without an escape clause such
"imperative military necessity" clause of the 1949 Geneva Conventions?

nations of today
as

the

Can anyone believe that a nuclear nation, envisioning the eventuality of defeat,
would not use the neutralized zones as a basis for blackmail? These are but a few
of the many questions raised by the Secretary-General's proposal, to each and
every one of which this writer would give a negative answer.
Is

there an alternative to the Secretary-General's proposal for large-scale

civilian sanctuaries for the protection

certainly

is,

and

it is

acceptable to the

First,

full-scale

restrictions

not only more

of the

feasible,

civilian population?

There most

much more

likely to be

but

community of nations. That

it is

alternative

is

as follows:

application of and compliance with the already existing

on allowable

military objectives,

present-day requirements.

What

is

needed

is

modernized
not

new

as

necessary to meet

norms, but compliance

with existing norms. For example, target-area bombing certainly violated the
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Civilian Sanctuaries

principle of the military objective, but

World War

during

do

to

available

Commissioner-General
hostilities

the

—but

somewhat

been

that

all

peripherally, the Protecting

do

Observer-General

or

Power

would have

Secretary-General

the

must be

It

during

is

a

of actual

time

one of the scores of hostilities which have occurred since

in not

end of World

sides so generally

that the principle practically ceased to exist.

II

revived. Again, and perhaps

already

was used by both

it

War

II

has this extremely valuable international institution

called into action.

law of air warfare,

Second, the

and codified

31

The extreme

all

any

now

should be elaborated upon

exists,

reluctance of nations to establish recognized and

accepted international rules in

example,

if

this

very

governments express horror

vital area

at

the

is

really incredible.

mere suggestion

nation, then engaged in hostilities, has resorted to "terror

For

any other

that

bombing"

—

the

bombing of nonmilitary objectives and of the civilian population in order to
destroy enemy morale and to bring an adversary to its knees on the home front
when it has not been possible to do so on the battlefront. The 1923 Hague Rules
32
of Air Warfare
and the ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules specifically proposed such
a prohibition,

World War

33

II

but

many

years later that proposal

is still

in limbo. Here, too,

practices have, unfortunately, probably negated the principle

of

the military objective.

Third, the initiation

who
has

of some system of effective sanctions against belligerents

been drafted and accepted with respect

Geneva Conventions.

34

There

devised for nation violators
military objective,

summary,

In
as

may be

once

it is

as

is

Such

a system

of sanctions

to individual violators

of the 1949

violate the principle of the rnilitary objective.

no reason why some such system cannot be

well

as

individual violators of the principle of the

that principle has

been resurrected.

suggested that the existing law of armed conflict, elaborated

necessary, particularly in the area of air warfare, if complied with (and

with additional methods to be established for enforcing compliance), can provide
the civilian population with the protection
already entitled

than

can

the

under existing norms; and
elaborate

and

which

that

impractical

it

it

requires

can do

this

proposal

and

to

which

much more
advanced

it is

readily

by

the

Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1969 and 1970 Reports on

"Respect for

Human

Rights in

Armed

Conflict."
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zones should
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as

it

states that
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inherent in attempting to separate families.
27. In modern warfare labor is almost as essential as armaments; and every individual, male or female,
young or old, capable of aiding in the overall productive effort is an asset whose productivity will be demanded
and required by the warring nation.
immunity and access to
28. Para. 82 of the 1970 Report refers to "the inspectors and experts with
the right of communication, including the use of a special code whenever
the area concerned,
necessary ..." In the light of the conspicuous lack of success encountered during the past two decades in
attempting to negotiate even the simplest means of on-the-ground verification during peacetime, this proposal
.

.

.

.

.

.

The frequent inability of the ICRC to function (North Korea
and North Vietnam are but two pertinent examples) is an index of what could be expected if, indeed, such a
provision could be successfully negotiated.
29. In an area of hundreds or thousands of square miles, it would certainly not be too difficult to establish
appears to be particularly naive and unrealistic.

many

covert

facilities

which would

items have valid nonmilitary uses.

actually

produce war

And who

is

materials, entirely apart

from the

fact that

to say that a civilian school for, say, garage

producing trained personnel for the military forces?
30. Each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, op. tit. supra notes 15 and 16, contains

many such

mechanics

common Art.

is

not

8 which

provides, in part:
.

.

.

They

[the representatives

of the Protecting Power]

shall,

in particular, take account of the

imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they carry out their duties. Their activities shall

only be restricted

as

an exceptional and temporary measure

when

this

is

rendered necessary by

imperative military necessities.

A

similar restriction also appears in other provisions

Convention,
31.

On

op.

tit.

supra note 19, refers, in

this subject, see

32.

17

Am. J.

Int'l

L.

of these Conventions. The 1954 Hague Cultural
of unavoidable military necessity."

11(2), to "exceptional cases

the thought-provoking article of DeSaussure,

There Any?" 23 Naval War
(1971). See also Levie, op.

art.

tit.

College Rev.,

No.

"The Laws of Air Warfare: Are

35 (1971); reprinted in 5 The

6, at

International

Lawyer 529

supra note 1, at 21-29.

245 (Suppl. 1923); 32

id.

12 (1938); Greenspan, The Modern

Law

of Land Warfare

650 (1959).
33. Art. 6, Draft Rules, op.

tit.

supra note 2.

1949 Geneva Conventions, op. tit. supra notes 15 and 16.
35. The present writer is not alone in doubting the wisdom and practicality of civilian sanctuaries as
proposed by the Secretary-General. See, for example, Stillman, op. tit. supra note 3, at 117, 121, and 123;
Bindschedler-Robert, "A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflict," The Law of Armed Conflict 20-21
(Carnegie End., 1971); and Rubin, "Informal Summary of Personal Reactions to U.N. Doc. A/8052" (ms.,
Am. Soc. Int'l L., 1971). In the discussion following the presentation of this paper at the Symposium, Colonel
Draper indicated that the proposal had met with a rather tepid reception at the ICRC's Conference of
34. Arts. 49, 50, 129, 146,

Government Experts held

in

Geneva

in

May—June,

1971.
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Law Aspects of Repatriation of
of War During Hostilities: A Reply

International

Prisoners

67 American Journal of International Law 693 (1973)*

I

July 1973 issue of the Journal, there appeared an
In thewritten
by Professor Richard Falk, in which he, in

article

effect,

title

thesis that the release
hostilities in

Vietnam

United

advanced the

of prisoners of war for repatriation during the course of
to an ad hoc

and

self-styled

(which admittedly consisted solely of individuals
the

with the above

"humanitarian organization"

who were

vocal opponents of

States participation in those hostilities) either constituted a valid

and

forward-looking interpretation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention of

1949

relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War

(hereinafter referred to as

"the 1949 Convention") or indicated the need for revision of that instrument.

The

one which

subject appears to be

calls

depth than the treatment provided in the
In this article,

I

war

who do

the

1949 Convention

wounded"
a

I

by Professor

Falk.

facts alleged

and the

Falk, the legal aspects involved

(in

the mandatory provisions of Article 109

other words, those

or so "seriously sick"

accomplish

which

article

come within

matter of right); and

to

by Professor

and repatriation during the course of hostilities of prisoners of

in (1) the release

not

article

independently of the

shall discuss,

arguments advanced in the

for an analysis in considerably greater

this

(2)

as to

who

are

et seq.

of

not so "seriously

be entided to release and repatriation

as

the use of an "impartial humanitarian organization"

purpose. Thereafter,

I

shall

point out

some of the

areas in

agree or disagree with the proponent of this procedure.

II

Historically, there

Powers for the

have been three major methods employed by Detaining

release

*

Reprinted in

ed., 1976).

hostilities

of

—

war ransom, exchange, and parole. The ransom of
personnel, which reached its peak in its application to chivalry

able-bodied prisoners of
captured military

and repatriation during the course of
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Law

in medieval times, had, for

seventeenth century.

became

It

War

of

practical purposes, disappeared

all

by the end of the

was replaced by exchange when continental armies

when

national and professional and

obtaining the release of captured

became accepted as the responsibility of the sovereign.
Exchange was man-for-man and grade-for-grade (with tables of "equivalent
values") so that, at least in theory, it would not result in any change in the relative
A
military strengths of the two sides. Exchange still existed as late as the American
Civil War, but it ceased to be a really effective procedure during that conflict.
Parole is the third method of effectuating the release and repatriation of
prisoners of war during the course of hostilities. Under this procedure, the
prisoner of war agrees to certain conditions that will govern his conduct upon
military personnel

from

his release

confined

a

method of procuring
course of

conflict.

a

status.

has proven relatively unimportant as a

It

the release and repatriation of prisoners of war during the
Historically,

permitting the prisoner of war

it

developed primarily into

more freedom within

Detaining Power, rather than of procuring

method of

the territory of the

release

his

a

and

repatriation.

Moreover, Article 21(2) of the 1949 Convention, like its predecessors,
specifically contemplates that Powers of Origin may prohibit their captured

from giving or accepting

military personnel

parole; a

number of

countries,

including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have traditionally

of their military personnel to give or accept parole.

restricted the right

72 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to the Treatment of

Article

Prisoners of War

8

(hereinafter referred to as "the

the possibility of agreements
hostilities

between

belligerents for the repatriation during

of "able-bodied prisoners of war

of captivity."

A

similar but

1929 Convention") suggested

who

have undergone a long period

somewhat more extensive provision was included

1949 Convention. Article 109(2) provides that the Parties may "conclude
agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral

in the

country of able-bodied prisoners of war
This provision

captivity."

belligerents to adopt

may be

who

have undergone

considered

as

a

long period of

an attempt to encourage the

one of these procedures (and

to give neutral states

others a basis for proposing them), rather than as a legal authorization to

inasmuch

as

no such authorization was needed

do

so,

in order to enable belligerents

lawfully to enter into such agreements. Article 6(1) of the 1949
specifically

and

Convention

contemplates the conclusion of special agreements by the Parties

concerning prisoner-of-war matters, subject only to the limitations that any such

agreement may not "adversely
to apply

and

that

it

may

affect" the prisoners

whom it purports

not "restrict the rights" elsewhere conferred upon them

by the Convention. Paragraph 2 of the same

may

of war to

unilaterally give prisoners

by the 1949 Convention

article

contemplates that

of war more favorable treatment than

itself.

is

a Party

required

Certainly, an agreement for the repatriation of

Aspects of Repatriation
longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of hostilities

not

within the ambit of either of the limitations mentioned above;

fall

would

Moreover, the Detaining Power could

would be barred from

individuals so repatriated
hostilities against

75

would
and

it

be more favorable treatment than required by the 1949

in any event

Convention.

1

justifiably assert that

further participation in the

it.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that

World War

II

saw many prisoners of war

held in captivity for periods in excess of five years, apparently no belligerent

many armed

13

And in none of the
end of World War II (and

sought to implement Article 72 of the 1929 Convention.

which have occurred since the
since the 1949 Convention became effective) has there been an agreement for
the repatriation of able-bodied prisoners of war prior to the cessation of
conflicts

However,

hostilities.

it is

not really

substantially similar provisions

been implemented by

difficult to

understand

new name

belligerents.

Any

bilateral

agreement providing for the
of war would merely be

which

for the old procedure of exchange, a procedure

disuse because, despite

neither of the

of the two Prisoner-of-War Conventions has ever

repatriation during hostilities of able-bodied prisoners
a

why

man-for-man and grade-for-grade

fell

into

it

inevitably

turned out to be more advantageous for one side than for the other.

Indeed,

this

same

hostilities
It

factor has

its

aspects,

even militated against the repatriation during the course of

of seriously wounded or sick prisoners of war.

being accepted that releases and repatriations during the course of hostilities

of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war are within the contemplation of
existing international law, despite the failure
a

matter of practice,

required of a
to

body

let

for

us

it

move

to

fall

of any belligerent

to the next problem.

state to

do

so as

What are the qualifications

within the category of organizations

empowered

perform the humanitarian functions which the 1949 Convention authorizes

for the benefit

of prisoners of war?

Article 8 of the

Power with

its

1949 Convention is the basic

article establishing

manifold humanitarian and other functions.

the Protecting

However,

Article

9 of that Convention specifically provides that humanitarian activities for the
benefit

of prisoners of war

Committee of

the

Red

may

Cross

humanitarian organization."

The

also

(the

be performed by the International

ICRC)

or by "any other impartial

organization and operations of the

ICRC

are

widely known and have received well-merited recognition throughout the 1949

Convention.

The

precise nature of the organizations

which

fall

within the

meaning of the term "any other impartial humanitarian organization"
considerably
Article

9 of the

is

less clear.

88 of the 1929 Convention, which was the direct progenitor of Article

1949 Convention, did not include the

possibility

any "humanitarian organization" other than the

of the intervention of

ICRC

for the purpose of

1
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furnishing assistance to prisoners of war. That possibility received recognition
for the

of

a

first

time in

proposal

a

made by the

committee of the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949

Convention.

19

The

Italian

humanitarian body"

proposal to add the words "or any other impartial

after the reference to the

who

Refugee Organization (IRO)

pointed out

in the original draft

view of the

that, in

between governments and the IRO,

collaboration

of the

existing

would seem opportune

"it

extend the provisions of Article 8 [now Article 9 of the 1949 Prisoner-of-War

Convention], to enable governments to

of

ICRC

received the strong support of the Director-General of the International

article

to

during a meeting

Italian representative

20
necessity.'"

The

themselves of its services in case

Committee of

proposal was adopted by the Joint

Diplomatic Conference
States

avail

after a

the

debate in which the representative of the United

had supported the use for humanitarian purposes of "welfare organizations

of a non-international character" and the Committee had rejected

a

Burmese

proposal to narrow the Italian proposal to "any other internationally recognized
21

impartial humanitarian body."'

It

was approved

Plenary Meeting of the

at a

Diplomatic Conference without debate.

The foregoing

the substance of the travaux preparatoires concerning the

is

addition of the words "or any other impartial humanitarian organization" to
Article 9 of the

1949 Convention.

meaning of these words,

ICRC's

it is

23
"

In attempting to elucidate the precise

therefore necessary to look elsewhere for help.

discussion of the matter in a 1960 publication

The humanitarian

activities

International

account

.

.

.;

extremely helpful.

authorized must be undertaken by the International

Committee of the Red Cross or by any other

The

is

The

Committee

and secondly,

mentioned

is

as

impartial humanitarian organization.

in

two

capacities

an example of what

is

—

firsdy

on

its

own

meant by "impartial

humanitarian organization. ..."

The

organization must be humanitarian; in other words

the condition of man, considered solely as a
as a military, political, professional

9 does not require

it

human

or other unit.

It

it

must be concerned with

being, regardless of his value

must

also

to be international.... Furthermore, the

require the organization to be neutral, but

it is

be

impartial. Article

Convention does not

obvious that impartiality benefits

gready from neutrality.

In order to be authorized, the organization's activities
in character; that

is

to say they

and must not be affected by any
limits,

any subsidiary

Convention

is

activity

must be purely humanitarian

must be concerned with human beings

to

implement the

not only authorized but desirable under Article

such,

Within those

political or military consideration.

which helps

as

principles of the
24
9.

.

.

.
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requirements for an organization's qualifying

are, then, three basic

as

"any other impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning of Article
9 of the 1949 Convention:

first, it

must be

impartial in

must be humanitarian in concept and function; and
institutional, operational,

and functional

resemblance

operations; second,

its

third,

to the

must have some

it

ICRC.

25

Negatively,

need not be international in creation and it need not be neutral in origin.
What is meant by "impartial"? An "impartial" organization is one which,

it

an institution,
operations,

its

that

prefers

it

is

unbiased and unprejudiced,

one which neither by
one

based in a neutral

act

and equitable to both

fair

it

as

sides in

nor by statement gives any indication

The mere fact of being established and
27
country does not of itself make an organization "impartial."
over the other.

side

Conversely, the mere fact of being established and based in a belligerent country

does not necessarily indicate a lack of "impartiality." While,
it

undoubtedly be most

will

difficult to identify

which

"neutral" in location but

accepted

is

as a practical matter,

an organization which

as "impartial," this is

is

not

neither a

paradox nor an impossibility. Such an organization will usually be one which
operates exclusively in the territory of

its

own

nation, preparing material

assistance for dispatch

through neutral

prisoners of war of its

own nationality held by the enemy;

it

will

relief channels,

such

the

as

and,

ICRC,

more

to the

relevandy,

be one which is permitted to and does provide material assistance to enemy

prisoners of war held in the territory of its

inconceivable that an organization which

own

is

nation.

It is,

however, almost

and based in the

established

territory

of one belligerent will be permitted to function in the territory of an opposing
belligerent,

no matter

how

and humanitarian

impartial

its

reputation and

its

Wartime public opinion alone would be a sufflciendy powerful
force to prevent an "enemy" organization from functioning freely in the territory
operations.

'

of the other side

—except under

the most unusual circumstances.

The meaning of the term "humanitarian"
and

its

is

application presents far fewer problems.

considerably

As

stated

less

by the

controversial

ICRC

in the

excerpts quoted above, "humanitarian" denotes "concerned with the condition

of man, considered solely

human

as a

war, a "humanitarian organization"

is

being." In the context of the prisoner of

one which has the objective of protecting

and improving the welfare of the prisoner of war and the conditions under which
he

exists.

and,

as

Certainly, this

we

organizations

is,

and has long been,

ICRC

have seen, the

serves

a

as

major objective of the
a

model

which come within the meaning of

ICRC,

for identifying the

Article 9 of the

1949

Convention.
Finally, the entity seeking to bring itself within that provision

of the

belligerents

seeks

"organization" and as such

to
it

functional resemblance to the

bring

within

must have some

that

—or which one
—must be an

provision

institutional, operational,

ICRC. An individual does

not qualify.

and

A small,

1
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ad hoc loose-knit group consisting of individuals
a specific

and limited purpose and which

is

who

have joined together for

obviously destined to have

span does not qualify. There must be some institutional

life

operational

and

experience

organization that

is

tradition,

which

clearly

both impartial and humanitarian.

32

Society could probably qualify institutionally

operated in the field of relief from natural

as

as

it

an

established religious

organization could probably qualify institutionally even though

previously engaged in prisoner-of-war welfare activities.

some

basis,

establishes

An

a limited

had not been

it

A national Red Cross

could an organization which has

An international organization,

disasters.

7/X

such

as

the

United Nations or the Organization of American

agency thereof, such

as

the

or an

States,

UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the OAS
The

Council, could probably qualify institutionally.

possibilities are

almost

limidess.

One

additional

of the

facet

of "impartial

designation

humanitarian

organizations" requires mention. Article 9 of the 1949 Convention makes the
activities

of the

ICRC

or of any other impartial humanitarian organization

"subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned."

on the proposed amendment
activities

to the draft article

In the debate

which contemplated

ICRC,

of impartial humanitarian organizations other than the

35

the
the

representative of France pointed out that "the activities of humanitarian bodies

were always subordinated to approval by Parties to the

conflict. "'

of the 1949 Convention has been interpreted, and properly

The provision

so, as

requiring the

consent of all the Parties "upon which the possibility of carrying out the action
37

contemplated depends."'

This

is

why it is inconceivable that even a universally

recognized humanitarian organization,

if established

and based in the

territory

of one belligerent, would be able to function in the territory of the other.

An

organization obviously cannot function

and approval of the sovereign of the
(normally, this

would be

if it

territory in

the Detaining Power);

does not have the permission

which

it

it

legally cannot,

should not, function if it does not also have the permission

other sovereign concerned (normally,

To
(1.)

this

proposes to operate

would be

the

and certainly

and approval of the

Power of Origin).

summarize:

An

repatriation

adequate legal

basis exists in international

law for the

release

and

of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of

hostilities (Article 109(2)).
(2.)

While the

legal

basis

for

such action contemplates

a

consensual

arrangement, the 1949 Convention not only permits but encourages unilateral

which is more favorable to the prisoners of war than is required by the
Convention itself (Article 6(2)).
(3.) Bilateral release and repatriation of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of
war during the course of hostilities, as provided in the 1949 Convention (Article
action

.

Aspects of Repatriation
109(2)),

is

actually a return to the historic procedure

1
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of exchange with the added

limitation against the further use of the repatriated prisoners of war

"on

active

military service" (Article 117).

Either the International

(4.)

Committee of

impartial humanitarian organization"

the welfare of prisoners of

the

may perform

war provided

Red

Cross or "any other

humanitarian

activities for

that the appropriate Parties to the

conflict give their consent (Article 9)

An "impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning of Article

(5.)

9 of the 1949 Convention

one which

is

equitable to both Parties concerned,
gives

any indication that

it

prefers

is

unbiased and unprejudiced,

one which neither by

one

side

act

fair

and

nor by statement

over the other; one which has the

humanitarian objective of protecting and improving the welfare of the prisoners

of war and the conditions under which they exist in their

one which
its

is

truly

an "organization,"

institutional, operational,

From

a status

measured, in the

and functional resemblance

from

are in substantial
a

final analysis,

to the

by

ICRC.

of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war through

the intervention of humanitarian organizations,
I

and

the foregoing general discussion of the legal aspects of the release and

repartriation during hostilities

and

status as captives;

He

interpretation, or, alternatively, revision
his basic

Article 109(2)

obvious that Professor Falk

agreement on the merit of such

humanitarian point of view.

accomplish

it is

purpose.

This

is

releases

suggests the

and

repatriations

need for

"flexible"

of the 1949 Convention in order to

unnecessary because the provisions of

of the 1949 Convention specifically cover exacdy the contingency

with which he

is

concerned,

thereby making "flexible"" interpretation or

revision unnecessary.

We part company completely when he attempts to
term "impartial humanitarian organization" so

as to

enlarge the scope of the

bring within

its

ambit a

"Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen
Detained in North Vietnam"
(hereinafter referred to as the "Committee of
Liaison") the members of which were far more concerned with anti-war
43
propaganda than with the welfare of prisoners of war.
The Committee of
Liaison was anything but "impartial"; it was more strongly motivated by political
group such

as

the self-styled

than by humanitarian considerations; and

its

existence as an "organization"

within the meaning of the 1949 Convention was,

at

the very

least,

debatable.

To put the matter in proper perspective, it will be helpful to summarize briefly
the events which are the basis for the legal thesis with which we are dealing.
The process really began in October-November 1967 when the Viet Cong
released three captured American soldiers in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to
Thomas E. Hay den, an American identified by the press as being the

1
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representative of "anti-war groups" in the

United

States.

45
*

Then

in February

1968 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) released three American

Hanoi

pilots in

to the

Rev. Daniel Berrigan and Howard Zinn,

press as representatives of "anti-war groups."

by the

July- August 1968, the

also identified

Some months

later, in

DRV released three more American pilots in Hanoi, this

time to Mrs. Robert Scheer, Vernon Grizzard, and Stuart Meacham, once again
identified

the

by the

DRV

press as representatives

of "anti-war" groups.

American servicemen

released three

in

Hanoi,

47

this

In August 1969

time to Rennard

who were identified as representing the "National
End the War in Vietnam." Finally, in September

C. Davis and David Dellinger,
Mobilization Committee to

1972, there occurred the release of three American pilots in Hanoi to Mrs. Cora

Weiss, David Dellinger, Professor Falk

49
et al.

Thus, the

DRV

made

the

first

of three captured American servicemen in February 1968; the second in

release

August 1968; the third in August 1969; and the fourth and last in October 1972.

The
the

two of these releases were made to well-known anti-war individuals;
latter two were made to two different anti-war groups. Each was attended
first

with great publicity over an extended period of time. Each involved the release
of only

a

token number of prisoners of war. Each involved prisoners of war

who

could only have been selected for release for reasons other than their physical
condition or length of confinement, the grounds mentioned in the 1949

Convention

for releases

The cablegram

sent

from Hanoi

States

and repatriations during the course of hostilities.

by the "escort group"

to the President

of the United

(which was, perhaps not unexpectedly, immediately

Hanoi

broadcast by

radio) displayed either remarkable presumption, remarkable
52
The four "guidelines" laid down for the
ignorance, or remarkable naivete.
'

benefit of the

comment,

U.

S.

Government by the Committee of Liaison warrant individual

particularly in

the light of the claim being advanced that the

Committee of Liaison was an

The
war

paragraph of the cablegram demanded that the three prisoners of

first

released

United

"impartial humanitarian organization."

by the

States "shall

in civilian aircraft."

DRV

to the

proceed

The

Committee of Liaison

home with

DRV

us

for repatriation to the

and representatives of their

could have made

a case for insisting

families

upon

the

use of civilian aircraft up to the territorial limits of the United States; but that

would omit such

a

major requirement from

privately so advise the

odd.

"

On

members of the

escort groups seems, to say the least, rather

a

condition asserted on the initiative of the

escort group, the group demonstrated that
it

public statement, and then

the other hand, if the use of civil aircraft and the designation of

authorized fellow passengers was

which

its

it

represented,

it,

and the Committee of Liaison

were anything but "impartial." Moreover, despite the

obvious mental reservations displayed by members of the escort group,
universal rule of military law that

upon

his

it is

a

departure from the territory and

Aspects of Repatriation

enemy (whether by

control of the

release, escape,

prisoner of war has the duty to report at once to the
his

to

1

81

or any other method), a
first

available authorities

of

Members of anti-war groups frequendy display a singular inability
recognize that the relationship between a member of the military service and
country.

the military authorities has evolved over the centuries as a result of the dictates

of necessity and

differs

considerably from the relationship between a civilian and

the civilian authorities.

The second paragraph of the cablegram

a

30-day

"furlough" to the three prisoners of war being released and repatriated.

How

called for the granting

of

such a completely internal, administrative matter could possibly have been

deemed

to

be within the purview of either the

humanitarian organization"

about
it

as

much

is

exceedingly

to lay

down

or of an "impartial

difficult to perceive.

It

was

just

DRV or the Committee of Liaison as

the business of either the

would have been

DRV

a condition that the

men were

to receive

automatic promotions or to be entitled to additional pay for the period during

which they had been
to

prisoners of war.

The members of the

have labored under the impression that their

Dellinger) with the

first

escort

group seem

contact (except for

problem of returned prisoners of war offered

a subtle

They
of war had

occasion to educate the military services about the process of repatriation.

were apparendy unmindful of the

fact that

thousands of prisoners

World War II and the Korean War.
The third paragraph of the cablegram demanded a "complete medical
checkup at the hospital of their choice, civilian or military." Once again the
Committee of Liaison pronounced itself on an internal, administrative matter
in an area in which the military services have had far more experience than the
members of the escort group. The members of the Committee again

been repatriated by the armed forces

after

demonstrated an unwillingness to accept the

fact that the three prisoners

of war

continued to be members of the military service, subject to military control and
discipline,

and were not

just civilian

members of

the general public and

Committee of Liaison. Moreover, despite the demand for a
medical checkup in a hospital made in the cablegram, the escort group later
apparently realized that this would completely remove their "proteges" from
their control and, as they approached the United States, their medical judgment
changed. "[I]t was clear to the escort group
that there was no immediate
need for medical surveillance."" However, once they were back in the United
States they had to concede that "the pilots preferred, or at least were unwilling
to contest, the Government's insistence on a medical checkup under military
"proteges" of the

.

.

.

auspices."

The

fourth paragraph of the cablegram prescribed that the three

repatriated "shall

Indochina." As

do nothing further

we

to

men

promote the American war

being

effort in

have seen, Article 117 of the 1949 Convention contains an

1
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ambiguous prohibition

on

War

against a repatriated prisoner

its

which

the broad ban

The

ICRC

armed operations

interprets this

former Detaining Power

against the

Certainly, any reasonable interpretation of Article

allies."

impose.

of war's being "employed

Like the United States, the

active military service."

to prohibit taking part "in

or

of

1

17

is

far

from

Committee of Liaison sought

the "impartial," anti-war

to

62

Committee of Liaison opposed U. S.
Vietnam is apparently considered one of

fact that the

in

hostilities

arguments in establishing both
Conversely,

it

at least

is

Vietnam

hostilities in

and

"impartiality"

its

more

the

decisive

"humanitarianism."

its

implied that support of U.

participation in the

participation in the

S.

of "impartiality" and "humanitarianism."

establishes a lack

Thus, the "National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in
Southeast Asia," an organization

servicemen either
goal

known

of whose members were

all

of war or missing in action and whose

to be prisoners

was "to achieve better treatment

for

the status of those missing in action,"

Americans held captive and to learn
dismissed as being one of the "groups

is

commitment

that also proclaim their humanitarian purposes, despite their

Mr. Nixon's war

policies."

'

While there

"National League" did not qualify

as

is

an "impartial humanitarian organization"

as in
it

oppose U.S. participation in the Vietnamese

failure to

the case of the

to

merit to the conclusion that the

within the meaning of Article 9 of the 1949 Convention,
its

of

relatives

Committee of Liaison,

there

is

no

this

not because of

is

conflict,

basis for

but because,

concluding that

was the type of organization envisaged by the draftsmen of the 1949

Convention.

The

of the U.S. Government to oppose Dellinger's application for

failure

leave to travel with the escort group
is

construed

activities

as

when he was free on bail pending an appeal

evidence of an implied consent by the United States to the

The

of the Committee of Liaison.

fn

did not "interfere with

its

activities,"

and that "the North Vietnamese

Committee,

are also cited as evidence that the
activities

United

it is

contended

U.S. Government

"make an objection"
initiative

"it

that the failure

was

a

to

the

was not repudiated,"

States agreed to

of the Committee of Liaison and that

In other words,
interfere

or

fact that the

and concurred

in the

consensual process."

of the U.S. Government to

with and to prevent the repatriation in 1972, just

as it

had taken no

action to interfere with or prevent the earlier repatriations, constituted a legal

acceptance

of the

organization."

Committee of

before the

an

"impartial

humanitarian

is

also

without

validity.

Despite the fact that

so specific in requiring the consent of both Parties to an

ICRC

discussion.

respect to the proper interpretation of Articles

9 and 10 of the 1949 Convention
is

as

That contention does not even appear to warrant

The argument advanced with
Article 9

Liaison

or an impartial humanitarian organization

armed conflict

may

undertake

Aspects of Repatriation
protection or relief of prisoners of war,

activities for the

of both Articles 9 and 10

that the language

the belligerent [belligerents?]

must agree

and the conclusion

organization";

is

is

to the designation

reached that

capacity to deal with an organization like the

DRV

at least a

is

de facto

the argument

made

it is

of a humanitarian

"most reasonable"

to

Power, North Vietnam, the

Committee of Liaison."

and

state

is

83

"ambiguous with regard to whether

interpret Article 10(2) "as giving the Detaining

The

72

1

"capacity to deal" with the

its

Committee of Liaison, or any other group, cannot be doubted; but to use this
circumstance to establish that the Committee of Liaison is, therefore, an
"impartial humanitarian organization" which may be unilaterally designated by
the

DRV as a substitute for the Protecting Power

attempt to attain

this result

Article 10(2) of the

Power and
to

if no

in effect, based

is,

all

quite another matter.

upon

1949 Convention provides

organization offering

is

The

the following reasoning:

that if there

is

no Protecting

guarantees of impartiality and efficacy

perform the duties of the Protecting Power has been designated to perform

those duties under Article 10(1), "the Detaining
State,

Power

shall request a neutral

or such an organization, to undertake the functions" of the Protecting

Power. In acceding

to the

Article 10 stating that

it

1949 Convention, the

would not "recognize

DRV made a reservation to

as legal"

such

Detaining Power "unless the request has been approved by the State

A substantially similar reservation to Article

the prisoners of war depend."

had been made by the

Convention
by the

in

USSR

USSR

1949 and in

by the
upon which

a request

10

and the Soviet bloc countries upon signing the

their subsequent ratifications.

for the reservation

The

reason given

was the belief that "the Government of the

country to which the protected persons belong [cannot be prevented] from
taking part in the choice of the substitute for the Protecting Power."

In

recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of
the 1949 Convention by the United States, the Department of State advised the
Senate of its opposition to the

USSR and similar reservations.

This opposition,

according to Falk,
seems to confirm the United States view that the Detaining Power had the
capacity,
that

even the duty, to designate an impartial humanitarian organization and

such designation would be determinative

from the country whose
or not "humanitarian."

Thus, based upon the

and the

men are

the absence of objection

detained that the organization

is

not "impartial"

79

DRV reservation to Article

earlier stated objection

10 of the 1949 Convention

of the Department of State to the DRV-type

reservation to that article, the conclusion
unilaterally designate

at least in

is

reached that

a

Detaining Power

may

an "impartial humanitarian organization" to perform

functions with respect to prisoners of war.

1
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In the
activities

first

of

War

must be borne

it

mind

in

with the

that Article 10 deals, not

of the "impartial humanitarian organization" referred to in Article

but with the

Powers.

place,

Law

It

activities

9,

of Protecting Powers and of "substitutes" for Protecting

seems incredible that the contention would be made that the

Committee of Liaison, a small group of completely inexperienced individuals,
whose only common thread was opposition to U.S. participation in the hostilities
in

Vietnam, could possibly qualify

impartiality

as

an organization "offering guarantees of

and efficacy to perform the duties of the Protecting Power,"

—which

are the requirements set forth in Article 10(1) for an organization that

may be

designated under Article 10(2).
In the second place, the
at
it

DRV,

the 1949 Diplomatic Conference,

considered that the

article

the

made

USSR
its

and the Soviet bloc countries

reservation to Article 10 because

improperly reduced the right of the Power of Origin

to participate in the selection
as

like the

of a substitute for the Protecting Power. Inasmuch

DRV became a Party to the 1949 Convention only on the condition that

no neutral

state

or humanitarian organization could be designated by a Detaining

Power to act as a substitute for the Protecting Power without the consent of the
Power of Origin, it is certainly inverse reasoning to claim that this established
the right of the
the

DRV acting as a Detaining Power,

Committee of Liaison,

unilaterally so to designate

without the consent of the United States, the Power

of Origin.

made in a letter written
Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the

In the third place, instead of referring to the suggestion

by Secretary Dulles

to the

which the United States should take with respect to the Soviet bloc
81
reservations,
it would have been more appropriate to refer to the position
actually and officially taken by the United States in connection with ratification
attitude

of the 1949 Convention:
Rejecting the reservations which States have

Convention relative
treaty relations

to the treatment

with

proposed by such

made with

respect to the

Geneva

of prisoners of war, the United States accepts

parties to that
82
reservations.
all

Convention, except

as to

the changes

In other words, while the United States has treaty relations with any state
has ratified or acceded to the 1949

Convention with

those treaty relations are subject to the changes

which

a reservation to Article 10,

made by

the reservation,

which

means that neither the United States nor the reserving state, when acting as a Detaining
Power, may designate a neutral Power or a humanitarian organization as a
substitute for the Protecting

Power without

the approval of the

Power of

Origin.

One

basic question remains.

Vietnamese

Why

did they do

it?

Why

did the North

unilaterally release these randomly-selected, token-size

groups of

of war

prisoners

repatriation?

for

Were
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185

North Vietnamese

more

the

humanitarian-minded than the belligerents of World

War I? Of World War II?

Of Korea? Were they inspired to do what they did because of empathy for the
men released and repatriated? All of these questions carrv their own negative
responses.

84

The Vietnam War was

unlike past conflicts. Previous wars had not seen the

which functioned openly,

establishment and proliferation of anti-war groups

seeking publicity that was not always easy for

85

them

to obtain.

The

token numbers of prisoners of war to these groups for repatriation
lengthy intervals served, on each occasion,

number of

release

of

at rather

major propaganda device, one

as a

North Vietnamese and the

particular

anti-war group large-scale newspaper, television, and radio coverage.

Had the

which

for a

been purely humanitarian in nature, the prisoners of war selected for

releases

release

days gave the

would have been

or those

who were

those

the most seriously

wounded

or sick,

who had been the longest in prisoner-of-war status; but neither of these
87

was used in the selection process.
The significance for the future of what transpired

valid criteria

of American participation in the war in Vietnam

one which

conflict,

is

a

participating in such an event

by

civilians will

probably not be

would undoubtedly

find themselves spending at

balance of the period of hostilities in close confinement after having

tried

Second,

not great. In an all-out armed

because the members of the antiwar group in any belligerent country

practical,

been

concluding months

"war" both under international law and in an American

constitutional sense, private repatriations

least the

is

in the

and convicted of treason or of communicating with the enemy.

as a practical

matter, with the limitations

which would

travel, particularly across international borders,

it

impossible for an "escort group" to accomplish

its

exist

on wartime

would probably be

all

function. Third, and

important, with the close censorship of the news media

which

is

but

most

maintained

during wartime, there would be litde or no propaganda value in releasing
token-sized groups of prisoners of war for repatriation

could completely control the amount of publicity,

be allowed within
actually desired.

its

territory, the place

Without the

publicity

if any,

Power of Origin
which the event would

as

the

where the impact of the propaganda

which

releases

is

and repatriations are

designed to generate, the motive for such action by a belligerent withers on the
vine.

In conclusion, while there are both legal

and humanitarian bases for the

release

and repatriation, or internment in neutral countries, during the course of
hostilities

of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war,

this

highly laudable purpose

can best be accomplished through resort to the established and recognized
faculties

of the Protecting Power and the International Committee of the

Red

1
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War
which have

Cross, rather than through the use of partisan, ad hoc groups

extremely limited public acceptance and recognition.

Notes
1.

2.

67 AJIL 465 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Falk).
135; 47 AJIL Supp. 119(1953).

6UST3316;75UNTS

One author asserts that "[fjaint though unmistakeable traces of it [ransom] survive even into Napoleon's
Napoleon and His British Captives 43 (1962). See also, Levie, The Nature and Scope of
the Armistice Agreement, 50 AJIL 880, 897 (1956). Perhaps it may be said to have reappeared momentarily as a
3.

war, ..." Lewis,

result

of the sequel to the Bay of Pigs episode.

4.

When,

for

and repatriated in

a

some

status until his counterpart

had thus been completed. Lewis, supra note
5.

The

made, a prisoner of war might be released
had been repatriated and the formal exchange

reason, a formal exchange could not be

temporary parole

3, at 45.

occasional procedure mentioned in the previous note was substantially the system adopted

as a

American Civil War. Lewis & Mewha,
The History of prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945, at 29-30
(1955); Murphy, Prisoners of War: Repatriation or Internment in Wartime 2-3 (1971).
6. The release and repatriation on temporary parole mentioned in note 4, supra, was the exception rather

general procedure in the rather ineffectual Dix-Hill Cartel during the

than the rule; and the Dix-Hill Cartel, in attempting to
result to the satisfaction
7.

See, for

of either

example, U.S.

make

it

the rule, failed to accomplish the intended

side.

Army

Field

Manual 27-10, The

Law of Land Warfare,

para.

187a (1956);

III, Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces, Exec. Order No. 10631, Aug. 18, 1955, 3 CFR,
1954-1958 Comp., at 266; United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land, Being Part III of the Manual

Article

of Military Law,

para. 246, n.

1

Code: de Justice Militaire, Armeede Terre,

(1958);

Art.

235 (Dalloz,

1963).

2021; 2 Bevans 932; 27 AJIL SUPP. 59 (1933).

8.

47

9.

On Dec.

Stat.

9,

1970, the

UN General Assembly adopted

a Resolution in which it:
Geneva Convention of 1949
which provides for
repatriation ... of able-bodied prisoners of war who have

Urges compliance with Article 109 of the

agreements with

a

view

to the direct

.

.

.

undergone a long period of captivity. (A/RES/ 1676 (XXV) (1970)).
In Havens, Release and Repatriation of Vietnam Prisoners, 57 ABAJ 41 44 (1971), the author argues that after
18 months as a prisoner of war an individual should be entitled to release and repatriation. However, he cites
no authority for this interpretation of the provisions of the 1949 Convention.
10. Article 109(3) prohibits the involuntary repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war during the
course of hostilities. Normal rules of treaty interpretation would seem to make this provision inapplicable to
the repatriation during hostilities of able-bodied prisoners of war unless it can be said that as a result of the
,

settlement reached in Korea in 1953, supported by

norm of international law

has evolved

which

a

number of resolutions of the

UN General Assembly,

a

prohibits the involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war under

any circumstances.

Although both the 1929 and the 1949 Conventions contemplate that such repatriations will be
Parties, there is certainly no reason why one Party cannot elect
to take such action unilaterally if it so desires. Article 6(2) of the 1949 Convention specifically mentions this
possibility and Article 118(2) of that Convention, dealing with post-hostilities release and repatriation,
specifically provides for, and even requires, unilateral action if no agreement covering the subject is reached
by the belligerents. Pakistan initiated this unilateral action in November 1972 with respect to the Indian
prisoners of war it then held. NY Times, Nov. 28, 1972, at 1, c. 2.
12. Article 117 of the 1949 Convention provides that "[n]o repatriated person may be employed on active
military service." This provision is, of course, quite ambiguous. Pictet (ed.), Commentary ON THE Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 538-39 (1960) (hereinafter cited as
11.

accomplished under agreements between the

Pictet,

Commentary). U.S.

military authorities have construed Article

serviceman from participating in

1

17

as

only prohibiting the repatriated

combat against the former Detaining Power and not

separation from the military service. American Prisoners of

Subcomtn. on National Security Policy and

Scientific

War

in

Southeast Asia,

Developments of the House

Comm.

as

requiring his complete

1971, Hearings

before the

on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong.,

350 (1971) (hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings).
Although the Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities
During the Second World War (September 1 1939 June 30, 1947) (1948) includes a 21 -page discussion
of the numerous repatriations of seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war in Europe (Vol. I, at
1st Sess.,

13.

,

—

Aspects of Repatriation
373-93),
to

it

does not even mention any proposal by

or neutral state or a humanitarian organization

a belligerent

Article

Vietnam, Korea, and the

later

of war to be considered

as

15.

87

72 of the 1929 Convention.
Probably no armed conflict which has occurred since 1945 (except for those involving the French in

implement
14.

1

The Dix-Hill

Vietnamese

conflict) has really

having "undergone

Cartel, supra notes 5

a

and

6, failed

a neutral

& Mewha,

long enough time for any prisoner

a

because in the early years of the American Civil

war favored the Union, while

the equal exchange of able-bodied prisoners of

the Confederacy, Lewis

continued for

long period of captivity."

supra note 5, at 30.

Of course,

later in the conflict

this criticism

is

War

favored

it

not true of internment in

country, the alternative provided for in Article 109(2).

16. See Lindsay (ed.), Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War 3 (1917):
The fear expressed by France [in February 1915] that under the system of exchange wounded soldiers
would be returned to Germany who could still be of military service [an amputee could work in a

common

depot, thus relieving an able-bodied solider], was
17.

18.
19.

War and

to other belligerents.

.

.

.

55 AJIL 374 (1961).
Ibid., at 394-96. See also I ICRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-29.
Fourth Meeting of the Joint Committee, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of

Levie, Prisoners of

the Protecting Power,

Geneva of 1949, Vol. ILB, at 18, 21 (hereinafter cited as Final Record).
20. Annex 24, Final Record, Vol. Ill, at 32.
21. Final Record, Vol. IIB, at 60 (emphasis added).
22. Article 7/8/8/8,

23.

ibid., at

At some point in the

346.

deliberations the

word "body" was changed

was unable to pinpoint the event in the Final RECORD,
24. Pictet,
25.

Both

Commentary,

26.

No

matter

by the

how politically

remote

belligerents, they will,

conflict that

"impartiality,"
difficulty

this particular

this

author

matter.

ICRC

Convention and the doctrine of ejus dem generis

that

it

was to be considered

"as

indicate

an example of what

is

'impartial humanitarian organization'."

war and from the
armed

but

to "organization"

not unique to

107-08.

the phrasing of the provision of the 1949

the validity of the conclusion reached

meant by

a result

may be

in progress.

its

policymakers and other members

may be from

the cause of the

of course, inevitably have individual prejudices with respect to any

However,

the organization

if

is

to

be able to maintain

its

aura of

even these individual preferences must be both suppressed and concealed because of the human

of ascribing "impartiality" to an organization whose policymakers and other members have publicly

expressed individual preferences and prejudices.
27.

During the hostilities

justification

Ministry of Defence,
the

its

that the

ICRC was a "capitalist spy organization." United Kingdom,

Treatment of British Prisoners of

POWs; Pawns

in

hostilities in

Power Politics,

War in Korea 33-34

Vietnam would seem

The Progressive, March

(1955).

The

actions of

to indicate a similar attitude. Falk,

1971,

Under

at 13, 16.

The

the circumstances,

USSR communicating to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
ICRC to undertake additional tasks relating to the protection of human rights in

unexpected, indeed, to find the

belief in the

armed
this

Korea the Chinese charged, with the support of the USSR, and totally without

North Vietnamese during the

American
it is

in

and solely for political reasons,

conflict

need for the

and omitting any suggestion for the use of "other impartial humanitarian organizations" for

purpose. Report of the Secretary-General, Respect for

Human

Rights in

Armed

Conflict,

UN Doc. A/8052,

Sept. 18, 1970, at 119, 120.

28.

During World

War

II,

the

Young Men's

Christian Association, the National Catholic Welfare

Conference, and other similar organizations, were permitted, in varying degrees, to supplement the
humanitarian

A

ICRC

work of the

on behalf of enemy

prisoners of war held in the

Brief History of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, World

these organizations might,

most

upon

investigation, qualify

without regard to their origin, nationality, or religion.

29.

When

own

under Article

II, at

9.

Of course,

United

States.

Rich

489-91 (mimeo., 1946).

While

(ed.),

Some of

their orientation was, for the

they normally offered humanitarian assistance to

part, primarily religious,

limited to those of their

War

all

enemy

prisoners of war,

religious supplies furnished

by them were

denomination.

the representative of the United States at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference supported the

proposed change in the

draft

character," he unquestionably

of Article 9 and referred to "welfare organizations of

had

in

mind

the operation of such organizations in their

a

non-international

own

country, based

upon the experience in the United States during World War II mentioned in the previous note.
30. There could certainly be little dispute that, during World War II, it would have been impossible
the American Red Cross, or the YMCA, or the National Catholic Welfare Conference,

for
all

American-established and based humanitarian organizations, to have obtained permission to function in

Germany or Japan, or

for the

German

or Japanese

Red

Cross to have obtained permission to function in the

1

Law

Levie on the

88

of

War

indubitably true of the American Red Cross, the Red Cross of the Republic of
Red Cross of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the hostilities in Vietnam.
No matter how humanitarian may have been H. Ross Perot's motives, his misguided activities on

United

States.

The same was

Vietnam, and the
31.

behalf of the American prisoners of war then held in North Vietnam could not have been considered

as falling

within any provision of the 1949 Convention.
32. The "institutional basis" and the "operational experience and tradition" need not necessarily have
been prisoner-of-war oriented, or even war-oriented.
33. Some official action previously taken by the international organization might have called in question
its

impartiality but

34.

would

would not

it

affect its "institutional" qualifications.

can be assumed that the People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

It

rely

on

provision in justification of their right to refuse to allow the

this

humanitarian functions within their

territories.

Whether they did indeed

ICRC

act

on

to perform

its

the basis of law

customary
is

another

question.
35.

See text in connection with notes 19-23, supra.

36.

Final Record, Vol. IIB,

37.

Pictet,

38.

Supra note 30. If Switzerland were

Commentary,

at 60.

109.

ICRC

the

a belligerent,

would undoubtedly

find itself refused

permission to function in the territory of that country's enemy, despite the century-old tradition of impartial

ICRC

humanitarianism which the
functions

39. This

Communist
to

have

enjoys.

which might be performed
is

why

the reservation

could, of course, continue to perform those humanitarian

made

to Article 10 of the

countries (including, subsequently, the
Levie, supra note 17,

a valid basis.

Power, and

It

in Switzerland.

for

some

reason, a

new

at

Protecting

DRV)

1949 Convention by the

and objected

to

385, n. 32. That

article

Power cannot be

designated, the Detaining

provides that

the services of a neutral state or of a humanitarian organization such as the

The Communist

the Protecting Power.

USSR

by the Western

reservation properly

necessary for the designation of such a substitute. (For a

more

ICRC

if

and the other

countries, appears

there

is

no Protecting

Power may

request

to perform the functions of

makes the consent of the Power of Origin

detailed discussion of the reservation to Article

10, see text at pp. 182-84.)
(1) and (4), Falk, at 477.
174—75 and note 9, supra,
42. Mrs. Cora Weiss, co-chairman with David Dellinger of

40.

"Observations" Nos.

41.

See text

at

pp.

this

Committee,

testified as follows

with

respect to this group:

The Committee of Liaison was

we

and purpose,

on January

established

of Women Strike for Peace, returned from

a trip to

stated that the purposes

between prisoners and

their families;

and

15, 1970, after three

of the committee were

(2) to

women

including myself,

North Vietnam. In our announcement of formation
(1) to facilitate

communication

on behalf of families regarding

inquire

the status of

their missing relatives.

1971 Hearings 230.
inception stated that

An
it

"Information Sheet" issued by the Committee of Liaison during the

had been established

"at the request

on to give assurances that the Committee of Liaison
North Vietnam." Ibid., 532.
goes

month of

its

of the North Vietnamese." The Information Sheet

"is

not in any sense representing the government of

Falk, 473-74.

43.

The significance of mentioning a time period instead of an exact date is discussed in note 86, infra.
45. The men released were Sgt. Edward R. Johnson, Sgt. Daniel L. Pitzer, and Sgt. James E. Jackson.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1967, at 2, c. 6. On three subsequent occasions the Viet Cong released a total of six
44.

additional

American servicemen

in the field, allowing

them

to return to U.S. military control without the

benefit of an escort.
46.

Black,
at

The men released were Maj. Norris M. Overly, USAF, captured in Sept. 1967; and Capt. Jon D.
USAF, and Lt. (j.g.) David P. Matheny, USN, both captured in Oct. 1967. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1968,

l,c. 8.

The men

47.

USAF,
Aug.

released

were Maj. James

F.

Low, USAF, captured in Dec. 1967; Capt. Joe V. Carpenter,
Thompson, USAF, captured in March 1968. N.Y. Times,

captured in Feb. 1968; and Maj. Fred N.

5,

1968,

at 15, c. 1.

The men

48.

released

were

Lt.

Robert

F.

Frishman,

Hegdahl, captured in April 1967; and Capt. Wesley L.

Aug.

5,

49.

USN,

1969,

USN,

captured in Oct. 1967; Seaman Douglas B.

Rumble USAF,

captured in April 1968. N.Y. Times,

at 1, c. 2.

Lt. (j.g.)

Markham

L. Gartley,

USN,

had been captured

had been captured in Dec. 1971; and Maj. Edward K.

in

Elias

Aug. 1968; Lt

USAF, had been

David Dellinger was once again one of the emissaries selected by the

(j.g.)

Morris A. Charles,

captured in April 1972.

DRV to receive the release of the three

Aspects of Repatriation
prisoners of war, but this time

but in his parallel capacity
50.

Only Frishman could be

certainly qualified as a

have had

said to

been prisoners of war
51.

for 16

for less than

Falk, 467, 471-72. Falk

Government by

had been

months. All of the other

one year

which might have warranted

a prisoner

men

(actually, for periods

a

his release

of war for more than four years,

prisoner of war for 28 months, Frishman

by the

released and repatriated

DRV had

of between 4 and 9 months).

seems to have been surprised that no answer was received from the U.S.

Committee of Liaison to

the

physical condition

a

who

"longtime" prisoner of war. Hegdahl had been

Rumble

22 months, and

89

was not in his capacity as a member of the "National Mobilization Committee,"
member of the Committee of Liaison. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, at 3, c.4.

it

as a

and repatriation on medical grounds. Gartley,

for

1

this

and other messages sent from Hanoi.

467.

Ibid.,

It is difficult

to believe that he really expected answers.

52.

While the cablegram does state that the conditions it contained were "[i]n accordance with the
North Vietnamese Government," Falk indicates clearly that its contents were

expressed expectations of the

developed by the "escort group"

as

an outgrowth of internal discussions which took place in Hanoi with

respect to the group's "responsibilities"

unconditional.
53.

to travel

anticipated

from

54.

Ibid.,

55.

The

by

civilian, rather

a press

officers

after

Airport. Ibid., 468.

World War

It

a

North Vietnamese

repatriated.

Each was put

had been well organized beforehand and which included preliminary

Hawaii or

in the military hospital nearest to his

All, emphasis added). Incredible

59. Ibid., 472.
for the benefit

as
is

home, complete medical examination

medical clearance was granted.

made

to "reported abuses in relation to prior treatment"

as it

may seem,
United

Here and elsewhere throughout

these

two quotations refer to

spite

of course, disregards the

followed them, evolved from

the treatment of repatriated

the article statements appear implying that anything
States

done

occurred solely because of public pressure

of strong governmental (or military

fact that

and the

neutral auspices"

States!

of repatriated prisoners of war in the United

by the escort group and in

II

Only

II.

the three officers to request a "furlough."

advanced that there should be "a preliminary medical examination, perhaps under

is

World War

after

and medical examination injapan, return to the United States when medically approved, further

prisoners of war in military hospitals in the

service) predilections to the contrary.

everything done for these men,

as

well

as

those

who

a refinement of the procedures for repatriated prisoners of

preceded and

war applied

after

and Korea.

Supra note 12.

61. Pictet,

Commentary,

62. If one of these

men had

539.
resigned from the military service and had then gone

support of U.S. participation in the hostilities in Vietnam, he clearly
the

Kennedy

Korea some 4,400 prisoners of war were released and

and treatment, and extended leave as soon
58. Falk, 471-72. Elsewhere reference

60.

arrival at

See note 52, supra.

hospitalization either in

This,

fact,

could have been motivated by the publicity

and disappeared from the military lexicon shortly

would have prompted

processing which

hospitalization

(ibid.,

aircraft,

the granting of 30-day "furloughs" one of the "expressed expectations of the

For example,

suggestion

were, in

use of the term "furlough" shows a practical ignorance of contemporary military vocabulary.

Was

a

DRV

by the

471.

Government"?
through

than military,

conference and reception planned for their

certain antiquarian interest

57.

that the releases

471.

was never applicable to
56.

and

of course, possible that the desire of the Committee of Liaison to retain "custody" of the three

It is,

men and

Ibid.,

(ibid., 466-67)

would not have

on

a

speaking tour in

violated Article 117 of

1949 Convention; but he would have violated the broader prohibition of the fourth "guideline."
63. Falk, 473-74.
64.

1971 Hearings 25.

65. Falk,

474 and

to the activities

n. 13. (In the cited note, the activities

of H. Ross Perot.)

474.

66.

Ibid.,

67.

Ibid.

68.

Ibid.,

475.

69.

Ibid.,

All.

70.
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71.
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72.
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74.
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75.
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Law
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War

76. See note 39 supra. The USSR reservation provides for "the consent of the Government of the country
of which the prisoners of war are nationals." 191 UNTS 367. Either wording refers, of course, to the Power

of Origin.

Record,

77.

Final

78.

Geneva Conventions for

84th Cong.,

1st Sess.,

Vol. IIB,

at

347.

the Protection of

on Executives D,

War

Victims,

E, F, and G,

Hearing before the Senate

82d Cong.,

1st Sess., at

Comm.

on Foreign Relations,

62 (1955).

79. Falk, 475.
80.

Ibid.

81.

Ibid., n. 17.

UST 3316, 3514; 213 UNTS 383.
Pilloud, Reservations to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 5 (1958).
84. A number of questions, basically along this same line, appear in the Falk article,
82. 6
83.

at 477 and 478. They
"North Vietnamese motivations are of no account." Ibid., 478.
85. When the Viet Cong made the first prisoner-of-war release, in Nov. 1967, Nguyen Van Hieu, the
VC representative in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where it took place was quoted as follows:
Mr. Hieu said that the soldiers were being released in cooperation with American opponents of the

are not

answered except by the statement

United

States

involvement

usefully to the

United

N.Y. Times, Nov.
subsequent
86.

Vietnam war in the expectation

that they

would be

able to contribute

peace movement.

13, 1967, at 2,

c. 6.

This revealing statement was not repeated on the occasion of the

releases.

Some

a great fanfare

for

in the

States

that

evidence of this can found in the

fact that

with each release of prisoners of war there would be

when the announcement of the proposed release was made, or when the escort group set off
when it arrived in Hanoi and then there would be an unexplained delay of a number of days

—

Hanoi, or

while the publicity, of course, continued. For example, in the second 1968 release the delay was "pretty close

weeks" (1971 Hearings 222) and in the 1972 release of which Falk gives us a blow-by-blow description
from Sept. 17 to 24 (Falk, 466). While it is true that a Gallup poll conducted in
Feb. 1970 revealed that a majority of Americans did not believe the glowing statements made by the members
of the escort groups upon their return to the United States, a surprising number of Americans apparently did
believe them
and even if the number had been much smaller, the propaganda value to the DRV far
outweighed the cost, which was negligible.
87. Actually, it is probable that no criteria were used. See note 50 supra. In the July- Aug. 1968 release the
three pilots released had been prisoners of war for only four to seven months. Note 47 supra. Concerning the
selection of these three individuals, one witness before the House Subcommittee testified:
When Thompson, Low and Carpenter were brought together at the time of their release, they tried
to three

the unexplained delay was

—

to figure out
that

why

they had been selected.

the obvious conclusion was

health, they

too, each

were not

debilitated or injured,

had been penned up

They determined,

as

many

others have since determined,

that none of them had been held very long,

all

were

in apparent

good

nor had they been subjected to extremes of brutality. And,

separately, in a solitary cell, barred

from learning all they might otherwise

have learned about the general condition of the prison camps or the general condition or treatment
of other prisoners.

As Major Thompson
take

good

says,

"We

were

care of their prisoners'."

1971 Hearings 387.

safe bets to release.

People would see and

say,

'Maybe they do

Weapons
Law and Responsibility

Any

of the

analysis

under the

1

I

of using lachrymatories, napalm, and herbicides

my

view, be confined to determining their

925 Geneva Protocol and customary international law. As

have urged elsewhere,
past.

legality

Warfare 153 (Peter D. Trooboffed., 1975)

should not, in

(defoliants)

status

in

of Warfare

we should concern ourselves with the future,

will, therefore,

I

not just the

attempt here not only to examine the existing law

regarding these weapons, but also to look ahead to what this country's policy

should be toward their use in armed

conflicts.

Lachrymatories

CS

3
,

the

modern-day lachrymatory or tear gas

and incapacitates by causing

a copious

,

a sensory irritant that harasses

is

flow of tears. While

it

may sometimes

cause irritation, and even blistering, of the skin and, occasionally, nausea and

vomiting, the symptoms will usually quickly disappear

when

the victim

is

A

removed from the contaminated
to

be "a temporary, reversible

It is

The

area.

disability

incapacity caused

with few,

if any,

by

tear gas

permanent

said

is

effects.""

used by most of the police forces of the world for domestic riot-control

purposes.

Its

great advantage over older tear gases,

and others currendy available

—

CN, is the speed with which it incapacitates about five seconds
exposure. CS is, of course, only a modern version of tear gas, which has

such

been

as

after

long

available in other forms.

Strangely enough,

it

may

the use of CS in hostilities in
uses of CS, in

be said that the United States introduced

Vietnam

for humanitarian reasons.

September 1965,

force

was holed up in

there

were

tunnel.

truthfully

also quite a

actually

a tunnel.

few

He decided to use CS

people, including seventeen

accomplished this purpose.

The United

civilian

One

of the

first

A Viet Cong

commander believed that
noncombatants, women, and children in the
States

and succeeded in flushing out about four hundred

armed Viet Cong, without

inflicting

any

injuries

"7

or causing any deaths.

A second use of CS that might be termed "humanitarian"

was in helicopter missions to remove the wounded from the
to rescue

downed

fliers.

field

of combat and

In these cases the surrounding area was saturated with

.

1

Law
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of

War

CS in order to hold down small-arms fire against the helicopter during the course
of its pickup mission.

However, CS proved so effective for these purposes that its use was quickly
extended to include numerous methods of delivery, both by air and on the
ground, and many types of combat operations. Among the combat uses in
Vietnam listed by various students of the matter are:
Defensive operations:

1

Defending perimeters

2.

Covering the removal of troops by helicopter (an extension

combat operations of the

wounded and
3.

on outposts and other fortified

(to repulse attacks

rescuing

original humanitarian purpose of

downed

fliers);

areas);

to defensive

removing the

and

ambush of convoys (the ambushing troops, who, being
unseen, were not good targets for small arms, were frustrated by the use of
CS covering wide areas on both sides of the road).

Responding

to the

Offensive operations:

enemy from tunnels, caves, bunkers, fortifications,
reduced the number of friendly casualties);

1.

Flushing the

2.

Covering the landing of troops by helicopter (an extension to offensive combat

3.

Contaminating an area and thus denying

considerably

etc.

(this

operations of the original humanitarian purpose);

particularly persistent, during dry spells

its

it

use to the

enemy

(while

can be stirred up by the

CS

is

not

movement

of a vehicle for some period of time); and
4.

Reconnoitering enemy troop positions (CS forced concealed troops to reveal
their position).

Thus we find CS not being employed for humanitarian purposes to reduce
the number of casualties, particularly of noncombatants. Instead, it was being
used in conjunction with small-arms and

artillery fire

and antipersonnel bombs. The individual driven from
tear gas thus

became

and with high-explosive
his place

the victim of the conventional weapon.

believes that developing these uses for tear gas, far

of safety by the

One commentator

from having

a

humanitarian

number of casualties among noncombatants. He
concludes that tear gas forced noncombatants from cover, exposing them to
weapons from which they would otherwise have been protected.
result, actually

Was
if

there

increased the

there anything illegal about the use of these
is

some norm of

combat procedures? Only

international law, either contractual or customary,

armed conflict. The questions that
then arise are: Do the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol include a ban
on the use of incapacitating gases, such as tear gas? And, if so, has this ban become

prohibiting the use of tear gas in international

Weapons
pan of customary
States that were not

international law, binding

a

On

parties to the

There

writers.

between

are those

who

on nations such

Protocol during the

both of these questions there

hostilities?

such

CS

as

among

believe that, because of the discrepancy in

the English and French versions of the Protocol,

tear eases

93

1

United

the

as

sharp difference of opinion

a

is

Warfare

of

12

are not included in the treatv ban.

the

wording

or for other reasons,

There

are others

who

are iust as certain that they are.

Even

if

one assumes

that tear gases are included within the prohibitions

the Protocol, that, of course, merely establishes a contractual ban.
necessarily

on

the

mean

United

was

that there

States,

a

norm of customary

then not yet

among

sharp a division of thought

a

There

whether there

as to

does not

It

international law binding

party to the Protocol.

the experts

of

is

a

is

just as

norm of

customary international law prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed

The

conflict.

positions taken in the writings

questions that, in
If the

1.

interpreting

and

as

my

both

itself

as

is

so indefinite that

banning the use of tear

not covering incapacitating gases such

many

articles

If there

2.

is

on
a

how

as tear gas,

armed

can

be said to

norm of customary

norm of customary

many

international law banning the use of

international

as tear gas, in

armed

conflict,

making the

reservations to the Protocol

applicable only with respect to other parties to the Protocol?

what

is

the

ratifications

Are the resenting

not saying that they are free from any ban on the use of any

states

it

conflict

the subject?

incapacitating gases, such
significance of the

have been written

gas in international

constitute the basis for, or represent the codification of, a

international law

raise three

view, remain unanswered.

Protocol
it

on the customary law

gas,

including

incapacitating gases, in hostilities with nonparties? If they are not saying that,

what

are thev saving; in the reservations":
^v%Tiat

3.

do writers such

is

Lauterpacht

on the use of

gas

binding upon "practically

all

that the prohibition
gases)

as

international law be binding only

on

16

and Stone

States"?

practically

How

of

a

and bv

rule

-18

as

CS?

there exists a well-founded fear that unless

all

what

can

a rule

of customary

are the practicalities that

to find that international law.

The answer

gases,

appears to be that

including the incapacitating

considered barred, nations will build up their production capabilities

and their reserves and these will not be limited
20

did,

they say

of custom, prohibits the use in international armed conflict

comparatively harmless gas such

gases, are

mean when

all states?

have motivated nations and international lawyers
treatv

'

(which would presumably include tear

Setting aside the unresolved legal problems,

bv

17

of course, occur."

included in the ban,

it

Furthermore,

will

be

it

difficult, if

between the lawful and the unlawful.

is

to incapacitating gases.

feared that if

not impossible,

21
If tear gases are

'

This

some gases are not
to draw a clear line

allowed because of their

1
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nonpermanent

Law

effect,

War

of

why

not, for example, a psychochemical that gives the

victim temporary hallucinations, or a gas that painlessly immobilizes the victim
for a

number of hours?

agent that

Finally, there exists the fear that

generally admitted to be only temporarily incapacitating, will

is

inevitably escalate into

more

We have seen that the use

extensive gas warfare.

of CS in Vietnam started out with
into a

any use of gas, even an

a

narrow humanitarian purpose and expanded

major operational combat weapon. While the escalation fortunately did

not go any farther, that possibility was always present.

On

am frankly unable to say that the
United States was bound during the Vietnam War by any rule of international
law prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed conflict. I am
the basis of the available materials,

I

convinced, however, that morally and politically the United States would be
well advised to adopt and follow a policy of self-denial. This country should

adopt

a policy

of no

for other gases.

humanitarian

23

first

use of tear gas just

While the

basis,

original use

combat

the varied

antihumanitarian in nature and

as it

CS

of

announced such

has
in

Vietnam may have had

uses subsequently adopted

result.

The United

were

some

a

actually

States has isolated itself

politically in this area. It has also created the possibility that the use

in

a policy

of tear gas

future conflict will gradually escalate into full-fledged gas warfare.

The

advantages derived from the use of tear gas in Vietnam, even assuming that such
use was completely in accordance with international law,
price that

had

to

were not worth the

be paid.

Napalm
Fire has, of course,

forces relied heavily

during World

been used

as a

weapon

since time

immemorial. Military

on flamethrowers during World War

War II.

Similarly,

I

and even more

so

magnesium and white-phosphorous fire bombs

were widely employed during World War II both in Europe and in the Far East.
Napalm was first developed and used during World War II. At no time
during either world war did a substantial or authoritative voice challenge the
legality

of using

fire as a

weapon

was used extensively for the

But these
receiving

protests
it

grew

first

came almost

and were unable

these protests

in international

in

armed

conflict.

When

time, in Korea, cries of outrage

exclusively

from the

to reciprocate in kind.

side

napalm

were heard.

whose troops were

During the Vietnam War

volume, and they had support from elements throughout

the world.

Napalm

is

ingredients that
gasoline

to

The word

a gelled gasoline.

were thought

produce the

gel.

itself

is

an acronym for the two

to constitute the thickener that
'

It

is

is

an extremely effective

added

to the

weapon and

now

undoubtedly the most valuable incendiary

Weapons

of Warfare

available.

Napalm

1
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greatly

is

more panic than other weapons.
For these reasons, the United Nations Group of Consultant Experts on
Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons stated that napalm should
and

feared,

be

classified

poisonous

Human

use causes far

its

with high-explosive weapons, rather than with asphyxiating or
Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on

gases.

Rights, adopted in Tehran

clause classifying

on 12

May

1968, contained a preambulary

napalm bombing with chemical warfare.

27

resolution was omitted from General Assembly Resolution
resulted

2444 (XXIII), which

from the Tehran conference.

In a report to the International Conference of the

is

a

weapon

Red Cross,

held in Istanbul

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted

in 1969, the International

napalm

This portion of the

that "can

be very

effective,

that

while remaining precise in

its

consequences"; and that "napalm and incendiary weapons in general are not
specifically prohibited

rule

falls

Some members of

of international law.'"

Group of Experts convened by the

the

air

by any

ICRC expressed the opinion that napalm

within the coverage of the 1925 Protocol because

it

can cause asphyxia by

...

deprivation. Others "considered such an assimilation difficult"

that

it is

has also

the use to

and concluded

which the weapon is put that determines its legality.

been condemned

as

29

Napalm

causing unnecessary suffering in violation of the

1907 Hague Regulations.
I

do not believe

that, at present, there

prohibits the use of napalm

upon

is

any rule of international law that
I

have argued

previously, a strong humanitarian basis for urging total prohibition.

However,

as a practical

ban

a

selected targets, but there

is,

as

matter, a meaningful agreement probably will not be reached to

weapon

as effective as

napalm has proved

itself to be.

As an

alternative,

I

concur in the proposal that the Secretary-General of the United Nations have

on napalm
weapons.
Such

prepared, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report
similar to the

one on chemical and bacteriological

(biological)

would examine whether it is necessary to limit or prohibit the use of
napalm in international armed conflict. If either of these types of action is agreed
upon, the report would serve as a basis for drafting an international convention
on napalm.
a report

Herbicides (Defoliants)

Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural chemicals that poison or desiccate the
leaves

of

plants, causing

herbicides cause leaf fall,
defoliants.

While the

first

them

either to lose their leaves or to die.

whether they

kill

the plant or not, they are

actual use of herbicides in

during the Vietnam War, they are

far

from

a

armed

conflict

new weapon.

When

known

as

was probably

In 1945 the United

.

1

Levle on the
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States

Law

War

of

had already developed herbicides

known

as

LN agents, which were stated

to be effective against plants, but not injurious to animals or

humans. Some

consideration was given to their use against the gardens that supplied food to
the Japanese military

on

Pacific islands that the Allied forces bypassed in their

But no such action was

advance toward Japan.

of course, had considerable use

As

in the case

as

actually taken. Herbicides have,

weed-control agents.

of CS, the passage of time brought about

the nature of the use of herbicides in Vietnam.

growths in order to open up to

defoliate jungle

a

major change

in

While the original use was to
view enemy infiltration routes,

number of other uses were soon found. Crop destruction subsequently assumed
some importance, although it never displaced defoliation as the primary use.
a

By 1 968

the extent of the use of herbicides was limited only by the availability

of supplies.

'

Some of

the uses to

which herbicides were put

in

Vietnam

included:

enemy

—
perimeters—

1

Defoliating

2.

Defoliating friendly base

3.

Defoliating lines of communication,

infiltration routes

to

open them

to view;

to prevent sneak attacks;

including river banks

—

to

prevent

ambushes;

enemy

4.

Defoliating

5.

Destroying crops

base areas

—

—

make

to

procurement and supply.

to

the

make his troops move; and
enemy divert his combat efforts

to

food
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among the experts on the
applicability of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to herbicides. Some believe that the
Protocol includes a ban on antiplant chemicals. They concede that the evidence
Once

again, there

to support this finding

the legislative history,

not

legal,

point

a clear line

consider

a sharp division

is

of opinion

comparatively weak.

is

which they heavily

that, as in the case

38

Their strongest argument

rely

upon.

of incapacitating

between what is prohibited and what is

all

It is

gases,

not.

customary international law against the use of herbicides.

of this conclusion

destruction

is

if defoliation

The

thesis.

first is

is

ever present.

40

The

has a valid military purpose and if crop

two arguments

validity

39

They are particularly

limited to crops destined for consumption by the military.

perhaps, appropriate to note

of this basic

a result, unless nations

1925 Geneva Protocol or in

in the

.

certain

impossible to draw

herbicides as banned, the possibility of escalation

Other writers find no prohibition

not

rather the practical,

it is

As

is

It is,

have been advanced in support

that

of each has been attacked.

that because herbicides are widely used domestically to control

weeds and other unwanted vegetation, the Protocol (and, presumably,
customary international law) cannot possibly have been intended to apply to
them.

*

This argument

domestic use

is

is

correctly

met with

irrelevant for these purposes.

the response that evidence of
*

There

is

nothing to prevent

Weapons
nations from banning the use as a

chemicals that

may be

On

nations.

weapon

armed

1

conflict

97
of

permitted within the boundaries of many of these same

the other hand,

the weakness of this particular argument

may

not be relied upon to support the

that herbicides are within the reach

of the Protocol or of customary

concerning domestic use of herbicides

view

in international

of Warfare

international law.

The second argument sometimes advanced
herbicides

is

that it could not have

because their military use was

no

unknown

in 1925. This

is

challenged

4S

A

similar reply

long ago with respect to Protocol coverage of nuclear weapons.
in accepting this
to support

it

view

in the context

in this context.

of nuclear weapons.

The acceptance of such an

virtually convert a treaty prohibiting the use

armed conflict into

a treaty

inapplicable,

it

being of

It is

was advanced
I

had difficulty

equally difficult

interpretation could

of certain gases in international

banning war. Salutary as this result might be, I scarcely

believe that a legal justification can be
is

as

within the objectives that the parties

by the Protocol.

to achieve

of

been intended to prohibit the use of herbicides

legal significance if the prohibition falls

were attempting

against Protocol coverage

found for it. And, of course,

cannot represent the codification of a

if the

Protocol

norm of customary

international law outlawing herbicides.

One
is

of the major practical arguments advanced against the use of herbicides

ecological in character.

The

experts stated that there had

ecological changes caused
that

report of the United Nations group of consultant

been no

by herbicide

scientific evaluation

spraying.

of the long-term

They were

twenty years will be needed to regenerate the mangrove

river

Another

banks in Vietnam.

the ecology of a region

chain of events."

on

One

'

a

scientist

massive scale

nature of the earth."

The United
substantially

we may

set in

forests

we

along the

intervene in

motion an

irreversible

nonscientist writer in the field coined the

"ecocide" in asserting that a recent

damage had been done

warns that "when

able to estimate

scientific study indicated that

to "future generations [in Southeast Asia]

word

permanent

and the very

49

States

heeded the admonitions of the environmentalists and

phased out

its

herbicide-spraying program in Vietnam.

When it did

so, it

sought acceptable substitutes that would accomplish the same missions.

Two

seemingly noncontroversial methods were adopted: plows that tore up the

vegetation along roads and
that,

by exploding

trails

to

reduce ambushes, and concussion bombs

horizontally, destroyed vegetation without cratering.

The

environmentalists, concerned only with their "thing," attacked the use of these

new

Perhaps they will soon

technologies.

make

the side effects of

war

so

unpopular that they will succeed where the statesman and the international
lawyer have long labored in vain
fought by denying

all

weapons

—they

will

make

it

impossible for wars to be

to their military forces.

am

I

Law
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1

War

of

inclined to conclude that international law does not prohibit the use of

herbicides so long as such use does not violate any of the general

norms of the

laws of war. This means that the destruction caused by herbicides must have a

and

valid military purpose
as

is

sprayed has to be identifiable

being grown for the use of the military. However,

of which are not

effects

complete upsetting of the
a

food crop that

that a

weapon may be

now
life

really predictable. It

is

cycle of a treated area. Ultimately, the use of such

destructive to

as

weapon the ultimate
one that may cause a

this is a

mankind

as a

nuclear or biological war.

appears not only that the United States was well advised to phase out

weapon, but

this

also that

it

It

use of

its

should cut off the supply to South Vietnam in order

With its ratification

to eliminate completely the use of herbicides in that country.

of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States has

by voluntarily renouncing the

first

now

taken the

first

use of herbicides, with certain

step

minor

exceptions.
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Addendum
At the time
a century,

had

that this article

finally ratified the

yet in force for this country.
to the use

was written

in 1970, the

1925 Geneva Gas

United

Protocol

States, after half

although

it

was not

However, many of the questions of law with respect

of the weapons referred to in the basic

article

continue to

exist.

Discussions of some of the developments in these matters will be found in the
articles

entided

"Nuclear,

"Prohibitions and Restrictions

Chemical,

on

the

and

Biological

Weapons"

Use of Conventional Weapons"

and
in the

present collection.
In 1976 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
(better

on

5

known as the ENMOD

Convention). This

October 1978. The United

States

is

Convention entered into force

a Party.

The Falklands Crisis and
the Laws of War
The Falklands War: Lessons for
International

One

Law 64

week

(Alberto

before

the

Strategy,

Diplomacy and

R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend

Argentine

surrender

at

Port

eds.,

1985)

Stanley,

the

well-respected British news journal, The Economist, published an article

captioned

"War Laws

—Made To Be Broken." After

provisions of the laws of war
field,

which the

discussing a

writer, obviously not an expert in the

thought had been violated during the course of the

up with

this

number of

hostilities,

he ended

alarming conclusion: "These, and no doubt other matters not yet

to appear, will

be the subject of anguished inquiry, once the fighting ends."

more widely observed in the
World War II. This essay will

Despite such contentions, the laws of war were
Falklands

crisis

than in any other conflict since

analyze several law-of-war problems that arose during the hostilities, and will
illustrate

the degree to

which both

norms of combat without any

belligerents succeeded in observing legal

significant military disadvantage.

Maritime Exclusion Zone

The Argentine
Britain

invasion of the Falkland Islands began

broke off diplomatic relations that same day; but

1982, five days

announcing

later,

that as

that Great Britain

from 12 April 1982

zone" 200 miles around the Falkland

and naval

auxiliaries thereafter

are liable to

it

took

a

it

first

April 1982. Great

was not

until 7 April

real retaliatory step,

was establishing a "maritime exclusion

Islands,

and

that

any Argentine warships

within that zone "will be treated

be attacked by British forces."

responded by establishing

its

on 2

On

as hostile

and

the following day Argentina

200-mile defense zone off its coast and around the

Falklands.

When

the British

announcement was made the impression was

given, and

it

was generally understood, that the British nuclear submarine Superb was on

The facts presented in this essay were drawn primarily from Christopher Dobson,
THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT (1982), and from press reports contained in such
publications as THE ECONOMIST, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, TIME, the NEW
*

YORK TIMES,

and others

for the period

of

1

April to

1

July 1982.
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station in that area

Law

Aires.

There were

War

was undoubtedly the major reason for the failure of
emerge from its base at Puerto Belgrano, south of Buenos

and

the Argentine fleet to

of

this

later

complaints that the press,

been intentionally misled when
in

Scotland.

However,

this

as

was discovered

it

was

a

well

as

the Argentines, had

was

that the Superb

base

at its

and successful piece of

perfectly valid

"disinformation" by the British.
Since the 1856 Declaration of Paris

has

it

been

a settled rule

of maritime

warfare that a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective; that

were not barred from the exclusion zone;
It

the

announced blockade. The
declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels

blockading belligerent must be able to enforce
British

is,

it

its

only applied to

enemy

naval vessels.

was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to the Argentine naval

forces.

A state

of armed conflict certainly existed between Argentina and Great

Britain and, hence, the

from some

limitations

any event,

if,

armed forces of each, including naval vessels, were, apart
not here applicable, subject to attack wherever found. In

by disinformation,

neutrals) that there

is

a belligerent

can convince the

an effective blockade in existence, then there

enemy
is

(and

an effective

blockade.

On

23 April the British informed the Argentine government that "any

approach on the part of Argentine warships, submarines, naval
military aircraft

which would amount

to a threat to interfere

auxiliaries or

with the mission

of British forces in the South Adantic would encounter the appropriate

At the same time

response."

merchant

stated that "all Argentine vessels, including

it

vessels or fishing vessels apparently

engaged in surveillance of or

intelligence gathering activities against British forces in the
also

be regarded as hostile."

South Adantic, would

Then on 30 April the British extended their maritime

exclusion zone to include "any ships and any aircraft" found therein. This was

now

a true

blockade

—

and, presumably, there were

now British

station in the area prepared to enforce the declaration.

one Argentine support
Falkland Islands.

A

ship,

the Formosa,

number of

managed

So

far as

submarines on
is

known, only

thereafter to reach the

military cargo aircraft

were

also successful in

reaching their destination before the British carriers arrived in the area.
interesting to note that

International dispatch
that the British air

On

2

May

sometime

after the hostilities

had ended

and

a loss

United Press

from Buenos Aires quoted an Argentine general
sea

blockade "was

of almost 400

lives.

as

saying

a success, a total success."

the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano,

submarine with

a

It is

The

was sunk by

a British

exact location of the Belgrano

at

the time of the attack has not been officially disclosed, but there have been

suggestions that

it

was about 35 miles outside the maritime exclusion zone.

Certainly, a cruiser of a belligerent has

enemy

attack because

it is

on the high

no

right to consider itself immune

seas

from

beyond the range of a proclaimed

The Falklands
maritime exclusion zone. Great Britain justified
the cruiser

was

its

a threat to its picket ships, frigates,
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action by pointing out that

and destroyers, and

that

it

had

previously advised the Argentine government of the establishment of a defensive

zone around units of the British

which the

fleet

Belgrano

had disregarded.

Sympathy for the Argentine loss, and the feeling that the British had somehow
been "unfair," were quickly dissipated when, two days later, on 4 May anExocet
missile fired by an Argentine plane hit and sank the British destroyer Sheffield
with

a loss

of about twenty

On 7 May the British
coast.

lives.

extended their war zone to 12 miles off the Argentine

This blockade was completely effective,

made

by the Argentine

so

fear

would be the victim of the British nuclear
submarines which were now, beyond any doubt, patrolling the waters off the
coast of Argentina outside the twelve-mile limit. However, on 1 5 May the
Soviet Ambassador in London advised the British government that the Soviet
Union considered the British blockade to be unlawful because it "arbitrarily
that if its fleet sortied

from

its

base

it

proclaimed(ed) vast expanses of the high seas closed to ships and craft of other
countries," citing the 1958
claim.

Of course,

a

Convention on the High Seas

Union might have questioned

the blockaded area as excessive, if the blockade

doubt

Paris, to

that

it

the basis for

blockade always denies the use of part of the high

other countries. While the Soviet

little

as

was),

it

was

was

its

seas to

the extent of

effective (and there

seems

blockade under the 1856 Declaration of

a valid

which Russia was one of the

original parties.

Fishing Vessels

Supreme Court held that by customary
international law fishing vessels were exempt from seizure by enemy naval forces
in time of war. In 1907 this rule was incorporated into the Hague Convention
In

1900 the United

No. XI.

States

Article 3 (1) of that

Convention

exclusively for fishing along the coast

2 of that same article goes
cease to be

we have

exempt

as

soon

on
as

.

.

.

are

says, in part, that "[vjessels

used

exempt from capture." Paragraph

to qualify that provision

by

stating that "[t]hey

they take any part whatsoever in

hostilities."

As

on 23 April 1982 the British government informed the
Argentine government that, among other things, "fishing vessels apparently
engaged in surveillance or intelligence gathering activities" would be regarded
as hostile. This statement was really unnecessary as it was merely another
already seen,

declaration of the British intention to apply existing law.

On

9

May

1982 the Argentine fishing

vessel

Narwal was attacked by British

damaged that she sank on the following day. At the
time of the attack she was about 60-70 miles within the British maritime
exclusion zone, shadowing British fleet units. According to one report: "She
was not armed but she was a spy ship with an Argentine Navy Lieutenant

forces

and was

so severely

Levie on the
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Commander on board
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War

sending back information about the

movements."" The Argentines have not denied
the Narwal had lost her

immunity and was

[British]

that allegation.

fleet's

That being

legally subject to the treatment

so,

which

she received.

Hospital Ships

Shordy

after

government

in the Falklands began, the British

hostilities

requisitioned the SS Uganda, a vessel previously used for education cruises for

schoolchildren, converting

it

into a hospital ship.

There were

route to the South Adantic the Uganda carried combat troops.
are true, this

was

a violation

of

articles

30

(2)

The

may be

carried

on

If such allegations

and 33 of the Second Geneva

Convention of 1949 on the treatment of sick and wounded
medical personnel

hospital ships,

sailors.

exclusively for proper purposes does not change the situation.
ship

is

claims of the

extra
be.

vessel

was used

When

a hospital

permanendy to be entided to the
During both World Wars there were numerous

used for improper purposes

immunity granted to such

While

combat troops may not

combat troops were debarked the

fact that after the

en

allegations that

ships.

it

ceases

misuse of hospital ships and rejection of their subsequent

entidement to immunity.

It

appears that such claims are inevitable and that,

all

too often, they will be justified.

The Economist

(5

June 1982,

p. 20) asserted that

Falkland Sound at night to pick up

by bringing the Uganda into

wounded and shipwrecked Argentine soldiers

"may have breached" the provision that hospital ships must "be
situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil
their safety." The reporter or editor who wrote that article was obviously not
very familiar with the laws of war. He cited the First Geneva Convention of
the British

1949, which

he quoted

is

concerned with land warfare, not sea warfare; and the provision

relates to the

not to hospital

mandatory
delay, take

that "
all

ships.
[

placement of medical establishments and units on land,
Article

a]fter

18

(1)

of the Second Convention makes

each engagement, Parties to the conflict

possible measures to search for

and

shall,

it

without

collect the shipwrecked,

wounded and sick." This is presumably what the Uganda was doing in the Sound,
and

it is

one of the humanitarian functions of every
Incendiary

hospital ship.

Weapons

Among the Argentine material captured by the British on the Falkland Islands
was

a large

supply of napalm, one of the most effective incendiary weapons in

military arsenals. This caused a great deal of critical

Actually, even under the provisions of Protocol

comment in the British press.

III

of the

Conventional Weapons Convention, incendiaries such

still

as

unratified

napalm

1980

are not

The Falklands
outlawed, only their

mode of use

is

restricted;

directed towards the protection of civilians,

and since those
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restrictions are

all

does not appear that they would

it

have been violated by Argentine use against British combat troops.
Protecting

Powers

Diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain were broken off

on 2 April 1982, immediately after the news of the Argentine landings on the
Falklands reached London. Shortly thereafter Great Britain requested the Swiss
government

to act as

Protecting

its

Common Article

pursuant to

Power

vis-a-vis Argentina,

presumably

8/8/8/9 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,

while the Argentine government requested Brazil to act in that capacity on
behalf.

Even though they performed no major
of extreme importance in view of the

this is

instance of the use of Protecting

innumerable international armed

There were,

conflicts

functions in the military area,

fact that it

since

to

was the

World War
either

first

II,

which have occurred

no Protecting Powers in

for example,

and there do not appear

Powers

its

clear-cut

despite the

in the interim.

Korea or Vietnam,

be any in the Iran-Iraq War.
Civilians

on the whole a physical rather than a legal problem.
However, there were a number of rules of the laws of war which came into
play. When resistance at Port Stanley ended on 2 April, Governor Rex Hunt
Civilians presented

(in full

his

ceremonial dress with a white-plumed Napoleon-style

family

were escorted

to

at

and

an Argentine Air Force plane and flown to

Montevideo, Uruguay. The British Antarctic Survey Team's
based

hat), his wife,

civilian scientists,

Grytviken, on South Georgia, were also repatriated by the Argentines

after a short delay.

LADE,

the airline

which had been operated by the Argentine

Air Force between Port Stanley and
Argentina, continued to

hundred British
the British

subjects

fly after

Commodoro

the Argentine takeover.

who were living on

government elected

Pdvadavia,

the islands

to avail themselves

South

in

While eighty

as civilian

to

one

employees of

of this method of departure

with their families, only twenty-one "Kelpers" so elected; and

when members

of the Anglo-Argentine community in Argentina proposed that a neutral ship

be sent to the islands to evacuate the 300 children to the mainland,
Falkland Islanders, not the Argentine government,
Article 35(1)

who

it

was the

rejected the proposal.

of the Fourth Geneva convention of 1949 authorizes the

departure of protected persons (civilians) from the territory of a party to the
conflict.

Islands

On
and

However,

if

the basis of the Argentine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland
their

we

dependencies,

adopt the

thesis

this

article

would have been

applicable.

of British sovereignty, then the departure of

Levie on the

208
those
that

who

Law

of
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the islands was an act of grace by Argentina since article 48 of

left

Convention, relating to occupied

territory,

only requires the Occupying

Power to permit the departure of protected persons who are not nationals of
the power whose territory is occupied
and all but thirty of the Falkland

—

Islanders

and other residents were British

Argentines.)

One

because he was considered to be

a

may adopt with

respect

internment. Deportation

Convention but
Article

42

(1)

it

thirty

were

subversive influence; several others were

Fox Bay. Article 41 (1) of the Fourth
only measures of control which the Occupying Power

apparently placed in a detention center
that the

(The other

William Luxton, was deported, probably

British subject,

Convention states

nationals.

to
is

at

protected persons are assigned residence and
specifically prohibited

may be assumed

that

by

article

Mr. Luxton preferred

of the Convention authorizes internment

if

it

49

(1)

of the

to internment.

the security of the

—

Occupying Power makes it necessary a decision which, of course, is a
subjective one made by that power. Accordingly, the action of the Argentines
in this respect was within the purview of and in accordance with the provisions
of the Convention.

There were estimated

when

to

be 17,000 British passport-holders in Argentina

commenced on

hostilities

2 April 1982.

The Argentine government

would guarantee the safety of these individuals. Nevertheless,
on 5 April the British government broadcast a radio message recommending
that they leave the country. How many did so is unknown but there is no
evidence that the Argentine government made any effort to prevent them from
exercising the right granted to them by article 35 of the Fourth Convention,

announced

that

it

mentioned above,

to leave the territory

Argentina claimed in

a television

of a party to the

conflict.

broadcast that the British were guilty of

bombing" of Port Stanley as a result of which two civilians were
killed and four were wounded. Inasmuch as more than 10,000 members of the
Argentine military forces were crowded into the area of that small town (normal
population: 1,050), with somewhere between 250 and 600 civilians who had
"indiscriminate

remained in
light.

their

homes, the

Certainly, the British

civilian casualties

appear to have been remarkably

bombardment and bombing of

the Argentine

personnel and positions in Port Stanley cannot be said to have violated any

Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, 1907 Hague
Convention No. IX on Naval Bombardment, or the as-yet inapplicable 1977
Protocol I. The residents of Port Stanley were British nationals and were the
persons on whose behalf the British forces had traveled 8,000 miles to fight and
there is no reason to believe that the British commanders did not exercise the
utmost caution on their behalf. Thus, when, on 13 June 1982, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed the creation of a "neutral zone"
provision of the 1907

for the protection

of the

civilians

still

in Port Stanley, the British immediately

The Falklands

The Argentines

agreed.
that

it

did so on the following day and the

had arranged for such

Article 13
'[p]risoners

(1)

undoubtedly individual

war,

first

War

at all

times be humanely treated." Although there were

cases in

which

provision was violated during the

this

Falkland Islands, on the whole the treatment of prisoners of

by the Argentines and later by the

than either World War

War of 1904-5

or Vietnam. In

this respect, as in others, the

war." Thus, although

article

I,

closely resembled the

World War II, Korea,

war was fought

as a

"gendemen's

118 of the Third Convention merely requires the

and repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay

active hostilities," the

after the cessation

Royal Marines captured on both the Falkland

on South Georgia were
also

more

British,

Russo-Japanese

release

announced

of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that

of war must

hostilities in the

ICRC
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repatriated almost immediately

Islands

of

and

by the Argentines. So

were two Royal Air Force technicians captured at the airfield at Port Stanley,

men who were

able

to

provide

the

with valuable intelligence

British

information.

When

the British began to take prisoners of war,

first

on South Georgia and

then on the Falkland Islands, they followed the pattern established by the
Argentines of promptly repatriating them. In

and so prompt

that

it

aroused the

ire

the practice was so regular

fact,

of the Royal Navy

when

of the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, captured by the British

was quickly returned to Argentina. As one report

at

the entire crew

South Georgia,

stated, "to give the

Argentines
A

back

a fully trained

We

have seen that

repatriation
hostilities."

seemed the height of folly."
118 of the Third Convention requires the

crew of submarine
article

specialists

of prisoners of war "without delay
Despite

this clear provision, India

after the cessation

of active

held Pakistani prisoners of war for

over two years after the complete cessation of active

hostilities,

from December

1971 to March-April 1974, allegedly because there was no guarantee that

would not break out again, but actually as political hostages in an effort

hostilities

to

by

compel Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh. Contrary to the procedure followed

which

India,

flagrantly violated the

Convention provision, Great Britain

began the repatriation of Argentina prisoners of war immediately
surrender of the Argentine forces

on

the Falklands.

At

first

after the final

the British sought to

obtain a statement from Argentina acknowledging the cessation of active
hostilities.

Even though such an acknowledgment was not forthcoming,

British quickly repatriated
officers,

over 10,000 prisoners of war, retaining about 550

including the Argentine

Menendez. Within

a

the

commander on

the

Falklands,

month, despite the Argentine government's

General
refusal to

Levie on the

21

admit to
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of

complete cessation of hostilities, the remaining prisoners of war were

returned by the British.

There were some instances
of the Third Convention

which

in

it

may have been

has

been suggested

When

violated.

Port Stanley surrendered they were required to He

under guard while they were being searched for

made of

that scene.

It

has

violated article 13(2) of the

been implied

on

that the provisions

the

Royal Marines

down,
weapons. Photographs were
the ground, face

that the taking of those

Convention which requires

photographs

that prisoners

protected against "insults and public curiosity." Inasmuch

as

and inasmuch

belligerents,

as

air,

it

is

and

moment of

One

13

article

(2)

with no complaints by the

impossible to recognize any particular

individual in the Falklands picture, there

photograph violated

full-faced,

of war be

hundreds of

photographs have been taken and published in every war of the
surrender, hands held high in the

is

at least a

reasonable doubt that the

of the Convention.

Argentine naval sub-officer was shot and killed while

a

prisoner of war,

The

while apparently attempting to sabotage the captured submarine Santa Fe.
British

the

at

immediately informed the Argentine government of the incident through

medium of the

Committee of the Red Cross and

International

Court of Inquiry, presumably pursuant

The Argentine government was

to article 121

instituted a

of the Third Convention.

advised of the result reached by that court,

which exonerated the British guard, and apparendy it was satisfied that justice
was done.
As in all modern armed conflicts, land mines were used in the Falklands in
great profusion; at the end of hostilities, their removal became a major problem.
Article 7

of Protocol

II

to the as yet unratified

Convention contains provisions
Apparently,
instances

as is

1980 Conventional Weapons

for the recording of the location of minefields.

not unusual in modern warfare,

by the Argentines, with the

this

was not done

result that the locating

in

many

and removal of the

numerous buried mines became a slow, painstaking, and dangerous procedure.
After World War II large numbers of captured German soldiers were retained
in France for the purpose of removing mines, and a substantial number were
killed or injured in the process.
specifically provides that

article

a result, article 52(1)

only prisoners of war

be employed on labor which
of that

As

is

who

of the Third Convention

volunteer for the task

of a dangerous nature, and the third paragraph

provides that the removal of "mines and similar devices"

considered dangerous.

It

has

been asserted

is

to be

that captured Argentine soldiers

were

"ordered" to clear minefields near Goose Green.
clear violation

may

If this

of the provisions of the Convention.

was

If they

so,

it

constituted a

were volunteers,

it

did not.
Article 117

of the Third Convention provides that "[n]o repatriated person

may be employed on

active military service."

While the meaning of this phrase

1

The Falklands
is

numerous

subject to

interpretations there can
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be no doubt that

precludes

it

the use of repatriated personnel in actual combat. There are charges that

some

Royal Marines, captured by the Argentines on South Georgia and repatriated
to Great Britain, were subsequently included in the British Task Force. If this
was

so,

it

One

was

a violation

of the provisions of the Convention.

interesting episode occurred with respect to prisoners of war.

Captain Alfredo Astiz, the

commander of

When

on South

the Argentine forces

Georgia, surrendered to the British forces on 22 April 1982, he and the

commander of the
that
it

Santa Fe, the Argentine submarine

morning, were entertained

was alleged

most

that Captain Astiz

at

which had been captured

dinner by the British

Subsequently,

officers.

was the infamous "Captain Death," one of the

of the government's interrogators during the suppression of the

sadistic

movement in Argentina some years before. Sweden wanted to question
him concerning eyewitness reports that he had shot a young Swedish girl. France
wanted to question him concerning the disappearance of two French nuns. This
raised an interesting question of law. The offenses were alleged to have occurred
guerrilla

in Argentina long before the beginning of the hostilities

between Argentina and

Great Britain. Assuming that they constituted violations of article 3 of the Fourth

Convention, dealing with non-international armed

Power

in a subsequent international

armed

conflict turn

over a prisoner of war

to a third state, a party to the Conventions, for possible trial

The

can a Detaining

conflicts,

and punishment?

answered that question in the negative, rejecting the Swedish and

British

French requests. Whether that decision was correct remains an open question.
After being taken to Great Britain,

described

as a

where he was subjected

to

what

has

been

"token" interrogation, Captain Astiz was repatriated.

Mercenaries

One

of the most

difficult

problems which confronted the Diplomatic

Conference drafting the 1977 Protocol
the use of mercenaries.

Under the

I

involved proposals seeking to eliminate

definition

now contained in article

instrument, one of the requirements for categorizing an individual
is

that

he

"is

motivated to take part in the

private gain and, in fact,

is

hostilities essentially

as a

47 of that

mercenary

by the

desire for

promised by or on behalf of a Party to the

conflict,

material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to

combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party."

The Gurkha Rifles have been part of the British Army for well over 100
years. They are recruited from an ethnic group which lives in what is now Nepal.
During World War II there were 100 battalions of Gurkhas in the British Army;
today there are five such battalions.
Pdfles

was being sent

that protest

When it became known that the 7th Gurkha

to the Falklands, Argentina protested to Nepal.

was based on the

allegation that the

Whether

Gurkhas were serving the

British

Levle on the
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mercenaries, or was

as

of

War

made merely because they were Nepalese

citizens,

is

not

known. The Gurkhas are certainly motivated by the desire for private gain. They
serve the required number of years, and then retire in Nepal as relatively
prosperous citizens. However, inasmuch as they receive a considerably smaller
pay than do British

soldiers,

come within

doubtful that they

it is

the definition

of mercenaries.

Neutrals and Neutrality
Prior to
all

World War

II,

during

hostilities there

well-established rules applicable to each status.
Italy

II,

a

dichotomy under which

world community were either belligerents or

states in the

World War

was

and Spain, and perhaps

At various times

that they

"non-belligerents." That term can be defined best by saying: "I

win, and

I

do everything

will

Anglo-Argentine
officially

I

with

in the course

announced

others,

neutrals,

hope

of

were

that

you

can to help you, except fight." During the

hostilities in the

Falkland Islands, the United States did not

use the term "non-belligerent," but that was undoubtedly

its status.

After Secretary Haig failed in his peacemaking efforts, the United States

announced

its

support of Great Britain which included a willingness to supply

any military aid short of direct involvement of American combat

forces.

On 29

which it declared
that "the United States cannot stand neutral." Five days later, on 4 May, the
United States House of Representatives adopted a similar resolution in which

April 1982 the United States Senate adopted a resolution in

it

expressed "full diplomatic support of Great Britain in

rule

of law." In the course of the war the United

with a secure method of communication with

its

its

efforts to

uphold the

States furnished the British

nuclear submarines in the

zone, weather information, aviation fuel, use of the airfield

on Ascension

war

Island,

ammunition and missiles, and KC-135 tanker planes. A request for AWACS
was refused because it would have involved American airmen in the hostilities.
Whether the United States acted in accordance with the rules of neutrality which
existed prior to

World War

There was speculation
Argentine junta,

it

be in

its

own

that, despite

was receiving

can be assumed that

if

the Soviet

interests,

ideological differences.

the very

II is, at

aid

least,

questionable.

the strong anticommunist stance of the

of various kinds from the Soviet Union.

Union considered

the granting of such aid to

would not have found it impossible to overlook the
The USSR abstained on, but did not veto, United

it

Nations Resolution 502, calling for Argentina to withdraw
Falkland Islands.

The

Soviets also

employed

Angola and Cuba for surveillance of the
the South Adantic. This, however,

and planes do
is

this

with respect to

no hard evidence

It

that the

all

USSR

surface vessels

British

Task Force

may have been
naval

its

forces

from the

and planes from

as it sailed

towards

routine since Soviet ships

movements of Western powers;

there

passed the information so obtained to the

The Falklands
Argentines. In

has

fact, it

been suggested, with

a

good
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had

deal of reason, that

Union been doing so the Narwal would never have been sent on the
spy mission in which it was engaged when it was sunk by the British.

the Soviet
suicidal

Laws

Implications for the
In

some important

continued

viability

underlying

it,

of

War

respects, the Falklands crisis offers

of the laws of war. Despite the intense

the conflict illustrates that states can

much hope

for the

nationalistic rivalries

wage conventional warfare

in compliance with the laws of

war without thereby giving

substantial military advantage. But,

on the other hand, one must be mindful of

the peculiar qualities of the Falklands

war

War

that

made

to exert their restraining influence. First, this

specific

For both

ends with limited means.

limited

—

The

parties

end was quite

destructive

The means,

easily recognizable objective.

military actions against the

enemy's homeland; had

conducted otherwise, the war would have been

weaken

the

too,

were

adversaries restricted their operations to the disputed territory,

from

refrained

war, fought for

a limited

control of a particular territory. This was not an abstract, hazy goal,

but rather a concrete,
limited.

possible for the laws of

it

was

adversaries a

much more

and

not been

it

violent and

and could have released the kind of political frenzy and hatred

that

the observance of the laws of war. Second, the adversaries, despite

obvious differences in political regimes, saw themselves
civilization,

as

and shared many cultural affinities and bonds

members of the same

—some

stretching over

why the war was in many respects a "gendemen's
conflict was brief. It is difficult to predict how well the laws of

centuries. This helps to explain

war." Third, the

war would have been observed had
the usual weariness and

mounting

this

been

frustration against the

question whether further conflicts that lack

have

a protracted struggle, filled

all

enemy.

It is

Falklands

War

an open

these special characteristics will

encouraging a record on the observance of the laws of war

as

with

as

did the

of 1982.
Notes

1.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677

2.

Christopher Dobson, The Falklands Conflict (London: Hodder

3.

The Uganda may have been confused with

a letter

dated 8 October 1982 Captain L.

(1900).

W.

the Canberra

L. Chelton,

& Stoughton,

(New York

Times, 28

1982), p. 104.

May

1982,

p.

A8:4). In

R.N., Chief Naval Judge Advocate of the Royal

Navy, advised the author that no British hospital ship carried combat troops to the South Atlantic; and

members of the
4.
5.

International

Committee of the Red

Cross, carried thereon, could verify

Dobson, The Falklands Conflict, pp. 156-7.
The British were legally entitled to use the Ascension

Airfield in

(13 UST

Ascension Island by United

1917,

TIAS 5148, 449

Kingdom

UNTS

177).

airfield

that

this.

under an agreement, "Use of Wideawake

Military Aircraft," signed

at

Washington, 29 August 1962

,
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1 International

Criminal

in

the

Law 233

Law

War

of

(M. Cherif Bassiouni

ed.,

1986)

There are two completely different aspects of the subject of criminality in
the law of

war

committed before capture (pre— capture
committed

are

offenses or

war

after capture (post— capture offenses).

are similar or identical, but
are certainly

some

—

war

insofar as prisoners of

Many

concerned
crimes);

offenses

and offenses

of the rules applicable

The two aspects of the problem
They will be so treated and in the

are different.

worthy of separate treatment.

order mentioned.

Pre—capture Offenses (War Crimes)
Historical

committed before capture we normally refer to violations of the
law of war committed against the nationals, civilian or military, or the property,
of the Capturing Power or of one of its allies. Despite a rather widespread
misunderstanding on the subject, there was nothing new about the war crimes
trials conducted after World War II except their numbers and the broad range

By

offenses

of the offenses charged.

One

author has given considerable publicity to a case

which occurred in 1474 in which an ad hoc international tribunal tried one Peter
von Hagenbach for various crimes committed while he was in command of
what might be termed a military occupation, although the war was yet to come.
Hagenbach pleaded that he had only obeyed the orders of his master, the Duke
of Burgundy. His defense was rejected, he was found guilty, and he was
executed.
After the termination of hostilities in the American Civil

War

(1861-1865),

which had most of the characteristics of an international war, the
Federal authorities conducted a number of trials of individuals for offenses
2
committed against Union prisoners of war during the course of the conflict.
During the pacification of the Philippines which followed the acquisition of
those islands by the United States as a result of the Spanish- American War (1 898)
a number of American officers were tried by American Army courts-martial for
violations of the law of war. (This is another area where there is a good deal
a conflict
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men were

of misunderstanding. While these

American Army's

tried for violations

War," the

of

specific

which
they were tried were also violations of the law of war and their trials would have
been denominated "war crimes trials" if they had been tried by an enemy, or
provisions of the

And at about this same

an international court.)

some of

tried

during the

its

"Articles of

own

offenses for

period the British

Army not only

personnel for violations of the law of war committed

Boer

the

in

hostilities

War

(1899-1902),

Vereeniging (1902) which ended that conflict

specifically

but the Treaty of

provided for British

who had allegedly committed acts

courts-martial for certain Boers

"contrary to

the usages of war."

After the end of World

Authors of the
Versailles

War

War

a

I

"Commission on

the Responsibility of the

and on the Enforcement of Penalties" created by the

Peace Conference recommended criminal prosecution for

"who have been

all

persons,

guilty

of offenses against the laws

and customs of war or the laws of humanity."

The Peace Conference

without distinction of rank,

implemented
Versailles

that

recommendation with

Articles

by which Germany recognized the

for violations

228-230 of the Treaty of

right of the Allies to

trial

by

a requesting Ally. Public

weak German government from complying with
agreement was reached for

The

results

to

trials

opinion prevented

those

of the twelve

a viable one.

the Federal Republic of

which were conducted were

trials

dropped the matter.

(The so-called "war crimes

Germany

itself since

the

trials"

end of World

Germans, where no nationalism

is

a

to the

conducted by

War

II

do not
trials

of

involved; and

when they were begun sufficient time had elapsed for a change of public
and

so

This episode

disprove that conclusion. For the most part they have involved the
for offenses against

and

provisions

convinced most students of the problem that the Versailles solution

problem was not

a

be conducted by the Supreme Court of

unsatisfactory to the former Allies that they

Germans

trials

of the laws and customs of war and promised to hand over the

individuals requested for

Leipzig.

conduct

attitude

cooling of wartime patriotism.)

Codification

All that has

been mentioned up

law of war. In

a

to this point

was in the realm of the customary

1906 Convention for the protection of the wounded and

there was a provision
insufficient, to seek

by which the

from

Parties agreed, if their laws

sick

were then

their legislatures

"the necessary measures to repress, in time of war, individual acts of robbery or
ill

treatment of the sick and

wounded of

the armies, as well as to punish,

as

usurpations of military insignia, the wrongful use of the flag and brassard of the

1
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Red

Cross by military persons or private individuals not protected by the present

convention."

This was, of course, a

punishment of certain

call

specific

for national legislation to provide for the

war

crimes. Little

provision; but the 1929 version of this
Parties agreed therein to seek

from

was done

to

implement

this

Convention went even further when the

their legislatures

"the necessary measures for the repression in time of war of any act contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention."

(For

some reason

there was

convention drafted

The

first real

no comparable provision

in the prisoner-of-war

the same time by the same Diplomatic Conference.)

at

international codification in this area, if such

it

can be

was the 1945 London Charter drafted and signed by France, Great

called,

Britain, the

which 19 other states subsequently
adhered.
It was, of course the basis for the Nuremberg Trial. A number of the
other war crimes trials in Germany which followed World War II were based
on an adaptation of the London Charter by the four Powers governing occupied
12
However, most of the several
Germany, issued either jointly or severally.
Soviet Union, and the United States, to
1

which followed World War II, both in Europe and
in the Pacific, were based on the customary law of war and were conducted by
courts established by individual states.
It was not until the drafting of the four
thousand war crimes

trials

1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims that
codification in this area of international law.
articles

to

all

we

Those Conventions contained two

which, with appropriate and understandable differences, were

The

of them.

Convention read

articles

find true

common

contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoners-of-War)

as follows:

Article 129

The High Contracting

Parties undertake to enact

any

legislation necessary to

provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be

committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave

breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before

own
own

courts.

It

may

legislation,

also, if

it

prefers,

case.

and in accordance with the provisions of its

hand such persons over

Party concerned, provided such

its

High Contracting
made out a prima facie

for trial to another

High Contracting Party

has
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Each High Contracting Parties
of

all

shall take

acts contrary to the provisions

of the present Convention other than the

grave breaches defined in the following

In
trial

all

measures necessary for the suppression

article.

circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper

and defense, which

shall

not be

less

favourable than those provided by Article

105 and those following of the present Convention.

Article 130

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article
any of the following

acts, if

committed

relates shall

be those involving

against persons or property protected

the Convention: wilful killing, torture or

by

inhuman treatment, including biological

experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,

compelling

a prisoner

of war to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully

depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular

trial

prescribed in this

Convention.
If you analyze the provisions

to these

a.

articles

you

will find that the Parties

Conventions have:

specifically established a

characterized

b.

of these two

as

number of substantive

penal offenses which they have

"grave breaches" of the Conventions;

agreed to universal jurisdiction (of Parties to the Conventions) over those

offenses;

c.

indicated that

by national

d.

trials

for "grave breaches"

of the Conventions will be conducted

courts;

agreed that they will either themselves try any accused found in their territory

or will extradite that accused to any other Party concerned
facie case (aut dedere aut punire);

e.

guaranteed

a fair trial for

who makes out a prima

and

any person accused of having committed such

a grave

breach.

The

procedural rules relating to the

trials

and punishment of prisoners of war

contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoner-of-War) Convention,

set forth in

some

would be equally
applicable with respect to pre-capture offenses. However, it is probably
appropriate to mention here that although Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention provides that prisoners of war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses
"retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention," a number
detail

below

in

the discussion of post-capture offenses,
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of states have made reservations to that
such individuals

as

article, insisting

upon

the right to treat

common criminals after they have been finally convicted and

while they serve their sentences.
In 1977 a Protocol

to the

I

elaborated considerably

1949 Geneva Conventions was signed which

on the provisions quoted above.

and 85 of this Protocol repeat many of the offenses
Conventions. They

add to the

also

list

17

Articles 11, 75(2),

listed in the

1949 Geneva

contained in the Conventions a

number

of offenses which cannot be considered as being established penal offenses;

more

they are offenses

include such matters

as

closely related to the

making the

civilian

conduct of war. These offenses

population the object of attack; or

the launching of an attack against an installation
forces,

such

as a

rather,

known

to contain dangerous

nuclear generating plant; or attacking an undefended locality;

or attacking an individual

who

is

hors de combat; etc.

Although the Diplomatic Conference which drafted this Protocol was unable
to reach

on

agree

agreement on the question of the defense of "superior orders,"

making

provisions

"if they

they did not take

to conclude

was committing or was going

in the circumstances at the time, that he
if

did

superiors responsible for the acts of a subordinate

knew, or had information which should have enabled them

such a breach and

it

all

feasible

to

commit

measures within their power to

prevent or repress the breach."
(Article 86(2))

It also

agreed on provisions making

that persons

under

it

the duty of a

commander who

is

aware

his control

"are going to cornrnit or have

committed

a breach

of the Conventions or of this

Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the

Conventions or

this

Protocol, and,

where appropriate,

to initiate disciplinary or

penal action against violators thereof." (Article 87(3)).

commander fail to comply with the foregoing provisions
18
he would be punishable under Article 86(2), above.

Presumably, should the

of Article 87(3),

Article 88 of the

matters;"
area,

1977 Protocol

and Article 89

where

politics

is

I is

entitled

"Mutual

entided "Co-operation." As

determine policy, these

assistance in criminal
is

not unusual in

articles express

this

pious statements

rather than positive rules:

"The High Contracting
assistance in

Parties shall afford

one another the

greatest

measure of

connection with criminal proceedings in respect of grave breaches;"

(Article 88(1)).
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circumstances permit, the High Contracting Parties

in the matter

co-operate

of extradition;" (Article 88(2)).

"... The provisions of the preceding paragraphs
obligations arising
multilateral

shall

shall not,

from the provisions of any other

nature which governs or

will

however,
of

treaty

affect the

a bilateral

or

govern the whole or part of the subject

of mutual assistance in criminal matters;" (Article 88(3)).

"... the High Contracting

Parties undertake to act,

joindy or individually, in

co-operation with the United Nations." (Article 89).

On the other hand, Article

75 of the 1977 Protocol

entitled

"Fundamental

whole gamut of protections

guarantees," does affirmatively set forth the
a

I,

to

which

person charged with an offense "related to the armed conflict" or "arising out

of the

hostilities"

reason for his

court

is

arrest.

respecting

be afforded. Thus, he

to

He

the

is

is

entided to be informed of the

be tried by "an impartial and regularly constituted

to

recognized

generally

principles

of regular judicial

procedure;" and those "generally recognized principles of regular judicial

procedure" are enumerated
a truly impartial

in time

court

of war can be

(if

at length. Suffice to say that if

they are applied by

any court trying enemy military or

such!),

no accused could complain

civilian

that

personnel

he had not had

a

fair trial.

Mercenaries

There

one aspect of the 1977 Protocol

is

I

which requires

special

mention. Article 47 of that document defines the term "mercenary" and
provides that

A mercenary shall
The

drafting of such a provision

of course,

a

and

its

inclusion in the 1977 Protocol

is

bothersome

is

that

entitled to proper

of Article 75 of the Protocol,

movements who
become,

fail

to

trial

19

mercenaries in Angola

of the

was

tried as

safeguards, to the

a privilege

comply with

an

illegal

combatant, he

"Fundamental guarantees"

accorded to the members of liberation

certain provisions of the Protocol

in effect, illegal combatants.

to the fairness

was,

attempts to provide in that article that

all

the individual alleged to be a mercenary

would be

I

matter within the discretion of the Diplomatic Conference.

However, what
if

not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.

Numerous

aspects of the

and thus

trial

of the

appear to warrant considerable pessimism with respect

trials

that these individuals will receive.
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Conclusion

Apart from

the

weakness

of the

provisions

calling

international

for

cooperation in the prosecution of pre-capture offenses, including the extradition

of persons charged with such

1977 Protocol
trials

I

establish a

1949 Geneva Conventions and the

offenses, the

number of substantive

offenses

and provide for the

of persons accused of having committed those offenses,

granting

them

which may

all

of the safeguards necessary to assure

arise in

alleged to have

the future with respect to the

committed war crimes

will not

trial

it is

the same time

a fair trial.

Any problems

and punishment of persons

be because of a lack of applicable

law, substantive or procedural, but because such law

of the improper manner in which

at

is

disregarded or because

applied.

Post-Capture Offenses
Introduction

There has never been any question but

that a Detaining

Power

has the right

enemy personnel in its hands for offenses committed during the period of
internment.
The problems which have arisen in this regard are usually
concerned with the actions of the Detaining Power in making penal offenses
out of acts committed by prisoners of war, when the same acts would not be
penal offenses if committed by its own personnel; in trying enemy personnel
before specially constituted "hanging" courts; in denying to enemy personnel
to try

the safeguards of trial accorded to

enemy personnel

own personnel; and in adjudging sentences

its

which could be adjudged
against its own personnel found guilty of committing the same acts.
When the matter of a convention on prisoners of war was under review after

against

in excess of the sentences

World War I, the Xth International Conference of the Red Cross recommended
that "An international code of disciplinary and penal sanctions applicable to
prisoners

of

war

recommendation
international

should

be

included

in

Convention."

this

suffered the not-unusual fate of attempts to

—

criminal law field

it

22

That

expand the

was not accepted by the subsequent

conferences on the subject. However, over the course of the years the offenses

committed during the period of detention

for

punished, and the procedures by which they

have become highly institutionalized and,

which

prisoners of war

may be punished for those
if there

is

may be

offenses,

compliance with the

provisions of the latest and currendy applicable set of rules in this regard, those

contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoner-of-War) Convention, there should be

no

valid cause for complaint either

by

his

Protecting Power, or by his

by the person convicted and punished, or

Power of Origin.
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Substantive Offenses

The Convention

has reached a very simple solution to the

which

specific substantive offenses for

may be

punished:

1949 Third Convention makes them subject

Article 82(1) of the

1.

prisoners of war

problem of the

to the

and orders in force in the armed forces of the

"laws, regulations

Detaining Power"

and authorizes the Detaining Power to take

appropriate action for violations of those laws, regulations and orders.

Article 82(2)

2.

of that Convention provides that

order of the Detaining

war punishable when

would not be

forces
is

By

to

this

same

that

act

act

committed by

committed by

punishable, the

law, regulation or

maximum

a

a prisoner

of

member of its own

allowable punishment

be disciplinary, not penal, in nature.

means the Convention

prisoner of war to the

has,

with respect to penal matters, equated the

member of the armed

moreover, accepted the

has,

Power makes an

if any

forces of the Detaining

fact that there will necessarily

Power.

be some special

It

rules

of conduct promulgated by the Detaining Power which will be uniquely
applicable to prisoners of

—but

war

it

has placed severe limitations

punishment which may be imposed for violations of those

on

the

special rules

of

conduct.

Procedural Rules

General:

a.

or civilian, that

A prisoner of war must be tried by the same court, either military
would

try a

member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power

for the particular offense charged (Article 84(1));
b.

"the

The

trial

essential

court must be one which affords the prisoner-of-war accused
guarantees

and

of independence

impartiality

as

generally

recognized" (Article 84(2));
c.

Double jeopardy

(non

bis in

idem)

is

specifically prohibited (Article 86);

The penalty assessed against a prisoner of war may not exceed that provided
in respect of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article

d.

for

87(1)).

Disciplinary sanctions:

a.

This

is

a type

of punishment for minor offenses

which may be imposed administratively by the camp commander or his delegate
(Article

96(2)).

punishment

There

in the

armed

is

probably an

forces

equivalent

of most nations;

type

of administrative
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b.

The accused must be

advised of the charge and must be given an

opportunity to defend himself (Article 96(4));

The allowable punishments are limited to a monetary fine, discontinuance
of any privileges normally allowed by the Detaining Power above those granted
c.

by the Convention, fatigue duties not exceeding two hours
maximum of 30 days confinement (Articles 89 and 90(2));
d. The punishment must not be inhuman, brutal or dangerous

and

daily,

a

to the health

(Article 89(3));

There

e.

awarded
It

f.

are a

number of provisions

norms

establishing

for

any confinement

97 and 98);
here that violations of the offenses unique to prisoners of war

as a disciplinary

is

mentioned above

will

punishment

(Articles 88,

be punished; for example, there are several provisions

with respect to attempted escapes which,

when

unsuccessful, are punishable

by

disciplinary sanctions only (Articles 91-94, inclusive).

Judicial proceedings:
tried

must have been such

The

a.

in the

offense for

which

a prisoner

of war

is

to

be

law of the Detaining Power or in international

time of its commission (no ex postfacto laws) (Article 99(1)). Logically,

law

at the

this

provision should have been in the general provisions, with the prohibition

against double jeopardy;
b.
as

Lists

soon

may

of the offenses punishable by the death sentence must be exchanged

as possible after

not be thereafter

the outbreak of hostilities and additions to those

made without

involved (Article 100); and

executed until
Protecting

six

Power

months

when

the agreement of the

a death sentence

after notice

is

adjudged,

it

belligerents

may

not be

of its imposition has been given to the

(Article 101);

Mental or physical coercion in order to extort

c.

two

lists

a confession

is

specifically

prohibited (Article 99(2));
d.

The

Protecting

Power must be

in advance (Article 104(1))

notified of an

and must, except in rare

be permitted to attend the

trial

(Article 105(5));

impending

trial

three

weeks

cases involving state security,

proof of the notification

is

jurisdictional (Article 104(4));

The accused

e.

in a language

choice, or

is

entided to particulars of the charge and other documents

which he understands;

to

be represented by counsel of his

own

one provided by the Protecting Power, or one provided by the

Detaining Power; to confer with counsel freely and privately; to confer with

and

to call witnesses; to

have

a full

have the services of an interpreter (Article 105); and to

opportunity to present

his defense (Article 99(3));

The punishment which may be imposed upon conviction is limited to that
which could be imposed upon a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power convicted of the same offense (Article 87(1));
f.

Law
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The accused

g.

of

War
same

entitled to the

is

rights

of appeal

as a

armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article 106);
h. There are a number of provisions establishing norms
adjudged by the court

(Articles

for

member of the

any confinement

88 and 108).

Conclusion

Committee of the Red Cross,
in the course of drafting the 1949 Third Convention the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference modernized the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention with respect to the trial and punishment of prisoners of war for
offenses committed while in that status. Although there has, fortunately, been
no occasion to test the application of these provisions on a wide scale they do
appear to ensure fair and just treatment for prisoners of war accused of
post-capture offenses. Once again, it may be stated that any problems which

Under

may

the able guidance of the International

arise

will not

be because of a lack of applicable law, substantive or

procedural, but because such law

manner

in

which

disregarded or because of the improper

is

applied.

it is
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a

breach of the law.

it

was

else

but

for in the present instance,

perfectly clear to the accused that killing defenceless people in the life-boats

could be nothing

."
.

.

The Llandovery Castle Case,

ibid.,

130-131.

for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies
Geneva, 6 July 1906, 222 Parry 144, The Laws of Armed Conflicts 233 (D. Schindler &J. Toman,
eds., 1981) (hereinafter Schindler/Toman).
10. Article 29(1), Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies
in the Field, Geneva, 27 July 1929, 118 U.N.T.S. 303; Schindler/Toman, 257.
9.

Article 28(1),

in the Field,

Convention

225

Criminality
Agreement

11.

for the Prosecution

and Punishment of the Major

War

Criminals of the European Axis,

82 United Nations Treaty Series 280; Levie, Documents, 276. Although the Court which heard the Tokyo
Trial was international in membership, it was created by a Special Proclamation of General MacArthur, acting

Supreme Commander

Schindler/Toman 823; Levie, Documents. 312.
20 December 1945, Trial of War Criminals before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals, 1, xvi (hereinafter T.W.C.); Levie, Documents, 304. For a typical implementing order, see
Ordinance No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany, U.S. Zone of Occupation, 18 October 1946,
as

the

Control Council

12.

T.W.C.,

I,

Reports of Trials of

War

10,

Documents, 364.

xxiii, Levie,

See generally the

13.

for the Allied Powers.

Law No.

volumes issued by the United Nations War Crimes Commission entitled Law

fifteen

Criminals (1947-1949).

Common Articles 49/50/129/146 and 50/51/130/147,

14.

1949 Conventions for the Protection of War

Victims, 75 U.N.T.S. 31/85/135/287; Schindler/Toman, 305-333-355-427.

There

15.

is,

however, disagreement

as to

whether Article 146(2)

when the two States involved have a general extradition
16. The North Vietnamese reservation stated:

only

"The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

is

itself an

extradition treaty or

is

effective

treaty.

declares that prisoners of war prosecuted for and convicted of

war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the principles laid

down by

the

Nuremberg

Court of Justice shall not benefit from the present Convention as specified in Article 85." (Emphasis
added.) (The original French translation furnished to the depositary by the North Vietnamese used the
words "poursuivis

et

condamnes"

—prosecuted and

convicted. 274 United Nations Treaty Series 340.)

Despite the foregoing, the North Vietnamese took the position that upon capture

war were immediately war

all

American

criminals and, therefore, not entitled to any of the benefits of the

prisoners of

1949 Third

(Prisoner-of-War) Convention, a denial which would, presumably, include the provisions thereof with respect
to

trial

safeguards.

17.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection

of Victims of International

Armed

Conflicts (Protocol

18. This represents a return to the doctrine

I),

Schindler/Toman, 551; Levie, Documents, 824.

of the responsibility of the commander expounded in In

re

294 and 319, which had appeared to be on its way to oblivion.
19. The Nigerian delegate, the main proponent of the provisions which became Article 47 of the 1977
Protocol I, stated that mercenaries would not be denied the protection of the fundamental guarantees of Article
Yamashita,

327 U.S.

1,

Levie, Documents,

75 and of the 1949 Geneva Conventions generally.

Official

Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the

Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian

Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, XV, 192

However, statements by the delegates of other supporters of the article, and their adamant refusal to
include any specific mention of Article 75 does not augur well in this regard. This was the obvious feeling of
(par. 16).

many of the

delegates. See,

20. See Note,

Case

W.

21.
Articles

e.g., id.,

191

(par. 14),

(par. 23),

194

(par. 25);

Trial of Mercenaries:

195

(par. 28); etc.

Death

to the

Dogs of War," 9

323 (1977).

Res. J. Int'l L.

Many

of the provisions with respect to

64-77

(civilian

(Civilians)

193

"The Laws of War and The Angolan

time period will likewise be found, mutatis mutandis, in

this

population in occupied territory) and 117-126 (civilian internees) of the 1949 Fourth

Convention.

22. International

Committee of the Red

Cross,

Commentary on

the

Geneva Convention Relative

to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War 407 (Pictet, ed., 1960).
23. Persons who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the 1949 Third or Fourth
Conventions would

fall

within the purview of the protective provisions of Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol

Criminality

in

The Law

of

I.

War

Addendum
After the end of

World War

II

in

1945 the victorious Allied Powers

established International Military Tribunals for the

and Japanese war criminals,
commissions for the

trials

violated the law of war.

as

well

as

of other persons

Hundreds of such

many

trials

of the major German

other tribunals and military

who were deemed
trials

guilty

of having

were conducted. (Probably the

Levie on the
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of

were those of Klaus Barbie, decided on 4 July 1987, and of
Paul Touvier, decided on 20 April 1994, both by French Cours d' Assises. In
October 1 997 proceedings were instituted in a Bordeaux court charging Maurice
of those

last

Papon, once

trials

a

member of post-war French

deaths of 1,090 French Jews during

Despite the

many

the

many

World War

international wars

violations of the

cabinets,

with responsiblity for the

II.)

which have taken place

of violations of the law of war which had occurred during those

My

States tried

Lai, in

at

the time these

were not considered

because the United States was trying

trials

should

make

a difference

is

A

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:

this area, see

its

own

The

Comparison with

xx hereof) and War Crimes

collection. In

conflicts.

to

United

War

in

the Past

the Persian

and a Look

a grave

Gulf in the present

to the penalty

Tide 18 of

to

inside

or outside the United States,

breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances
(b), shall

any term of years, or both, and

be fined under

if

this tide

or imprisoned for

death results to the victim,

shall also

life

be subject

CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a)
Armed

or

of death.

that the person

of the

at the

crimes

described in subsection

(b)

this

118—WAR CRIMES

OFFENSE. Whoever, whether

commits

Why

Statute of the International

War Crimes Act of 1996, an amendment
Code, which reads as follows:
Chapter

(a)

at

August 1996 the Congress enacted, and on 21 August 1996 the

States

§2401.

(The

be true war

personnel.

President approved, the
the

arising out

difficult to understand.)

For subsequent developments in

Future (page

trial

William Calley and others for violations of the law of war

Vietnam, but

crimes

and

law of war which have been committed during the

course of those conflicts, there has not been a single war crimes

United

since 1945

committing such breach or the victim of such breach

is

a

are

member

Forces of the United States or a national of the United States

(as

defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

(c)

DEFINITIONS. As

used in

this section,

Geneva Conventions' means conduct defined

the term 'grave breach of the

as a

grave breach in any of the

international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at

Geneva 12

August 1949 or any protocol to any such convention, to which the United
is

a party.

Under
case.

States

this statute

the Calley Case

would now be considered

to

be

a

war crimes

XII
Means and Methods
14 Syracuse Journal of International

of

Combat

Sea

at

Law and Commerce 121

(1988)

indeed that an individual whose only military experience has been
Itwithstrange
land forces and who has only once been aboard a warship (and that was
is

to

be present

strewn

at sea)

at a

ceremony where the

ashes of a deceased naval officer

were

should be asked to present a paper on the subject of "Means and

Methods of Combat at Sea" to this Round Table. In view of the fact that there
are a great number of naval experts present, I cannot even believe that it was
intended to be a case of the blind leading the blind! If this had been scheduled
to be the first paper delivered I would have assumed that the organizers of this
Round Table were motivated by the desire to lay a groundwork in this area at
the lowest possible technical level and then work up to the more esoteric
problems. However, in view of the sequence of the programming, that
explanation likewise seems to be ruled out. Fortunately
state

am

in a position to

without fear of challenge that because of limitations of time and space,

will only
at

I

sea

I

be able to specify the modern methods or means of conducting warfare

with respect to which there appear

be

to

legal problems,

without

attempting to offer any solutions to those problems.
It

will

be recalled that the Final Act of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference

included the statement of a wish that

its

successor conference prepare regulations

relative to the laws

and customs of naval warfare.

outbreak of World

War

I,

that conference

Hague Peace Conferences was brought
lacunae in the

Of course,

because of the

never took place and the

to an end.

Subsequent

series

efforts to

law of naval warfare through conventional means, such

as

fill

of

the

the 1909

Declaration of London, were, for one reason or another, unsuccessful, with the
result that, apart

from the much-disregarded 1936 London Proces-Verbal on

submarine warfare,
Declaration of Paris,
the

the law of naval warfare consists basically of the 1856
the several conventions

1949 Second Geneva Convention,

on the

and customary international law.

The 1977 Protocol

An
Article

subject adopted in 1907,

I

important preliminary question concerns the extent,

49 of the 1977 Protocol

applicable to warfare at sea.

It

I

if

makes the provisions of

any, to

which

that Protocol

unquestionably applies to naval bombardments of

Law

Levie on the
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of

War
Hague Convention IX Concerning
Time of War. Does it also apply generally

land targets, the subject of the 1907

Bombardment by Naval

Forces in

methods and means of conducting warfare

to other

Dr. Elmar Rauch,

asserts

at sea?

with considerable vigor that

this

One commentator,
protocol "regulates

the conduct of hostilities and the pertinent treaty provisions apply to any land,

or sea warfare." Another commentator, Professor

air,

categorical in asserting that "[t]his goes to

show once

Frits

Kalshoven,

is

equally

again that the Diplomatic

Conference, carefully avoided taking up, in particular, the matter of naval
warfare proper."

When

Rauch presented his thesis to a Committee of the International
Military Law and the Law of War at Garmisch in September 1985,

Dr.

Society for
it

generated considerable controversy. At the risk of oversimplification,

quote the two paragraphs of the

and

a

then

very small part of the relevant
let

you draw your own

The

of the Protocol relied upon by Dr. Rauch

activities at the

Diplomatic Conference and

scope of application

provisions of this Section apply to any land,

air

or sea warfare which

affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects

further apply to

all

attacks

but do not otherwise

4.

The

sea or

from the

air against

may

on land. They

objectives

on land

of international law applicable in armed

air.

of

provisions

from the

affect the rules

conflict at sea or in the

shall

conclusions:

49 -Definition of attacks and

Article

3.

article

I

this

Section are

additional

to

the

rules

concerning

humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly in Part
II

thereof,

and in other international agreements binding upon the High

Contracting Parties,

well

as

as to

other rules of international law relating to the

protection of civilians and civilian objects
effects

When

on

land, at sea or in the air against the

of hostilities.

Article 49, then draft Article 44,

was being discussed

in the

Working

Group of Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference, the words "on land"
at the end of what is now the first sentence of paragraph 3 were the subject of
considerable debate.
in the report

of the

The following statement with
Working Group:

Discussions in the

would be both

difficult

we should be

this article.

The

is

contained

Working Group showed almost complete agreement
and undesirable in the time

revise the laws applicable to
clear that

respect thereto

armed

conflict at sea

careful not to revise that

solution was found

available to try to

and in the

air.

that

it

review and

Moreover,

it

was

body of law inadvertendy through

by combining the

ICRC text with a sentence

Combat
which

stated clearly that, except for attacks against objectives

applicable to

armed

conflict at sea or in the air

Several delegates wish

They object to
as a

it

is

first

land, the

229
law

unaffected.

recorded that they remain

the phrase 'on land' in the

on

Sea

at

dissatisfied

with

this draft.

sentence and to the second sentence

whole. These delegates would prefer to have

this section

of the Protocol

affect

the law applicable to the conduct of warfare at sea or in the air to the extent that
provisions of this Section

would be more

favorable to civilians than the existing

law.

The

additional sentence referred to

Paragraph 3 (then paragraph

1).

of course, the second sentence in

is,

At the meeting of Committee

III

which took

place immediately after the submission of that report, the following occurred:

The term

'on land' was adopted by 56 votes to one, with 7 abstentions.

of the second sentence beginning with 'but do not'
in the

air'

.

.

.

The

part

and ending with ...

'or

was adopted by 56 votes to one, with nine abstentions.

Paragraph

1

ofArticle 44 was adopted by 60 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The Report of Committee III, Second Session, adopted the wording of the
12
report of the Working Group almost verbatim
and the Plenary Meeting
adopted the

article

without discussion.

I

now

ask you: did the Diplomatic

Conference make the provisions of the 1977 Protocol

I

generally applicable to

warfare at sea?

Blockade
For centuries

enemy,

a naval

blockade for the purpose of cutting off supplies to the

like a land siege, has

been an accepted method of conducting naval

warfare and the supplies so cut off have frequently included foodstuffs. This has

been true whether foodstuffs have been considered
conditional contraband, or not contraband.

London

15

(which

itself stated that it

The

to

be absolute contraband,

unratified

1909 Declaration of

corresponded with generally recognized

principles of international law) listed foodstuffs as conditional contraband.

imposition of the "long distance" blockade by the United

World War I was intended to bring Germany to
population and
million
II,

the

it is

its

When,

Kingdom during

knees by starving the civilian

alleged to have caused the deaths

German noncombatants.

The

during the

by malnutrition of half a
last

year of World

War

United States instituted a blockade ofJapan primarily by mining the waters

around that country,
Starvation."

it

actually

called

the

mining program "Operation

Levie on the
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of

Assembly on the Question of

Article 3 of the Resolution of the General

Defining Aggression includes in

of

its list

"regardless of a declaration of war":

acts qualifying as acts

of aggression,

The blockade of the

ports or coasts

18
"(c)

of a State by the armed forces of another State."

One well-known commentator on
The

the subject has stated:

'blockade of the ports or coasts' of another State was another listed

what

indicator of aggression, but

precisely constituted a 'blockade

.

.

.

was

deliberately left vague.'

Does

this

provision of the resolution purport to constitute an attempt to

eliminate the blockade completely,

Does

this

mean

that

even

method of conducting warfare

as a

after there

is

no question but

at sea?

that hostilities

have

erupted between two or more nations and after the Security Council has been

unable to obtain a cease

fire,

they are in contact and are

and the two

sides are attacking

each other wherever

bombing each other wherever

targets are available,

the imposition of a blockade

by one of the

participants in the dispute

would be

an act of aggression? Did the Committee which drafted the definition of

among

aggression consider that,

change in the law of warfare

other things,

it

was recommending

Or was

at sea?

the banning of blockades a

prohibition on the use of this type of force to bring pressure to bear

during peacetime, such

as that

a material

used by Germany, Great Britain, and

on

a nation

Italy against

Venezuela in 1902?
Article 54(1) of the

1977 Protocol
•

method of warfare
no longer prevent
the

is

prohibited."

foodstuffs

Committee charged with

"The

fact that the

made

22

21
I

states:

Does

as a

mean that naval blockades may
enemy ports? The 1975 Report of

this

from reaching
this

"Starvation of civilians

matter by the Diplomatic Conference stated:

paragraph [Article 54(1)] does not change the law of naval

by Article 44, paragraph 1 [Article 49(3)]."
The Australian delegation was even more specific in its explanation of

blockade

vote.

is

23

clear

its

It said:

The

Australian delegation wishes to place

on record

its

view

that Article

Article 54] does not prevent military operations intended to control

48 [now

and regulate

the production and distribution of foodstuffs to the civilian population, and that
it

does not affect existing legal rule concerning the right of military forces to

requisition foodstuffs.

Moreover, in the view of my delegation, nothing in Article

48 direcdy or indirecdy

Dr.

Rauch

affects existing rules

concerning naval blockade.

disagrees with the foregoing interpretations of Article 54(1) of the

1977 Protocol

I,

taking the position that under that provision of the Protocol

Combat
there

is

an absolute prohibition of a naval blockade of foodstuffs.

to be seen

how

belligerents will interpret

Sea

at
25

231

remains

It

it.

Mine Warfare

is

The only conventional law with respect to the subject of mine warfare at sea
the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic
Inasmuch

Submarine Contact Mines.

"automatic contact mines," there
to the

modern

is

as that

a dispute

Convention repeatedly

on

the question of its applicability

which do
explode. Some commentators

"influence mines" (magnetic, pressure, acoustic,

not require contact with the target in order to

Convention

believe that the
27

is

etc.),

equally applicable to the various influence

Others believe that the wording of the Convention is so

mines.

-28

•

•

mines other than those specified are not subject to

O'Connell has taken the position

refers to

its

that while influence

restrictive that

provisions.

mines are not

Professor

specifically

covered by the Convention, the practice of belligerents has been such

as to

bring

Influence mines are frequendy bottom or ground
them within its purview.
mines, which He on the seabed unmoored. If the Convention is applicable to
them, the question which arises is whether, under Article 1(1) of the

Convention, they must disarm themselves one hour
planted

—

a

after

requirement which would make them practically

the validity of the dispute, this appears to be
respect to the conduct of warfare at sea

During the

drafting of the

they have been

useless. In

view of

one area where new laws with

might prove

useful.

1907 Hague Convention No. VIII the Netherlands

sought to have included therein a provision which would have prohibited the
laying of mines barring passage through a

proposal was rejected and

Commission report
relating to straits
straits

all

that

strait

was done in

a statement that there

on

this

this practice

would be

seas.

This

regard was to include in the

was no intention to change the law

without stating what that law was.

were mined, and with such success

restriction

connecting two open

that

it is

During both World Wars
deemed unlikely that any

acceptable to most nations

now

or in the

foreseeable future.

One

comparatively recent development in naval weapons systems

"torpedo mine."
inserted into a

It is

mine

32
casing.

It is

deployed

like

an ordinary mine in deep water

by enemy submarines.

and

while surface ships will pass over

submarine

triggering the torpedo.

been made

the

an anti-submarine weapons system consisting of a torpedo

in the vicinity of routes traveled
classify

is

targets

At the present time

it is

It

has the ability to detect

moored but

it

without

suggestions have

bottom or ground mine, buried in the seabed for
concealment purposes, and not moored. Two legal problems would then arise
with respect to this weapon: first, it might be argued that under the provisions
that

it

be used

as a

of Article 1(1) of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII such

a

weapon should

Levie on the
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disarm

itself

Law

one hour

unarmed and

of

after

War
being deployed.

armed, and sent on

of a target

—

way when

it

it is

actually

receives the signal of the approach

The second problem

submarine.

a

its

the other hand,

on the seabed; the torpedo only becomes

inactive while lying

activated,

On

is

under Article

that

1(3)

of the

mark must become harmless. When
released, the encapsulated torpedo would be no different from any other
torpedo. Presumably the fact that it would sink to the bottom of the sea at the
end of an unsuccessful run would meet the Convention's requirement although
it is probable that all torpedoes can be and are programmed to disarm themselves
Convention

torpedo which misses

a

when they miss their target.
One final aspect of mine warfare

its

worthy of mention. In 1972 the Seabed

is

Arms Control Treaty

came into effect. This Treaty prohibits emplacing or
emplanting any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone. The same
any

restriction exists as to

The

coastal State,

facilities

whether belligerent or

neutral,

may emplace

or emplant any

type of mine, conventional or nuclear, within

its

presumably, to notification, and, in appropriate

cases, to the right

passage.

Other States

weapons.

for storing, testing, or using such

are limited to the

twelve-mile zone, subject,

of innocent

employing or emplanting of conventional

mines beyond the twelve-mile zone.

A

conventional mines within the

waters of its

territorial

belligerent

may, of course,

enemy provided

not the "sole object" of such mines to intercept commercial

that

May

vessels.

it

lay
it is

lay

nuclear mines in those waters subject only to that same limitation?

The Natural Environment
There

is

one aspect of the conduct of war

been paid and which could prove catastrophic for
of such warfare on the natural environment.

which
mankind

at sea to

little

—

attention has

that

is,

the effect

What will happen to the live natural

resources of the sea if supertankers carrying hundreds of thousands of tons of

Or if off-shore pumping facilities are attacked
and left discharging their product into the sea? What will happen to those natural
crude

oil are

torpedoed and sunk?

resources and to
are destroyed

by

mankind

itself if nuclear

shells, missiles,

submarines and other nuclear warships

mines, or torpedoes?

submarine, carrying weapons with nuclear warheads

is

Or if a warship,

While there
from these two

so destroyed?

harm arising
be instances where they cannot

are "fail-safe" devices intended to protect against
latter eventualities,

not only will there

but events have demonstrated the undependability of such devices.
solution for this

regard

problem nor, unfortunately, can

which would be

of the 1977 Protocol
appear that

its

I

Articles

generally acceptable to

are

deemed

to

surface or

I

I

operate,

have no

envision any rules in this

states.

Even

be applicable to warfare

if the provisions
at sea,

it

does not

35 and 55 thereof will solve the problem. For example,

no torpedo mine

is

programmed

And

conventional submarines.
belligerent during wartime,
in

rules

its

of engagement

in such a

way

as

Combat

at

to limit

its

with the desperate need for

no nation can

233

attacks to

of every

oil

be expected to provide

realistically

35

on

a prohibition against attacks

Sea

tankers.

Missiles

The development and

use of missiles with conventional warheads, such as

Exocet, should not create any major legal problems. As in land warfare, they are

nothing more than modern

Of course,
to

if missiles

from the

Bombardment by Naval
However,

even

when they are

used over the horizon.

used against land targets their use

sea are

is

subject

of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IX Concerning

provisions

the

artillery,

if they are

Time of War

Forces in

used against targets

at sea

and the 1977 Protocol

1.

they are subject to no prohibitions

One commentator,

or restrictions not imposed on the use of a warship's guns.

writing in 1972, questioned whether naval surface-to-surface missiles were
"sufficiently discriminating to ensure that the distinction

between military targets

on

on the

and

the one hand,
38

However, while

maintained."

and neutral

civilian

a missile, like

targets

any other

innocent victim and thus create an international incident,
to affect the legal status of missiles as a

other,

projectile,
this

can be

may

hit

an

would not appear

means of conducting warfare

at sea.

Exclusion Zones

Naval warfare may take place anywhere
territorial seas

high

seas.

or internal waters of neutral

The

right

of neutral

and

vessels

during wartime, cannot be denied

—

that ships

states.

may

This, of course, includes the

aircraft to use the

has

had many names

is

probably

One commentator, Commander
An

to an

armed

ships

and

is

One

now best known as an

such limitation

"exclusion zone."

an area of water and superadjacent

and

air

to

space in

which

it

which

a party

denies access to

without permission.

Exclusion zones, under various names, were notified in both

(IMT)

at

World Wars,

World War II the International
Nuremberg found German Admiral Doenitz guilty

frequendy under the guise of
Military Tribunal

even

barred area, war zone or

as a military area,

conflict purports to exercise control
39

aircraft

seas,

Fenrick, has defined this term as follows:

exclusion zone, also referred to

operational zone,

high

but, legally or illegally, certain limitations

have frequendy been placed on that right by belligerents.

which

except in the

sail

reprisals.

After

of a violation of the 1936 London Proces- Verbal (Protocol

I)

holding:

Levle on the
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War

order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning

when

within these

[operational] zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation

the protocol.

It

will

be noted that the Tribunal referred only to the sinking without warning

of neutral

ships

the

The

within these zones.

enemy merchant

War

of

41

vessels

is

left

of such an order directed solely

effect

at

During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas

unstated.

of exclusion zones proliferated with the British

establishment

A

announcing four and the Argentines announcing
such zone announced by the British was
April 1982, effective 30 April 1982.

The

its

Total

*X

The most extensive
Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of 28
three.

core of that announcement was to the

effect that:

Any

ship

and any

aircraft,

whether military or

civilian,

which

is

found within the

zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in London
as

operating in support of the

illegal

occupation [of the Falkland

therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked

So
action

far as

is

known,

the Soviet

Union was

—perhaps out of pique because

will

be regarded

Islands]

and

will

by British forces.

the only neutral to protest this

a British

spokesman had made reference

to "Soviet spy ships trailing the British forces inside the

Zone."

Exclusion zones of a sort have been announced by both Iran and Iraq in their

long-running war.

5

That complicated

situation,

with both

sides in violation

international law at least as frequently as they are in compliance with

not used either

as a

precedent or

as

In his study of exclusion zones

it, is

of

better

an indication of the practice of states.

Commander

Fenrick makes the following

proposal:

It is

suggested that

if belligerents

use exclusion zones they should publicly declare

the existence, location and duration of the zones,

what

is

excluded from the zone,

and the sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without
permission, and also provide

enough

comes

lead time before the zone

into effect

to allow ships to clear the area.

Doesn't that sound very
I

much

like a

blockade?

pose the following questions: Are exclusion zones

conducting warfare

at sea? If not, are there

method of
factors which

a legal

any possible limiting

could make them legal?

Submarine Warfare
Part
to the

IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty

method of conducting submarine

48

contains

warfare:

first,

two

rules

with respect

they must conform to the

Combat
rules applicable to surface vessels: and, second,

specified cases, they are prohibited

from sinking

at

Sea

235

except in certain limited and
a

merchant

vessel

without

having placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety

first

—which

does not include the ship's boats unless in proximity to land or another vessel.

There were eleven

parties to these provisions, including France, Italy, Japan, the

United Kingdom, and the United
1936 Proces- Verbal

Germany and

War

'

to

the Soviet

States.

which

The

provisions

thirty-seven

were repeated

additional

Union, had acceded prior

in the

including

States,

to the outbreak

of World

II.

As we have already
while in

that,

seen, the International Military Tribunal

command

(IMT) found

of the German submarine force during World

War

II,

Admiral Doenitz had issued orders which violated the provisions of the 1936
Proces- Verbal. However, the Tribunal did not

assess

punishment for this offense

because of evidence that both the British and the United States navies had

followed substantially similar procedures. In other words, three of the major
naval

Powers of the time had completely disregarded the provisions of the law

of naval warfare restricting the methods of conducting submarine warfare. The
Tribunal apparently considered

that,

despite this,

the

1936 Proces-Verbal

continued to be binding international law of naval warfare.

Can

really

it

be

believed that in any future conflict involving naval powers, submarine warfare

be conducted in a manner other than

will

it

was

in

World War

II?

Can

it

be

on the conduct of submarine
warfare in a new treaty, or the drafting of new restrictive provisions on this
method of conducting naval warfare, would be other than a useless gesture?
believed that the reiteration of the provisions

Conclusions

The methods and means of conducting warfare at sea that have been developed
since the end of World War II are unquestionably numerous. For some, no new
conventional law

is

necessary.

For a few,

it

would probably be

helpful to have

new

conventional law to replace the customary law which has evolved or the complete
lack of law governing their use.
viable solution appears to

good could

than

result

For

still

others, the likelihood

be completely unattainable.

from the

drafting

by the

It is

of agreement on

believed that

large majority

a

more harm

of non-maritime

powers, and the attempted imposition on the maritime powers, of prohibitions and
restrictions

on methods and means of conducting warfare

powers would refuse

at sea

which

the latter

to accept.
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XIII
The Status

of Belligerent Personnel

"Splashed" and Rescued by a Neutral
in

the Persian Gulf Area
*

31

When

Virginia Journal of International

a neutral

country such

as

Law 611

(1991)

the United States has a rather sizeable

naval force in a confined area for the protection of vessels flying

its

components of that force will, at times, find themselves
in armed confrontation with ships and military aircraft of belligerents in that
area. In the Iran-Iraq war, ships and military aircraft frequendy attacked the
flag, it is

inevitable that

Navy had been sent to the Persian Gulf to protect, or even
attacked components of the U.S. Navy itself. There are several discrete examples
tankers that the U.S.

ofjust such confrontations.

On August 10,

Navy fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian
plane which had violated the "bubble" announced by the Navy as a measure of
self-protection. And on August 25, 1987, a U.S. destroyer fired across the bows
1987, a U.S.

of two small unidentified vessels which were approaching the tankers that the
destroyer was escorting.

On April,

18, 1988, in retaliation for the

damaging of

an American warship, United States armed forces attacked and destroyed two
Iranian oil platforms (which

were

also

used

as anti-aircraft platforms)

naval vessels engaged in a subsequent encounter with Iranian vessels,

all

and U.S.
of which

However, as the individuals on the platforms
were given warning of the attacks which were about to take place, and Iranian
tugboats were permitted to engage in rescue work without impediment by the
U.S. forces, no Iranians were rescued from the sea by the latter.
The first two incidents terminated with no damages, no casualties and no
resulted in heavy Iranian casualties.

The third incident terminated with both Iranian casualties
and "splashed" personnel, but again with no individuals in custody. The question
these examples pose concerns the status of the members of the crews of such
ships or aircraft when they are disabled, sunk or shot down by the U.S. forces

individuals in custody.

*

This

article is a revision

of remarks delivered

at the

82nd Annual Meeting of the

American Society of International Law Panel on Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and
the

Use of Force

in the Persian

Am. SOC'Y INTL

L.

Gulf War, 23 April 1988. See Levie, Remarks, 82 Proc.

597 (1988).
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of

while they are engaged in such attacks, or while they are committing other illegal
acts against

U.S. flagged merchant shipping, or warships, or planes, and

they are thereafter rescued from the sea by those forces.

I

when

refer to "ships" rather

than "warships" because there exists a considerable question regarding the status

of some of the Iranian warships involved.
Article 14 of the

Respect

and Salvage

to Assistance

war." However,

at

1910 Convention

Every master

bound, so

Sea

states that it

of Certain Rules with

does not apply to "ships

of the same Convention provides

article 11(1)

is

at

for the Unification

far as

that:

he can do so without serious danger to

his

her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an

vessel,

enemy, found

at sea in

danger of being

lost.

This humanitarian rule should be and in

fact

was complied with by the U.S.

naval forces in the Persian Gulf. For example, an Iraqi pilot

whose plane had

been shot

down by

the U.S.

naval forces. Shortly thereafter he was turned over to the Iraqi

authorities.

On

the Iranians was rescued from the sea by a

component of

the night of September 21-22, 1987, an Iranian vessel, later

identified as the Iran Ajr,

was observed by

a

U.S.

Army helicopter equipped with

night- vision sensors to be laying mines in the Gulf in the vicinity of U.S. naval
vessels

and an anchorage used by them and the tankers they were there

to protect.

When the minelayer disregarded the radio orders of the helicopter to discontinue
its

minelaying

rendered

it

Similarly,

on October

8,

Iranians

sea

by

when

1987,

waters of the Persian Gulf was fired

wounded

fire

on the

Iranian vessel

and

Twenty-six Iranian seamen and three bodies

dead in the water.

were subsequendy rescued from the
forces.

opened

activity, the helicopter

a

component of

a

U.S. helicopter flying over the

upon by a gunboat,

it

the U.S. naval

returned the

fire.

and the bodies of two others were recovered from the
7

Four

sea

by

who were rescued
after these incidents prisoners of war? While the question is moot at the moment
a

component of the U.S.

as all

naval forces.

Were

the individuals

of the individuals were quickly repatriated through the agency of the

government of Oman,

one which may require

it is

a

hard decision

at

some time

in the future.

Common

article

2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the

Treatment of War Victims

is

which those Conventions

are to be applied.

the article concerned with the circumstances under

[T]he present Convention

shall

which may

arise

armed
Parties,

conflict

even

if

the state of war

apply in

all

9
It

cases

provides that:
of declared war or of any other

between two or more of the High Contracting

is

not recognized by one of them.
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A number ofyears ago the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
produced

what

and

lengthy,

have

commentaries with respect to each of the four
of these commentaries contains
to

common

article 2.

The

difference arising

members of the armed
2,

even

if

one of the

a substantially identical statement

Treatment of Prisoners of War

to the

between two

forces

is

numerous

are the participating forces;

long the conflict

have captured adversaries

been no

state that:

to the intervention

of a

lasts,

falling

how much

it

state

of war.

slaughter takes place, or

suffices for the

how

armed forces of one Power

within the scope of Article

4.

Even

if there

The number of persons captured

of course, immaterial.

2 in the great majority of cases. However, in
circumstances,

may be

it

Nicholson of the United
in the

Potsdam

area

gunpoint for

a

some

too all-encompassing.

States

Army was

respects,

When

Major Arthur D.

number of hours, he

who was

But was there an "armed

"detained."

Goodman of the United

Army on December 4,

States?

Were

released,

"covered by the Convention"

between

the provisions of the

When

Lieutenant

Syria

"detained."

and the United

States?

applicable

announcements made by both U.S.
he was

Navy was

officials

to

down by

the Syrian

prisoner of war

makes you
Although an

that

when

there

is

eligible for the

person

the provisions of the

lieutenant?

The

and the Syrians appeared

However, the United

a prisoner-of-war.

a

But was there an "armed

Were

the

changed its position. President Reagan later stated:
a

shot

once again there was certainly

who was

Prisoner-of-War Convention

that

States

conflict"

1983, and was taken into custody by the Syrians and held

one month before being

conflict"

"covered

certainly constituted a person

Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the sergeant?
0.

and under some

shot and killed by a Russian soldier

between the Soviet Union and the United
Robert

article

on March 25, 1985, and his sergeant-driver was held prisoner

by the Convention"

for

is

in such circumstances

This will be an acceptable interpretation of the provisions of common

at

of

makes no

It

righting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained

sufficient for its application.
is,

and leading

Parties denies the existence

how

has

States

the 1949

an armed conflict within the meaning of Article

difference

to

with respect

Commentary on

pertinent portions of the

Geneva Convention Relative

Any

become authoritative,
1949 Geneva Conventions. Each

subsequently

States

"I don't

no declared war between

to

original

assume

appeared to have

know how you have

nations.

I

don't think

Geneva Accords."

isolated incident

of the use of force between two nations

may

be considered by one or both of them to be indicative of the existence of an

armed

conflict

their options

between them,

open and

usually the nations involved will wish to keep

will not consider that such an incident has initiated an
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armed

conflict

—

War

of

unless the very purpose of the incident

was

to serve as a basis

for such a claim.

The

question to be decided, then,

first

between the

which occurred

armed

The ICRC

parties.

conflict

in the Persian

is

whether there

is

an armed conflict

takes the position that such incidents as those

Gulf in September and October 1987 constitute

and bring the Convention into

17

play.

I

ICRC

conclusion. But even assuming arguendo that the

do not agree with
position

that

correct, this

is

alone will not always solve the problem.
Article 4 of the

1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention

who

categories of persons

among

are entitled to the status

conflict as well as militias or volunteer corps

The

forces."

Iranians

who were

of prisoners of war.

armed

these categories are "[m] embers of the

specifies the

forces of a Party to the

forming part of such armed

recovered from the sea by the U.S.

Navy on

September 22, 1987, were apparently members of the Iranian navy and the

was an Iranian warship.

If

'

there

First

was an armed

conflict

and

vessel

the

if

Prisoner-of-War Convention was applicable, they would unquestionably come
within the coverage of the quoted provision and would be entided to the
protection afforded by the Convention.

Suppose, however, that they had been members of the "Revolutionary

Guards"

—

who

the individuals

appear to compose the crews of the so-called

"gunboats" which attack any and every ship found in the Persian Gulf, without
20

.

regard to the flag that
fall

it flies

or the cargo that

it

carries.

Do

such individuals

within the category of persons entided to prisoner-of-war status

they

by U.S. naval forces from the waters of the Persian Gulf into which

are rescued

they have been precipitated by action of those same armed forces?
illegal

combatants

really

know

very

would appear

who
little

are they

While we

about the organization of the Revolutionary Guards,

it

minimum, members of a militia or volunteer
Iranian armed forces. Under these circumstances, and

that they are, at a

ICRC
a

Convention provision,

interpretation of the

entitled to the status

power during

Or

are not entitled to the benefits of that status?

corps forming part of the

under the

when

of prisoners of war

period of armed conflict.

guilty of violations of international

if

they

It is

fall

they, too, are

into the hands of another

very possible that they have been

law inasmuch

they have, without warning,

as

attacked unarmed, neutral vessels. But this does not affect their entitlement to

prisoner-of-war

punishment for

My

status. It

only means that they could be subjected to

their illegal acts

conclusion, then,

is

Iraq.

unlikely event.

if there

is

a difference,

Therefore, none of the Iranians

likely to be, "splashed"

do not constitute

that occasional incidents

war, or even of armed conflict,

and Iran or

—an

and

trial

and rescued by United

a state

between the United

who

have been, or

States

who

States forces in the Persian

have been, or will be, entided to prisoner-of-war

status. It

of

are

Gulf

must be borne

in

Splashed and Rescued
mind, however, that
individual

he

is

is,

a decision that there

is

no armed

conflict

and
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means

therefore, not entided to prisoner-of-war status only

that

not entided to the protection of all of the specific provisions of the 1949

Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. It does not mean that he is unreservedly
at the mercy of the power in whose custody he finds himself. He is still entitled
to

all

of the protection of general humanitarian law. For example, he must receive

may not be denied adequate food and water, he
may not be tortured or otherwise maltreated, he may not be treated as a hostage,
any necessary medical

care,

he

etc.

One

final aspect

of the problem

is

worthy of mention.

It is

not beyond the

realm of possibility that some American military personnel serving in the Persian

Gulf

will, in the future, fall into the

power of

the Iranian regime.

undoubtedly be recalled that the holding of hostages

phenomenon

to that regime.

not an

is

It

will

unknown

devoutly to be hoped that the precedent that

It is

the United States has established of immediate repatriation will contribute to

making

it

politically

hostages, as

inexpedient for Iran to hold such American personnel

as

might otherwise have occurred.

Addendum
Even

disregarding the perennial Arab-Israeli controversies, during the past

decade international
general,

crisis

has followed international

and in the Persian Gulf in

from 1980

to 1988, a

Middle East in

in the

and Iraq fought

particular. Iran

war which

crisis

a

bloody war

necessitated the establishment of a naval

presence in that area by half a dozen nations in order to protect neutral merchant
shipping.

During 1984, the mystery of the mines

difficulties for

clear the

its

Suez Canal and necessitated

sea.

During the 1980s there was

Egypt and

mines from the

in the

Red

Sea posed grave

a multilateral force to

rarely a

moment when

Lebanon was not costing lives, with international
21
number of occasions. Then, on 2 August 1990, less than

the internecine conflict in

interventions

two

on

a

years after the Iran-Iraq conflict

had come

to

an inconclusive

under Saddam Hussein, invaded, occupied, and annexed
bringing

down upon

the international

its

its

halt, Iraq,

neighbor, Kuwait,

head the wrath of the great majority of the members of

community, including most of the

fifteen

Security Council of the United Nations. Military forces

concentrated in Saudi Arabia and

when

members of

from

the

thirty nations

non-military actions such

as

economic

Saddam Hussein to recognize the error
of his actions, the Security Council authorized Kuwait and its cooperating
"coalition" states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement

blockades proved ineffective in inducing

Resolution 660 (1990) and

all

subsequent relevant resolutions"

complied with the mentioned resolutions by 15 January 1991.

if Iraq

22
'

had not

This was, of

Levie on the
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of

way of authorizing

course, a euphemistic

the use of armed force while avoiding

the need for any unpalatable words.

bombardment began

Aerial

shortly after the deadline. Inevitably, coalition

were shot down and crew members became prisoners of war of the Iraqis.
In this instance there was no question with respect to the applicability of the
1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. Although Iraq became a party to

planes

Convention

this

conflict as she

in 1956, she paid as

attention to

little

had during the Iran-Iraq War.

its

provisions in this

In the other direction there was

number of Iraqis who elected to become prisoners of war
rather than fight for Saddam Hussein. The ground war started late in February
and within a matter of days the number of Iraqi prisoners of war in the custody
of the members of the coalition reached the tens of thousands.
Delegates of
a fairly substantial

ICRC

the

immediately began visiting these prisoners of war,

thereafter continued

When

a process

which

without interruption.

Iraq capitulated

and agreed to comply with the provisions of the

previous Security Council resolutions, Security Council Resolution 686 (1991),
set forth

The

the requirements to be imposed

on

Iraq in order to warrant a cease

fire.

resolution contained the following provision:

Further

3.

(c)

demand

that Iraq:

Arrange for immediate access to and release of

under the auspices of the International Committee of the

all

Red

prisoners of

Cross and return

the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the
States cooperating

On March
was

that

all

6,

with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990).

.

.

Member
.

1991, Iraq released thirty-five prisoners of war, asserting that

she held.

27
'

Shortly thereafter the coalition

incremental repatriation of the Iraqi prisoners of war

That process was

for repatriation.

who

war

desired repatriation

were back

commenced

the

who had expressed a desire

to continue until

all

Iraqi prisoners

of war

in Iraq.
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ed.,

Introduction

Chapter

10 of The Commander's Handbook on

the

Law

of Naval Operations

concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the

is

on naval
and naval air bombardment of

extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge

warfare (except in connection with naval surface

land objectives, riverine operations,

of the Handbook have deemed
subjects
status

—and righdy

so.

it

etc.) is

probably

fairly limited,

appropriate to include a

full

the draftsmen

chapter

on

these

In addition to discussing the evolution and present

of the applicable rules of the international law of war with respect to each

of those categories of weapons,

this

commentary will discuss the extent to which

those rules affect naval warfare qua naval warfare and the extent to
affect the operations

of naval units against objectives on land.

Nuclear

When

the

new

first

Weapons

atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August

began

a

which

has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great

Not

(and perilous) era for the planet Earth.

unexpectedly, sometime after the

atom bomb and the extent of the

facts

casualties

and Nagasaki became generally known, an
illegality

which they

of the use of the atom

bomb

—

It also

began

many

6,

1945,

it

a controversy

people.

with respect to the nature of the

and damage
issue

was

inflicted at

Hiroshima

raised as to the legality or

and, subsequently, the same issue was,

more powerful and devastating successors.
In the discussion which follows it must be borne in mind that while there are a
2
number of conventions placing various types of restrictions on nuclear weapons,
3
there is no convention which specifically outlaws their use. In light of the

of course, raised

as to

complete

of all of the practically endless

failure

accomplish

the use of its far

this result, to

efforts

undertaken since 1945 to

argue that the use of such weapons

is

prohibited by

inference derived from the provisions of international agreements dating from
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1868, from 1899, or from 1907, appears to be the equivalent of

tilting at

windmills. In view of the foregoing this writer concurs with the statement

contained in the Handbook to the effect

that,

"There

are

no

of customary

rules

or conventional international law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear
A

weapons

armed

in

and con appears

The 1868

St.

conflict."

Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro

to be warranted.

Renouncing the Use, in Time of War,
Under 400 Grammes Weight contained a number of

Petersburg Declaration

of Explosive Projectiles

humanitarian preambular clauses:
That the only legitimate object which
during war

That

is

to

weaken

for this purpose

States should

enemy;

the military forces of the

it is

endeavour to accomplish

sufficient to disable the greatest possible

number of

men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which
aggravate the sufferings of disabled

men, or render

uselessly

their death inevitable;

That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws
of humanity.

During the course of the
(II)

With Respect

to the

drafting of what

Laws and Customs of War on Land and

Regulations, several provisions

affecting the subject

Art. 22.

The

became the 1899 Hague Convention
its

were included which have often been

annexed
cited as

under discussion. These provisions were:

right

of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not

unlimited.

Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided

by

special

Conventions,

it is

especially forbidden:

(a)

To employ

poison or poisoned weapons;

(e)

To employ

arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous

injury;

.

.

.

.

.

The cognate

provisions of the 1907

Hague Convention

Laws and Customs of War on Land and
identical

.

its

(IV) Respecting the

annexed Regulations

are essentially

with those quoted above.

Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be

included in the Regulations could not possibly cover

all

of the contingencies that

NBC Weapons
might

arise

during the course of a war, the Russian representative

Peace Conference, Martens,

Conference agreed, that

a

a
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at the

1899

noted international lawyer, proposed, and the

paragraph be included in the preamble which would

read:

more complete code of the laws of war is

Until a

Parties think

it

issued, the

High Contracting

right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations

adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and

empire of the principles of international law,

between

established

as

they result from the usages

from the laws of humanity, and the

civilized nations,

requirements of the public conscience.

Assuming

that these

preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a

Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken
the miHtary forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings of
disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits which
a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it constitute the
use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon "calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give the populations

number of questions

arise.

and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles of international
law, as they result

from the usages established between

the laws of humanity,

civilized nations,

from

and the requirements of the public conscience" to which

they were entitled? And, most important,

if

one or more of these questions

answered in the affirmative, does the particular principle apply

is

if the alternative

would have resulted in a million American military casualties and an even greater
number of Japanese casualties, military and civilian? In other words, was the
principle of proportionality applicable? While all of those questions have been
posed here with respect to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to

—and answered—before any

be asked

hundreds of books and

Literally

the questions posed

and

it is

future use of nuclear weapons.

articles

have been written on both

it is

present writer does not propose to

weapons

draw himself into

are with us

and

at

Under those

the mistake of using

on

disagrees with his

circumstances

them and

we

is

incorrect.

The

that quagmire. Suffice

it

the present time there does not

appear to be any possibility that they will disappear,
future.

who

correct and that the other person's position

to say that nuclear

of

doubtful that any proponent of either side of the

argument has been successful in convincing anyone
position that

sides

at least in

the foreseeable

can only hope that neither side will make

thus bring an

end

to civilization,

and

to

life itself,

this planet.

There

is,

important

of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play an

role.

much of the

A

preemptive

first strike

by one

side

might possibly eliminate

other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force

—but

it

could not
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reach

the

deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which are the

ever-mobile

carriers

of nuclear

confrontation which has
II, is a

ballistic

missiles.

Thus,

this

potential naval

maintained by both parties involved in the eyeball-to-eyeball

retaliatory force,

War

War

of

more or less

existed since shortly after the

end of World

major factor in the policy of deterrence. Moreover, the strength and

speed of these nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines are reputedly
such that there are experts

weapons, such
such
as

as

who believe that they can only be destroyed by nuclear

nuclear-armed depth charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes.

If

the case, the use of these latter nuclear weapons

is

during

a

period of active

no nation and no navy

is

hostilities,

becomes almost inevitable
whether we call it war or armed conflict,

going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines

armed with nuclear ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged.
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons
attacks

on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and

would
While

adversely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the atmosphere.

surface vessels)

two nuclear submarines with no such adverse
effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would probably have shut
down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard the submarines
would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of radioactivity released
the United States has lost

by each of those

vessels

would have been minimal.

damage would be caused by
submarine with

its

Moreover, should
naval

a

the sinking of a nuclear

How much

environmental

armed and nuclear-powered

war reach the nuclear

stage,

it is

a virtual certainty that

engagement would include the use of nuclear weapons

opposing enemy

unknown.

reactor in operation appears to be a relative

fleets.

any

against the

When this occurs the extent of the contamination of the

oceans and of the atmosphere

is

incalculable as nuclear explosions

would be

taking place both in the atmosphere and in the water and nuclear-powered ships

would be sunk with

their reactors in operation.

the nuclear stage, such matters

Of course,

should

a

war reach

would be a small, and comparatively unimportant,

part of the overall picture.

The

ballistic

missiles carried

by nuclear-powered submarines, referred

to

on land. It is
doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment of
objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles. However,
should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment would be
miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from landbased nuclear
ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released from below the
above, would, of course,

if

used, be directed against objectives

and from the nuclear weapons dropped from the air.
probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict

surface of the seas,
It

is

approaches the nuclear stage, law will play
actions of the belligerents.

a

very small role in determining the

4

1
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Chemical Weapons
Chemical warfare agents have been defined

"chemical substances, whether

as

which might be employed because of their direct
on man, animals and plants."

gaseous, liquid, or solid,

toxic

1

effects

The

earliest

formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals in

warfare occurred

adopted

the 1899

at

a Declaration stating,

Hague Peace Conference which drafted and
"The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from

the use of projectiles the sole object of which
12

deleterious gases."

is

the diffusion of asphyxiating or

This Declaration was of unlimited duration. All of the major

European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the United

Kingdom, signed and

ratified

it.

The United

States neither signed

nor

ratified

it.

The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this,
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas was
delivered by artillery shells but, because of the sub-zero weather, had

and

the

incident

almost

passed

unnoticed.

13

The

first

little

effect

major,

and

well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915,

when

the

Germans opened containers of compressed chlorine, permitting a favoring wind
to
far

blow

1

the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient.

sides

many

success of the operation

and before the war was brought

exceeded expectations

than three years later

The

end more

other chemical weapons were being used by both

The Treaty
between Germany and

and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors,

of Versailles, which

to an

legally terminated

World War

I

as

etc.

the Allies, contained the following provision:

Art. 171.

The

use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and

liquids, materials or devices

are stricdy forbidden in

The same

all

analogous

being prohibited, their manufacture and importation

Germany.

applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage

and use of the

said products or devices.

The 1922 Washington Conference on

the Limitation of Armaments,

consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the

the United States,

drafted a treaty

United Kingdom, and

which was primarily concerned with

submarine warfare but which included the following provisions:
Art. 5.

The

use in

war of

asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and

analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy

condemned by

general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having

declared in treaties to

which

a majority

of the civilized Powers are

parties,

all

the

been

Levle on the
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end

signatory Powers, to the

accepted

as a part

that this prohibition shall

be universally

of international law binding alike the conscience and practice

of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby

between themselves and

To become

invite

as

other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

all

effective this treaty required the ratification

in the Conference. France refused to ratify

it

of all of the participants

because of objections to some of

the provisions with respect to submarine warfare. Accordingly, the treaty never

entered into force. However, three years later another conference,

concerned with international trade

in

weapons and ammunition,

1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in

War

drafted the

of Asphyxiating,

Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

much

of

its

wording was taken almost verbatim from the prior

in

war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other

analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been jusdy

gases,

condemned by

While

draftings,

importance warrants the setting forth of its operative provisions in their
Whereas the use

one

this

its

entirety:

and of

all

the general

opinion of the civilized world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared

in Treaties to

which

the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To

the

end

International

that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part

Law, binding

alike the conscience

of

and the practice of nations;

Declare:

That the High Contracting

Parties, so far as

they are not already Parties to

Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this

prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be
as

between themselves according

bound

to the terms of this declaration.

Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty,

with

its

provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just

and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
latter until

Many

50 years

of the

later, in

states

it

two

years earlier,

did not ratify the

1975!

which have

ratified the

1925 Geneva Protocol have done

so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations

of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol
Britannic Majesty toward any

Power

or the armed forces of whose

allies, fail

20
the Protocol."'

It

at

does not appear that

shall cease to

that

be binding on His

enmity with him whose armed

to respect the prohibitions laid
this "first

is

forces,

down

in

use" reservation has ever been

invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the prohibited

gases.

For example,

NBC Weapons
Italy, a

party to the Protocol

(as

was Ethiopia), admittedly used poison

1935-1936 war with Ethiopia. Japan, although
did not ratify the Protocol until after

a party to the

Roosevelt warned the Japanese against the use of poisonous
time Japan denied using such gas in China,

it

gas in

its

1899 Declaration,

On June 5,

World War II.
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1942, President
21

gas.

While

at that

has never officially denied such

use since the end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol

(as

was the

Yemen Arab

in

Yemen.

Republic),

Iraq, also a party to the

war with

recent

alleged to have used gas in the civil

is

Protocol
In

Iran.

(as is Iran),

none of these

war

has been accused of using gas in

cases

is

its

there evidence of retaliation in

kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack

was not in possession of a

stock of chemical weapons.

During World

War

II

Hider on occasion considered the use of chemical

weapons against England. However, he apparendy realized, or his military
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would be
self-defeating to

Germany

Germany.

that the use

On June

5,

1943, President Roosevelt warned

of chemical weapons by any Axis country against any one

of the United Nations would

result in "swift retaliation in kind," specifying that

would be "munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives
throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country.'" With the
possible exception of Japanese use in China, chemical weapons were not used
by any belligerent during World War II.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of
27
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare.
A resolution adopted in 1968,
the targets

among

other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the

assistance

of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological)

weapons.

This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969,

found

that "because

they are considered

of the
as

scale

and intensity of the potential

w
weapons
of mass destruction."

29

effects

The

of their use,

report contained

the following statement:

The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines.
Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict
how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of
society and the

Upon

environment in which

all

30
live.

the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution to

the effect that the 1925
rules

we

Geneva Protocol "embodies the

generally recognized

of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflict of

biological

and chemical methods of warfare."

represented the political judgment of those nations
resolution.

Of

course, this merely

which voted

in favor

of the
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Law

War

of

to maintain a supply

of chemical weapons for use in

against a violator of the provisions of the
"first

user," has created the longtime

retaliation

1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other

problem of finding

a safe

method

for the

disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties of the

One

possessor.

technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary" gases, will

two non-toxic
when mixed, an action which is

considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of

chemicals

which only become

toxic

accomplished while, for example, an

artillery shell is in flight.

of the Chemical Corps of the United States

weapons
storage;

as

A

representative

Army listed the advantages of binary

including "improved safety during production, transportation and

no requirement

for high-cost toxic production facilities;

and simplified

low-cost demilitarization procedures."

A

number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of the
1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within its
prohibitions the use of smoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare, and
the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The argument
of smoke, that

against the use

of asphyxia,

is

weak and

is

it

temporarily incapacitates due to a type

at least

not very frequently advanced. Originally the British

Geneva Protocol as covering
lachrymatories.
However, deeming it an essential weapon for use in Northern
Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position that "CS and other
34
such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Practically all
interpreted

the

provisions

of the

1925

33

governments use lachrymatories domestically for the suppression of such events

and other

as riots

armed

civil disturbances.

conflict remains a matter

A further problem
its

Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in

of dispute.

of interpretation

is

whether the Protocol includes within

prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during

when

World War

II

would be in accordance with
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although
the Judge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such
action,
no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste of
resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used extensively,
the question was raised as to whether

both for crop destruction and

it

When

as a defoliant.

the issue was raised in the

Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the

General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived
the

Army had

United

reached in 1945.

States has

37
'

renounced the

extremely limited purposes.

Nevertheless,
first

at

as will

the same conclusion

be noted below, the

use of herbicides except for certain

38

Another such problem of interpretation
within the prohibitions of the Protocol.

is

whether incendiary weapons

The United

States has

are

long taken the

NBC Weapons
position that there

At

weapons.

is

no

rule

of international law prohibiting the use of incendiary

a conference

Committee of the Red
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of experts convened in 1969 by the International

Cross,

some of the

use of incendiary weapons, and particularly

were of the opinion that the
napalm, was prohibited by the 1925

experts

Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it "causes a sort of asphyxia."
Others took the position that incendiary weapons were not prohibited but were
subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC concluded that "more extensive
studies should be made of the consequences of incendiary weapons in order to
The U.N. Report with
reach a clear legal solution as to their employment."
respect to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same
year, contains the following relevant statement:

We

is a dividing line between chemical agents of
which we use the terms, and incendiary substances, such
as napalm and smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary
deprivation of air or reduced visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are
better classified with high explosives than with the substances with which we are

also recognize that there

warfare, in the sense in

concerned.

Studies

They

are therefore not dealt

with further in

were subsequently made by

this report.

group of experts appointed by the

a

Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI),

and by the

ICRC

1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and

itself in

probably by other organizations and institutions.

The U.N.

experts found

it

appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of

working out measures for the prohibition of the

use, production,

—

and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons"

development

a clear indication

of their understanding that there was no such prohibition then extant.

The

author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never any positive indication
that the intention

of the [1925] Geneva Protocol was to prohibit incendiaries."

The

ICRC

the

Ad Hoc Committee on

studies

on

Conference
Humanitarian

were inconclusive.

the

Law

was discussed by

Conventional Weapons of the Diplomatic

Reaffirmation

and

Armed

Applicable in

Conference adopted

Finally, the subject

a resolution in

which

it

Development
Conflicts

45

of International

and the Diplomatic

recommended

the convening of a

conference to draft agreements on certain conventional weapons.
conference was held in 1980 and resulted
Prohibitions or Restrictions

manner

in

which they may be

foregoing survey

is,

among

others, a Protocol

on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.

does not prohibit the use of incendiaries;
the

in,

used.

it

merely places certain

The sum

Such

total to

a

on

This Protocol
restrictions

on

be derived from the

of course, that incendiary weapons do not come within the

purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
any other international agreement on the law of war.

or, for that matter,

of

Law

Levie on the
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The 1980 Protocol

of

War

provides that

it

is

prohibited "to

make

the civilian

population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by

incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law of war generally prohibits such attacks

by any weapon!) Such

restrictions

on

the

of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended to

use

implement

would obviously have no effect on
However, they would be applicable with respect to

prohibition,

that

engagements

at sea.

bombardments of land
to the use

Now

let us see

ratify the
it

by warships or by

targets, either

where the United

During

States stands generally

been mentioned

has already

It

1899 Declaration and

until 1975.

that the

that the

The United

on

the question of

United

States did not

that 50-year interim period the position

summed up

ratified

of the United

in the predecessor

which contained the following statement:

to the Handbook,

restricts

naval

and with respect

1925 Geneva Protocol was not

with respect to chemical warfare was well

States

aircraft,

naval

of incendiaries by marines ashore.

chemical warfare.

by

and the accompanying

a prohibition,

States

not

is

any treaty

a party to

now

in force that prohibits or

the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological

weapons. Although the use of such weapons frequently has been condemned by
states,

including the United States,
by treaty a

restriction established

use.

However,

may be

it

state legally

clear that the use

it is

remains doubtful

that, in the absence

of a

specific

prohibited at present from resorting to their

is

of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons

considered justified against an

enemy who

first

resorts to the use

of these

,-.48

rr

weapons, [rootnotes omitted)

The United

States has almost

uniformly taken the position that there

During the

customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons.

Vietnam the United
tear gas

States

but

its

widely used for

a

Tear

utility as a

November

was

gas

States

originally

non-lethal gas quickly

number of purposes.

both in the United

4
'

and elsewhere

-

used for humanitarian

became apparent and

it

was

This created considerable discussion
in the

world with the

result that

on

Nixon issued a statement in which he said that
1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and

25,1969, President

he was resubmitting the

consent to ratification and that the United States "Reaffirms
renunciation of the
renunciation to the

first
first

use of lethal chemical

the Senate gave

its

its

oft-repeated

weapons" and "Extends

this

use of incapacitating chemicals."

After extensive hearings and further

Protocol

hostilities in

used two controversial types of chemical weapons

and herbicides.

purposes

no

is

commitments by the Executive Branch,

advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 Geneva

and President Ford

ratified

it

on January

22, 1975.

was deposited, and the Protocol became binding on the United

The

ratification

States,

on April

NBC Weapons

On

10, 1975.

which
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Order 11,850

April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive

provides:

The United
herbicides in

States renounces, as a matter

war except

use,

under regulations applicable to

and

for control of vegetation within U.S. bases

immediate defensive perimeters, and
in defensive military

(a)

first

first

use of

their domestic use,

installations or

around

use of riot control agents in

to save lives such

Use of riot control agents

distinct

(b)

modes

of national policy,

their

war except

as:

in riot control situations in areas

under direct and

U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

Use of riot control agents

which

in situations in

civilians are

used to mask

or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c)

Use of riot control agents

downed
(d)

in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of

aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

Use of

riot control agents in rear

echelon areas outside the zone of

immediate combat to protect convoys from

civil

disturbances, terrorists

and

paramilitary organizations.

Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States has

not been involved in any armed conflict which would
appropriate.

United

However, the Handbook,

States position

recalled that
difficult

to

its

make

its

application

issued in 1987, further illuminates the

with respect to the use of chemical weapons.

predecessor, The

Law

of Naval Warfare, stated that

it

It

will

be

would be

hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary
In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says:

international law.

The United

States considers the prohibition against first use

incapacitating chemical
therefore, binding

on

weapons

all

to

of

lethal

and

be part of customary international law and,

nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas

Protocol.

It

will

still

be interesting to record the reactions to

this position

of states which are

not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed themselves

in the General

As

we

Assembly of the United Nations.

shall see, there is in existence a

58

Convention which supplements the

1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological agents

proposals

and

their delivery

weapons.

Although separate

made in 1 962 by both the Soviet Union and the United States included

similar provisions

with respect to chemical weapons,

both the United

Levie on the
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Kingdom and
from the

Law

of

War
on

the United States later insisted

others.

As

a result, despite fairly

on chemical weapons

at

separating chemical

continuous

the present time

the only restriction

efforts,

is

the 1925

to

Geneva

weapons

Geneva Protocol which

prohibits use only.

1984 then Vice President Bush went

In

Conference on Disarmament (CD) and

to table a

to attend a

United

meeting of the

States proposal

which

sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been accomplished
for biological

weapons.

It

has since

subsequendy drafted and studied

a

1

been under consideration in the CD, which

987

In January

revision.

1

989

conference

a

hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a resolution calling for

1925 Geneva Protocol and

reaffirmation of the

concluding,

at

an

early

date,

necessity of

stressed "the

convention on the prohibition of the

a

development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on
In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet

their destruction."

reached agreement on the key remaining issues

CD

1989) the
15

is

working on

October 1989.

a

May

Union

and currendy (December

1989 version

In view of the insistence

with changes made up to
of the United States on

know that the Soviet Union
has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the United States
which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth Amendment to the
"anywhere-anytime" inspections,

it is

of interest to

Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures."

The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of the
1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols ), so there
is still

the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be agreement

on

Convention which

a

will

prohibit the

development, production and

stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as providing
for the destruction of

such

a

all

such chemical agents

now

in the arsenals of parties to

Convention.
Bacteriological (Biological)

Bacteriological

70
(biological)

weapons

Weapons

have

been

defined

as

"living

which
and which

organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them,
are intended to cause disease or death in

depend

for their effects

attacked."
far

fewer

on

man, animals or

plants,

their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant

on the use of biological weapons present
problems than do those on the use of chemical weapons. In fact,

International restrictions

legal

the legal situation

is

so clear that the

major problem

is,

once again,

that

of

ensuring compliance.
It

will

be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva

Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of

poisonous

gas] to the use

of bacteriological methods of warfare."

'

The League

NBC Weapons
of Nations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted,
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albeit

which would have prohibited the production
and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During World War
II considerable scientific research was done on biological weapons. However,
unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty

no such weapons were used by either side, with one possible exception. The
Soviet Union has long contended that during World War II the Japanese had a
unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731" located at Harbin in China and
that this unit

had conducted bacteriological experiments on

Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps, Americans.

several

When

thousand

war ended,

the

many of the senior officers of this unit were taken into Soviet custody and in
December 1949 twelve of them were tried by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk,
were found

of engaging in bacteriological warfare, and received sentences

guilty

of confinement in
twenty-five years.
a unit
it

camp for terms varying from two to
1982 the Japanese Government acknowledged that such

a labor correction

73

In

Assuming that the Soviet charges

had existed during the war.

would appear

that the activities

experimental stage, that
against

enemy

are correct,

of the Japanese unit never passed the

never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals

it

military forces as a

weapon of war.

Union tabled
Disarmament Committee (ENDC)
In 1962 the Soviet

at

the meeting of the Eighteen Nation

a

proposal for general and complete

disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of

weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological
and radiological weapons."

A

few weeks

provision

later the

which

bacteriological,

75

United

States

submitted

called for "Elimination of

all

its

counterproposal with

a

stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,

and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the

production of such weapons."
In

view of the

close similarity

agreement with respect

been quickly attained.

at least to

77

of the two proposals,

chemical and biological

However, such was not

would seem that
weapons could have
it

the case.

There were those

who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not be joined
in the

same

treaty as there

was experience with chemical weapons, but none

with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument

is

far

from

clear, it

was

which might otherwise have been taken.
Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal which called for a
complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents," but made no mention
of chemical weapons.
When, in 1971 the United States and the Soviet Union

sufficient to delay the affirmative action

,

tabled identical drafts

79

relating to biologicals only, the result

conclusion. Using that draft as a

was

a

foregone

working document the Conference of the

Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had replaced

ENDC)

produced

a

Levie on the
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of

on the Prohibition of the Development,

Convention

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
t^

Destruction.

Art.

80

1.

T

most important provision

Its

Each

Party

State

to

this

Production

and

Weapons and on Their

states:

Convention undertakes never in any

circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1)

Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or

method of production, of

types and in quantities that have

no

justification for

prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2)

Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed

toxins for hostile purposes or in

It

armed

also contains provisions requiring

specified in Article

1

to use such agents or

conflict.

each State Party to destroy

all

of the items

within nine months of the Convention coming into force

(presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to transfer to any

encourage the manufacture

recipient, or to
It is

any of the prohibited items.

of,

Geneva Protocol and

thus evident that States Parties to the 1925

1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from
stockpiling, acquiring, retaining,

from the

arsenals

developing, manufacturing,

or using biological weapons In view of the coverage

of the Convention, nations have not made
international agreements

to the

were intended

to,

"first

use" reservations.

The two

and should eliminate biologicals

of all such Parties and should mean that in any future war, large

or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or unconventional, biologicals

would not be

a factor.

Unfortunately, events have already demonstrated that

these expectations will not be met.

A

catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet

more than 1,000 people died
poisoning, although Soviet

as a result

officials

has contended that the Soviet

Union,

used biological

chemical)

Afghanistan.
anthrax, and

well

'

if,

If,

as

as

is

as

81

disease.

In addition, the

in

which

United

States

either direcdy or through surrogates, has

weapons

in

Southeast Asia and in

generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident involved

the United States contends, biologicals have been used by the

in

provisions of the

1980

of what appears to have been anthrax

Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union
Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals

Vietnamese
then the

(as

in

claimed that the deaths had been caused by

meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth

82

Union

two agreements

to

which

Geneva Protocol contains no provision
for verification contained in the

1

it is

a party.

in Afghanistan,

contrary to the

Unfortunately, the 1925

for verification

and the only provision

972 Convention is a meaningless one providing

for resort to the Security Council.

NBC Weapons
The predecessor to
was not

a party to the

1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological

States

is

drafted, stated:

now

not a party to any treaty

the use in warfare

restricts

.

.

.

remains doubtful

by

treaty, a state legally

states,

including the United

absence of a specific restriction established

that, in the
is

in force that prohibits or

of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of

such weapons frequendy has been condemned by
States, it

when the United States

the Handbook, published at a time

Convention had not yet been

The United
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prohibited

present from resorting to their use.

at

[Footnotes omitted.]

This was probably a
25, 1969,

fair

statement of the United States position until

when President Nixon, on behalf of the United States, renounced the

use of biological

weapons by

toxins in this renunciation.

Bacteriological

Protocol with
that the

November

"

Then

Convention and

its

country.

this

in

this

84

Three months

later

he included

country became a party to the 1972

1975

it

1925 Geneva

finally ratified the

ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however,

Handbook may be going too

The United

far

when

thereby binding on

all

conflict to

appears

it asserts:

States considers the prohibition against the use

weapons during armed

it

of biological

be part of customary international law and

nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas

Protocol or the 1972 Biological

Weapons Convention.

Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not necessarily
be a binding rule of customary international law,

United

it

becomes such

as

soon

States ratifies a treaty containing that principle? Certainly, the

States did

not consider

itself

bound by any

rule

as

the

United

of customary international law

when it issued its military manuals in 1955 and
consider itself so bound at any time thereafter, even when (and

prohibiting the use of biologicals

1956; nor did

it

President

until)

Nixon made

his

1969 and 1970 statements

renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins.

which

are not parties to the

which

are not parties to the

quoted statement?

Or

is

Would

more
50 or more

the 50 or

1925 Geneva Protocol and the

unilaterally

nations
nations

1972 Bacteriological Convention agree with the

this statement,

and the

similar

one with respect

to

chemical weapons quoted above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that
they might just

as

well ratify the agreements

as

they are

bound by them

in

any

event?
In

view of the mobility of naval forces,

but not impossible, that naval vessels

it

has always

at sea will

been considered unlikely,

have to meet the problem of

defending themselves against an attack using biological (or chemical) weapons.

Should such an attack occur, for example by guided missiles which succeed in

Levie on the
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War

penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the lethal item, the attack

have
it

a devastating effect

would

because air-intake systems would quickly disseminate

throughout the interior of the

ordnance would have pierced the

vessel,

or because concurrent high-explosive

of the

shell

Items such

ship.

clothing, etc., available for the protection of the individual

as

masks, special

members of the crew,

would greatly impede the functioning of the crew, even if there was time to
don them. In addition, naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be
among the weapons systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land
targets,

sailing

should biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in
1

a field trial, a ship

6 kilometers offshore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to

The

the coastline discharging a harmless powder.
area of over 75,000 square kilometers.

biological

Had

"depending on the organism and

resulting aerosol covered an

the material disseminated been a
its

degree of hardiness, areas from

5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked, infecting
a

high proportion of unprotected people in the area."

Conclusions
There

is

no law

which

in force, conventional or customary,

prohibits the use

of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only
victors,

losers,

no

but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or not

a

war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will depend
upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers and
upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance to
bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people and

upon

the peoples of neutral nations.

Chemical and biological weapons,
destruction.

Once

released they are

nuclear weapons, their effects can

like nuclear

weapons, are weapons of mass

beyond the control of the user and,

come back

to

haunt the

certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting,
for the

environment and for the populations. This

to the use

is

nations of the world
is

The

use of

and severe consequences

even more true with respect

of many biologicals. The use of either of these types of weapons

prohibited by an international agreement to which

weapons

user.

like

community

are parties.

more than two-thirds of the

The very

existence of biological

prohibited by an international agreement with

participation. Hopefully, there will, in

is

due course, be an

a similar

amount of

identical prohibition

with respect to chemical weapons.
In

view of the tremendous

lethal

and destructive

capabilities

of nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to
turn the clock back to the nineteenth century,
biological weapons, as
scientist's eyes.

when

we now know them, were

nuclear, chemical, and

not even

a

gleam

in a
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States

Govt. Print. Off, 1962),
76.

well have engaged in similar experimentation or

was not

p.

104 [hereinafter cited

as

employment during World

German or Jewish

civilians.

on Disarmament (Washington: U.S.

Documents on Disarmament].

279.

One

might question the seriousness of the two proposals as far
324-25 (1969).
79. Documents on Disarmament, supra note 75, pp. 456-57 (1971).
77.
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as

they related to nuclear weapons.

78. Documents on Disarmament, supra note 75, pp.
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85.

v.

62, p. 272.)

White House

1970, Department

Press Release, "U.S.

of State Bulletin,

86.

Handbook, supra note

87.

U.N.

would

March

1, par.

Renounces Use of Toxins

2,

1970,

much

as a

Method of Warfare," February

14,

62, p. 226.

Chemical weapons used in the same way would have

greater quantities and, even so,

be devastating and would

still

v.

10.4.2.

Report, supra note 11, pars. 39-41.

disseminated in
result

December
id., March

establish

to

be

would cover a considerably smaller area. However, the
beyond doubt that they are, indeed, weapons of mass

destruction.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological

Weapons

Addendum
In 1971 there was drafted a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear

Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
and the Subsoil Thereof. The United States is a Party to this Treaty.
In 1972 the United Nations

Committee on Disarmament drafted a Convention

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological)

and Toxin Weapons and on

their Destruction

General Assembly of the United Nations.

Convention,

as

bacteriological
State

is

have

the

great

The United

majority

and biological weapons

are

which was approved by the

of other

now

States has ratified this
States.

All

types

of

completely banned and each

given nine months from the date of the entry into force of the

Convention within which
(Presumably

this

destroy

means nine months

country.)

1975. As

not unusual, Iraq

is

all

after the

The Convention

a particular
is

to

itself

such weapons in

Convention

its

stockpile.

enters into force for

entered into force on 26

March

believed to continue to possess such weapons
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and has placed constant

who

of

War

difficulties in the

way of the United Nations

have attempted to ascertain whether

it is

inspectors

complying with the terms of the

1991 Security Council Resolution (S.C. Res. 687) requiring their destruction,
as

well

of chemical weapons.

as that

1993 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved

In

Convention

a

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical

Weapons and on Their Destruction. This Convention supplements the 1925 Geneva

Gas

which merely prohibited "use." Once

Protocol

again, Iraq

continue to possess such weapons and has placed constant

who

of the United Nations inspectors

is

believed to

difficulties in the

have attempted to ascertain whether

way
it is

complying with the terms of Security Council Resolution 687. (The United
States Senate

gave

its

advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty

April 1997, despite the

vehement opposition of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and President Clinton

on 25 April 1997. Unfortunately,
"understandings,"

on 24

many of which

the

ratification

will not coincide

includes a

ratified

it

number of

with the interpretations of

other Parties to the Convention.)

On

15

December 1994

a resolution in

which

it

the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted

requested the International Court of Justice to provide

an advisory opinion on the question:
in any circumstances permitted

unanimously
law any
a

that

"There

is

"Is the threat

under international law?" The Court decided

in neither customary

specific authorization

international law any comprehensive

weapons

as

such."

which the vote was seven

nor conventional international

of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and by

vote of eleven to three that "There

use of nuclear

or use of nuclear weapons

is

in neither

customary nor conventional

and universal prohibition of the

However,

threat or

a further

holding of the Court, on

by the

President's casting vote,

to seven, decided

states:

It

follows from the above mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear

weapons would generally be contrary
in

armed

conflict,

However,
of fact

in

to the rules of international

and in particular the principles and

view of the current

at its disposal,

state

rules

law applicable

of humanitarian law.

of international law, and of the elements

the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat

or use of nuclear weapons

would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance

of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be

at stake.

XV
The Rise and

an Internationally

Fall of

Codified Denial of the

Defense of Superior Orders
30 Revue De

Droit Militaire Et

De

Droit

De La

Guerre 183 (1991)

Introduction

As

long

as

there have been

trials

more popularly known

for violations of the laws

and customs of

"war crimes trials", the trial tribunals have
been confronted with the defense of "superior orders" the claim that the
accused did what he did because he was ordered to do so by a superior officer
(or by his Government) and that his refusal to obey the order would have brought
war,

dire

consequences upon him.

However,

crimes
as to

trials

a plea

trial

have almost uniformly rejected

tribunals

since the termination of the

conducted

whether

—

And as along as there have been trials for violations

of the laws and customs of war the
that defense.

as

after

World War

II

major programs of war

there has been an ongoing dispute

of superior orders should be allowed, or disallowed, and,

allowed, the criteria to be used

the basis for

as

its

application.

Does

if

international

action in this area constitute an invasion of the national jurisdiction? Should the

doctrine apply to

Should the

all

illegality

would recognize

its

war crimes or only

to certain specifically

named

crimes?

of the order received be such that any "reasonable" person
invalidity; or

should

be such

it

as to

be recognized by

a

person of "ordinary sense and understanding"; or by a person of the "commonest
understanding"? Should

it

be

"illegal

on

its

face"; or "manifestly illegal"; or
l

"palpably illegal"; or of "obvious criminality"?
acceptable consensus

on

An inability to

reach a generally

these problems has resulted in the repeated rejection of

attempts to legislate internationally in this area. Consequendy, the continued
existence of an international rule denying superior orders as a defense to a charge

of violating the laws and customs of war appears to be in jeopardy

—

if it has

not

already ceased to exist.

More

than five centuries ago,

when one

Peter

von Hagenbach was

tried

by

an "international" tribunal for maltreating, and permitting his subordinates to
maltreat, the inhabitants

what might be termed

of the town of Breisach while he was in

a military

command

of

occupation (although the war did not begin

of

War

until thereafter), his defense

was

Levie on the
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Law

were

that his actions

compliance with the

in

Duke of Burgundy. Even though complete obedience
to the commands of one's liege lord was a way of life in the fifteenth century,
and even though human life, particularly of civilians, was not respected then as
orders of his master, the

it is

today,

von Hagenbach was found

guilty

and he was sentenced

commander of the

Captain Henry Wirz, the erstwhile Confederate

camp

Military

Commission for the maltreatment of the

think

I

may also

merely obeyed the
duties,

claim

as a self-evident

legal orders

of

my

prisoners of war in his custody,

his personal

this

know

proposition that if I, a subaltern officer,

superiors in the discharge of

my

official

claim the prosecutor asserted:

that

it is

urged that during

all

this

time he was acting under General

Winder's orders, and for the purpose of argument
acting.

summation Wirz said:

cannot be held responsible for the motives that dictated such orders.

I

Against

I

notorious

Andersonville, Georgia, was tried before a federal

at

one of his defenses was "superior orders." In
I

when

of the American Civil War,

Similarly, in 1865, at the conclusion

prisoner-of-war

to death.

I

will

A superior officer cannot order a subordinate

concede that he was so

do an

to

illegal act,

and

if a

subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, the superior

and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could no more

war than could the prisoner do

the prisoner to violate the laws of
orders.

The conclusion

And

is

where such orders

plain, that

notwithstanding his earnest appeal,

begging that he,

poor

a

made

to

exist

you

both

command

so without

are guilty.

law,

have

man,

justice,

in a desperate

It is

and

guilty

work on

If members

that can warrant

and he was sentenced

interesting to note that in the

standard

may come

terrible strait,

you

international law,

first

cries

to you, there

is

in refusing to let

because the lesser and not the greater criminal

Wirz was found

.

subaltern, acting only in obedience to his superior, should

no sympathy, no code of morals,
all

.

in his final statement,

not bear the odium and punishment deserved, with whatever force these
a desperate

.

is

on

of

no

him

trial.

to death.

(1906) edition of his

Oppenheim

now

famous and

7
said:

of the armed forces commit violations by

order of their

Government,

they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by the enemy; the latter can,

however, resort to

by

their

reprisals.

members of forces commit

commanders, the members may not be punished,

are alone responsible,

on

In case

their capture

and the

latter

by the enemy.

violations ordered

for the

may, therefore, be punished

as

commanders
war criminals

1

Superior Orders

That statement, or one closely resembling

Oppenheim's

editions of

edition (the 5th) edited

edition of the second

its

by Lauterpacht.

and in the 7th

reversed himself

with

treatise,

volume

it,
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appeared in the subsequent

various editors, including the

first

In the next (6th) edition Lauterpacht

edition, the last that

he edited (and the

last

that has appeared to date), the following rule

is

10
set forth:

The

253.

fact that a rule

of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order

of the belligerent Government or of an individual belligerent commander does

war crime; neither does it, in
confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured

not deprive the act in question of its character
principle,

A

belligerent.

and by

different

writers,

Undoubtedly,
justification

but
a

it is

as a

view has occasionally been adopted in
difficult to

regard

it

as

military manuals,

expressing a sound legal principle.

Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in

of a war crime

bound

is

to take into consideration the fact that

obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful,

of the armed forces and that the

latter

is

the duty of every

member

cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be

expected to weigh scrupulously, the legal merits of the order received; that rules

of warfare are often controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to
crime

may have been executed in obedience
Such circumstances

reprisals.

act

bound
if,

.

.

.

However,

obey lawful orders only and

in obedience to a

command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged

The

Preliminary Peace Conference which met

of peace with Germany

Commission on

are

that they cannot therefore escape liability

of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity.

Penalties

measure of

subject to these qualifications, the

rules

a treaty

as a

governed by the major principle that members of the armed forces

is

to

conceived

war

are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the

of the stigma of a war crime.

question

to orders

a

at the

the Responsibility of the

with the task of inquiring into

at Versailles in

end of World

War

II

1919

to draft

established a

War and on Enforcement of
and reporting upon, among other things,
Authors of the

the degree of responsibility for breaches of the laws and customs of war. In

its

Commission listed thirty-two types of violations of the laws and
customs of war and, concerning the defense of superior orders, its report
report the

1

unanimously

We

stated:

desired to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved

responsibility

by the mere

of the same offence.
orders

is

Article

It

fact that a

will

228 of the Treaty of

many of the

higher authority might have been convicted

be for the court to decide whether

sufficient to acquit the

from

a plea

of superior

person charged from responsibility.

Versailles

belligerents required the

which

actually

ended World

German Government

to

War

hand over

I

for

to the

Law
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Allied

Governments

for

violation of the laws

prevailing in

of

trial "all

persons accused of having committed an act in

and customs of war."

Germany

compliance with such

a

12

In the face of the public opinion

no Government could have survived
requirement and so it was subsequendy agreed that the
that time

at

named would,

individuals

War

instead,

be tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig.

The

trials

who

had obeyed the order of their commanding

were

but in one of them, involving the

a fiasco;

officer to fire

of a hospital ship which their submarine had torpedoed, the

It is

true that according to the

trial

of two

upon

officers

the lifeboats

German Court

[German] Military Penal Code,

if the

said:

execution

of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the law
is

punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order

However, the subordinate obeying an order

known

to

him

that the order

is

liable to

is

as

alone responsible.

punishment,

if it

was

of the superior involved the infringement of civil or

military law. This applies in the case of the accused.

It is

certainly to be

urged in

favour of the military subordinates that they are under no obligation to question

upon

the order of their superior officer, and they can count

such confidence can be held to

exist, if

such an order

is

its

legality.

universally

But no

known

to

everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the
law.

The accused were found
imprisonment for

a

While the 1922
failure

to

term of years.
never came into force because of the

Treaty of Washington

of ratification by France,

The

by the Court and were sentenced

guilty

of interest to note that Article 3 thereof stated:

it is

Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement of the

humane

rules

of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and
destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any

Power who

shall violate

any of those

whether or not such person

rules,

deemed

orders of a governmental superior, shall be

war and

shall

be brought to

be

liable to trial

trial

before the

jurisdiction of which he

and punishment

civil

may be

World War

Power within

the

II

and

trials

far

from

free

of international

appears to have been raised, or even

trials

World War

would be

may

found.

written about by the students of the subject,

the Allies that there

an act of piracy and

or military authorities of any

the subject of war crimes

All during the course of

under

have violated the laws of

as if for

Although the inter-war period (1919-1939) was
hostilities,

to

is

its

II

on comparatively few

occasions.

Aftermath

there had been statements

for those

major war criminals

made by

who

had

Superior Orders

plunged the world into catastrophic war and for those individuals

A

otherwise violated international law.

European

war crimes

established a

trials.

who had
and

private conference of British

from occupied countries which met in Cambridge

jurists

November 1941
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committee

and procedures

to draft rules

The sub-committee on

to

in

govern

superior orders concluded that

generally speaking, the codes of law of the respective countries recognize the plea

of superior orders to be valid
officer,

if the

order

is

given by

within the course of his duty and within

the order

is

not blatandy

be considered on

its

illegal.

own

his

a superior to

normal competence, provided

The conclusion reached was

merits, but that the plea

an inferior

is

that each case

must

not an automatic defence.

The London International Assembly, established by the League of Nations
Union of Great Britain, adopted a resolution which included the following with
respect to the defense of superior orders:

(a)

That an order given by

international

law was not in

a superior to

itself a

20

an inferior to commit a crime violating

defence, but that the Courts were entided to

consider whether the accused was placed in a
ordered, and acquit

(b)

him

'state

of compulsion' to act

or mitigate the punishment accordingly;

That such exculpating or extenuating circumstances should in

disregarded in

two

as

types of cases:

when

all

cases

be

the act was so obviously heinous that

it

human
member of an

could not be committed without revolting the conscience of an average
being; and

when

organization

The

the accused was, at the time of the offence, a

whose membership implied

the execution of criminal orders.

War Crimes (later the
United Nations War Crimes Commission) was established in London on 20
October 1943 by 17 of the States at war with Germany and Japan. (The Soviet
United Nations Commission for the Investigation of

Union was not represented
activities

at this
21

of the Commission.)

Its

meeting, nor did
Legal

it

later participate in the

Committee concluded

that a general

understanding between the victorious belligerent nations on the subject of
superior orders was desirable and stated that
consistent with international law:

The defence of obedience
for the

was

it

believed the following rule to be

22

to superior orders shall not constitute a justification

commission of an offence

against the laws

and customs of war,

if the

order

so manifesdy contrary to those laws or customs that, taking into account his

rank or position and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence,
an individual of ordinary understanding

was

illegal.

would have known

that such an order
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of

War

This recommendation did not meet with unanimous support and the

Commission's Enforcement Committee eventually recommended

Commission submit

the following statement to the Governments:

The Commission

has considered the question of 'superior orders'.

It finally

The Commission

considers

decided to leave out any provision on the subject.
that

it is

better to leave

should be attached to

make

it

clear that

its

that the

23

it

.

.

.

to the court itself in each case to decide

a plea

what weight

of superior orders. But the Commission wants to

members unanimously

agree that in principle this plea does

not of itself exonerate the offenders.

Finally,

March 1945,

in

Commission

the

adopted the following

itself

position:

Having regard
legal rules

on

the subject,

most

that in

to the fact that

cases

many,

if

not most, of the members States have

some of which have been adopted very recendy, and

these rules differ

consideration that the question

how

from one another, and

far

to the further

obedience to the orders of

a superior

exonerates an offender or mitigates the punishment must depend

on

circumstances of the particular case, the Commission does not consider that
usefully

propound any

it

the

can

principle or rule.

The Commission unanimously

maintains the view

.

.

.

that the

mere

fact

of

having acted in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve
person

who

has

committed

a

war crime from

a

responsibility.

Early in 1945 the United States prepared a draft of a proposal for an
international military tribunal to try the

major German war criminals. Paragraph

11 of that proposal stated:

The

fact that a

defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or government

sanction shall not constitute an absolute defense but

defense or in mitigation of punishment
are

if

may be

considered either in

the tribunal before

which the charges

being tried determines that justice so requires.

That proposal was submitted

to the representatives

of the Provisional French

Government, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
April 1945, together with a later draft in

which

a

at

San Francisco

paragraph concerning

in

trial

procedures contained a sub-paragraph stating that any agreement on the matter

should include

(c)

except

a

as

provision which could,

the court in

its

discretion shall

deem

appropriate in particular cases,

exclude any defense based upon the fact that the accused acted under orders of a
superior officer or pursuant to state or national policy.
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Then, on 14 June 1945, the United
proposal, a

document which

Conference which met to

trial

became the working paper

later

draft the definitive

Military Tribunal. Paragraph

In any

States distributed a revision

1

of its

draft

London

for the

Charter of the International

5 of that revision stated:

27

before an International Military Tribunal the fact that a defendant

acted pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not constitute
a defense per se,

punishment

but

may be

if the tribunal

considered either in defense or in mitigation of

determines that justice so requires.

In a further Revised Draft submitted

by the United

States

on 30 June 1945,

during the course of the London Conference, the relevant paragraph now read:
17.

The

fact that a

government sanction

28

defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or to

shall

not constitute a defense per

se,

but

may be

considered

in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

A Soviet proposal which was tabled at the Conference on 2 July 1 945 stated: 29
ARTICLE
Carrying

The
shall

carrying out

29

Out of an Order

by the defendant of an order of his superior or government

not be considered a reason excluding his responsibility for the crimes

in Article 2 of this Statute. In certain cases,

when the

set

out

subordinate acted blindly in

carrying out the orders of this superior, the Tribunal has right to mitigate the

punishment of the defendant.

A drafting subcommittee was then created by the Conference. The provision
which

it

forth in the last

8.

The

on

the question of superior orders varied litde
30
revision proposed by the United States:

drafted

fact that the

from

that set

defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or the

Government sanction shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered
in mitigation

In

of punishment

Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

if the

what was apparendy the only

place at the

London Conference,

General Nikitchenko: In

change but would
in speaking

of superior orders which took

the following occurred:

article

like to point

real discussion

7

[8?]

of the Charter

out two considerations.

of major criminals to speak of them

as

I

do not propose any

Would it be

carrying out

proper

really

some order of a

Law
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superior? This

when
Sir

were

not

is

question of principle

a

David Maxwell

some

seventh editions of
it

Fyfe:

There

doing what Hider

law, certainly in

clear,

are

points:

wonder if that is

I

necessary

they have already said they

were

a defense,

but in the sixth and

appears that they aren't a defense. If we don't

it

we may have some
is

first,

should do; and secondly, in international

cases, superior orders

Oppenheim

trouble

on

it.

a misunderstanding.

orders of a superior as a defense, but

would be improper

two

said they

General Nikitchenko: There

it

but

really,

speaking of major criminals.

just

make

War

of

I

I

wasn't against disallowing

thought that in regard to major criminals

to say that superior orders could be used in mitigation

of

punishment.

Sir

David Maxwell

was threatened

to

Fyfe:

be shot

if

seems to

It

me

difficult.

Suppose someone

he did not carry out Hider's orders.

important, the Tribunal might

let

him

off with his

life. It

said,

If he wasn't

seems to be

a

he
too

matter for

the Tribunal.

In one of the

German

cases

on

trial

which were such

a farce after the last

war

they did say that superior orders were no defense but could be taken into account

on

been the general

mitigation. That has

on superior

rule

orders in international

law books.

General Nikitchenko:

If the

have no intention of pressing

we

think

it is

other heads of the delegations consider

it.

In general,

it

it

best,

we

should be considered in mitigation;

proper.

* * * *

Judge Falco:
If

we

Is it

necessary to indicate to the Tribunal the reason for mitigation?

say simply that orders are not a defense,

tribunal to say that they

Mr Justice Jackson:

may be

it

would seem

to

be

left

to the

in mitigation.

That is about what we proposed

originally

—not an

absolute

defense but a mitigation.

Sir

David Maxwell

Fyfe:

The important part

is

that

it

should not be an absolute

defense.

Judge Falco: That

is

the important part.

the Tribunal to consider mitigation?

Must we add

that that

is

the reason for

Superior Orders

With some minor

editing the Article 8 set forth above

the Charter of the International Military Tribunal

As

finally

adopted

Article

8.

it

The

became
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Article 8

of

which later sat in Nuremberg.

stated:

Government or of a

Defendant acted pursuant to order of

that the

fact

superior shall not free

considered in mitigation of punishment

him from

if the

responsibility,

but

his

may be

Tribunal determines that justice so

requires.

In applying that rule at the

Tribunal

The
That

Nuremberg

Trial the International Military

said:

provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of

a soldier

was ordered

to kill or torture in violation

of war has never been recognized

all

nations.

of the international law

defense to such acts of brutality, though,

as a

as

the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment.

The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations,
is

not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in

Another statement in

When
gave

him

initiated.
if

they

that judgment

was

to effect that

they [certain of the defendants] with knowledge of his [Hider's] aims,

made themselves parties to the
be deemed innocent because Hitler made

their cooperation, they

They

not to

are

knew what

them from

in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic crime.

Germany armed

use of them,

The relation of
any more than it does

responsibility for their acts.

leader and follower does not preclude responsibility here

In considering

plan he had

they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a

dictator does not absolve

Tribunal

fact possible.

whether the General

Staff

found

forces should be

35

and the High

to

Command

of the

be criminal organizations, the

said:

Many

of these

to military orders.

men

have made

When

it

a

mockery of the

suits their

soldier's

oath of obedience

defense they say they had to obey;

confronted with Hider's brutal crimes, which are

when

shown to have been within their

general knowledge, they say they disobeyed.

On

20 December 1945 the Allied Control Council for Germany, consisting

of military representatives of the Occupying Powers, the same four nations

which had drafted the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
promulgated Allied Control Council
trials

in

Germany of war

Law No.

10, setting forth the basis for the

criminals other than those to be tried

by the

Law

Levie on the
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of

War

International Military Tribunal.

37

The

'

provisions of Article 11(4) (b) of that

with respect to superior orders were substantially the same

those of the

as

Law

London

Charter:

The
a

fact that

any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of

superior does not free

him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered

in mitigation.

convened pursuant

In The Hostage Case the Tribunal,

Implicit obedience to orders of superior officers
military system.

But

is

to

10, held:

almost indispensable to every

obedience to lawful orders only.

this implies

38

Law No.

done

If the act

pursuant to a superior's orders be murder, the production of the order will not

make

it

any

less so. It

may

mitigate but

it

cannot justify the order.

We are

of the

and he could not reasonably have been expected to

known to the inferior,
know of its illegality, no

wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime

exists

view, however, that

if

the illegality of the order was not

and the

inferior will

members of the armed forces are bound
to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot escape
criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law and

be protected. But the general rule

is

that

outrages fundamental concepts of justice.

was saying

In effect, here the Tribunal

and could not be expected
criminal intent, no mens

know

to

that if the subordinate did not

was

that the order

there

illegal,

and the subordinate would not be

rea,

opinion in The Einsatsgruppen Case is to the same

effect,

know

was no

The

guilty.

the Tribunal there having

said:

Those of the defendants who admit
the subject of this

had no

will

trial,

participation in the mass killings

which

are

plead that they were under military orders and, therefore,

of their own. As intent

is

a basic prerequisite to responsibility for

crime, they argue that they are innocent of criminality since they performed the

The

admitted executions under duress, that

is

formed

and were, therefore, subject to the

part of a military organization

which govern

soldiers. It

the defendants
superiors to

kill

were

is

axiomatic that

soldiers

and

certain people,

a

reasoning agent.

He

piece of machinery.

soldier

how

is

a military

as soldiers

question posed by the defendants.

The obedience of a

to say, superior orders.

may

duty

first

responded to the

The answer

is

not a

command

difficult

It is a fallacy

of their

is

A

the

soldier

is

not expected to respond, like a

of wide-spread consumption that

him

to do....

a soldier

The

is

fact that a

not, without incurring unfavorable consequences, refuse to

salute, exercise, reconnoiter,

is

one.

not the obedience of an automaton.

does not respond, and

rules

to obey. If

is

can they be held guilty of crime? That

required to do everything his superior officer orders
soldier

man's

defendants

drill,

and even go into batde, does not mean that he must

Superior Orders
every

fulfill

must
that

demand put

to him. In the

relate to military duty.

he

steal for

him.

a military subject

place, an order to require

An officer may not demand

And what

the superior officer

subordinate

his subordinate, the

first

not required to do. Even

is

obedience

soldier, for instance,

may not militarily demand of

must be one which the superior

it

of a
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is

if the

order refers to

authorized, under the

circumstances, to give.

The

subordinate

he accepts

bound only

is

to

obey the lawful orders of his superior and

order and executes

a criminal

it

with a malice of his own, he

if

may not

plead superior orders in mitigation of his offense. If the nature of the ordered act
is

manifesdy beyond the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate
If

one claims duress in the

that the

harm caused by obeying
harm which would result

not plead ignorance to the criminality of the order.
execution of an
the illegal order

is

a

it

must be shown

not disproportionally greater than the

from not obeying the
In High

order

illegal

Command

may

illegal order.

which

Case, the Tribunal before

that case

was

tried

quoted

1944 statement of Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, in which he had

said:

not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable

It is

crime

is

exempt from punishment because he

passes the responsibility to his

superior, especially if orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to

all

human

morality and every international usage of warfare.

As would be expected,

that statement

was made in

his official capacity as

Minister of Propaganda and referred to alleged acts of Allied troops.

intended

German

as a

statement of

German

military law, nor as an

It

was not

admonition to the

soldier.

Concerning the

of an intermediate headquarters in passing

act

down

to

commands an order received from higher headquarters, the Tribunal
42
High Command Case went on to say:

subordinate
in

its

Military

commanders

in the field with far reaching military responsibilities

cannot be charged under international law with criminal participation in issuing
orders

which

known

not obviously criminal or which they are not shown to have

are

to be criminal

under international law. Such

expected to draw fine distinctions and conclusions

with orders issued by

his superiors.

He

a

commander cannot be

as to legality in

connection

has the right to presume, in the absence

of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been
properly determined before
responsible for a
It is

mere

their

issuance.

cannot be held criminally

error in judgment as to disputable legal questions.

therefore considered that to find a field

for the transmittal

He

commander

criminally responsible

of such an order, he must have passed the order to the chain of

Levie on the
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command and
is

shown

the order

have

to

Law

of

War

must be one

known was

World War

II

is

criminal

on

face, or

its

one which he

criminal.

In a digest of the laws applied
trials after

that

by various courts which conducted war crimes

War Crimes Commission

the United Nations

said:

The plea of superior orders has been raised by the Defence in war crimes trials
more frequendy than any other. The most common form of the plea consists in
the argument that the accused was ordered to commit the offence by a military
superior and that under military discipline orders must be obeyed.

argument

is

that

which claims

that

been shot or otherwise punished;
reprisals
It

would have been taken

has often

been

commands which

said that

had the accused not obeyed he would have
sometimes

it is

also

maintained in court that

against his family.

an accused

are lawful or

is

entided under international law to obey

which he could not reasonably be expected

know were unlawful. The question, however,

arises

if

those acts constitute

acted

upon

a defence.

orders

On

does not free

acts

war crimes, and

which were

it

him from

...

the legality under

liability to

punishment

seems to follow that the plea of having

under municipal law must

legal

to

whether these commands

must be lawful under municipal law or international law;
municipal law of the accused's

A closely related

the other hand, if the order

is

legal

also fail to constitute

under international law,

it is

show how an act committed in obedience to it could be illegal under
that system.... The true test in practice is whether an order, illegal under
international law, on which an accused has acted was or must be presumed to
have been known to him to be so illegal, or was obviously so illegal ("illegal on
its face" to use the term employed by the Tribunal in the High Command Trial)
or should have been recognised by him as being so illegal.
difficult to

The provisions contained in Article
orders as a defense and limiting

followed by

many of the

World War

II

its

8 of the

London Charter denying superior

application to mitigation of punishment

were

laws enacted and orders issued after the conclusion of

which were concerned with

the

trials

of violators of the laws and

customs of war. Thus, the Charter attached to the Special Proclamation creating
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1MTFE), issued

on 19 January

Supreme Commander

for the Allied

1946 by General Douglas MacArthur

as

Powers (SCAP), included the following

provisions:

44

Article 6. Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time,

of an accused, nor the

fact that

government or of a superior
from

responsibility for

may be

shall,

an accused acted pursuant to order of

of itself, be

any crime with which he

sufficient to free
is

considered in mitigation of punishment

justice so requires.

his

such an accused

charged, but such circumstances
if

the Tribunal determines that

Superior Orders
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None of the judges of the IMTFE, concurring or dissenting, found it necessary
to advert to the

quoted provision of its Charter either in the lengthy judgment

or in the other opinions.

As we have already

45

of the London Charter was

seen, Article 8

for the cognate provision

of Allied Control Council

Law No.

also the

source

10 and for similar

provisions issued in other occupied territories.

United Nations

On

11

December 1946

unanimously adopted

a resolution the first operative

General Assembly:

that the

the General Assembly of the United Nations

Affirms the principles of international

Nuremberg Tribunal and

to the International

its

Committee on Codification

Law Commission) with

principles, either in the context

security

law recognized by the Charter of the

the judgment of the Tribunal.

Another operative paragraph charged
changed

paragraph of which stated

47

the formulation of those

of a code of offenses against the peace and

of mankind or of an international criminal code.

When the International

Law Commission had prepared its first draft in complying with the
to

it

(later

task assigned

of "formulating" the principles of international law recognized in the

London Charter and
IV read

in the Judgment

of the Nuremberg Tribunal,

its

Principle

as follows:

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.

The

overall

document received

of the General Assembly, the
resolution, later
States for

a

result

mixed reception

a process

Committee

of which was the preparation of a

adopted by the General Assembly,

comment,

in the Sixth

which had

49

r

referring

early evolved in the

method of indefinite postponement.
The following year, in accordance with

it

to

draft

member

United Nations

as a

General Assembly, the International

Code of Offences Against
draft text

The

Law Commission began

and

fact that a

J.

work on a

a superior

may be

defence or in mitigation of punishment

Draft

4 of the

first

Spiropoulos, stated:

person charged with a crime defined in

government or

to

Security of Mankind. Article

prepared by the Special Rapporteur,

the orders of a
as a

the Peace

the directive received from the

this

code acted under

taken into consideration either

ifjustice so requires.

Law
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proved

This

War

of

unacceptable

Rapporteur's proposal to read:

The

Commission which modified

the

to

pursuant to order of his government or of a superior
responsibility,

In

its

on the
of

its

provided

commentary on

Principle
basis

a

moral choice was in

states:

"The

fact that a

a superior

on

observations

him from

does not relieve

principle IV,

article 8

was in

made

responsibility

fact possible to

in the General

under

him."

Assembly during

its

have been carefully studied; no substantial modification, however,

been made

in the drafting of this article,

by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The
is

principles,

person acted pursuant to order of his

international law, provided a moral choice

has

said:

of the interpretation given by the Nuremberg Tribunal to

Government or of

fifth session,

him.

fact possible to

Commission

the

this Article

this

IV of the Commission's formulation of the Nuremberg

Charter,

The

Code acted
does not relieve him from

person charged with an offence defined in

fact that a

the

51

responsible only

is

based on

down the

article lays

in the circumstances,

if,

which

it

was

a clear

enunciation

principle that the accused

possible for

him

to act contrary

to superior orders.

The

Law Commission's

International

Code

did not meet with any

Assembly than had

greater acceptance in the General

Nuremberg

Draft

its

formulation of the

and the project was shelved for some time.

Principles

When it was

once again taken up by the Commission in 1954, Article 4 was redrafted
*

*

to

52

state:

The

fact that a

pursuant to an order of his

Government or of a

responsibility in international
for

him not comply with

to replace

all

was possible

it

action

stated:

criticized the expression 'moral choice', the

by the wording of the new

However, on the recommendation of
Assembly postponed

it

that order.

some Governments had

Commission decided

superior

this

law if, in the circumstances at the time,

This time the Commission's commentary
Since

Code acted
does not relieve him of

person charged with an offence defined in

on

its

the draft

reached on the definition of aggression.

"

text above.

Sixth Commission, the General

Code

until a decision

had been

This did not occur until 1974 and the

Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind did not reappear

on the agenda of the
session

it

once again

International
started to

Law Commission

until 1981.

During

its

1984

have annual discussions on the subject. Most of
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time has been spent on the question of the offenses to be included and through

1986 the problem of superior orders had not been reached for discussion. As
result,

today, almost forty years later, the efforts of the International

Commission

to "formulate" the

offenses against the peace

On

the same day that

Nuremberg

Nuremberg

and security of mankind have
it

and to

still

draft a

Law

code of

not been successful.

adopted the resolution on the "formulation" of the

and the drafting of

Principles

Principles

a

a

code of

offenses, the

General

Assembly adopted another resolution which requested the Economic and Social
54

The Council, in turn,
requested the Secretary-General to collate the comments received and to prepare
Council to draw up

a draft

convention on the subject. Article

Command

No

convention on genocide.

a

of the law or superior orders

provision

on the

V of his
shall

draft provided:

55

not justify genocide.

subject of superior orders appears in the convention as

eventually drafted and adopted.

Other International Efforts to Codify the Rule

We

have seen the actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly,

and by its subordinate bodies, concerning the codification of the
to the non-availability
trials.

rule

with respect

of the defense of superior orders in international criminal

Now let us review the efforts of other international bodies on this subject.

Red Cross Conference
recommended that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) draft
In

1948 the XVIIth (Stockholm) International

which

provisions for the repression of breaches of the humanitarian conventions
•

were then in the process of evolution
1949 Geneva Conventions for the

57

and which ultimately became the four

Protection of

War

58
Victims.

The

ICRC complied

with that resolution and, with the help of a small group of recognized experts,
•

drafted a

number of separate provisions on the subject, one of which provided:

ARTICLE
The

fact that the

(a)

accused acted in obedience to the orders of a superior or in

pursuance of a law or regulation
prosecution can

40

shall

not constitute

a valid defence,

if the

show that in view of the circumstances the accused had reasonable

grounds to assume that he was committing a breach of this Convention. In such
a

case

the punishment

may

nevertheless be

mitigated or remitted, if the

circumstances justify.

With

respect to this proposed provision the

ICRC

60
said

59
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Law

of

War

within prescribed

establishes,

limits, the responsibility

of offenders;

it

rejects

the principle, recognized in various military penal codes, that orders received
a

superior exculpate the subordinate

The

of August

has carried

8,

bearing

as far as

out.

the Declaration of London

as a possible

extenuating circumstance, the executor of the order

full responsibility.

The

suggested text appears to the

between

obedience

discipline,

—and

of defenceless

to

orders,

ICRC

—an

to

be an acceptable compromise

essential

prerequisite

of

military

the moral duty to oppose any patent atrocity, such as the massacre

women

and children.

should be noted that the onus of proof

important in view of the

prove that he was not

The

them

1945, which, in the case of 'war crimes', only admitted the plea of

superior orders

It

who

text proposed does not, however, go

from

lies

on

the prosecution. This

fact that certain legislations called

upon

is

the accused to

guilty.

experts debated whether, even in the case of flagrant participation in such

of death were not sufficient to constitute

violations, the threat

obeying superior orders.
latitude

is

left

to the

No

a legal

excuse for

concession of this kind was however made,

as

every

judge to mitigate or remit punishment. This power of

discretion seems the best practical solution to the conflict

on

this

point between

English and Continental conceptions of law.

The few

which are available on this subject,
particularly the report of its Special Committee, indicate that the 1949
Diplomatic Conference discarded the forgoing provision on the following
bits

of

legislative

history

basis:

[N]or could general agreement be reached

at this stage

regarding the notions

of complicity, attempted violation, duress or legitimate defense or the plea 'by
orders of a superior'. These should be

left

to the judges

who would

apply the

national laws.

The Diplomatic Conference is not here to work out international
Bodies far more competent than we are have tried to do it for years.
As

a result,

no provision with

penal law.

respect to superior orders appears in the 1949

Geneva Conventions.
In 1971

the

ICRC

convened

a

Conference of Government Experts

to

consider the drafting of a protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which,

among

other things, would remedy some of the defects in those Conventions

which had surfaced over the years. One of the conclusions reached by
Commission IV of that first conference was to the effect that:
556.

A number of shortcomings in the Conventions should be remedied. They

concerned, in particular, the question of superior orders. That problem had not

been provided

for in the Conventions,

and

it

was necessary to specify precisely
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under what conditions an accused person could plead that he had received orders

from

a superior, as a justification for his

commission of an

Conventions. In order to remedy that deficiency

it

down by

Nuremberg

the

Apparently the

by the

would be necessary

guided by the work of the United Nations which itself took
laid

act forbidden

as a basis

be

to

the principles

tribunal.

ICRC felt that there was more justification in the decision of

the 1949 Diplomatic Conference than in the

Conference of Government Experts and

when

recommendation of the 1971
it

prepared a draft Protocol to

1949 Geneva Conventions for consideration by various other preliminary

the

conferences which
rather

was about to convene,

innocuous paragraph in

2.

for

it

its

Article 75:

The High Contracting Parties

shall

application of the principle under

all

that draft included the following

determine the procedure to be followed

which

a subordinate

any duty to obey an order which would lead him to commit

is

exempted from
breach of

a grave

the provisions of the Conventions and of the present Protocol.

In

its

Commentary on

In particular,

it

should be setded
laid

[the

at

that provision the

ICRC]

manner

consistent with the guidelines

of the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely, that

possible for soldiers to refuse to

constitute a serious infraction

some countries

said:

considered that the basic question of superior orders

the national level, in a

down in the Judgment

ICRC

obey an order which,

of humanitarian

rules.

The

it

should be

if carried out,

would

military regulations of

contain a provision regarding superior orders and

already

submission to rank, whereby superiors must only issue orders which conform to
international

order which
a

law and subordinates are relieved from the obligation to obey an

would be contrary

thereto and

which would cause them

to

commit

crime or an offence.

The summary of the

1972

discussions of this article that took place at the

ICRC to review
ICRC had prepared,

(Second) Conference of Government Experts, convened by the

and propose changes in the
indicates

some of

draft

Protocol which the

the problems that have been encountered in the efforts to

legislate internationally in this area. It states:

4.123.

A

number of

on

experts approved the introduction of a provision

superior orders, such as proposed in draft Article 75, § 2 of the

ICRC

text.

.

.

.

The language of that paragraph did not, however, seem sufficiendy clear and a
number of amendments were proposed. It was pointed out that attempts had been
made in several national legislations to give a satisfactory formulation of the defence
of superior orders, a concept recognized by the Charter and the Judgment of the

.

Levie on the
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Law

of

War

Nuremberg; but so far it had appeared
impossible to find a formula that would really cover all situations and on which
agreement would be general. It would not be right to limit the scope of the defence
International

Military Tribunal

to grave breaches only (as the

at

1CRC draft did).

According to one expert,

be stipulated that the subordinate not merely had the

right,

it

should

but was obliged, to

Some experts, however, were of a completely opposite
deletion of the proposed paragraph. They laid emphasis

disobey the unlawful order.

view and demanded the

on the

necessity to respect the exigencies of military discipline,

out that

it

would be

difficult in

whether to obey or not.
should be

far

more

It

and they pointed

time of armed conflict to permit soldiers to decide

was equally considered that the approach

to this question

general and that the principles recognized by the

Tribunal, the Draft

Code of Offences

Against the Peace and Security

Nuremberg
of Mankind

should be taken into account.

Actually, there

were

five separate proposals

on the

subject of superior orders,

none of which was adopted by the Conference. The ICRC thereupon took
it upon itself to include the following provisions in the Draft Additional Protocol
I prepared by it for use as the Working Document of the Diplomatic Conference

which the Swiss Government had
1974:

already agreed to host beginning in April

67

ARTICLE

77.

—

Superior orders

No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order, of his government

1

or of a superior which, if carried out,

would

constitute a grave breach of the

provisions of the Conventions or of the present Protocol.
2.

The

of having acted pursuant to an order of

fact

his

government or of

superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility if
established that, in the circumstances at the time, he should have reasonably
that

he was committing

a grave

it

a

be

known

breach of the Conventions or of the present

Protocol and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order.
/TO

The ICRC's Commentary on
It

that provision stated:

was pointed out that this provision might put soldiers

position, as they

were compelled by

issued to them.

That

is

military laws

in an extremely difficult

and regulations to obey orders

why it was thought necessary to add to the
reasonably known that he was committing a grave

the reason

sentence "he should have

breach" the words "and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order."

These provisions fared no better in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted

977 Protocol

the

1

in

1949 fared

in

than had the comparable provision proposed by the

I

the earlier Diplomatic

researcher, the action

on

these provisions

is

ICRC

Conference. Fortunately for the
better

documented than was

that of
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its

1949 predecessor. After considerable debate in Committee

and 1977
that

sessions

Committee

of the Diplomatic Conference, a

to

make

I

during the 1976

vote was taken in

roll call

the basic determination as to whether an article

on

which was being drafted.
To implement that
That roll call resulted in a favorable vote of 34/9/35.
decision the following article was subsequendy approved by the Committee by
superior orders should be included in the Protocol

a

vote of 38/22/1 5:
Article 77.

1.

The High Contracting

—

Superior orders

Parties undertake to ensure that their internal

penalizing disobedience to orders shall not apply to orders that

would

law

constitute

grave breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol.
2.

The mere

of having acted pursuant to an order of an authority or a

fact

superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility, if
established that in the circumstances at the time he
that

knew

or should have

it

be

known

he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol.

It

may, however, be taken into account in mitigation of punishment.

The breadth of the differing views of the various delegations was indicated
72
by the fact some twenty-five of them found it necessary to explain their votes.
Those explanations
did,

or did not,

fell

into three general categories: the proposed article either

draw the necessary balance between compliance with

humanitarian law and military discipline; the proposed
not,

draw an adequate

article either did,

or did

between national and international law; and

distinction

the proposed article properly, or improperly, limited

its

coverage to "grave

breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol. Thereafter,

with a

minimum of discussion,

on 30

May

up by the Plenary Meeting
As the Conference rules
vote 36/25/25.

the article was taken

1977 and resulted in

a

required a two-thirds majority for the inclusion in the 1977 Protocol
constituted a rejection of the article

were not considered

amounted
I,

to only

as

on superior

orders.

I,

the vote

(Although abstainers

voting, the 36 affirmative votes out of 61 votes cast

59% of the

total.

To have been included in the 1977 Protocol

41 of the 61 votes cast were required.)

Conclusion
There has been no international

activity in this area since the rejection

by the

Diplomatic Conference in 1977 of the provision adopted by the Committee of
that

Conference.

The

current discussions in the International

Law Commission

appear to have completely eliminated any reference to the subject; and the
present author
a provision,

is

inclined to believe that even if the

perhaps similar to that contained in

its

Commission were

1954

draft

to adopt

of Code of Offences

Levie on the

288

Law

of

War

Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,

it

would be included

adoption. In other words,

it

a

would

provision

Committee of the General Assembly

receive the approval of the Sixth (Legal)

or that

doubtful that such

it is

any convention submitted to the nations for

in

appears unlikely that there will be any internationally
"7

approved provision on the subject of superior orders in the foreseeable

Where

A

future.

On

two occasions specific proposals for
provisions of major humanitarian conventions on the law of war which would
have placed limitations on the availability of superior orders as a defense have
does that leave the matter?

been rejected by

large, representative,

United Nations eliminated such

Convention prepared by

its

Diplomatic Conferences.

An organ of the

proposal from the draft of the Genocide

a

Two

Secretary-General.

specific proposals drafted

by the International Law Commission which included provisions on the subject
of superior orders have met with less than enthusiasm from the General Assembly
of the United Nations. Although

was not

this latter

necessarily directed against

the proposed provisions with respect to superior orders, but might have been

directed against other parts of the

documents submitted by the Commission, the

remains that in the more than forty years which have elapsed since the

fact

completion of the war crimes

trial

there has

would be

—and

there

availability

of the defense of

superior orders has been rejected as a rule of international law and that such

defense

is

is

professionally derelict if he failed

denying the

to assert to the trial court that the rule

been no

law provides otherwise, any defense

in sight. Unless applicable national

counsel in a future war crimes

II,

by any international body

successful drafting of such a provision

none

World War

trials after

a

with the commission of a violation

available to an individual charged

of the law of war.
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The Law of Naval Warfare: Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 28
(Naval

War

College International

Richard J. Grunawalt

Law

Studies

No. 65,

1993)

ed.,

Parti

Submarine

Early History of the

Although

the idea of a submersible boat dates back at least to the early

number of efforts

seventeenth century, and a

occurred over the subsequent years,

was not

it

to perfect such a vessel

until the latter part

eighteenth century that realistic attempts began to be

During the
submersible

known

as

the American Turtle.

British

one-man

a

several attacks against British

Its

unsuccessful.

Then in 1 797 Robert

who had been demonstrating his version of the submersible to the French

Navy, submitted
the use

all

of the

in this respect.

American Revolution David Bushnell devised

warships were, for one reason or another,
Fulton,

made

had

by

his

French Directory for the construction and

a proposal to the

"Nautulus

Company" of

a

submarine against the ships of the

Navy. Paragraph Six of that proposal

And whereas

fire

stated:

Ships or other unusual means of destroying Navies are

Considered Contrary to the Laws of war, and persons taken in such enterprises
are liable to Suffer death,

it

be an object of Safety

will

if

the Directory give the

Company Commissions Specifying that all persons taken in the Nautulus
Submarine Expedition Shall be treated as Prisoners of War, And in Case of

Nautulus
or

Violence being offered the Government will Retaliate on the British Prisoners in
a

It

four fold degree.

can thus be seen that even in

its

earliest

form, and even

directed solely against warships, the submarine

Fulton was unable to

sell his

was equally unsuccessful in

From

idea to the French

selling

it

was

it

it

was

a controversial

to

be

weapon.

Government. Subsequently, he

to the British.

the very beginning of the idea of a vessel that

water instead of on the water,

when

was accepted

that if

would
it

travel

under the

could be successfully
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developed

it

Law

would be an

large standing navies. It
it

would be used

It

War

asset to small nations, nations

was assumed

American

Civil

War

which could not

It is,

therefore, not surprising to

the Confederacy developed and built

type of vessel to be used against the blockading warships of the

was

a

Union Navy.

David and altogether the Confederate Navy probably constructed

called a

more than

afford

because of its anticipated short range,

that,

primarily for coastal defense.

find that during the
this

of

dozen of them.

propelled by a steam engine,

moved with

it

was not

It

had to have

truly a submersible, because,
a constant

being

source of air. Accordingly,

—not exacdy

recommended
method for safe navigation, and one which resulted in a number of sinkings
during its trials, with the loss of most of the members of the crews. However,
on October 5, 1863, one of these boats attacked and damaged the U.S.S. New
The Confederates also built a true submersible, called the Hunley,
Ironsides.
propelled by eight members of the crew turning a crankshaft which ran down
the center for most of the length of the vessel and which was connected to a
propeller. Its claim to fame is that on February 17, 1864 it sank the U.S.S.
it

its

Housatonic-znd

deck awash and an open hatch

itself] It

may be

said that the

of the submarine in warfare

era

Navy appeared

a

David and the Hunley ushered in the

—even though

at this

point the Confederate

to lose interest in submersibles.

In the quarter century

being developed, and

which followed, numerous other inventions were

tested, in various countries, particularly in France, a

country which had early exhibited great interest in such a weapon, even though
it

had rejected Fulton's proposal. The

first really

successful submersible, the

forerunner of the submarine of today, was built by John P. Holland, an

Irish-American who, after he had constructed several models, succeeded in
selling the latest version

that

first

the

it

of the Holland to the United

had acquired. At

that

States

Navy

same period both the United

Royal Navy placed orders with Holland

in 1900, the

States

for the construction

Navy and

and delivery

of additional submarines; while a number of continental nations were placing
similar orders

with Holland and other inventors. Even Admiral von Tirpitz,

head of the German Navy, was eventually convinced that the submarine was
o

no longer

solely a

weapon of coastal

defense.

The 1899 Hague Peace Conference
When, on December
Russia issued

its

30, 1898, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Imperial

proposed agenda for the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, one

item thereof stated:
4.

Prohibition of the use in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo-boats or

of other engines of destruction of the same nature;

Submarine Warfare
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Second Subcommission of the

Commission of the Conference on May

31, 1899, the

German

First

representative

indicated that "if all the other governments agreed not to adopt vessels of this
kind,

Germany would join

in this understanding";

delegates concurred in that statement; the
his

Government "wishes

United

and the

Italian

and Japanese

States delegate indicated that

to preserve full liberty ... to use

submarine torpedo

boats or not"; the delegate of Austria-Hungary gave his personal opinion that
"this

new invention

.

.

.

may be

used for the defense of ports and roadsteads and

render very important services"; the French delegate stated that "the submarine

torpedo [boat] has an eminendy defensive purpose, and that the right to use

it

should therefore not be taken from a country"; the British delegate thought that

would consent to the prohibition in question if all the great Powers
were agreed on this point. It would concern itself little as to what decision the
smaller countries reached"; the Dutch delegate and the delegate of Sweden and
Norway believed that "the submarine torpedo [boat] is a weapon of the weak,
"his country

and does not think

its

use can be prohibited."

In his report the Rapporteur of the Subcommission said

After an exchange of personal views

which enabled

several delegates

...

regarding the future of this weapon,

made by

a majority

be considered

as

Bulgaria, Greece, Persia,

First

and precise ideas

shown that, according to

a prohibition

at least for

His prognostication was confirmed

submarine was taken in the

to formulate very clear

it is

of the delegates,

very unlikely,

on the question of submarine torpedo boats

of the boats in question must

the time being.

when

a vote

on the proposal

to

ban the

Commission and resulted in five votes (Belgium,

and Siam) for the prohibition with

votes (Germany, Great Britain,

the declarations

Italy,

Japan, and

Rumania)

reservations; five

for the prohibition

on condition of unanimity; and nine votes (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France,

Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and

Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,

States) in the negative. Russia, Serbia,
all

efforts to

ban the submarine

be borne in mind that
that the

at this

at

and Switzerland abstained.

the 1899

12

the United

That ended

Hague Peace Conference.

point in time most naval experts

still

It

should

considered

submarine was a weapon to be used for coastal defense, particularly by

the smaller

and weaker nations which did not have strong

13

navies.

Litde or no

consideration was given to the fact that the submarine might be valuable as a

commerce

destroyer and

submarine, inexplicably,
restnctions

on

its

on the high seas. Moreover, having failed to ban the
no attempt was made to obtain even minimum

.14

operations.
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The 1907 Hague Peace Conference
During the period between the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
the major international event in the military area was the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-1905).

No

submarines participated in

one author has

this conflict but, as

pointed out, even a few Russian short-range submarines could have done enough

damage

to the Japanese to

have caused the

latter to

lift

and even a few of the longer-ranged ones could have

At

ofJapanese troops in Korea.

that time,

the blockade of Port Arthur

effectively

impeded the landing

however, neither Japan nor Russia had

any submarines in their navies. That situation would soon change.

The Russian agenda

for the

1907 Second Hague Peace Conference called for

and customs of maritime

the "framing of a convention relative to the laws

-17 When

•

warfare," but contained no specific mention of the submarine.

Fourth Commission of that Conference met for the
its

President, de Martens of Russia, said:

what the Second Commission of the
18
While the Conference did
warfare."
respect to

"We
last

time on June 24, 1907,

first

now do

must

draft a

number of conventions with

war at sea, some good and some not so good,

Although there

is

for naval warfare

Peace Conference did for land

the possibility of drafting

with respect to the use of submarines was not even

rules

a subject

both of those Hague Peace Conferences to reach agreement on
19

the use of submarines,

United

torpedo-boat or

a

vessel representing

restrictions

States proposal to

exempt

the poisoning of arms and of springs had

a

a

private property

few moments

thousand

I

do not

now

see

lives.

a

magnificent

In 1899 Russia

an

as

were accepted unanimously.

It will,

idea.

however, be appropriate

out that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VI provided that

enemy merchant

safety

it

any indication among us of such an

No further mention of submarines could be found.
to point

from

been prohibited, and most of the Powers

to adhere to the proposal provided

But unfortunately

on

said:

submarine can annihilate in

an enormous outlay and

all

proposed that the employment of such engines of destruction be given up, just

seemed ready

of

of the 1907 Conference. During the lengthy

capture or seizure at sea the Belgian delegate

A

inability

the present author could find only one passing reference

to the subject in the proceedings

discussion of the

of discussion.

tendency on the part of writers to refer to the

a

the

'

ship

were

of the persons on board

to

as

if

be destroyed "provision must be made for the

well

as

the security of the ship's papers."'

1909 Declaration of London
Article

I

of this Declaration stated that "the

rules

contained in the following

Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of
international law."

As the Declaration was intended

to be all-inclusive insofar

Submarine Warfare
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on maritime trade during the course of a war were concerned and
as it contained no special rules with respect to submarines, it must be assumed
23
That being the case, submarines
that there were at that time still no such rules.
would be bound by the general rules applicable to all warships. Customary
as restrictions

law prescribed

international

that,

while a warship could be attacked without

warning, a merchant vessel was a noncombatant which could only be attacked

warning and which could only be sunk under exceptional circumstances

after

and then only

of the passengers and crew had been assured.

after the safety

Although the then Lieutenant Rickover wrote in 1935 that

"[i]n

German government

correspondence with the United States the

its

official

appears not to

have questioned the American contention that the rules of international law

governing surface men-of-war applied

War I Germany

actually did take issue

she had chosen to use "a

regulated

with

new weapon,

by international law and,

in

during

also to the submarine,"'
this

conclusion. She contended that

the use of

doing

so,

which had not yet been

could not and did not violate

any existing rules but only took into account the peculiarity of this

weapon does not

to the British
first

itself carry

of war."

in the existing rules

new weapon,

Contrariwise, Lauterpacht took the position that "[t]he

the submarine boat."'

novelty of a

World

with

Strange to

is

a legitimate claim to a

relate, in a

Ambassador in Washington, the

point to be established

it

that international

change

message of July 18, 1916

British Foreign Office said:

law ought not to

modification to submarines, rules and regulations which

transfer

work

"The

without

fairly

well as

regards surface vessels."
It

was during the immediate pre- World War I period

a decision

which was

of the submarine

to

as

that Great Britain

made

have far-reaching consequences with respect to the use

a

commerce

destroyer and the disregarding of the

requirements of warning and of assuring the safety of the passengers and crew.

On March

26, 1913

announced

in

merchantmen,
defensive and

Winston Churchill, then

Lord of the Admiralty,
Parliament the intention of the British Government to arm its
First

the same time asserting that the armaments

at

would not change

would be

the status of these vessels as

noncombatant

.

merchant

As

we

ships, to

be distinguished from converted armed merchant

shall see, this

stricdy

decision had serious consequences in both

.29

cruisers.

World Wars,

one being the so-called "unrestricted submarine warfare" and the subsequent
controversy

as

Protocol are

still

whether the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine

to

binding law.
Part

World War
In

World War

the protection of

I

I

II

(1914-1918)

the inadequacy of the law of naval warfare with respect to

merchant

vessels

proved

to

be

a

matter of prime importance
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for both belligerents

Civil

War was

of

and

neutrals. It

may

well be said that while the American

the beginning of the era of the submarine,

recognition

as a

World War

I.

On

War

Law

August

dangerous

6,

—and

controversial

—

naval

only received

it

full

weapon system during

1914, just a few days after the outbreak of

World War

I,

Secretary of State Bryan sent a circular message to the belligerents asking each
if

it

would be

down by

"willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid

the Declaration of London of 1909 shall be applicable during the present conflict
in Europe."'

Most of the

belligerents, including

Germany, indicated

that they

would comply with the rules set forth in that Declaration, subject to reciprocity.
However, Great Britain's decision to adopt these rules was made "subject to
certain modifications and additions which they adjudge indispensable to the
efficient conduct of their naval operations."
As a result of the British position,
32
the United States withdrew its suggestion.
Primary among these British
'

"modifications and additions" was a vast increase in the
33

items.

Historically, an

be stopped,

visited,

enemy merchant ship was

list

of contraband

noncombatant which could

a

and searched in order to examine her papers and to determine

whether she was carrying contraband, and captured

if

found

to

be carrying

contraband, but which could not be attacked, nor destroyed, except under
specific

and limited circumstances

aboard had been assured.
safety unless the

The

—and then only

lifeboats

of the persons

after the safety

were not considered

to

be

a place

of

weather was moderate and land was within a reasonable distance,

or another vessel was available which could take the crew and passengers of the

doomed vessel aboard. For some months after the outbreak of World War I
German submarines were used almost exclusively in the capacity of warship
against warship.
The few merchantmen which were sunk by German
submarines during

this

period had suffered their fate in

strict

accordance with

the customary law of naval warfare applicable to the sinking of merchant vessels

by

surface warships

— they had been stopped by

a

warning

shot, visited

and

searched, found to have contraband aboard, and the safety of passengers and

crews had been assured before they were sunk.

*

That procedure was not

to

continue.

On November 3,

1914 the

Sea must be considered

was so

a military area."'

effective that the

declaration of a

British gave notice that "the

agreed

on

war zone around

neutrals

with

the

British sea blockade

German Navy urged
the British

be sunk. The Foreign Office opposed such
effect

The

a

whole of the North

Isles

of Germany

the need to counter

within which

all

ships

Government determined

Office.

that

it

by

a

would

procedure because of its anticipated

and the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg,
Foreign

it

However,

early

in

at first

1915 the German

had no alternative but to use the submarine

stop the flow of food and essential munitions to the British

37
Isles

to

and on
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February

4,

1915 the German Admiralty issued

a
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Proclamation declaring the

waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel,
to

be

a

"war zone" in which,

after

February 18, 1915,

all

enemy merchant ships

—

would be destroyed without assuring the safety of the passengers and crews in
The Proclamation added
other words, they would be sunk without warning.
that,

because,

merchant
risk in

on January

vessels to fly neutral flags,

the

A

announced zone.

justified the

German

had ordered

31, 1915, the British Admiralty

even neutral merchant

would be

vessels

lengthy "Memorial", issued

at

British
at

the same time,

action as retaliation for British disregard of the provisions
in

of the 1909 Declaration of London and of the 1856 Declaration of Paris

North Sea between Scodand and Norway

the British declaration of the

as

being

of war" combined with neutral acceptance of these

"comprised within the

seat

British violations.

was thus

It

and

that

first

arose a

problem which continues

to

plague the Governments and navies of the world and students of the law of

maritime warfare to

this

day

—

the question of the legality of war zones, under

any of the various names which have been given to such areas of the high

by

seas

41

belligerents.

The German Proclamation caused
States.

considerable consternation in the United

Robert Lansing, then Counselor of the Department of State, prepared

a

German proclamation which he himself referred to as "sharp." It
described the German intention as "a wanton act unparalleled in naval
warfare." " However, after he had read the accompanying "Memorial" he
reply to the

relented considerably. Nevertheless, the United States protest

described
use of the

as

American

accomplished

among

The United

"strong."

its

flag

by British merchant

44

be

Great Britain the

As neither of these

ships.

still

protests

purpose, the United States proposed that each side should,

other things, agree:

That neither

States also protested to

may

45

will use submarines to attack

merchant

vessels

of any nationality

except to enforce the right of visit and search.

That each
for the

will require their respective

purpose of disguise or

Germany accepted
the
a

ground

that the

claim to torpedo

this

merchant

vessels

not to use neutral

ruse de guerre.

proposal with conditions. Great Britain rejected

German Proclamation of February

at sight";

and

4,

that submarines did not,

ships before prize courts, sinking

crews, etc.

1915 was, "in

and could

with the well-established rules of maritime warfare, such

existed, distinguishing

flags

as

not,

it

on

effect,

comply

bringing merchant

them only when extraordinary circumstances

between neutral and enemy

ships, assuring the safety

of

Of course, the British position disregarded the fact that by accepting
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Germany would

the proposed agreement

any claimed right to "torpedo
This began
that

at sight"

with

campaign of submarines

a

have, in effect, consented to give up

as

of its

all

corollaries.

commerce

destroyers, a

campaign

extended from February 1915 to September 1915, during which period

made

German Government by the Government of
the United States over attacks upon and the sinking of American merchant vessels
and of other merchant vessels on which American citizens were traveling. The
strong protests were

matter reached
result

a

to the

peak with the sinking of the Lusitania on

of which over 100 American citizens were

the following statement:

lost.

May

The U.S.

7,

1915

as a

protest included

47

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the
objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies
employing submarines

in the practical impossibility of

in the destruction

of

commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and
humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically
impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine
her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her;
and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without
leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.

when the Arabic was sunk on
aboard, German submarines were

After another strong protest by the United States

August

19, 1915,

with American

citizens

ordered not to attack passenger ships without a warning and an opportunity for
the passengers and

crew

to

be taken to

a place

of safety.

As

this

required the

submarine to come to the surface, an extremely dangerous procedure in

a

German submarines were soon recalled from the English
Channel. One anonymous author believes that this seven-month period
(February-September 1915) "saw the submarine come of age as the first modern
weapon to make war a universal scourge, rather than a professional duel between
confined area,

rival

all

armies and

fleets."

Thus, within the

first

World War

year of

I

the use of the submarine had

generated issues with respect to the arming of merchantmen, the use of
colors, the establishment

false

of "war zones", the sinking of merchantmen without

warning, and the failure to assure the safety of the passengers and crews. All of

two were addressed by the 1936
The problem of the status of merchantmen

those issues continue to exist; only the latter

London Submarine

Protocol.

under convoy did not

50

arise until

much

later in the

war.

Disputes with respect to submarine warfare continued to arise and
April 18, 1916, the United States

warned Germany

finally,

on

that if the latter intended to

continue "to prosecute relendess and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of
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what the United States must consider the sacred
and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates
The
of humanity," it would have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations.

commerce without regard

German

reply, dated

May

the following instructions

to

4,

1916, notified the United States

had been issued

to

In accordance with the general principles of

merchant

vessels

German

visit

as [a]

and without saving human

naval

war zone,

lives, unless

that

naval forces:

and search and destruction of

recognized by international law, such

without the area declared

Government

shall

vessels,

both within and

not be sunk without warning

these ships attempt to escape or offer

resistance.

The following months were comparatively free of incidents but,
the success of the U-boats

understandably,

was considerably reduced. Ultimately, the German

Government decided that its only possibility of winning the war, which had
reached a stalemate on land, was to embark on a program of unrestricted
submarine warfare and an announcement of such a policy was suddenly made
on January 31, 1917, to take effect the following day.
On February 3, 1917,
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany;
on March 12,
on
1917, the United States announced its intention to arm its merchantmen;
April 2, 1917, in a speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war against
Germany, President Wilson stated: "The intimation [of the German
Government] is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our
merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of the law and subject to be
dealt with as pirates would be";
and on April 6, 1917, the United States
declared war on Germany.
Because of the magnitude of the problem created by the arming of
merchantmen during World War I, it is, perhaps, advisable to deal with it at
some length at this point. It is a problem which was and is important to neutrals
as well as belligerents inasmuch as Article 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention
No. XIII,
provides that, in general, a warship may only remain in neutral
waters for twenty-four hours. If armed merchantmen are warships, then this rule
applies to them and if they remain in neutral waters beyond the
twenty-four-hour period, they
subject to internment. If they

are,

under Article 24 of the same Convention,

were held

provisions, their utility as cargo carriers

to

fall

within the ambit of those

would be completely

nullified as

could accomplish unloading and reloading within that time frame.

demanded that
Convention
It

Germany

the United States (and other neutrals) apply the provisions of this

armed merchantmen. The United States declined to do
The Netherlands was the only country that so interpreted

to British

58
so.

none

appears that

and applied the cited provisions of the Hague Convention.
taken the position that "neutrals are not justified in treating an

One

author has

armed merchant

Levie on the

302

vessel as an

A

Law

of

War

innocent peaceful

major work argues

carrier.

By

that neutral states

and tenuous distinction between

so doing they risk their neutrality."

"employed the convenient but

'offensive'

elusive

and 'defensive' armament" because

of their desire to avoid the need to apply the provisions of the 1907 Hague

Convention No. XIII

The

to

armed

provisions of the 1907

belligerent

merchantmen.

Hague Convention No. VII

62
require,

among

other things, that merchant vessels converted into warships must be placed under

commander who

the direct authority of the State and must have a

is

"in the

Service of the State and duly commissioned by the competent authorities" and
a

crew which

subject to military discipline.

is

When

the British ordered the

many of the captains and other officers
of these vessels held commissions in the Royal Navy Reserves and many of the
vessels were subsequently furnished with Royal Navy gun crews. Nevertheless,
arming of all of their merchant

vessels,

Government contended

the British

were armed

that these vessels

defensive purposes and that, therefore, these facts did not
auxiliary cruisers.

of the

officers

solely for

make them armed

The British were probably correct in contending that the status

and

men

did not bring the vessel within the provisions of

this

Hague Convention. The vessels were not State vessels and the crews, other than
the gunners, were not subject to military discipline. However, whether the fact
that they were armed removed them from the category of vessels entitled to the
protections of customary international law
It is

is

an altogether different question.

often believed that the original decision of the British

Government

to

arm its merchant ships was reached as a measure of protection against submarines.
This

is

not

so. In

March 1913, when Churchill made

House of Commons,

now good

is

auxiliary cruisers.

reason to believe that a considerable

merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed
of guns.

.

.

.

announcement

in the

the British were not concerned with submarines, they

were concerned with converted merchant
There

his

Our food-carrying liners and

number of

ships

vessels carrying

Thus he

said:

foreign

by the mounting

raw material following

would in certain contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and
the manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they
the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one effective gun and a few

these trade routes

equipped in

would be

at

rounds of ammunition.

.

.

.

Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be

covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed

merchantman
Again, a year

The House

Much

is

another merchantman armed in

later,

on March

will expect

me

17, 1914,

to say a

misconception has arisen on

he

its

own

defence.

said:

few words on the arming of merchant
this subject.

.

.

.

ships.

Forty ships have been armed

with two 4.7 guns apiece, and by the end of 1914-1915 seventy ships will have
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been so armed. They

are

armed

solely for defensive purposes.

mounted in the stern and can only fire on a pursuer.
in common with merchant vessels taken over by
commissioned

into

nor are these

auxiliary cruisers,

Vessels so

The guns
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are

armed have nothing

the Admiralty and converted
vessels privateers or

commerce

They are exclusively ships which carry food to this country.
They are, however, thoroughly
not allowed to fight any ship of war.

destroyers in any sense.

They are

.

capable of self-defence against

During the years
United

much

States

to

that

it

be desired. However,

the problem,

it

will

.

World War I, the position of the
armed merchantmen was so ambivalent as to leave

was

with respect to

.

an enemy's armed merchantmen.

a neutral in

as it

was one of the main

players with respect to

be of interest to analyze the permutations and combinations

which were encountered in the negotiations on this subject and the decisions
which were made and unmade.
Within a few days after the beginning of the war the British Charge d' Affaires
in

Washington

called the attention

of the Secretary of State to the

fact that "a

number" of British merchant vessels were armed "solely for the purpose
Two weeks later, the British Ambassador advised the Secretary
of defence."

certain

of State that he had been directed to give the United

States:

the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes

of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for purposes of defence,
that they will

never

fire unless first fired

upon, and that they will never under any

circumstances attack any vessel.

Despite these assurances,
their
to

it

does not appear that the armed merchantmen used

guns solely for defense, nor that the British Government expected them

do

so.

Thus, confidential instructions to masters of armed merchant vessels

stated:

If a

submarine

is

obviously pursuing a ship by day and

that she has hostile intentions, the ship

notwithstanding the submarines
act,

such

as firing a

when

evident to the master

pursued should open

fire

may not have committed

in self-defence,

a definite hostile

gun or torpedo.

Any submarine approaching
Moreover,

[sic]

it is

a

merchant

vessel

may be

treated as hostile.

they became available, merchant ships were supplied with

depth charges, definitely an offensive weapon.
In justification

of the practice of arming merchant

ships,

and in support of

them from a noncombatant status, the
British frequently referred to the long history of armed merchant ships, pointing
out that this had been ordered by Royal Proclamation as early as the seventeenth
their

contention that

this

did not remove
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Levle on the

century and that

Law

of

War

had been recognized by Prize Courts during the
They omitted to mention that this procedure had been

this right

Napoleonic Wars.

directed against pirates and privateers and that there
the well-traveled trade routes

which the

were no longer

were traversing and

British ships

on

pirates

that

privateering had been prohibited by the 1856 Declaration of Paris.

Lauterpacht, while a strong supporter of the right of a belligerent to

merchant

At the same time

it is

clear that the

substantial difficulty. In the

between

of

1856

is

on

entided to

the

vessels. Thirdly, the fact that a

resist actual

of distinction

a line

fraught with danger inasmuch

September

19,

vessel or

visit

commissioned

merchantman

or anticipated attack makes

Law without running

armament of the merchant

On

problems of

encouragement of even

between

distinction?]

submarines to exercise their right of
International

is

caveat:

vessels raises

not easy to draw

it is

the part of private vessels

[and

non-commissioned
she

place,

its

undermine the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of

threatens to

Paris

first

arming of merchant

offensive and defensive acts. Secondly, the

defensive hostilities
as it

added the following

ships for defensive purposes,

arm

armed and

impossible for

it

that

enemy

and capture in accordance with

the risk of destruction

being

is

and

rammed by

1914 the Department of

by the superior

her.

memorandum,

State issued a

prepared by Robert Lansing, entitled "The Status of Armed Merchant Vessels,"

which provided
ammunition

that,

while

a

merchant

for defensive purposes

of such items aboard would create

vessel

might carry armament and

without becoming
a

presumption

purposes, a presumption that could be

a

warship, the presence

that they

were

overcome by showing

for offensive

that the vessel

armament for defensive purposes only. The memorandum then
proceeded to list a number of "indications" that the armament would not be
used offensively, including such items as the size and number of the guns, their
With one
location on the vessel, the status of the officers and crew, etc.
amendment which provided that the presence of any gun on a merchantman,
this
no matter what its size, would create the presumption of offensive use,
memorandum laid down the policy followed by the United States during 1914
carried

its

and 1915.

On January 7,
to President

of even
to

1916, Lansing,

Wilson

in

a small caliber

now the Secretary of State,

which he pointed out the

memorandum

potential clanger to submarines

gun on an armed merchantman;

be required to give warning to merchant

sent a

that if submarines

vessels, the latter

should not be

armed; and that armed merchantmen should, therefore, be treated
possessing the immunities of private commercial vessels.

were

as

not

President Wilson

concurred with these conclusions and, on January 18, 1916, Lansing circulated
an informal letter to the belligerents in which he

set forth the

general rules of

Submarine Warfare
international

merchant

law and humanity understood
during a war.

vessels

He

to

be applicable to noncombatant

called attention to the

manner

submarine had changed maritime operations and the dangers

which the

in

faced

it

compelled to stop and search an armed merchant vessel on the high
then
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when

seas.

He

said:

and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels

Moreover,

pirates

of the

and privateering has been abolished. Consequendy, the placing of guns

seas,

on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only
on the ground of a purpose to render a merchantman superior in force to
submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. An armament,
therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive
armament.
would, therefore, appear to be

It

if it

a reasonable

could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused

to adhere stricdy to the rules

merchant

searching

vessels,

of international law in the matter of stopping and
determining their belligerent

removing the crews and passengers
and

prizes of war,

that

to places

merchant

vessels

my Government

should add that

argument

that a

merchant

nationality,

of safety before sinking the

and

vessels as

of belligerent nationality should be

prohibited and prevented from carrying any

I

and reciprocally just arrangement

armament whatsoever.

impressed with the reasonableness of the

is

vessel carrying

an armament of any

sort, in

view of the

character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea

craft,

should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral

as

a belligerent

Government, and

is

as

seriously considering instructing

well

its

by

officials

accordingly.

paragraph

If the

last

quoted was intended

agree to the basic suggestion, as

purpose.

While the

British

it

to

put pressure on Great Britain to

undoubtedly was,

it

did not accomplish

Government's adamant opposition

of the United States had probably previously been conveyed
until

March

23,

1916

Ambassador delivered

that the British

memorandum from

its

to the proposal

orally,

it

was not

to the Secretary

of

Government setting forth in some detail,
not always relevant, the reasons why that Government believed the proposal to
be pro-German, why it could not rely on a "non-guaranteed German promise",
and why it could not, therefore, accept the proposal made some two months
State a

earlier.

It

also

mentioned

presented

its

reasons

in the last paragraph

with international law.
it

the British

was pro-British.

'

The

why

did not consider that the action

of the American note would be in accordance

The Germans
British

it

won

also rejected the proposal, asserting that

both

battles:

they continued to arm their

merchantmen; and these armed merchantmen continued

to

be treated by the

Law
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Levie on the

United

States as ordinary

of

War

merchant

vessels

"armed

for defense only."

On March

memorandum, the
Department of State issued a new "Memorandum on the Status of Armed
Merchant Vessels" which was even more lenient on the subject than the 1914
25,

1916, just two days after the date of the British

memorandum had
The

status

been.

Two

pertinent paragraphs provided:

of an armed merchant

vessel as a

warship in neutral waters

may be

determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of
previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from

of the

all

the circumstances

case.

Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for the purposes of protection
against the

enemy,

in the course

In passing,

1928, the

are entided to enter

of legitimate

and leave neutral ports without hindrance

trade.

worthy of note with respect

it is

members of the then Pan American Union

problem

when,

in

drafted a convention

on

to this

that

the subject of maritime neutrality, Article 12(3) provided that the rules relating
to warships

would apply

Convention with
In conclusion,

it

might be

fire

armed merchant vessels"
merchant cruisers, they did not

said that "defensively

in that, unlike auxiliary
vessels;

they were not properly so-called in that they

immediately upon sighting

offensive action other than to

make

its

a

U-boat, before

appearance.

It

present author agrees with the following statement:

The

criteria [for

hostilities]

States ratified the

a reservation to that provision.

go searching for enemy

opened

armed merchantmen. The United
81

were properly so-called

usually

to

determining whether

should certainly include,

a

merchant

inter alia,

it

had taken any

should be obvious that the

82

vessel

is

participating in the

any armed merchant vessel and no

consideration should be given to the purported distinction between "defensive"

and "offensive" armament.

As we

shall see, this

same problem arose during the course of World
Part

War

83
II.

III

The Intra-War Period (1919-1939)

The

Versailles Treaty

document for the proposed League
be submitted to the Peace Conference which met at the end of
President Woodrow Wilson sought comments from David H.

In the course of drafting a suggested basic

of Nations, to

World War

I,

Miller, the Legal Adviser of the

American Delegation

to the Conference. In his

Submarine Warfare

comments on Wilson's Second
following provision:

The Contracting

Draft, Miller suggested the inclusion of the

84

Parties agree

never to make use of armed submarines in naval

operations, and further agree that they will hereafter build

or capable of being

307

armed and

further agree that

all

no submarines armed

submarines

now

in existence

or under construction shall be dismanded and rendered incapable of being armed
or shall be destroyed.

Wilson did not adopt

this

suggestion and while Article 191 of the Treaty of

which ended World War

Versailles

I

as

specifically prohibited "[t]he construction

for

between Germany and the

Allies,

or acquisition of any submarine, even

commercial purposes" by Germany, the Covenant of the League of Nations

contained no provision on the subject. As events proved,
Treaty, like

many of the

this

provision of the

other provisions thereof, was of litde value.

The 1921-1922 Washington Conference
In 1921 a Conference

The

on

the Limitation of Armament

conferees represented the five major victorious

France, Great Britain (and the

United States.

Commonwealth

met in Washington.
Powers in World War I:

countries), Italy, Japan,

and the

When the discussion with respect to submarines began, the British

Delegation took the position that "what was required was not merely restrictions

on submarines, but their total and final abolition." The French delegation was,
as it had been in the past, particularly opposed to the banning of the submarine
as

an accepted naval weapons system,

its

delegate saying:

method of warfare may or may not
be employed in conformity with the laws of war, and that the inhuman and
barbarous use made of the submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason
for condemning that belligerent, but not for condemning the submarine.

The French Government

believes that every

became obvious that the British proposal would not receive the
necessary support. As one commentator on the 1922 Diplomatic Conference
stated: "The British seem to hold that the submarine is an offensive weapon,
89
while the others consider that it is a defensive weapon."
Elihu Root, one of
It

quickly

the delegates of the
several

United States and a former Secretary of State, then submitted

proposed resolutions to the Conference. These resolutions

may be

considered to have been the genesis of the 1922, 1930, and 1936 codifications

of the rules relating to submarine warfare. Resolution
of existing law, while Resolution
90
law.

An

examination of the

II

was

Root

I

was

said to constitute a

Resolutions,

as

said to

be

a statement

change in the existing

minimally modified by the

Conference, will enable us to determine what the rules of submarine warfare

Levie on the

308

Law

were then considered

of

to be

War
and what the representatives of the nations present

considered that they should be,
here to

being an accepted

it

fact that the

submarine was

stay.

91

Root's Resolution

I

became

Articles

1

and 2 of the

treaty then in process

of being drafted, with only one major change: the logical addition of a second
condition under which

merchant

a

vessel

might be attacked (when

"to submit to visit and search after warning, or

As adopted and included

in the Treaty

it

refused
Q9

to

proceed as directed after seizure')

which was ultimately

.

these

drafted,

articles stated:

Art.

1

The

.

Signatory Powers declare that

among

the rules adopted

by

civilized

nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time

of war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law;

(1)
its

A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine

character before

A

merchant

can be seized.

it

must not be attacked unless

vessel

it

refuses to

submit to

visit

and

search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.

A merchant vessel
been

first

placed in

must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have

safety.

Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances

(2)

exempt from the

universal rules above stated; and if a submarine can not capture a vessel in

conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires

and from seizure and to permit the merchant

attack

Art. 2.

The

Signatory Powers invite

all

vessel to

it

proceed unmolested.

other civilized Powers to express their

assent to the foregoing statement of established

law so that there may be

public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct
the public opinion of the world

The

provisions of Article

of war

at sea

drafted.

Part

It

by

will

IV of the

1

is

to pass

from

to desist

judgment upon

have since been accepted

as

a clear

by which

future belligerents.

binding rules of the law

reiteration in substance in international agreements subsequently

become apparent that they formed
and
1930 London Naval Treaty

the basis for the provisions of
for those of

its

offspring, the

1936 London Submarine Protocol.
96

•

There can be no question but

that the provisions

of Root's Resolution

II

represented a major addition to the restrictions on the use of submarines in war
at sea. It

War

I.

It

condemned

the submarine for

was adopted

which did not

affect

as Article

its

what

a belligerent

had done in World

4 of the Treaty with only minor

substantive content.

It

read:

amendments

Submarine Warfare
Art.

The

4.

309

Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using

commerce

were violated in
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the
submarines

end

as

that the prohibition

destroyers without violating, as they

of the use of submarines

commerce

as

law of nations, they

universally accepted as a part of the

destroyers shall be

now

accept that

prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite

all

other

nations to adhere thereto.

This Article, outlawing the use of submarines against merchant vessels, even
they complied with the provisions of Article

law of war.

Had

it

done

so, it

the rules set forth in Article

Root's Resolution

1

,

would,
rules

as

did not survive

Root had

as Article

as a rule

of the

indicated, have supplanted

which codified then

was adopted

III

1,

if

existing law.

3 of the Treaty with only one

major change. That change was the substitution of the words "rules declared by

them with

respect to attacks

ships" for the

words

upon and

"rules declared

the seizure and destruction of merchant

by them with

the use of submarines in time of war."

cover violations of both Articles
Art. 3.
rules

The

Under

respect to the prohibition of

either reading, the provisions

and 4 of the Treaty. As Article 3

1

it

Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the

now read:
humane

of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure

and destruction of merchant
of any Power

who

under orders of

a

ships, further declare that

any of those

shall violate

governmental superior,

laws of war and shall be liable to

may be brought to

trial

the jurisdiction of which he

During the discussion of

civil

may be

this

shall

whether or not such person

be deemed

and punishment

trial

before the

rules,

any person in the service

as if for

Resolution the Japanese delegate asked for an

an act of piracy.

as

meant

would be

as

as if for

an act of piracy."

Root was quick

it

meant

that a violation

to indicate that

it

merely

universal jurisdiction, as in the case of piracy.

the provision already specifically so provided, there was, in reality,

no need for the reference
Like Article

However,

Power within

phrase was demonstrated by the fact that the Chairman,

should be treated

Inasmuch

an act of piracy and

found.

Secretary of State Hughes, said that he assumed that

that there

have violated the

or military authorities of any

explanation of the meaning of the phrase "punishment

The ambiguity of the

to

is

like

4, Article

to piracy

which merely caused confusion and antipathy.

3 has not survived

as a

separate rule of the law of war.

any other violation of the law of war, violations of the provisions

of the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare constitute universal

war crimes and the violator may
military authorities

found"

still

"be brought to

trial

before the

of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he

—depending, of

course,

on

the domestic law of that Power. In

civil

or

may be
fact, as

Law

Levie on the

31

we

shall see, after

War

of

World War

were charged with and

II

two German Admirals, Doenitz and Raeder,

tried for

having allegedly ordered

submarine

illegal

warfare.
In

form

final

its

1922 Washington Treaty (which

this

provision banning the use of noxious gases) included in

which

stated that

Inasmuch

was

this

quoted

as

would

it

France failed to

ratify

it,

having written,

a

few days

VI

Article

on the deposit of all the

a provision

ratifications."

the Treaty never took effect.

Admiral William V.

just as well.

as

"take effect

its

contained a

also

Pratt,

after the

99

of the United States Navy,

Conference ended,

practical

and

that

is

that the treaty

would not work.
This Diplomatic Conference created a Commission of Jurists with

was not

Perhaps

it

the task

of determining the adequacy of certain rules of international law with respect
to the

The Commission produced two

law of war.

wireless telegraphy in time of war
1

,

and one on

rules,

aerial warfare. Article 6,

one on

paragraph

of the former stated

The

wireless transmission,

on or above the high
immediate
be fired

seas,

by an enemy or

of any military information intended for

be considered

use, shall

neutral vessel or aircraft while being

a hostile act

completed
status.

a belligerent's

exposing the vessel or

aircraft to

at;

As the Diplomatic Conference had adjourned

on

of

sets

work, neither

its

set

of

sine die before the

rules ever received codified international

However, they undoubtedly represented the customary

the subjects

and

are

Commission

international law

worthy of and have received considerable

attention,

despite their informal status.
Article

1,

Neutrality

paragraph

of the Inter-American Convention on Maritime

1

104
sets forth in

considerable detail the rules with respect to the rights

of belligerent warships towards merchant
ship

vessels,

may not be rendered unnavigable before

the

including

a

provision that a

crew and passengers have been

placed in safety. Paragraph 2 makes these rules applicable to submarines with
the specific proviso that "[i]f the submarine cannot capture the ship while

observing these
the sh.p."

rules,

it

shall

not have the right to continue to attack or to destroy

105

The 1930 London Naval Conference

On January
convened,

this

21,

1930 another Conference on the Limitation of Armament

time in London.

It

was

officially

known

as

the

Conference of 1930. The participating Powers were the same
had been represented

Meeting

at

in

Washington eight

years earlier.

London Naval
as

At the very

which the subject of submarines was discussed the

those which
first

British

Plenary

once again

1

Submarine Warfare
proposed the abolition of the submarine,

United

States;

and once again

this

time with the

support of the

full

proposal received the support of

this

31

all

of the
1

0^i

Commonwealth countries, but the opposition of France, Italy, and Japan.
The United States had submitted a proposed resolution calling for the
appointment of a committee to consider

the abolition of the submarine; and

(1)

regulation of the use of the submarine "through subjecting

(2)

war governing

to the rules

it

of

the use of surface craft." France had submitted a proposed

resolution "forbidding submarines to act towards merchant ships otherwise than
in strict conformity with the rules, either present or future, to be observed
surface warships."

107

These resolutions were referred

to a

by

Committee of Experts
108

Committee of Jurists. The latter produced a Declaration
which was
approved unanimously by the First Committee and which was approved without
109
110
As incorporated into the Treaty,
discussion by the Plenary Meeting.
it
and

a

•

read:

Art. 22.

The following

In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines

(1)

Law

the rules of International

summoned, or of active
vessel or submarine,

of

which

to

without having
For

safety.

this

first

to

surface vessels are subject.

resistance to visit or search, a warship,

may

Law:

must conform

In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop

(2)

vessel

are accepted as established rules of International

on being duly

whether

surface

not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place

purpose the ship's boats are not regarded

and crew

unless the safety of the passengers

is

as a

place of safety

assured, in the existing sea

and

weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel

which

These

is

in a position to take

rules

aboard.

were, in general, a rephrasing and amplification of the rules which

had been included in Article
to

them

1

of the

1

922 Washington Treaty.

112
It is

important

note that while, pursuant to Article 23, the other provisions of the Treaty

ceased to be effective

on December 31, 1936,

without limitation of time." Despite the
accession to Part

Article

22 was "to remain in force

fact that there

was

a

provision for

IV of the Treaty by other Powers, no non-Conference Power

ever acceded, perhaps because France and Italy did not ratify these provisions
until 1936.

In addition to drafting the Declaration
the

Committee of Jurists made

The Committee wishes
where

it is

employed

a

to place

which became Article 22 of the Treaty,

statement which bears repeating.

it

on record

in the declaration,

is

that the expression

It said:

merchant

not to be understood

as

vessels

including a

Levie on the

31 2

merchant

manner

vessel

as to

Law

which

of

War

at

the

is

moment

participating in the hostilities in such a

cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel.

This would certainly include the merchant vessel which,
surfaces in

its

vicinity,

submarine, giving

its

immediately opens

when

or radios that

fire

a

submarine

has sighted a

it

longitude and latitude.

The 1935-1936 London Naval Conference
convened

In 1935 another Diplomatic Conference

in

London

to draft a

new

armament prior to the expiration of the 1930 London Naval
is frequendy associated with
Treaty. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol
treaty limiting naval

the

1

935-1 936 London Naval Conference and with the Treaty for the Limitation

of Naval Armament that was drafted

Conference and Treaty

that

at that

is

one further point

that

I

session of the
117
Minister of Great Britain, said:

should like to mention, because

very encouraging for our future deliberations. If

agreement for the abolition of submarines,
agreement which will prevent
laid

down rules for the

These

as a result

it is

their misuse. Part

me

vital

importance to reach an

IV of the London Naval Treaty

between the United States, Japan and the members

Commonwealth of Nations. But I am

of the preliminary

these rules have

appears to

proves impossible to obtain

it

of

it

treatment of merchant ships by submarines in time of war.

rules are already in force

of the British

relationship to

Its

At the opening

rather tenuous.

is

Conference Stanley Baldwin, the Prime
There

Conference.

talks

glad to be able to announce,
that,

once

distinct

from

with representatives of other nations,

been incorporated

in an instrument

which

will

be

London Naval Treaty, the French and Italian Governments who were unable
ratify the London Treaty as a whole will be in a position definitely to accept

the
to

such an instrument.
these rules

by

all

We

hope

at

the Fifteenth

be the

signal for the acceptance

Powers of the world and

the maritime

unrestricted submarine warfare

However,

that this will

may

it

by

this

means,

in the future be averted.

Meeting of the

1936, the French delegate found

that,

of

First

necessary to

Committee, held on March

13,

118
state:

on which we appeared all to be
agreed at the opening meeting of the Conference and which our First Committee
has not yet examined, namely, the embodiment in the Acts which our Conference
I

is

am

to

surprised not to see

draw up of the

on

rules

the

Agenda

a subject

of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty [of 1930],

concerning the use of submarines against merchant

The

vessels.

two treaties were quite separate
(the Japanese had left the Conference and would not sign the Naval Treaty but
would sign the Submarine Protocol) and that as another text had to be prepared
British representative pointed out that the

Submarine Warfare
they could only hope that the two could be signed at the same time.

matter of fact they were not, the Treaty being signed on

March

1

313
19

As

25, 1936,

a

and

more than seven months later, on November 6, 1936. On the latter
Protocol) was signed by the five nations which had participated in

the Protocol

date

(the

it

the drafting of both the 1930

Great Britain (and the
States.

and the 1936 London Naval

Commonwealth

Other nations were invited

was

belligerents in that

War

II

Japan, and the United

and approximately

erupted, including

war except Rumania. Japan was

Germany had acceded on November

not.

Italy,

to accede to the Protocol

37 others had done so before World

European

Nations),

Treaties: France,

23, 1936.

a Party,

all

of the

but China

120

The Nyon Agreements
The Spanish
American

the

War which began in 1936 was the first such conflict since
War in which submarines played a part. Because of their

Civil

Civil

method of operation, which included
ships

which did not belong to

nations

met

at

Nyon,

either side in the conflict, a

number of concerned

Nyon Agreement.

121

Any submarine which

in the conflict] in a

on and the sinking of merchant

Switzerland, in 1937 and drafted the

This agreement provided:

II.

attacks

attacks such a ship [one not

manner contrary

belonging to either side

to the rules referred to in the International

Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in

on April

22,

November

6,

1930 and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London on
1936,

shall

be counter-attacked and,

In effect, the Parties to this
a

civil

London

if possible,

Agreement were demanding

destroyed.

that the contestants in

war comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine

Protocol.
original
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(A Supplementary Agreement, signed three days

agreement applicable to surface

vessels

later,

made

and aircraft.) Nine European and

Mediterranean States were Parties to these agreements. (Understandably,
did not include

Germany and

Italy,

the

this

both of which were actively supporting the

Franco insurgents

who

probably controlled

Shortly thereafter,

on

October 1937, the Council of the League of Nations

adopted

(7)

a

Resolution which

Notes

dictates

5

that attacks

all

of the submarines involved.)

123
stated:

have taken place in violation of the most elementary

of humanity underlying the established rules of international law which

are affirmed, so far as

war time

is

concerned, in Part IV of the Treaty of London

of April 22, 1930, rules which have been formally accepted by the great majority
of Governments.

Law

Levie on the

31 4

Declares that

(8)

all

of

War

attacks of this kind against any

repugnant to the conscience of the

civilised nations

merchant

which now

vessels are

find expression

through the Council.

It is

strange that the League's Council referred to the 1930 Treaty,

only

a

few

and not

ratifications,

more than twenty-five

to the

ratifications

1936 Protocol, which, by

which had

this time,

had

and accessions.
Part IV

World War
As

in the case

conflict

II

and

of World War

by ensuring

Its

the British Admiralty had prepared for another

I,

many of

that

Aftermath (1939-1947)

its

merchant

ships

had been

with

built

mounting of guns and by storing guns to be used for
Moreover, the 1938 British Defense of Merchant Shipping

reinforced areas for the
124

arming those

•

ships.

Handbook included the following provisions:
As soon

the Master of a merchant ship realises that a ship or aircraft in sight

as

an enemy,

it is

his first

and most important duty

of the enemy by wireless telegraph. Such

means of saving not only the

Conditions under which

(a)

Against

armament

enemy

enemy who

is

plain that

it

(b)

Law, and

Against

will

it

enemy

enemy

war and November 4
least sixteen

had been

merchant

—As

it is

the

against an

ship.

On

will act in accordance

the

with

made

clear that resistance will

it

be

Law

—

If,

as

the

war

unfortunately becomes clear that, in defiance of International Law,

.

.;

sunk

illegal."

as

merchant

ships

without warning,

it

on an enemy surface vessel, submarine, or
attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will
fire

a favorable position for attacking.

to a British history

.

must only be used

acting in defiance of International

even before she has

illegally

Law

should be opened immediately.

has adopted a policy of attacking

According

.

should therefore not be opened until he has

to be averted, fire

is

prevent her gaining

sunk

fire

then be permissible to open

aircraft,

it

enemy

he intends to attempt capture. Once

progresses,

the

purpose of self-defence,

should be assumed that the

necessary if capture

.

may be opened:

clearly attempting to capture or sink the

outbreak of war
International

others;.

acting in accordance with International

solely for the

is

many

and position

promptly made may be the

a report

ship herself but

fire

to report the nature

is

of World

War II "between

the outbreak of the

[1939], thirty-two British and three Allied ships had been

many

as thirty-three neutral ships

in circumstances

which

had been attacked and

at

led to the conclusion that the sinking

5

Submarine Warfare
In his Memoirs, Admiral Doenitz, the

31

Commander of the U-boat arm of the

German Navy for a large part of the war, later the Commander-in-Chief of the
German Navy, and, ultimately, Hider's successor, asserts that these Instructions
were "a contravention of the Submarine Agreement."
that the

convoy system was contrary

merchant
as

ships,

were

Protocol

same Agreement.

127

Neither arming

nor ordering them to send by radio what can only be described

intelligence information,

warships,

to the

He also indicates his belief

sailing

acts contrary to

—but any of

them

convoy under the protection of
the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine

nor

removed

those acts

in

the particular merchant ship involved

from the limited category of ships protected by

On November 27,

that

Agreement.

128

1939 the British Government issued an Order in Council

Commerce of Germany which was intended, among
eliminate all German exports.
In response to neutral

Restricting Further the

other things, to
•

Government
basis
is

said in notes to the

of their actions

Italian

Governments

the British

that "the

main

admittedly the right of retaliation the essence of which

did, in fact, violate the

by the

rules as reprisal for illegal action

1856 Declaration of Paris and

a claim that

it

by

definition a reprisal contemplates an illegal
132
the party undertaking reprisal action.

was, nevertheless, legal because
action

Dutch and

Paris,

This was, of course, an admission by the British that the Order in

enemy."
Council

is

1856 Declaration of

from the ordinary

a departure
131

130

•

complaints of violation of the

by

On May

8,

1940, Churchill, once again First Lord of the Admiralty, stated

House of Commons that the Royal Navy had been instructed that in the
Skagerrak (a narrow arm of the North Sea between Denmark and Norway
leading into the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea) "all German ships by day and all
133
This action was
ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served."
frequently referred to by the Germans as a basis for their subsequent actions.
to the

Although the International Military Tribunal found Doenitz
the 1936

London Submarine Protocol by estabHshing operational

Churchill's order as

one ground for not
•

on the

On

guilty

basis

assessing
135

of violating

zones,

it

listed

punishment against Doenitz

of German submarine warfare.

August 28, 1939,

Germany had

a

few days before the outbreak of World
1

issued

its

Prize Ordinance

36

War

II,

which included some of the

by the 1936 London Submarine Protocol. A week later,
1939, Hitler issued Fuehrer's Directive No. 2, which provided

protections provided

on September 3,

by the German Navy against Great Britain were permissible
"warfare against merchant shipping is for the time being to be conducted

that offensive actions

but that

according to the prize regulations, also by submarines."

No.

137

Fuehrer's Directive

September 25, 1939, extended this directive to include the French.
The minutes of a conference between Hitler and Admiral Raeder, Chief of

the

4,

Naval

Staff,

held on September 23, 1939, reveal the following decisions:

139

Levle on the

31 6

The

2.

merchant

Law

of

War

intensification of anti-submarine

vessels will apparently

make

it

measures by

aircraft

impossible to search British

The Fuehrer approved the proposal
without previous warning against enemy merchant
in the future.

and armed

merchantmen

ships definitely identified as

such (with the exception of unmistakable passenger steamers), since

assumed that they

The

3.

warfare'

expression 'submarine warfare'

is

to

restrictions

It

j

is

to

be replaced by the expression 'war

be avoided. Instead of this, the proclamation of the
a military

'siege

of England'

system would free us from having to observe

whatsoever on account of objections based on International Law.

Fuehrer's Directive
t

may be

armed.

under consideration; such

any

it

merchant shipping.' The notorious expression 'unrestricted submarine

against

is

are

be taken

that action should

No.

5,

September 30, 1939, implemented these

decisions.

j 140

provided:

The

v/ar against

merchant shipping

is,

on

the whole, to be fought according to

prize law, with the following exceptions.

(1)

Merchantmen and

troopships recognized

beyond doubt

as hostile

may be

attacked without warning.

(2)

British

The same

applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters

Isles.

Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which
transmitters when stopped.
(3)

(4)

around the

As before, no

steamships

attacks are to

be made upon passenger

appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers

as

Even assuming

that "hostile"

merely meant "enemy," the

use their radio

vessels or large
as

first

well

as

goods.

part of the

first

exception (merchantmen, not armed merchantmen) was a violation of the
Protocol; the second part of that exception (troopships) was valid; the second

exception was probably justified;
the fourth

was intended

War and

of

I

to avoid incidents such as that
143
II.
the Athenia in World

and

of the Lusitania in World

War

During World

commerce

the third was undoubtedly justified;

War

II

Germany contended

that

its

use of the submarine as a

destroyer was a legal reprisal because of such British violations of the

law of naval warfare

of submarine

as

arming merchant

sightings, ordering

them

vessels,

ordering them to radio reports

to navigate

without

lights at

night,

ordering them to ram submarines, violations of the rules pertaining to blockades,
144
etc.

Thus, in

his

Memoirs, Doenitz wrote:

145

Submarine Warfare
In the same
step

by

way Naval High Command

reacted only with extreme caution and

which

step to the British measures

317

have just described and which

I

London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by
one the restrictions on the conduct of U-boat operations were removed in a series
of orders from Naval High Command beginning with permission to fire upon
constituted a breach of the

—

vessels

which used

guns, followed

which

their wireless,

(as a result

permission to attack

all

vessels identified as hostile

then, an established fact that

and ending with

operational zones.

as

.

of these provisions by the enemy, that

we

The

basis.

reached the

we

in response to breaches

allowed ourselves more and more

stage, as

it

was no need for Germany

British

a declaration

.

was inevitable

where the London agreement was abandoned completely and
Actually, there

to place

its

that

same treatment

as

warships

we

would,

for good.

actions

modus operandi constituted their merchant

auxiliaries, subject to the

by

the provisions of international law contained

London agreements and that it was only step by step,

latitude, until finally,

.

ships)

from the very outset the German Naval High

Command painstakingly adhered to
in the

and which carried

lights

of the instructions to ram given to British

of sea areas that would be regarded

It is,

without

sailed

- that

on

a reprisal

vessels naval

of being attacked

without warning immediately upon being sighted. As one author has

stated, the

London Submarine Protocol did not extend, and were
extend, to the "warshiplike merchantmen" of the British

provisions of the 1936

not intended to

merchant marine.

147

British procedures

Many

publicists are

changed the

forces,

and

therefore,

that the provisions

no longer

them into the British naval
1936 London Submarine Protocol were,

it

of the

integrated
148

The Commander's Handbook on the
149
United States Navy in 1987, states:

applicable to them.
.

Law

of armed British merchantmen from

status

noncombatants to combatants, that

of the opinion that these, and other,

.

by the

of Naval Operations, issued

.

During World War II the practice of attacking and sinking enemy merchant vessels
by

surface warships, submarines,

without

both

first

sides.

regularly

aircraft

without prior warning and

providing for the safety of passengers and crew was widespread on

Rationale for these apparent departures from the agreed rules of the

1936 London Protocol varied.
illegal acts

and military

Initially,

such

were justified

acts

as reprisals against

of the enemy. As the war progressed, however, merchant ships were

armed and convoyed,

participated in intelligence collection,

and were

otherwise incorporated directly or indirectly into the enemy's war-fighting/war
sustaining effort.

Consequendy, enemy merchant

legitimate military targets subject to destruction

on

were widely regarded

as

sight.

World War II the United States Congress
Act which, among other things, authorized the President

Shortly after the beginning of

enacted a Neutrality

vessels

Levie on the

31 8

to place restrictions
States
it

Law

of

War

"on the use of the ports and

territorial

waters of the United

by the submarines or armed merchantmen of a foreign

unlawful for foreign vessels to

the

fly

American

and authorized the President

to enforce)

which American

flag vessels

made

flag (a rather difficult provision

to designate

were forbidden

state." It also

"combat

areas" within

A

to proceed.

Presidential

Proclamation issued immediately thereafter placed such restrictions on the use

on submarines, but not on armed
Unlike the situation during World War I, the entrance into
merchantmen!
the ports of the United States by armed British merchantmen from the early
days of World War II did not seem to cause the Administration any concern
and was completely uncontrolled. From the very beginning of the war these
vessels were treated as peaceable cargo ships and Borchard's strong protest
This
appears to have occasioned little comment and no change of policy.
must be considered as one of the many indications of official American political
of American ports and

territorial

waters

151
'

policy favoring the British, rather than as a thoughtful interpretation of the
applicable law.

by the Neutrality Act, President

In accordance with the authority granted

Roosevelt

also issued a

Proclamation designating

American
this

flag vessels

were forbidden

combat zone and declared

without

warning,

to navigate.

153
"

zone, within which

its

with

coincide

to

"combat area" within which

a

•

the

Germany

availed itself of

vessels

would be sunk

all

American

zone.

During

his

cross-examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, before
the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz testified:

I

have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat

combat zones, they had

zones. If they entered the

damage, or

else stay

away. That

would be shown on land
or supplies to the enemy.
transport.

Sir

I

am

what war

is.

would be

fired

area.

That

is

risk

of suffering

For instance, no consideration

either to a neutral truck

It

run the

convoy bringing ammunition

on in exacdy the same way as an enemy

therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas

It is,

country into a combat
although

is

to

the position as

I

around the enemy's

know it in international law,

only a soldier.

David Maxwell-Fyfe:

I

see.

Doenitz: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas.
enters a

During

combat

this

area

Whoever

must take the consequences.

cross-examination Doenitz was also asked, "If you sank a neutral

which had come into that [declared operational] zone, you considered that
you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to
ship

look

after the safety

of the crews?"

To

this,

he replied: "In operational areas

I

Submarine Warfare

am
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obliged to take care of the survivors after an engagement, if the military

situation permits."

In finding Doenitz guilty of violating the 1936

London Submarine Protocol

by virtue of the German establishment of "operational zones," the International
Military Tribunal stated that the conferees in
in 1930,

in

London

knowledge of the

fact that

Washington in 1922,

and in London again in 1936, had had

full

"operational zones" (or "war zones," or "exclusion zones," or "combat zones,"

under whatever name one may give to them), had been declared by both
during

World War

"[y]et the protocol

I,

made no exception"

for them.

sides

'

It is

of interest to note that there was no mention whatsoever of such zones during
the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the provisions of the 1922

Washington Treaty, nor of those of the 1930 London Naval Treaty which

became the 1936 London Submarine Protocol; and

discussions whatsoever involved in the drafting of the Protocol

not be just

on

as logical to interpret all this as indicating that there

were no

there

that

itself.

Would

it

was no intention

the part of the draftsmen of those agreements to legislate with respect to this

problem, which went
application, that there

far

was no

which did not

in an area

beyond submarine warfare
desire or authority

relate exclusively to

on

in the

scope of

its

their part to establish rules
157

Moreover,

submarine warfare?

while the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty of waging unrestricted submarine
warfare

on what amounted to

a tu quoque defense,

of the use of operational zones on that same
that the British practice in this respect

was

it

failed to find

basis despite

identical with,

him not

guilty

undisputed evidence

and had preceded,

that

of the Germans.

There

is

one aspect of submarine warfare which appears

even though there can be no question

as to

to warrant

mention

the criminal liability of any person

engaged in it: the murder of the shipwrecked crews and passengers of ships which
have been sunk. This problem arose during World War

II

because of an incident

involving the Laconia, a British ship which was sunk in September 1942 by a

German submarine which then discovered that a large number of Italian
prisoners of war had been among those on board. The submarine took in tow
several lifeboats (as
substantial

displayed,

it

happened, the occupants of the

number of members of the
and sent

to render assistance as

provided:

to

Red

Cross

long

as

no

aggressive action against any vessel

none was taken

coming

against his U-boat. Unfortunately,

was by an American bomber which attacked and damaged

the U-boat, causing

was reported

with a large

a message, in English in the clear, asking for assistance in the

rescue efforts, promising to take

the only response

British crew),

lifeboats included a

it

to cast the lifeboats adrift

and

to

submerge.

159
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When

this

Doenitz he issued the so-called "Laconia Order" which

320

Levie on the

(1)

and

No

this

Law

of

War

attempt of any kind must be

made

at

rescuing

members of ships

includes picking up persons in the water and putting

them

sunk,

in lifeboats,

righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water.

Rescue runs counter

demands of warfare

of enemy ships and

to the rudimentary

for the destruction

crews.

(2)

Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers

(3)

Rescue the shipwrecked only

if their

statements

still

apply.

would be of importance

your boat.

for

(4)

Be

children in his

bombing

At Nuremberg the

enemy has no
on German cities.

mind

harsh, having in

attacks

that the

British prosecutor

contended

women

regard for

that this

was an order to destroy

any survivors of the ships sunk by German submarines, contending that
long been

German submarine

policy.

and

this

had

Evidence was adduced of a conversation

between Hitler and Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador

Germany, which

to

1

the

f\\

International Military Tribunal for the Far East reported as follows:

OSHIMA

had

conference with Hitler on January

a

policy of submarine warfare,

and

said that

1942. Hider explained his

3,

which he was conducting

against Allied shipping,

although the United States might build ships very quickly, her chief

problem would be the personnel shortage since the training of seafaring personnel
took

a

long time. Hider explained that he had given orders for

surface after torpedoing

word would
States

Hitler,
this

get

around

would have
approved

merchant
that

ships

and to shoot up the

most seamen were

difficulty in recruiting

this

new

lost in

his

submarines to

lifeboats, so that the

torpedoings and the United

crews.

OSHIMA,

in replying to

statement of policy and stated that the Japanese

method of waging submarine

would follow

warfare.
1

Concerning
It is

this

matter the International Military Tribunal

also asserted that the

German U-boat arm not

only did not carry out the

warning and rescue provisions of the protocol but
ordered the killing of the survivors of shipwrecked

f\1

said:

that

Doenitz deliberately

vessels,

whether enemy or

The prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders
of Doenitz, war order No. 154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order
of 1942. The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them
do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The
neutral.

Tribunal

is

of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty

required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors.

The

orders

were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure.

Submarine Warfare
The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions

[of the 1936 Protocol]

321

were

not carried out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be carried
out.
first

The argument of the
rule

of the

sea,

defense

may be

cannot rescue, then under

is

To

it

guilty

that the security

of the submarine

is,

as

the

paramount to rescue and that the development of aircraft made

rescue impossible. This

allow

is

its

so,

but the protocol

is

explicit. If the

commander

terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should

to pass harmless before his periscope.

These orders, then, prove Doentiz

of a violation of the protocol.

summarize, in passing upon the charges of illegal submarine warfare made

against

German Admiral Doenitz,

the International Military Tribunal discussed

and reached decisions on four aspects of the question:
1 f\

submarine warfare (not

waging unrestricted

1)

i

2) the

guilty);

proclamation of operational zones and

the sinking of neutral merchant ships therein (guilty); 3) ordering that the

shipwrecked be killed (not

guilty);

and

shipwrecked

4) failure to rescue the

However, because of the evidence of a number of British and American
practices, no sentence was assessed against Doenitz for the foregoing offenses of
which he was found guilty.
What were the reasons for the failure to comply with the rules of customary
(guilty).

international

War

I

law with respect to submarine warfare during the course of World

and for the

failure to

London Submarine

comply with those

rules, as codified in the

Protocol, during the course of World
•

of the problem has answered that question

The non-observance of the

rules

as follows:

effectively control the waters

German

aircraft to act in

risk

conformity with

surface warships to penetrate into

surrounding the British

were concerned, the unacceptable

Isles,

until the order

and mail were

involved in the procedure of surfacing,

was carried out and those on board

safe in the ship's boats, in

warned with the

aid

on

as

well

abandoned

as

the papers

an area where the superior enemy

of technical devices

reconnaissance, could arrive

and

and, as far as submarines

ascertaining the character of the ship and cargo, ordering the ship to be

and waiting

student

165

of the Protocol could be explained with the help

of military considerations: impossibility for the
the rules, impossibility for the

War II? One

1936

like

the scene in very

radio

little

forces,

and radar or by

air

time.

PartV
Post-World

War

II

(1948-to date)

As the footnotes will have indicated, there has been

much

discussion of the

on submarine warfare and the continued viability of the
1936 London Submarine Protocol since the end of World War II and the
completion of the trial before the International Military Tribunal. However,

question of restrictions

unfortunately, there has

been no attempt on the part of the international
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community

of

War

to clarify a very

confused situation, something that should be

The only "official" action which has been
taken in this respect during the past forty or more years is the issuance by the
U.S. Navy of its Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. That
avoided

at all costs in

volume contains
Although the

the law of war.

the following:

of the 1936 London Protocol continue to apply to surface

rules

warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including
satellite

as

well

communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems,
as

the customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following

World War
destroyed by

Accordingly,

II.

enemy merchant

may be

vessels

attacked and

surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of the

following circumstances:

and search or capture;

1.

Actively resisting

2.

Refusing to stop upon being

3.

Sailing

4.

If

armed;

5.

If

incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the

summoned

to

do

so;

under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military

enemy's armed

aircraft;

forces;

If acting in

6.

visit

any capacity

as a

naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's

armed

forces;

7.

If integrated

into

compliance with the

the

rules

enemy's war-fighting/ war-sustaining

effort

and

of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the

circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to irnminent

danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

volume, entitled Law of Naval Warfare, sub-paragraph 4, above, had
included the additional words "and there is reason to believe that such armament
In an earlier

1

has been used, or

is

f\&

intended for use, offensively against an enemy."

In

explanation of the deletion of those words, a proposed Annotated Supplement
to the

Handbook, which

In light of modern

is

unofficial

weapons

it is

and which

is still

in draft form, states:

impossible to determine,

whether the armament on merchant

ships

is

to

if it

ever was possible,

be used offensively against an

enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able
to make that determination. Accordingly, this rule has been modified in this text
from

that previously appearing in

NWIP

10-2, para. 503b(3).4.
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volume we find a number of references to submarines and to
submarine warfare. Having stated that "[t]he law of armed conflict imposes
essentially the same rules on submarines as apply to surface warships (a paraphrase
In the 1987

of the
goes

first

on

London Submarine

paragraph of the 1936

Protocol), the Handbook

169
to say:

The conventional rules
against enemy merchant

8.3.1. Interdiction of Enemy Merchant Shipping by Submarines.

of naval warfare pertaining to submarine operations

shipping constitute one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict.

Although the submarine's
capability

weapons system is dependent upon its

remain submerged (and thereby undetected) and despite

to

vulnerability

effectiveness as a

when

surfaced, the

London Protocol of 1936 makes no

its

distinction

between submarines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction of enemy
merchant shipping. The London Protocol
persistent refusal to stop

vessel

"without having

in a place of safety."

so,

except in the case of

or in the event of active resistance

"whether surface or submarine" may not destroy an enemy

to capture, a warship,

merchant

when ordered to do

specifies that

The

targeting constraints as

first

placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers

impracticality of imposing

burden

surface warships

belligerents of both sides during World War

II

is

upon submarines

the same

reflected in the practice of

when submarines regularly attacked

and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping. As in the case of such
attacks

by surface warships,

to unlawful acts

merchant

this practice

of the enemy or

vessels,

as a

was justified either as

necessary consequence of the arming of

of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant

shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining

The United

a reprisal in response

effort.

London Protocol of 1936, coupled with
of belligerents during and following World War II,

States considers that the

the customary practice

imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of
passengers, crew,

and

ship's papers before destruction

of an enemy merchant

vessel unless:

1.

The enemy merchant

otherwise

resists

vessel refuses to stop

when summoned

to

do so or

capture.

2.

The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itself armed.

3.

The enemy merchant

intelligence system or

armed

4.

is

vessel

is

any way the enemy's military

assisting in

acting in any capacity

as a

naval auxiliary to the enemy's

forces.

The enemy

war-sustaining

has integrated

effort

and

its

merchant shipping into

compliance

with

this

rule

its

warfighting or

would,

under

the
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circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger
or

would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

problem which

In a learned discussion of this

arrives at conclusions closely

resembling those reached by the draftsmen of the Handbook, one author states:
Besides the

two circumstances mentioned

Treaty of 1930

—

resistance to visit

may

and search

—

to

stop

sailing

is

(2)

of the London Naval

there are other situations in

which

vessels.

They

and there

is

active

international law

include:

under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military

if armed,

ii)

22

on being summoned and

allow the attack and destruction of merchant

i)

or

persistent refusal

in Article

aircraft.

reason to believe that such armament has been used,

intended for use offensively against an enemy.

if

iii)

incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of an

enemy's armed

forces.

if acting in

iv)

any capacity

as a

naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's

armed

forces

He

immediately points out that "[m]any British writers question the validity of

some of these

situations."

Conclusions

Can

it

be said

that, after the

experiences of two

World Wars,

the mandates

of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, codifying customary international law,
are

a valid

still

and binding part of the law of war

at sea?

Military Tribunal, sitting after the conclusion of those

no doubt

that in

World War

A

II,

its

and

International

conflagrations,

left

opinion the provisions of the Protocol had been, during

still

were,

majority of the writers

opinion.

two

The

Although

it is

after that conflict,

who

very

much

alive

and binding.

have studied the problem are of a similar

unquestionably true that

a rule

of international law

may be changed by evidence of a substantial change in the practice of States, the
failure of one belligerent in World War I to comply with the applicable rules
of customary international law, following which
action and the rules

War

II

were

codified,

and the

(Germany, Japan, and the United

been major maritime Powers,

to

it

was severely chastised

for

its

failure

of three belligerents in World

States),

even though they may have

comply with the provisions of the Protocol

World War I all of the
Entente Powers and the United States, both as a neutral and as a Power associated
does not forever erase them from the rule book. During
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with the Entente Powers, insisted that the rules with respect to submarine
warfare,

which were then

a part

of customary international law and are

now set

1936 London Submarine Protocol, were valid and binding rules.
During the interim between the wars a large number of the nations of the world,
forth in the

including in

many

which

cases those

these rules in conventional

form

later

did not comply therewith, accepted

in 1922, in 1930, in 1936,

and

in 1937.

of Germany, Japan, and the United States to comply with those

failure

The
rules

World War II did not result in their nullification. It must also be borne
in mind that in both World Wars Germany contended that her failure to comply
during

with the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare was an act of
reprisal, i.e., an admittedly illegal act. The same argument may, perhaps, be made
for the

United

American

States

inasmuch

as a

Japanese submarine had already sunk an

merchantman without warning when

unrestricted submarine warfare

Admiral Nimitz

testified,

was

by the United

States

the

message

ordering

Navy, concerning which

(No evidence could be found

sent.

that Japan
claimed that her unrestricted submarine warfare was an act of reprisal.) 173

Which
1.

brings the present author to the following conclusions:

War

While, during World

II,

the provisions of the

Submarine Protocol were largely not applied,
the particular belligerent, not

on the

law of war

basis

of the

them

at sea,

but on the

enemy (arming of merchant

basis that

this

was frequendy excused by

they were no longer a part of the

of reprisals against
vessels

1936 London

illegal actions

on

the part

with guns and depth charges,

in warship-escorted convoys, ordering the immediate reporting

by

of submarine sightings, ordering merchant vessels to ram submarines,
mining,

illegal

of war zones,

expansion of the
etc.), in itself a

list

of contraband,

illegal

sailing

radio
illegal

blockades, declarations

recognition of the continuing validity of those

provisions;

The 1936 London Submarine Protocol continues
subsisting part of the law of war at sea;
2.

3.

If the establishment

combat zones,

etc.) is

the application

of the

largely,

4.

It is

reasons

rules

of the

method of making war at sea,
1936 London Submarine Protocol will be

the 1936

a legal

nullified, at least in the

highly probable that in any

why

be a valid and

of zones (operations zones, war zones, exclusion zones,

determined to be

but not entirely,

to

zones so declared;

World War

III

belligerents will again find

London Submarine Protocol should not be

applied;
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In any future

5.

pressure of neutral
to

Law

of

War

armed conflict of lesser extent than a World War III the
Powers may be sufficiently strong to cause the belligerents

comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol.

One cannot do better than to conclude a study of the submarine with a portion
7/1

1

of the

final

The

conclusion reached by
submarine

era of the

a

noted expert in

the predominant

as

therefore be recognised as having begun.

.

.

.

a

book recently published:

weapon of power

Five hundred years ago, before the

sailing-ship pioneers ventured into great waters, the oceans

the only area of the world's surface in
against each other. In a future

both of merchant

clear

protect

deeps

it

new

were an empty

which men did not deploy

place,

military force

war the oceans might appear empty

again,

swept

and of the navies which have sought so long

traffic

against predators.

must

at sea

Yet the oceans' emptiness

will

be

to

illusory, for in their

navies of submarine warships, great and small, will be exacting

from

each other the price of admiralty.
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45. For. Rel. 119-120 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J.

88-89 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
97-98 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
46. For. Rel. 127-128 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 99, 101, 106 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
47. For. Rel. 393 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 129, 131 (Spec. Supp. 1915). It will be noted that this
protest repeated many of the arguments which had been advanced by the British in rejecting the proposal

made by

L.

Int'l.

L.

the United States.
For. Rel.

48.
this

Int'l.

decision

Am. J.

530-531 (Supp. 1915); 10

Int'l.

L.

166 (Spec. Supp. 1916).

One

author construes

as:

a significant

admission by

Germany

that the right

of unarmed belligerent merchantmen were

recognized by international law, and that the duty with respect to warning and the saving of human
life was as applicable to the submarine as to the surface warship.
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Submarine Warfare,]AG. J. 3 (November 1956).
49. Submarines 14 (1983).
50. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of22 April 1930, signed at London, November 6, 1936, 3 Treaties and Other International Agreements

of the United States of America, 1776-1949,
Int'l.

at

298 (Charles

I.

Bevans

ed.) [hereinafter Bevans];

31

137 (Supp. 1937); 173 L.N.T.S. 353; 140 B.F.S.P. 300; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18,

L.

Although

it is

officially a "Proces-Verbal," it

is

generally referred to

as a

Am.
at

J.

883.

"Protocol."

232-234 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 185, 190 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
52. For. Rel. 257, 259 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 195, 198 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
53. For. Rel. 100 (Supp. I, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 332, 333 (Spec. Supp. 1917). One well-regarded
expert in this field concluded that "in international law Germany had a good case. She failed to exploit it
51. For. Rel.

effectively in neutral eyes

54.

and eventually roused the neutrals to anger." O'Connell, supra note 37,
1, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 335-337 (Spec. Supp. 1917).

at 48.

For. Rel. 106 (Supp.

55. For. Rel. 171 (Supp.
Bill" passed the

House by

a

I,

1917); 11

Am. J.

Int'l.

L.

344-345 (Spec. Supp. 1917). The "Armed Ship

lopsided margin but was successfully filibustered in the Senate. President Wilson

then decided to exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the Navy to furnish American
merchantmen with guns and gun crews. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing 224-225 (1970
ed.).

197 (Supp. I, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 350, 352 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
1907 Hague Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval

56. For. Rel. 195,
57.

War,

signed at

The Hague, October

18, 1907,

36

Stat.

100 B.F.S.P. 448; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18,

at

2415; T.S. 545; 2

Am. J.

Int'l.

L.

202 (Supp. 1908);

951.

613 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 238-239 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
The Dutch reply to a British protest, stated:
The observation of a strict neutrality obliges them to place in the category of vessels

58. For. Rel.
59.

belligerent warships those

and

that

merchant

vessels

of the belligerent parties

consequently would be capable of committing

acts

that are

assimilated to

provided with an armament

of war.

No. 14 (1917) Cd 8690, quoted in International Law Situations, 1930, at 14.
60. Edwin Borchard, Armed Merchantmen, 34 Am. J. Int'l. L. 107, 111 (1940).
61. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 565 n. 117
(1962). The authors also point out that:
The construction of this "right to resist" urged by the same writers and by the British Government

Brit. Pari. Papers, Misc.,

was singularly

liberal.

Attack was said to include the attempt to capture, and the attempt to capture

included the attempt to exercise
view, entitled to
62.

start firing

visit

and search. In net

upon being

effect,

an armed merchantman was, under

sighted and approached

by an enemy

this

force.

See supra note 29.

See supra text accompanying note 29.
50 Pari. Deb., H.C. 1750 (5th ser. 1913). It will be noted that Churchill spoke of a British "armed
merchantman" meeting a foreign "armed merchantman." Actually, he was undoubtedly referring to a foreign
63.
64.
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Levie on the

"armed merchant
during

Moreover, he continued

cruiser."

which he

of any kind.

own

of their

War

of

question period, he was asked: "Is

a

for attack?" to
vessels

Law

to

fail

What

make

to

issue

has held that "it

Law

International

submarine and

resistance against

merchant

319. During

World War

auxiliary cruisers";

Germany

I

and the guns to

vessel

is

German

and

cruisers

not permitted to defend

that "[s]uch resistance

war

itself against a

vessel."

remain in neutral ports more than twenty-four hours was

vessels to

Am. J. Int'l. L. 321 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 223 (Spec. Supp. 1915). The

that defence

may

is

also

And

as

one author

shell."

words

a

in hitting first."

which sent down a
men would be unable to
War 86 (1931) [hereinafter

stated: "[I]f a surprise shell

fired in self-defence, the pity

from an offensive

Council

British Privy

not confined to taking to one's heels or even resuming

consist in an offensive-defensive, or in plain

Situations, 1930, at 6, 8.

crew had been

its

difference

its

a

598 (Supp. 1914);

must be recollected

blow, but, in the jargon of strategy,

detect

4, at

some "commissioned

Rel. 613 (Supp. 1914); 10

For. Rel.

66.

did have

armed

for

of the right of such armed

raised.) For.

it

referred were very much used against "ships of war" inasmuch as they were used against
memorandum of October 13, 1914, the German Government stated that the purpose of the

contrary to international law because

(The

and not

id. at

armament on the merchantmen was
is

11, 1913,

for defence only

they are serviceable for

had no "armed merchantmen" although

a

armed

is to defend themselves against the attack of another vessel
1599 (1913). (The question was undoubtedly "planted"!)
1925 (1914). The extent of this operation is indicated by the fact that by the end of the war

id. at

which Churchill

On June

verbal distinction.

be quite valueless for the purpose of attacking armed

4,139 merchant ships had been armed. Bernard Brodie, supra note

submarines. In

this

a fact that these ships are

replied: "Surely these ships will

standing." 53

59

65.

not

it

is

that the

drowning

Kenkichi Mori, The Submarine in

Mori].

604 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J.

67. For. Rel.

Int'l.

L.

230 (Spec. Supp. 1915). In view of the provisions of
British Ambassador also stated that "His Majesty's

Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 57, the
Government hold the view that it is not in accordance with

the 1907

ports

merchant

ships

neutrality

armed with purely defensive armaments."

and international law

For. Rel.

to detain in neutral

606 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J.

Int'l.

L.

231 (Spec. Supp. 1915).

Am. J. Int'l. L. 332 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
340 (Spec. Supp. 1916). On a number of occasions the United States called
the use of guns on merchant ships for offensive purposes. See, e.g., For. Rel. 849-850 (Supp.

68.

For. Rel. 196 (Supp. 1916); 10

69.

10

Am. J.

attention to

Int'l.

L. 339,

1915).

The same procedure was followed

70.

Major

War

World War

II.

13 International Military Tribunal, Trial of

T.M.W.C.].
608 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 232 (Spec. Supp. 1915).

Criminals 258

71. For. Rel. 607,

in

(1947) [hereinafter

See supra note 39.

72.

73. Lauterpacht's

Oppenheim,

at

468.

While

See, e.g., infra

this

is

as to

most

note 74, and the Borchard

For. Rel.

74.

probably true

"An overwhelming weight

supra note 27, at 469. Elsewhere he states that:

of authority recognized that their defensive armament in no way altered the
British writers

on the

article cited supra in

subject,

legal status

it is

of these

vessels." Id.

probably not true in general.

note 60.

611-612 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 234-235 (Spec. Supp. 1915). Secretary of State
this memorandum and in a letter to President Wilson he argued that "the character of

Bryan disagreed with

determined, not by whether she

the vessel

is

that she

armed

is

raises the

resists

or not, but by whether she

is

armed or not

presumption that she will use her arms." Baker, supra note 42,

at

354.

.

.

.

John

the fact
Bassett

Moore, one of the deans of international law in the United States, said of Secretary Bryan's position that "it
was obviously founded in law and common sense." John B. Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 395, 439 (1937).
75. For. Rel. 749 (Supp. 1916).
76. Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 100-101.
77. For. Rel. 146-148 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 310,312-313 (Spec. Supp. 1916). Of the problem
created by permitting merchant vessels to be armed and yet considering them to be noncombatants, while
requiring the submarine to comply with the law applicable to surface warships, one expert in the law of
submarine warfare has written:
It

soon became apparent

presented
law.

The

a

[in

World War I] that even a British armed merchant ship sailing alone
German submarines which attempted to comply with traditional

very real military danger to

predictable result of the

new

situation

was

that consideration

of military necessity,

as

simply self-preservation, led to the submarine remaining submerged and making torpedo

well

as

attacks

without warning.

William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41
of the problem.

See, e.g., the

Grotius

,

at

107.

A similar conclusion was reached by a number of other students

Committee Report,

supra note 14, at 155;

Hyman

G. Rickover, supra

Submarine Warfare
note 13,

at

1223: Alex A. Kerr, International

Law and

Of Submarine

the Future

Warfare, 81 U.S.

Nav.
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Proc.

Inst.

1105, 1109 (October 1955).
78. For. Rel. 21

(Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J.

1

Int'l.

L.

336

(Spec. Supp. 1916).

The other Allied Governments

answered in the same vein.
In his Memoirs, Lansing, although strongly pro-British, said:

79.

Government wished

Briefly, the British

worked to

when they believed that it
when the change would benefit

international law enforced

the advantage of Great Britain and wished the law modified

Great Britain.

Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 111. The German response was a memorandum of 10 February 1916 in
which it was stated that armed merchantmen were not entitled to the status of peaceable vessels of commerce
and that German naval vessels were receiving orders "to treat such vessels as belligerents." For. Rel. 163-165
(Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 314-318 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
80. For. Rel. 244-248 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L.367, 369-370 (Spec. Supp. 1916). The vacillation
of the United States on

this matter and its ultimate improper decision was pointed out with vigor by Borchard
same problem arose in the early years of World War II. He termed the March 1916 memorandum
"humiliating retreat." Edwin Borchard, supra note 60, at 107. But see Mori, supra note 66, at 86-87. Another

when
a

the

expert in the field asserted that
traditional law."

it

"represented a return to a pro-Allied policy in the guise of a return to

William T. Mallison,

81. Inter-American

Jr.,

supra note 41, at 111.

Convention on Maritime Neutrality,

1989; T.S. 845; 2 Bevans, supra note 50,

major Latin- American nations having

at

signed at

Havana, February 20, 1928, 47

721. (There are only eight Parties to this Convention,

failed to ratify

it.)

Article 2 of the

Stat.

of the

all

Harvard Research in International

Law, Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. 167, 224 (Spec. Supp. 1939)
provides that belligerent merchant vessels "shall, if armed for defense or offense, be assimilated to warships."
See also Articles 28

and 55 of that document. However, Article 3

Similar Rules of Neutrality, signed at Stockholm,

(Supp. 1938)
2.

Access to [Danish] ports or to [Danish]
if

the

82. William T. Mallison,
83.

It

disguised

will

as

(2)

of the Scandinavian Declaration Regarding

Am. J.

27, 1938, 188 L.N.T.S. 295, 32

Int'l.

L. 141

states:

of the belligerents

ships

May

armament

is

territorial

waters

is

likewise prohibited to

destined to ends other than their

own

armed merchant

defense.

supra note 41, at 120.

Jr.,

have been noted that no mention has been made of the famous "Q-ships." These were warships

unarmed merchant

ships

and were undoubtedly another reason

why Germany elected to
War I. Id. at 67.

discontinue the practice of having a submarine surface and warn during the course of World
84. 2

David H.

The Drafting of the Covenant 65, 74 (1928).
between the Allied and Associated Powers, of the One

Miller,

Part, and Germany, of the
June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 43, 127; 112 B.F.S.P. 1, 94; 225
Perry C.T.S. 188, 276. (The United States did not ratify this Treaty because of the Senate's objections to the
Convenant of the League of Nations which was a part thereof. However, Article 191 (in Part V) was carried

85. Treaty of Peace

Other

Part, signed at Versailles,

over into the Treaty Between the United States and

Germany

for the Establishment of Friendly Relations,

August 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939; T.S. 658; 114 B.F.S.P. 828.)
86. Within a few years of Versailles the German Navy was able to arrange to

signed at Berlin,

submarine

through the use of Dutch and Spanish connections. Erich Raeder,

field

Francis L. Carsten,

The Reichwehr and

Politics

1918-1933,

retain

its

expertise in the

My Life

138-139 (1960);
242-244 (1966); John Keegan, The Price of

at

Admiralty 221 (1989).
87.
at

Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November

1921

12,

-

February

6,

1922,

467 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Washington Conference].
486.

88.

Id. at

89.

Yamato

War I had

Ichihashi,

The Washington Conference and

90.

1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87,

91.

Mat

92.

During the course of the

despite remonstrances

Kozhevnikov
to the

Historical Survey 81 (1928).

at

World War

confirmed

World
it.

610.

from the

unarmed merchant

vessels. Id. at

British delegate. Id. at 690, 692.

ed., n.d.) indicates that the

1936 Protocol

The

688.

He

adhered to

Soviet text International

applies only to

Am. J.

Int'l.

L.

it.

It

Law 438

(F.I.

and Japan Relating

Italy

Washington, February

57 (Supp. 1922); Schindler/Toman, sup ra note

Treaty never became effective.

refused to ratify

in Warfare, signed at

this definition

"unarmed merchantmen."

Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France,

87, at 1605; 16

II

discussion, the Italian representative stated that his delegation understood

Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases

that this

A

596.

the term "merchant vessel" to refer to

93.

After:

already demonstrated the correctness of the British position and

18, at 789.

It

6,

1922, supra note

must be emphasized

required the unanimous acceptance of the drafting States and France

Nevertheless, both the 1930

London Naval

Treaty,

infra

note 94, and the 1936

London

332

Law

Levie on the

Naval Treaty,

infra

of

War

note 116, refer to the 1922 Washington Treaty

as

though

it

were an

effective international

agreement.

Reduction of Naval Armament (London Naval Treaty),

94. Limitation and

1930, 46

2858; T.S. 830; 2 Bevans, supra note 50,

signed at

London, April

at

1055; 112 L.N.T.S. 65; 132 B.F.S.P. 603.

at

596.

22,

See supra note 50.

95.

seas

Stat.

96.

1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87,

97.

Id.

98.

Id. at

728.

He

added:

"The

was

peculiarity about piracy

that,

and not under the jurisdiction of any particular country, nevertheless

though the
it

act

was done on the high

could be punished by any country."

Unfortunately, he had previously stated that the Conference was "competent to declare that those

who violated

war were guilty of acts of piracy." Id. at 720. Most commentators seem to have reached the
that
Hughes did. See, e.g., Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 93 n.3 (3rd ed.,
conclusion
1959) where the statement is made that "[t]he Washington text was objectionable by reason of provision that
the laws of

submarine

officers

One

99.

who

author

broke the rule should be treated

by

attention to this

calls

as pirates."

misapprehension that the instrument would be obligatory

Kenkichi Mori, supra note 66,
is

See also infra note 121.

asserting that "the stipulation [in Article VI] dispels

between the nations which have

as

118. But see supra note 93. In Mallison, supra note 41

at

at

any

ratified it."

43, the conclusion

reached that "the submarine came out of the Washington Conference with undiminished

status as a lawful

combatant."

Lawrence H. Douglas, The Submarine and

100.

86, 92 (March-April 1974); reprinted

Moore,

in

Washington Conference of 1921, 26 Nav.

the

62 International

Law

War Coll. Rev.

Studies 479, 488 (Richard B. Lillich

& John N.

eds., 1980).

1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 814, 816; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 346.
Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War, 32 Am. J. Int'l. L. 2 (Supp.

101.

102. Rules

1938); General Collection of the

Laws and Customs ofWar 819, 821 (M. Deltenre

before the International Military Tribunal after
reference to this provision was contained in

note 70,

at

361. (Actually,

was

it

in Article

World War

footnote to the

a

39

(iii)

ed., 1943). In his

testimony

German Admiral Doenitz pointed out that
German Prize Ordinance. 13 T.M.W.C., supra

II,

of the Ordinance.)

103. In O'Connell, supra note 37, at 19, the author apparently takes the position that using

a ship's

radio

announce the appearance of a submarine and giving its location does not affect the ship's status as he calls
the decision to sink vessels which follow that procedure a "dilution of Germany's standards" of submarine

to

warfare.

104. See supra note 81.

The

105.

International Military Tribunal paraphrased this provision

cannot rescue, then under
it

its

[the

1936 Protocol's] terms he cannot sink

to pass harmless before his periscope."

T.M.W.C.,

1

by stating that "[i]f the commander
a merchant vessel and should allow

supra note 70, at 313;

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression:

Opinion and Judgement 140 (1947) [hereinafter Nazi Conspiracy].
106. Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930, at 187-202 (1930)

[hereinafter

1930 London

Conference].
107.

Id. at

411.

108.

Id. at

444.

109.

Id. at

238.

110.

See supra note 94.

111. In a criticism of these provisions

(as

reaffd in the

1936 London Submarine Protocol), one author has

written:

[T]he Protocol was

much

like

an elegant carpet thrown over

attempted reform with one sweeping gesture, while what was

a littered

called for

and soiled passage, for

was

a

it

thorough airing and

London Protocol was
wrongs and prevent future

meticulous renovation of the laws governing submarine conduct. In essence the
the product of an idealistic era

which

trusted in glib moralizing to right past

digressions.

Barnes supra note 14,

at

189.

However, another author

Conference was influenced by the
is

wanting."

Hyman

"spirit

takes the position that while the

G. Rickover, supra note 13,

accompanying note

at

See supra text

113.

1930 London Conference, supra note 106,

properly criticized because "they attempt

1220 and 1221.

93.

112.

a

at

443. Both the 1922 and the 1930 provisions have been

regulation of submarine warfare without at the same time

considering the question of the armed merchantman; yet the

Rickover, supra note 13,
114.

See supra text

at

1922 Washington

of Versailles," in the 1930 agreement "the tone of moral disapproval

1221.

accompanying note 102.

two problems

are intimately connected."
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115. See supra note 50.

on

116. Treaty

the Limitation of Armament (Second

London Naval

Treaty), signed at

London, March

25, 1936, 50 Stat. 1363; T.S. 919; 3 Bevans, supra note 50, at 257;

140 B.F.S.P. 243.
117. Documents of the London Naval Conference 1935, at 54 (1936) [hereinafter 1935 London

Conference]. Prime Minister Baldwin's statement was confirmed by the French representative in his opening
address. Id. at 63.

and

118.

Id. at

741-742 and 104.

119.

Id. at

742-743. For

its

a discussion in

140 B.F.S.P. 300, 302.

120.

of his naval

advisers. It

is,

It is

Race

submarines.

to Pearl

Harbor (1974).

believed that Hitler did

perhaps, appropriate to note that

and France both took the position

this as a political gesture

when World War

II

and against the advice

Kingdom

began, the United

that these rules applied to aircraft as well as to surface warships

and

547-48 (1939).
Agreement, signed

For. Rel.

1

The Nyon
at Nyon, Switzerland, Sept 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 137; 33 Am.
J.
550 (Supp. 1939); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 887. The Preamble stated that the submarine
were "contrary to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as acts of

121.
Int'l.

depth of the background of the 1935 London Naval Conference,

inevitable failure, see Stephen E. Pelz,

L.

attacks

piracy." Thus, although the

continued to be noted

Conflicts,

Civil

War and

Current Problems of International

123. League of Nations, OfFicialJournal,

the

Law

He

Roskill,

provisions

The War

at Sea,

of 1940 some 3,400 ships had been

1939-1945,

fitted

Development of Customary

Law

Concerning Internal

at

945-46; 33

Am. J.

Int'l.

L. 551 (Supp. 1939).

by the spring of 1939 over 9,000 officers of
gunnery and in convoy tactics. The statistics in 1

also states that

the British merchant marine had received instruction in

W.

its

287, 295-96 (A. Cassese ed., 1975).

December 1937,

124. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 341.

Stephen

effective,

misinterpreted.

Antonio Cassese, The Spanish

122.

Armed

1922 Washington Treaty, supra note 93, had never become

—and

at

22 (1954) [hereinafter Roskill], disclose

that

by the end

with low-angle guns for protection against submarines and some

20,000 members of the Royal Navy had been trained to use these "defensive" armaments,

as

well

as a large

number of the members of the merchant crews.
125. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 88-89. The British moved to the implementation of paragraph (b)
on 13 June, 1940. Id. at 90. It will be observed that the Handbook assumed that a merchant vessel had a right
to use its arms to resist visit and search and capture by an enemy warship
an action that Churchill had once
said a merchant vessel had no rights to take. See supra text accompanying note 65.
126. 1 William M. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade 113 (1952). On the other hand, it is reported

—

1943 the primary objectives of British submarines were the enemy's surface warships. 1 Roskill,

that until late in

However, restrictions on attacks by British submarines on enemy merchant shipping
Norwegian waters in 1940, id. at 172, and were removed in the Mediterranean on February

supra note 124, at 334.

were relaxed in
5,

1941,

439.

id. at

Ten Years and Twenty Days 35 (1959). For a discussion of the Battle of
convoy system, see Keegan, supra note 86, at 213-65.
128. See infra text accompanying note 149, concerning the convoying of neutral merchant ships. See Frits
Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 139 (1971) where the following appears:
On the other hand, neutral merchant vessels on their way to or from Great Britain in this period
gradually took to sailing under the protection of the British navy and air force. Attacks on such escorted
127. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs:

the Atlantic and of the

could not be considered unlawful; by the voluntary acceptance of direct armed protection of

vessels

one of the

armed

A fortiori,

the

assumed the character of legitimate objectives for the

belligerents, the vessels in question

attacks

of the other belligerent.

same

rule

would apply

to belligerent

merchant

vessels in

convoy. Concerning neutral merchant

convoy escorted by neutral warships, see Articles 61 and 62 of the 1909 Declaration of London,
supra note 22, which sets forth the customary rule in this respect. See also Article 64a, Harvard Research, supra
note 81, at 653 and Kyriakides v. Germany, 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribuneaux Arbitraux Mixtes 349,
vessels in a

summarized in the Harvard Research
the author, a

Rear Admiral

in the

non-combatant standing" and

that

at

679. In S.S. Hall, Submarine Warfare, 5 Trans. Grot. Soc. 82, 89 (1920),

Royal Navy,

stated that

"from the day we

merchantmen

[the British]

in

convoys "appear

to lose their

adopted the convoy system the German

submarine campaign became legitimate."
129. Order in Council Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany, November 27, 1939, Stat. R. &
O. 1939, no. 1709. For a full discussion of the contents of this Order and its effect, see Frits Kalshoven, supra

note 128,
1

Dep't

at 1

18-19. For the reaction of the United States, see the U.S. note British Blockade of German Exports,

St. Bull.

651 (No. 24, December

130. See supra note 39.

9, 1939).
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Cmd. 6191,

131.

1940,

at

5

of

(as

War

quoted

The preamble of the Order
1936 London Submarine Protocol, supra

in Kalshovcn, supra note 128, at 143).

Council asserted violations by Germany

in

among

of,

others, the

note 50.

One

and

probably the provision of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, supra note 39, did not apply "to the public

that

expert in

this field

points out that at this stage

of the enemy State." Kalshoven, supra note 128,

interests

"not" in the original text was corrected by
132. Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 33.

360

133.

Pari.

Deb., H.C., 5th

letter

at

German

Ser., colt 1351.

Government

May

25, 1989.)

(There has been considerable discussion

said,

controlled

143. (A typographical error substituting "to" for

from the author,

Churchill (and the International Military Tribunal)

exports were

and meant, "night" or

as to

whether

10 Digest of

"sight"). See, eg.,

Law 663-64 (M. Whiteman ed., 1968). The Parliamentary reporter recorded it as "night" which
of the sentence, is much more logical than "sight": otherwise the sentence would read "all

International

in the context

German

by day and all ships by sight").
went far beyond anything contained in German orders, since it meant that in these waters
from then onward neutral ships sailing with full lights would also be sunk by British submarines." Doenitz,
1

ships

34. "This order

supra note 127, at 59.
1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 140.
German Prize Ordinance, August 28,1939, at 149B.F.S.P. 663. After providing that ships

135.

136.

had no protection

(Article 32), that forcible resistance

enemy

use of the wireless constituted assistance to the

The

(1)

The

(2)

(Article 39), the

Ordinance

crew and the

ship's boats are

not deemed to be

convoy

stated, in Article 74:

destruction of vessels in accordance with articles 72 (enemy) and 73 (neutral)

permissible if the passengers, the

in

could be overcome by force (Article 36), and that the

is

only

ship's papers are placed in safety before destruction.
a

place of safety unless under the prevailing conditions

of the sea and weather the safety of the passengers and the crew

by the presence of another

The

48.

vessel

(Note

in original.)

The German Navy had proposed
546, Series

at

a

"prohibited area" which would, in

proposal was apparendy rejected

this

D

is assured by the proximity of land or
them on board.
London Rules of Submarine Warfare (printed

capable of taking

is

contents of this article correspond to the

in the annex).

but

which

time. 7

at that

effect,

have been

Documents on German Foreign

a "free fire"

zone

Policy, 1918-1945,

(1956).

137. 7 Fuehrer's Directive

No.

2,

Documents on German Foreign

Policy, 1918-1945, at 548, Series

D

(1956).
138. Fuehrer's Directive

No.

4,

Fuehrer's Directives for the

Conduct of the War

53,

54 (1947).

A British

"were not issued in any altruistic spirit but in the hope that after Poland
had been crushed, Britain and France and especially the latter would make peace. As soon as it was realised
that this hope was vain, removal of the restrictions on the methods of waging war at sea started." 1 Roskill,
historian asserts that these decisions

supra note 124, at 103.

139.

He

is

—

—

undoubtedly correct.

Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the

1

German Navy 9

(1947).

No. 5, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 176, 177, Series
D (1954). Fuehrer's Directive No. 7, October 18, 1939, id. at 316, authorized the Navy to "attack enemy
passenger ships which are in a convoy or sailing without lights."
140. 8 Fuehrer's Directive

141. In his cross-examination before the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz stated:
If a

night

was

merchant ship

it is

issued,

England
13

sails

without

lights,

must run the risk of being taken for a warship, because at
a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order
in which blacked-out troop transports were traveling from

it

not possible to distinguish between
it

concerned an operational area

to France.

T.M.W.C.,

supra note 70, at 357.

142. See supra notes 102 and 103. See also Doenitz's testimony before the International Military Tribunal,

13

T.M.W.C,
143.

The

September

4,

supra note 70, at 253.

Athenia,

1939.

a

passenger vessel, had been torpedoed without warning by

The Germans denied

and accused Churchill of having ordered

Germany.

When German

officials

they continued to deny this and

it

a

that

its

British

a

sinking had resulted from the action

submarine to sink the

German U-boat on
of a German U-boat

vessel in order to stir

learned that the Athenia had, indeed, been the victim of a

was not

until after the

war had ended

that the truth

up

feeling against

German torpedo

was learned.

1

T.M.W.C,

Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 143.
144. In 2 George Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals

supra note 70, at 316;

433 (1968), the following apt statement appears:
It is

on this issue [warfare at sea] by explaining the
way of reprisals and counter-reprisals. At least in the relations

always possible to maintain legal continuity

departures from the traditional law by

between the

belligerents, this type

of argument can claim

a

modicum of formal

validity. In substance,

Submarine Warfare
however, reasoning on these

merely hides

lines

The

145. Karl Doenitz, supra note 127, at 58-59.

same

Compare

breakdown of

T.M.W.C., supra note 70,

effect. 1

International Military Tribunal

1

by

had found more or

311-12; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105,

at

the enumeration of events leading to unrestricted warfare

appears in

the law and the resumption

of an almost complete freedom of action.

belligerents at sea

to the

a

335

at

less

138-139.

by Germany during World War

which

II

Roskill, supra note 124, at 103-104.

146. In Mallison, supra note 41, at 66-67, the author takes the position that "the actual British blockade

methods [such as including food on the list of contraband]

also

provided adequate justification for the submarine

operational zones as a legitimate reprisal."
147. Frits Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 128. In his testimony before the International Military Tribunal

Doenitz

said:

It is a

gun on board she will use it. It would have been a
were then to wait until the other ship fired
cannot
That is a reciprocal agreement, and one
in any circumstances expect the submarine

matter of course that

one-sided obligation
the

first

shot.

to wait until
as

13

it

if

gets hit

has a

if a ship

the submarine, in a suicidal way,

first.

And as

I

have

used their guns

said before, in practice the steamers

as

soon

they came within range.

T.M.W.C,
148. See,

supra note 70, at 360.

e.g.,

Edwin I. Nwogugu, Submarine Warfare, The Law of Naval Warfare 358-59 (N. Ronzitti
Nwogugu]. See also Robert W. Tucker, 50 International Law Studies 68 (1957). There

1988) [hereinafter

ed.,

does not appear to have been any dispute that merchant vessels, armed or unarmed, sailing in a convoy under
the protection of warships,

were beyond the ambit of the Protocol, even though the

entice neutral ships into their convoys

by claiming

that such action "affords neutral

Germans

protection and does not signify a breach of neutrality" and the

Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,

D

319-20, Series

(1954).

1987, para. 8.2.2.2. [hereinafter

Commander's Handbook].

150. Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and Peace of the United States etc.,

54

Stat. 4;

vessels greater

Documents on German

Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

149. U.S.

(NWP 9),

at

disagreed. 8

British did attempt to

merchant

34 Am. J.

Int'l.

November

4,

1939,

L. 44, 51 (Supp. 1940).

151. Presidential Proclamation of November 4, 1939, Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States

by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, 54 Stat. 2672 (1939);
1939); International

Law

Situations 1939, at 48 (Paul S.

Wild

1

Dep't

456 (No.

St. Bull.

19,

November

4,

ed., 1940).

Edwin Borchard, supra note 60, at 107. He pointed out that these ships were far more powerful than
World War I predecessors as they carried four six-inch guns, mounted fore and aft. See supra text

152.
their

accompaning note 65.
153. Presidential Proclamation of November 4, 1939, Definition of Combat Areas, 54 Stat.

Dep't
146.

454-55 (No.

St. Bull.

Germany urged other

154.

13

T.M.W.C,

logical difference

19,

November

4,

1939); 1939 International

Law

2673 (1939);

1

Situations, supra note 151, at

neutrals to designate a similar zone.

supra note 70, at 365.

One

author goes even further, asserting

between the merchant ship on the one hand and the

that:

"There

railroad train or the factory

is

on

no
the

other." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1108.
155.

13

T.M.W.C,

supra note 70, at 367. Later answers indicated that he

of Article 16 of the 1907 Hague Convention No.
of the Geneva Convention, signed

at

was referring

to the provisions

X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles

The Hague, October

18, 1907,

36

Stat.

2371; 2

Am.

J. Int'l. L.

153

(Supp. 1908); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 313.

T.M.W.C.

supra note 70, at 312-13;

156.

1

157.

Another argument

note 41,

at

80,

There

where the author points out:
no indication that the Tribunal gave

is

that the Protocol
this subject.
is

at

careful consideration to the alternative interpretation

areas since there was no international agreement on
was advanced by Kranzbuhler [Doenitz's defense attorney] and it

was inapplicable in operational

Such an

interpretation

the very least as plausible as the interpretation selected

operational area

The

Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 139.
on this matter will be found in Mallison, supra

criticizing the Tribunal's logic

authors of

is

evaluated

two post-war

as

by the Tribunal.

It is

more

plausible if the

too important to be dealt with by implication.

studies of

submarine warfare both recommend the affirmative legalization of

"war zones" or "operational zones." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1 109; and Barnes, supra note 14, at 197-98.
158. See, e.g., the testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner, 13 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 453. See also
supra the text

159.
160.

accompanying note 36.

T.M.W.C.
35 T.M.W.C.
13

supra note 70, at 281-95;
supra note 70, at 270.

James McMillan, Five

Men

at

Nuremberg 181-85

(1985).
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Judgment of the

161.

(mimeo,

Law

War

of

International Military Tribunal for the Far East,

n.d.) [hereinafter Judgment];

1

The Tokyo Judgment 412

November

4-12, 1948,

&

(B.V.A. Roling

1072-73

at

C.F. Ruter eds., 1977)

[hereinafter The Tokyo Judgment]. It was definitely implemented by the Japanese. Judgment, 1073-74; The
Tokyo Judgment, supra.
162. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 139-40. Concerning the

one

Laconia order,

analysis states:

The ambiguity of the order
its

intent

was only

was intended
to have

this

necessity.

opinion

The most

rescue, not solely

rescue was

deemed

is

deliberately to

kill

survivors.

The

a

seemed

lawful one.

doubtful, since the rule in question allows only for circumstances of operational

or perhaps not even primarily

—

Order was

this basis

that

it

laid

of operational

for reasons

demands of war

to run "counter to the rudimentary

On

International Military Tribunal

former interpretation was intended the order was

that if the

favorable interpretation of the Laconia

—

and crews."

apparently was considered to stem from an uncertainty as to whether
submarine commanders from making any attempt to rescue survivors or

them

to enjoin

been of the opinion

But even

ships

to forbid

down

a

policy of no

necessity, but because

for the destruction

alone the unlawful character of the order

would seem

of enemy

to be readily

apparent.

Tucker, supra note 148,

at 73.

One commentator

163.

that "the British

construes this portion of the opinion

merchant marine was no longer

an auxiliary to the British naval forces." Horace B. Robertson,
164.

made

1

the

T.M.W.C.,

supra note 70, at 311-13;

as

indicating that the Tribunal had found

be considered

entitled to

Jr.,

as

non-combatant.

Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105,

same findings on these charges with respect

at

had become

The Tribunal
T.M.W.C. 317;

138-40.

German Grand Admiral Raeder.

to

It

supra note 48, at 6-7.

1

Nazi Conspiracy 143.
Kalshoven, supra note 128,

139-40.

165.

Frits

166.

Commander's Handbook, supra note

will also

at

149, at para. 8.2.2.2. Relevant quotations from this

be found in the text accompanying notes 149,

Law of Naval Warfare (NWIP
mention of the submarine
167. A Soviet volume

supra,

10-2) (1955) [hereinafter

and 168,

Law of Naval

infra.

Earlier the U.S.

volume

Navy had

issued

Warfare]. Strange to relate, there

is

no

The word "submarine" does not even appear in its Index!
entitled The International Law of the Sea recently published in English in Moscow

in that volume.

(LP. Blishchenko, gen., 1988) states, at 229:

The arming of merchant ships in contravention of the VII Hague Convention on the transformation
of merchant ships into naval

vessels, especially

ships, eliminates the difference

regarded either

as

international law.

noncombatants or
It is

Law of Naval

accompanied by

military

and

is

request of civilian status for

a

ratified the

armed

such ships cannot be

legitimate combatants, and therefore cannot

as

not

a

civilian objects. In this case

of interest to note that Russia never

VII and that the Soviet Union
168.

between

be protected under

1907 Hague Convention No.

Party thereto.

Warfare, supra note 166,

at para.

503b(3).

Commander's Handbook, supra note 149, at para. 8.3.1.
170. Edwin I. Nwogugu, supra note 148, at 355-56.
171. Of the publicists whose works have been reviewed who express an opinion on the subject, the
following take the position that the 1936 London Submarine Protocol is still binding law: Eric Castren, The
Present Law of War and Neutrality 289 (1954); C.John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 388
the Laws of War and Their
(3d ed., 1954); Gerald I.A.D. Draper, Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities
Enforcement, 18 Nav. War Coll. Rev. 22, 30 (November 1965), reprinted in 62 International Law Studies 247
(Richard B. Lillich &John Norton Moore eds., 1980); William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 118-1221;
Edwin I. Nwogugu, supra note 1 48, at 359-60; Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 37, at 52; Horace B. Robertson,
Jr., Submarine Warfare, in JAG.J. 7 (November 1956); Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 198
169.

—

(3rded., 1959); and
in

Robert W. Tucker,

Commander's Handbook

note 169.
part

The

supra note 148, at 352.

supra note 149, at para. 8.3.1,

publicists taking the position that the

is

The United States Navy's position,
to the

same

effect. See supra text

1936 London Submarine Protocol

of the law of maritime warfare include Barnes, Submarine Warfare and

Coll.

Rev. 35 (February 1972),
eds., 1980); W. Hays Parks, Conventional

quoted

Navy

(May
in

no longer an

effective

Law, 2 World Polity

O.

61 International

Moore

98, 106

expressed

Miller, The Law of Naval Warfare, 24 Nav. War
Law Studies 263 (Richard B. Lillich &John Norton
Bombing and the Law of War, 108 U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.

121, 187 (1960); Kerr, supra note 77, at 1110; William
reprinted in

is

International

as

accompanying

Aerial

1982); and Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 428 (2nd. imp., 1959). As

O'Connell, supra note 37,

states that

submarine warfare

these rules are obsolete.

is

at

51, the

1966 Manual of International Maritime Law of the Soviet
among other treaties, and then says that all of

regulated by the Protocol,

Submarine Warfare
Robert W. Tucker,
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by Doenitz's defense
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stated that on that date he had received a message ordering
unrestricted submarine warfare. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 108-11. This could, of course, also be
attributed to the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
172.

supra note 148, at 66. In answer to interrogatories prepared

counsel, Admiral Chester Nimitz,

173. Japanese merchant ships acted very much the same as British merchant ships, being armed, reporting
submarine sightings, attempting to ram, etc. William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 89-90. This would
have justified unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific by the United States. However, it would not be a
justification for such action from the very first day of the war. Another author justifies the action of the United

merchant marine was integrated into the Japanese Navy (armed, sent radio
was no danger to neutrals (there were no neutral vessels in the Pacific), and that
there were no neutrals in the declared operational zones. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., supra note 48, at 8.
174. John Keegan, supra note 86, at 274—75. The final chapter of this book (266-75) contains a succinct
discussion of the tremendous technical evolution which the submarine has undergone since the end of World
States

on the

basis that the Japanese

sightings, etc.), that there

War

II.

XVII
The 1977 Protocol I and The United States
38

The

failure

Saint Louis University

of previous United
to the Senate for

Protocol I

Law Journal 469

(1993)

States Administrations to

its

send the 1977

advice and consent to ratification by the

President was both a political and a military decision. Accordingly,

it is

possible,

but unlikely, that different action will be taken by the Clinton Administration.

Why,

then, does the

treaty, the

United

of this law-of-war

States object to the provisions

purpose of the drafting of which was to

fill

which had
1907 Hague
(1907 Hague

in the lacunae

admittedly been found to exist in the Regulations Attached

to the

IV Respecting the Laws and

Customs of War on Land
Regulations on Land Warfare) and in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions?
Convention No.

the

United

in the

1977

States has stated that

it

considers itself bound

Protocol I which, represent

by the

True,

rules contained

customary international law

—but only

the extent that they reflect customary international law as determined

to

by United

States legal advisers.

A

review of the provisions of the 1977

officials

Protocol

/labeled

as

objectionable by

of the United States in informal presentations will quickly demonstrate

that there are actually

no overpowering reasons

to object to the vast majority

of

The finding of a need for two dozen or more reservations and
more understandings (as reported to have been demanded by the

those provisions.

two dozen or

Joint Chiefs of Staff) can only have resulted
are

from "nitpicking." While there

unquestionably some really objectionable provisions, these could very easily

be taken care of at the time of ratification. Other provisions

exacdy

as

the United States

a reservation

would have

desired, but this

is

may not be worded

not

a valid

reason for

or an understanding unless the objectionable wording results in an

—and such

ambiguous or unintended or unwanted meaning

instances are rare.

President Reagan's statement in his message to the Senate that "Protocol

fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed" was a gross overstatement of the
resulting

from overreaction

to a very small

I is

facts,

group of provisions on one subject

which, concededly, were flawed.

Because the document containing the specific objections to the 1977
/registered

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

we

have, to

classified,

we must

have recourse

some of those objections may
an abbreviated extent, in the letter from the

to other sources in order to ascertain

be. This information

still

Protocol

what

at least

Law
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of

War

Secretary of State to the President submitting the 1977 Protocol //for transmission
to the Senate,

and

more

in

made

detail in presentations

various meetings by

at

Department of State and of the Department of Defense.
Presumably, the objections stated by these officials are the major reasons for the
representatives of the

non-ratification of the Protocol

To
clear

begin

at the

by the United

States.

beginning, certainly the Preamble of the 1977 Protocol lis

and concise and leaves nothing

which, in sum, point out that the

to interpretation. After three paragraphs

drafted rules applicable during the course of international

manner

legitimizes aggression or the threat or use

substantive provision

must be applied

in

which
all

community has
armed conflict in no

fact that the international

states that

circumstances to

of force, there appears

a

such rules

who

persons

all

are protected

by those

instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
conflict or

on the causes espoused by or attributed

The importance of this
to rest the "just
a

statement cannot be overemphasized

war" doctrine espoused by some

number of Third World

as it definitely lays

nations, including, particularly,

nations as well as the nations

which were Communist

time period, under which the humanitarian law of war would be binding

at that

upon

TO
to the Parties to the conflict.

the "aggressor," always the

enemy, while

the victim of aggression, always oneself.

it

would not be binding upon

The United

States has expressed

objection to the Preamble which, in fact, states a proposition to
States has

no

which the United

long adhered: that the provisions of the humanitarian law of war are

equally applicable to both sides in any international conflict,

no matter what the

cause alleged.

The United States objects strongly and,
so, to Article 1(4)
itself,

of 1977

Protocol

in the opinion

of this author, properly

In addition to being objectionable in

I.

that article lays the foundation for other objectionable provisions

Protocol.

The

The troublesome

material in Article 1(4) reads as follows:

situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include

which people

are fighting against colonial

this

provision refers to

armed

conflicts in

and
..."
of self-determination.

domination and

against racist regimes in the exercise of their right

Obviously,

of the

alien occupation

civil conflicts, i.e., internal conflicts,

which

have always heretofore been considered to be governed by national law, not
international law, except insofar as

Conventions

may be

said to

govern

Common

Article 3 of the

civil conflicts

—something

heretofore steadfasdy denied, or disregarded. Moreover,

as

we

1949 Geneva

that rebels have
shall see,

with

its

implementation by Article 44(3), the provision places members of so-called
national liberation movements in a status superior to that of all other

1977 Protocol
combatants

—

exactly the

acceptable to nations

end sought by

which believe

that

341

I

one

progenitors, but scarcely

its

combatants should be protected

all legal

equally.

1874

Article 9 of the

Project of an International Declaration Concerning the

Laws

and Customs of War established four requirements for an individual to be
considered a legal combatant:
responsible for his subordinates;
at a distance; (3) carry his

He

commanded by a person
(2) wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
must

(1)

arms openly; and

(4)

be

conduct military operations in

accordance with the laws and customs of war.
restated in Article

of the Regulations Attached

1

II with Respect to the
1

on Land Warfare);
Regulations on
1(1)

s

Land

1949 Geneva

these four requirements

responsible

it

and they were again
this

1977

fit

to discard

Protocol I follows the

armed

requires the

commander and

them

members of national

War

restated in the

continuous acceptance of

by the international community

giving additional protection to
Article 43(1) of the

Treatment of Prisoners of

to the

Despite

Conventions.

1977 Diplomatic Conference saw

to the extent that

1899 Hague Convention No.

to the

they were incorporated by reference in Article

Warfare;

of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative

three

These requirements were

Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899 Hague Regulations
they were stated again in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague

(1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention);
first

14

for over a century, the

for the sole purpose

liberation

of

movements.

foregoing historical precedent

forces of a party to a conflict to have a

to enforce the

law of war, even

if that

party does

not recognize the government or authority of the adverse party. However,
Article 44(3),

which implements the objectionable

Article 1(4) of the Protocol,

members of national liberation movements from those
well as from others. It is here that the main United States

has the effect of relieving

requirements,

as

objection to the Protocol

lies

—

....

and, admittedly, not without justification.

In a lengthy analysis of these provisions written

some

19

years ago, this author

concluded:

To

summarize, paragraph 3 of Article 44 requires combatants

Article 43) to distinguish themselves

engaged in an attack or in
will

fulfill

that

from the

a military

requirement

if

when

engagement and

military

deployment preliminary

defined in

population "while they are

operation preparatory to an attack."

they carry their arms openly

military

(b)

civilian

(as

visible to the

during an actual

(a)

enemy while

in the course of a

to an attack. This appears to

combatants

may merge with

to attack, at

which time they move out of the crowd,

the crowd,

weapons concealed,

They

mean

that these

until they are

disclose their

about

weapons, and

begin their attack.

There seems

little

doubt but

that the provisions

will increase the dangers to the civilian population.

of paragraph 3 of Article 44
20

Levie on the

342

Law

War

of

Paragraph 4 of Article 44 provides that even
limited requirements just

of war

status,

he

mentioned and

entided to

is

all

including those relating to any
quarrel.

It

is,

trial

with

1977

and punishment. With

States also

Protocol
is

member of the

/which provide,

for his alleged criminal acts

trial

be

to

trial

in effect, that a

fair

and

fair.

combatant

nevertheless entided to prisoner of war

international

war prosecuted

a

can be no

this there

seems to object to the provisions of Article 44(2) of

Convention, to which the United

no

prisoner of war,

a

who

has violated
22
status if captured.
But

nothing novel about that provision. Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva

is

retain,

meet the

to

therefore, not entided to prisoner

the safeguards required for such a

all

the law of war

there

fails

merely ensures what any civilized nation would certainly provide:

The United
the

an individual

of the protection available to

treatment of the captured person prior to
a trial

if

even

if

basis for the

group

States

is

community,

practically every other

is

specifically provides that prisoners

of the law of war)

for pre-capture offenses (violations

convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."

statement that

this

movement

conduct by members of the group can lead

No

"shall

There

is

protected by article 1(4), no

of its

to the loss

protected

status as a

place in the Protocol will there be found any provision for

"qualifying" a group. Like Article 85 of the 1949 Third
Article 44(2)

23

of

paragraph of the Protocol provides that "once

qualifies as a national liberation

organization."

a party, as

of the 1977

Protocol I

of the law of war will not

affect

Geneva Convention,

merely provides that pre-capture violations

an individual's right to the

status

of being

a

—

war it does not prevent his captor from trying him and, if he is
convicted, from punishing him for any pre-capture violation of the law of war.
Moreover, rather surprisingly, that paragraph excepts from its coverage those

prisoner of

who

individuals

have not complied with the provisions of Article 44(3) and

This means that the

member of the

national liberation

carry his arms openly during a military

deployment prior

to an attack

is

movement who

engagement or during

(4).

fails

to

military

a

not entided to prisoner of war status. (However,

under Article 44(4) he is, nevertheless, entided
a prisoner of war is entided, so this appears

the protections to

to

all

to

be

a distinction

which

without

a

difference.)

Department of State emphasized

In his presentation, the Legal Adviser of the
his position that the provisions just cited

groups protection
Terrorists

as

combatants.'"

do not engage

in

have the

There

"war" or

in

is

effect

no

"armed

of "granting

basis for

terrorist

such reasoning.

conflict" as those terms are

understood in either national or international law. They engage in isolated
criminal

acts.

alia, shall

armed

Terrorists

do not have "an

enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in

conflict" as required

Terrorists

internal disciplinary system which, inter

do not

by Article

43(1).

participate in the "military

Any law

is

anathema

engagement" or

to them.

in the "military

1977 Protocol
deployment" specified in Article

They engage

44(3).

343

I

in hit-and-run or blind

operations primarily against the civilian population.

While members of

movements may, and frequendy

do, engage in acts of

national liberation

when

terrorism,

they do so and are thereafter captured they

compelled to answer for such criminal

commits the

identical acts

may

Terrorists

acts, just as

may be compelled

to

answer for

.27
recognized.

found in the opinion of the United

States District

the only relevant case of those cited
findings to be expected

from courts on

this issue.

The

There is no evidence in the record that defendant was
military force

which had

and regulations of that

a tribunal established for

force.

To

a

who

his criminal acts.

war

status

when

Statements to be
28

Court in the Lopez

by the Legal Adviser,

be

legally

the uniformed soldier

claim that they are entitled to prisoner of

captured, but their claims are rarely, if ever,

may

case,

are typical

court there

of the

said:

member ofan organized

punishing violations of the rules

the extent that defendant

is

a

member of any

organization, this court can take judicial notice of the fact that that organization
exists at least in part for the

States
rules

purpose of violating criminal

and that therefore such violations would conform

and principles of that

organization....

There

is

no

statutes

of the United

to rather than violate the

logic to the

argument

that

an organization can be created for the purpose of violating the laws of this nation

and overthrowing

its

government and

exempt from prosecution

at

the same time declare

its

members

for violation of the criminal laws of that
29

to

be

same country,

the United States of America.

With

the changes that have occurred in the political world since 1977,

doubtful that

many states which are party to

to take issue

with

mentioned above

a reservation to

if such reservation

of ratification. Moreover,

if a

few

the Protocol

it is

would find it necessary

those few paragraphs of the Protocol

were made by the United

parties did object

States at the

and announced

time

that they

would not consider themselves bound by the Protocol vis-a-vis the United
States, such action would be of little moment
and the United States would be

—

in a better position with respect to the vast majority

with respect to the few objectors.

Of course,

of parties and no worse off

politically

such an action would

be a clear rebuff to the national liberation movements which have uncontrolled
terrorist

live

with

Part

II

now few

in

number and

the United States could

Protocol lis entitled

"Wounded,

Sick and Shipwrecked"

wings. But these are
30
that.

of the 1977

and does not appear to present any problems for the United
in Part

III,

31
States.

However,

"Methods and Means of Warfare; Combatant and Prisoner of War

Status," objections are encountered, in addition to those already

connection with the discussion of Articles 1(4) and 44.

mentioned

Some of these

in

objections

Levie on the
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of

present real problems, while others do not.
provisions of Article 35(3),

3. It is

state:

32

to this provision,

and ambiguous and

an

The United

States

official

of the United States has said that

33
not a part of customary law."' If

is

certainly action should

and the

larger part

it is

truly

it is

be taken to remove any ambiguity. But

Environmental Modification

the

objection relates to the

expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural

environment.

to

first

prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or

may be

As

which

The

is it

"too broad

ambiguous,

ambiguous?

of the international community are parties

which includes

Convention

the following

provision:

1.

Each

any

State Party to this

other

hostile

Convention undertakes not

of environmental

use

widespread, long-lasting or severe effects

as

to engage in military or

modification

the

techniques

having

means of destruction, damage or

injury to any other State Party.

In the

first

United

place,

States,

is

it

should be noted that

drafted in the disjunctive,

that contained in Article 35(3)

and

is,

therefore,

even broader than

of the 1977 Protocol, which

conjunctive. In the second place,

when

accepted by the

this latter provision,

this

is

drafted in the

provision was drafted, the drafting

conference included "understandings" with respect to each of the three
descriptive adjectives used.

It is

They

the understanding of the

said:

Committee

that, for the

purposes of this Convention,

the terms "widespread," "long-lasting" and "severe" shall be interpreted as
follows:

(a)

"widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square

kilometres;
(b)

"long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;

(c)

"severe": involving serious or significant disruption or

harm

to

While, of course, the understandings refer to those words

as

natural and

economic resources or other

Environmental Modification Convention,
state

which

had

a

is

different

international
art

a party to the

meaning

community

in

1977

it

human

life,

assets.

would be extremely

Protocol I to assert that the

the Protocol; and

it

is

difficult for

indeed, for the

rare,

The conclusion

any

words so defined

to have the benefit of agreed definitions

included in an international convention.

used in the

is

of words of

inescapable that

1977 Protocol
the

United

States has

no

valid reason for objecting to the substance or to the

wording of Article 35(3) of the 1911 Protocol I.
The next provision to which objection is made
2. It is

prohibited to

make use of the flags

is

Article 39(2)

or impede military operations.

this

do not support the prohibition in

article

is

been the

63.

official

shield, favour, protect

To

"we [the United States]
use of enemy emblems and

that

say that the objection to this

astonishing is an understatement.

policy of the United States since

who fight in the

Troops

is

made

39 of the

uniforms during military operations."

has

states:

37

provision the statement

provision by the United States

which

or military emblems, insignia or uniforms

of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to

Concerning
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as

The following

long ago

uniform of their enemies, without any

as

1863:

plain, striking,

and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter.

65.

The

use of the enemy's national standard,

for the purpose

they lose

Article

23

all

(f )

prohibits "the
field
is

of deceiving the enemy in

flag,

or other

battle,

is

emblem of nationality,

an act of perfidy by which

claim to the protection of the laws of war.

39

of both the 1899 and the 1901 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare

improper use" of the enemy uniform or

manual of the United

States

Army interprets

them
.41 Wearingemploy
enemy

certainly forbidden to

term

as

a current

meaning

that "[i]t

in combat, but their use at other times

is

uniforms "while engaging in attacks" would

not forbidden."

unquestionably

that

and

insignia,

fall

within that manual's prohibition; and war crimes

trials

for

the use of enemy uniforms in non-battle military operations were conducted in
42
43
wars prior to World War I
and in World War II.
Finally, as noted above,

one of the four requirements to be
wearing of

a fixed distinctive

a legal

combatant has uniformly been "the

emblem, recognizable

44
at a distance";

and the

removal of that requirement by Article 44(3) of the 1911 Protocoll is one of the

major objections voiced by the United States to that instrument.

The next

which objection is expressed is
Article 47, which, in effect, denies humanitarian protection to most mercenaries.
Why the United States should take up the cudgel on behalf of mercenaries is
somewhat of a mystery, unless it fears that attempts might be made to place
provision of the 1911 Protocol I to

foreign military advisers
the fact that they
article.

do not

and technicians in the category of mercenaries, despite
fall

Moreover, there

within the definition of mercenaries

is

a general belief,

sponsor, Nigeria, that the article will have

made by

the United States

is

set forth in that

apparendy entertained even by

little, if

any, effect.

apparently not directed

at

'

The

its

objection

the substance of the

Levle on the
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a desire to protect

mercenaries, but at the fact that

it is

another

instance of politicizing the 1977 Protocol I in favor of national liberation
48
This provision of 1977 Protocol /is, of course, the other side of
movements.

the coin with respect to national liberation

movements:

protection to

full

members of national liberation movements no matter to what extent they violate
the law

who

of war; no protection to those

oppose national liberation

movements even if they comply with the law of war.
Objection is made to Article 51 (6) which prohibits attacks
population by
reprisals as a

way of reprisal. While
method of compelling

there

is

much

to

against the civilian

be said for the use of

the adverse party

who

is

violating the

humanitarian law of war to return to compliance with that law, there

much

to be said in favor

of prohibiting

929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention,

against prisoners of war;
first

and

it is

The United States

is

of

a party to the

Article 2(3) of which prohibits reprisals

a party to the

1949 Geneva Conventions, the

three of which include provisions prohibiting reprisals against the

on

also

reprisals against certain categories

individuals, including the civilian population.
1

is

wounded

against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea,
and
52
against prisoners of war.
Article 33 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,

and

sick

land,

-53

prohibits reprisals against persons protected

members of

civilian populations

by

that convention,

all

of whom are

but whose categories are limited in number

(primarily the civilian populations of occupied territories), and, in particular,

does not include the civilian populations of the belligerents in their
territories.

There does not appear

wounded and

who

the United States' position

of the

reprisal

—and

are

there

would appear

bombing of its own

is

to

be based on the belief that only the

civilian

population might serve

be

reprisals,

as a basis

the civilian population of the United

considerable merit to that belief.

populations in Europe by both sides during World
to

civilian population. All three

no longer, or were never, combatants. However,

enemy from bombing

for dissuading an
States

be any great difference between the

and prisoners of war and the

sick

categories are persons

fear

to

home

The bombing of civilian

War II,

claimed by both

sides

caused innumerable deaths and created devastation which

probably contributed to extending the duration of the

hostilities.

Here, mixed

military-humanitarian reasons might well warrant a reservation to this provision.
(It is

worthy of note

that

no other objection was voiced

to Article 51, paragraph

2 of which prohibits making the civilian population the subject of attack or the
threat of attack,

and paragraphs 4 and

5

of which prohibit indiscriminate

attacks,

including target area bombing.)

For military reasons the United States objects to the provisions of Article
56(1),

which

prohibits attacks

on
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[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear electrical generating stations,

.

.

dangerous forces and consequent severe

.

if

such attack

among

losses

may

cause the release of

the civilian population.

55

The Legal Adviser of the Department of State has indicated his belief that "under
this article, civilian losses are

In other words,

target."'

not to be balanced against the military value of the

it is

his position that this provision disregards the

longstanding principle of proportionality and prohibits the attack

be "severe"

civilian losses

military point of view.

provision, the

United

57

how

no matter

Accepting

States could,

important the target

ratification,

merely "understand"

a

that,

would apply

other applicable cases, the principle of proportionality

as in

may be from

construction of the

this as a valid possible

upon

if there are to

in

balancing the "severe" losses against the military advantage.

The

Legal Adviser of the Department of State further points out that during

the drafting of this provision a United States representative had called attention
to the difference

statement

between

made by

this

prohibition and current international law.

59

The

the United States representative indicated that his primary

concern and the main thrust of
international humanitarian law

his

argument was not

that the progress

was removing from the category of military

which had previously been within

objectives installations

of

that category,

a

procedure that has occurred with some degree of regularity during the past
century (medical and religious personnel and units, military hospitals, hospital
civilian hospitals,

ships,

cultural objects

have

all

medical

received

aircraft,

museums,

and

places of worship,

this special protection),

but that these specially

protected installations might be used "as a cover to obtain military advantage."

One

cannot help but conclude that the military decision to object to

provision
it

may well be

became apparent

bomb

that for humanitarian reasons the

the dikes, these

artillery

based on the experience in North Vietnam where,

became havens

United

States

for reserve fuel supplies

weapons. While Article 56(2) attempts to eliminate

setting forth

this

when

would not

and

anti-aircraft

this

problem by

with particularity the circumstances which will

result in the

that there are

some

loopholes in that paragraph of which a lawless belligerent could avail

itself.

cessation of the special protection,

However, the adverse party could

it

must be admitted

also take

advantage of the language of these

provisions as a legal basis for asserting that the

known facts

warrant the cessation

made to
is to the distinction between the stated manner in which a dam or
protection and the stated manner in which a nuclear power plant

of the special protection accorded to these objects. (One objection
Article 56(2)

dike loses
loses
is

it

more

its

protection.
restrictive.)

Understandably, in view of its projected

effect, the latter

Law
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The United

States

War

of

complains that Article 5 (Protecting Powers) and Article

90 (International Fact-Finding Commission) do not go
both cases the consent of the

Communist

body

valid complaint
as far as

than

its

is

enough because

required and

all

in

of the

countries have been adamant in refusing to allow any foreign or

international

go

parties to the conflict

far

on

to operate or investigate

when made,

but

is it still

one might have wished,

And

valid?

does go

it

their territories.

"

This was

a

although Article 5 does not

a bit further in the right direction

predecessors in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

'

The

provisions of Article

90 for an International Fact-Finding Commission are novel and offer great
potential even

though the "non-law-abiding" nations

decline to permit the

Commission

although Article 90 does not go

will unquestionably

to function in their territories.

as far as

Once

again,

one might have wished by making the

competence of the Commission compulsory

for

all

parties,

it

does represent a

considerable advance in the methods of enforcing the humanitarian law of war.

Moreover,
parties

has been so successful that already

it

have

filed the requisite

the required twenty

statement recognizing the competence of the

Commission, and the Commission has been
It is

more than

believed that from the foregoing

established.

it

can be seen that the few valid

objections of the United States to the 1977 Protocol I do not justify the refusal

by the executive branch
ratification.

few

to send

to the Senate for

its

advice and consent to

Rather than dozens of reservations and understandings, only

are required in order for the

insofar as

it

it is

United

States to

concerned, those provisions which

it

remove from

a

very

the Protocol,

considers as politicizing that

which there are valid military
objections.
The United States can then join the more than one hundred other
members of the international community who are already parties to the 1977

instrument,

Protocol

as

well

as

the

few provisions

for
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advice and consent to ratification. Nevertheless,

shares this view." Id.

it

the 1977 Protocol

To

"invite[d]

II.

Sofaer, The Position of the United States on Current

& Pol'Y 460 (1987)

it

date the Senate has not accepted the

Law

of

War

Am. U. J.
Department

Agreements, 2

[hereinafter Sofaer, Position]. Judge Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the U.S.

Abraham D. Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I
War Victims (Cont'd), 82 Am. J. Intl L. 784 (1988) [hereinafter
Sofaer, Agora]. For the presentation made by Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, see Matheson, supra note 4. For the presentation made by Douglas J. Feith, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, see Douglas J. Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law

of State
to

the

also

wrote the following

Geneva Conventions on

AKRON

Backwards, 19
article:

L.

Rev. 531 (1986)

Douglas J. Feith, Law

Interest 36

(Fall

a legal officer

on

see also Burras

article:

the Protection of

in the Service

[hereinafter Feith]. Feith

of Terrorism

— The

had previously published the following

Strange Case of the Additional Protocol,

1

National

some of the remarks made by Lieutenant Colonel Burras M. Carnahan, USAF,

1985). For

the Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Carnahan, Customary International Law, supra note 6;

M. Carnahan,

Additional Protocol

I:

A Military

View, 19

Akron L. Rev.

543 (1986)

(this article

includes a disclaimer statement).
9.

Articles in support

the head of the

United

Laws of War, 75 Am.

Waldemar A.
Protocol,

20

Solf,

J.

of the 1977

States

INTL

L.

the

Am.

J.

at

Akron

L. PvEV. 261 (1986);

Feith's

States

is

somehow

Law in

see

1977

Protocol

I,

one by Ambassador George Aldrich,
George Aldrich, New Life for the

Solf, a

member of the

the Service of Terror

Hans-Peter Gasser,

the latter article,

— The

U.S. Delegation,

see

Strange Case of the Additional

8, at

An Appealfor Ratification by the

Abraham

obligated to ratify or accede to

by the Geneva Conference." Sofaer, Agora, supra note
which support that conclusion.
10.

others,

and one by Hans-Peter Gasser, Legal Adviser to the Directorate,

Committee of the Red Cross,
Intl L. 912 (1987). Regarding

United

among

the Diplomatic Conference, see

764 (1981); one by Waldemar A.

A Response to Douglas J.

International

81

Protocol /include,

Delegation

1977

United States,

Sofaer states that Gasser assumes "that

Protocol

784. However,

/simply because

it

no facts or arguments

was adopted
are presented

supra note 1, preamble, 16 I.L.M. at 1391 (emphasis added).

mentioned here, despite the fact that the Preamble is not the subject of objection by
the United States, because it is occasionally hinted by opponents to ratification of the 1977 Protocol I that some
of its provisions condone the just war doctrine. See, e.g., Feith, supra note 8, at 532.
12. No objection is stated to Article 1(1), (2), and (3). Paragraphs (1) and (3) of that article merely restate
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, see supra note 3, and paragraph (2) restates the DeMartens Clause
11.

This matter

is

Law

Levie on the

350

which originated

of

War

Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention No. 11 with Respect to the Laws and
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; see also 1 Bevans, supra note 2, at 247; Schindler &

in the

Customs of War on Land, July

supra note 1, at 63; Levie, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 17, 152, 366, 457, 492.
The United States has ratified the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, at 2-3, 18 I.L.M. 1456. See also Levie, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 247, 306.

Toman,
13.

1979,

Article 12

of this Convention

states:

[T]he present Convention

shall

conflicts as defined in the

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and

mentioned

conflicts
Id. at 10.

not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed

in article 1, paragraph 4

Convention

problem

take hostages, leaving that

members of national

will not apply to

to the provisions

TERRORISM,

Brussels]; see also Levie,

supra note

Law of War: A Documentary History
member of the armed

the uniformed

an individual he will

own

force, if

16.

See supra note 2.

1929, 47

Stat.

abo 2 Bevans, supra note

Toman,
18.

supra note

1949

See

1, at

First

Friedman

(L.

ed.,

of a nation normally meets
he

if

is

1, at

28;

1

The

1972) [hereinafter Friedman]. Obviously,
all

this will

of these requirements.
warrant his

trial

On occasion,

and punishment by

thereafter captured.

2021, T.S. No. 846 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention];

Am. J. Intl. L.
TERRORISM, supra note 1.

932; 118 L.N.T.S. 343; 27

2, at

339;

& Toman, supra note

17, 444; Schindler

1, at

by the enemy,

well-disciplined, or

it is

See supra note 12.

17. July 27,

forces

194

meet the fourth requirement, and

to

fail

15.

note

3.

August 27, 1874, 65 British Foreign and State Papers 1005 [hereinafter 1874 Declaration of

14.

see

movements who

Geneva Convention makes the taking of hostages

grave breach of that instrument with no exclusions. See supra note

his

liberation

of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional

Protocols. See supra notes 1,3. Article 147 of the 1949 Fourth

as

armed

of 1977 ....

I

In other words, the United States has agreed that the doctrine of aut punire, aut dedire (punish or

extradite) contained in that

a

the Protocols thereto, including

of Additional Protocol

Levie,

see generally

Geneva Convention,

supra note 3,

13(2);

art.

(Supp.) 59 (1933); Schindler

&

1949 Second Geneva Convention, supra

1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(2).
Strangely, the United States delegation voted in favor of Article 44 in

3, art. 13(2);

19.

15 Official Rjecords, supra note

1, at

155; 2

(1980) [hereinafter Levie, Protection].

Howard

The United

Levie,

S.

21.

Committee

totality in

War Victims

HI.

485, 486

of its vote.

States delegation later gave an explanation

Records, supra note 1, at 169, 179; 2 Levie, Protection, id., at
Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War Under the 1977 Protocol I, 23 Akron L. Rev. 55, 64 (1989).
The United States "supports" Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I, which sets forth the "Fundamental
505-06.

15 Official
20.

its

Protection of

Guarantees" to which

person in the custody of the adverse party

a

is

entided. Matheson, supra note 4,

at

427-28.
22.

Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 465-66.

23.

The

cited provisions of

both of these instruments are international actions intended to

international rule contrary to the rule enunciated in the case of In

which held

that the provisions for the trial

Convention,

Communist

see supra
states

of prisoners of war

re

note 17, only applied to post-capture offenses.

of the time made

a reservation to Article

Yamashita,

set forth in the

The

327 U.S.

1,

establish

an

20-21 (1946),

1929 Geneva Prisoner of War

Soviet

Union and

all

of the other

85 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention,

see supra

under which the individual ceased to have those benefits once he had been finally convicted.
24. Of course, the individual who has prisoner of war status will have to be tried by the court that would

note

3,

be authorized to

try

members of the

no great problem; and the
See infra notes
25.

armed

captor's

25-28 and accompanying

civilian

of the 1977

population

as

usually a court-martial

—but

that should present

Douglas J. Feith, then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Department of Defense,

humanitarian law." Feith, supra note

The

—

text.

8, at

convention containing ninety-one substantive
26. Article 51(2)

forces

who has no military standing, would continue to be tried by civilian courts.

Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 467.

for Negotiations Policy,
itself

terrorist,

labelled the

534. This

articles,

is

1977

Protocol I "a pro-terrorist treaty that calls

because of two paragraphs of two

articles

of

a

many of which include numerous numbered paragraphs!

Protocol I provides:

such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts

or threats of violence the primary purpose of which

is

to spread terror

among

the civilian population

are prohibited.

1977

Protocol

terrorists

27.

some

—

I,

supra note

the time

The

bomb

cases cited

terrorists

1,

art.

left in

by

51(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1413. This provision prohibits the

main

activity

of

public places.

Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at

465

n.136,

claim that they are entitled to prisoner of war status

—

merely indicate that
a

when

captured

claim not sustained by the courts.

1977 Protocol
Manuel Noriega

asserted

and was granted prisoner of war

status

by the United

States,

351

I

but he surrendered

during the course of armed conflict in Panama.
28.

Dist

United

States v.

29.

111.

July 14, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library,

Id.

30. Fear has

been expressed

"racist." Sofaer, Position, supra
it is

CR 736-4 (N.D.

Oscar Lopez, No. 80

file).

States would be viewed as "imperialist," or
would undoubtedly be so denominated by a few nations,
momentous effect in the present era.

of the United

that the position

note

8, at

470.

While

it

this would have a
Matheson, supra note 4, at 423-24; but see supra note 6.
32. For some reason the Diplomatic Conference elected to include in the 1977

extremely doubtful that

31.

See, e.g.,

the protection of the natural environment in

two provisions
supra note 1,

are

art.

worded somewhat

separate articles, Article 35(3)

differently, their substance

35(3), 55(1), 16 I.L.M. at 1408, 1415.

in his presentation, perhaps because

55(1). See

two

Matheson, supra note

Matheson

and intent
refers to,

Protocol /provisions for

and Article 55(1). While the

are the same. See

1977

Protocol

I,

but does not discuss, Article 55(1)

he considers the criticism of Article 35(3) to be equally applicable to Article

4, at

424.

33. Matheson, supra note 4, at 424.

It is

interesting to note that the

wording of that paragraph was based

made by the Rapporteur of Committee III, who was the head of the United States Delegation,
2 Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 271, and that the United States delegation made no objection to the
paragraph either after it was adopted in Committee III, 14 OFFICIAL Records, supra note 1, at 408-14; 2
Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 273-75, or after it was adopted by the Plenary Meeting, 6 Official
Records, supra note 1, at 99-101, 113-18; 2 Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 277-80. Presumably, he
on

a

proposal

had been authorized to propose this wording.
34. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or

Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification

see also Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 163;
TERRORISM, supra note 1 at 1 90, 299. In signing the Convention in Geneva on May 18,1 977, Secretary
of State Vance pointed out that the United States believed that "it is wise to outlaw what is commonly called

Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 88;
Levie,

,

'environmental warfare' before

it

has a real chance to be developed significandy for military purposes, with

by Secretary of State Vance at the Signing of the Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May
18, 1977, in 1977 Documents on Disarmament 326, 327 (1977).
35. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental

potentially disastrous consequences." Statement

Modification Techniques, Sept.
36.
as

It is

1976,

in

1976

Documents on Disarmament

an unacceptable limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. If the United States

need only repeat on

by

2,

this

ratification the

understanding that

it

stated at

fears this interpretation,

it

the time of signing: "[T]he rules established

on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear
718. The United Kingdom stated a similar understanding. Id.

protocol were not intended to have any effect

weapons." Schindler
37.

577, 582 (1976).

probably these provisions that are sometimes claimed to have the potential of being interpreted

1977

& Toman, supra note

Protocol

I,

supra note 1,

art.

1, at

39(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1409.

38. Matheson, supra note 4, at 425.
39. General Orders
States in the Field (also

No.

100, Apr. 24, 1863, Instructions for the

known

and in Friedman, supra note 14,
40.

as the Lieber Code), reprinted
at

in

Government of Armies of the United
& Toman, supra note 1, at 3, 12,

Schindler

170.

See supra notes 2, 12.

Army Field Manual ^ 54 (1956). The British manual, The Law of War on Land ^
320 (1958), is to the same effect. Of course, a spy has always been in violation of the law of war when caught
behind enemy lines in the enemy's uniform.
42. Coleman Phillipson, International Law and the Great War 208 (1915).
43. United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes
41.

27-10 U.S.

Commission 490-91

Although the accused

war crimes

of Otto Skorzeny, see National
Commission,
RG 338,
M1217, Roll 1;
War Crimes
9 L. Rep. of Trials
OF War Criminals 90 (1948), were acquitted of entering into combat while wearing American uniforms, a
number of other members of Skorzeny 's unit who were captured by American units while wearing American
uniforms during the Battle of the Bulge were immediately tried by court-martial, convicted of spying, and
executed. Maximilian Koessler, International Law on Use of Enemy Uniforms as a Stratagem and the Acquittal in
the Skorzeny Case, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 16, 29-30 (1959).
44. See Friedman, supra note 14; see also text accompanying notes 14-18, supra.
45. It should not be overlooked that Article 39(3) specifically exempts espionage and armed conflict at
sea from the scope of the quoted provision. See 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 39(3), 16 I.L.M. at 1409.

Archives,

(1948).

File

in the

United Nations

trial

.
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Levie on the

Law

War

of

International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols

46.

U 1806 (Yves Sandoz ct al. cds., 1987).
47. There are a number of General Assembly
of mercenaries

trial

Laws q/"War and

The
at

the

as illegal

Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death

7977

provisions of Article 47(2) (b) of the

1412, require that to be

which

several

resolutions dealing with mercenaries.

a

of the accused

The

well-publicized

last

combatants was that held in Angola in June 1976. See Mike J. Hoover, Notes, The
to the

Protocol

Dogs of War, 9 Case

see

I,

7977

Protocol

mercenary the individual must have taken

who were

convicted in the Angolan

48.

Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 469.

49.

See supra note 17.

trial

1949 First Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 46.
1949 Second Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 47.
52. 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, ^

I,

W.

Res. J. INT'L

supra note

1, art.

L.

323

47(2)(b),

direct part in the hostilities,

(1977).

16 I.L.M.

something

had not done.

50.
51.

54. Article
II

3.

See supra note 3.

53.

20 of the 1977

Protocol I prohibits reprisals against the persons

and objects protected by Part

of the Protocol (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical units and personnel, and medical transportation);

Article 52(1) prohibits reprisals against civilian objects; Article 53(c) prohibits reprisals against cultural objects

and places of worship; Article 54(4) prohibits

reprisals against objects indispensable to the survival

of the

civilian

population; Article 55(2) prohibits reprisals against the natural environment; and Article 56(4) prohibits reprisals
against

works or

installations

containing dangerous forces. See generally 1977 Protocol

made by

objection was raised in the presentations

I,

supra note

1.

No

the officials of the United States to any of these provisions.

See supra notes 4, 8.

1977

55.

Protocol

I,

supra note

56(1), 16 I.L.M. at 1415.

1, art.

56. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 468.
57.
losses

should be noted that Article

It

"which would be

that Article

an attack

a

concerning reaching decisions to

57(2)(a)(iii),

attack, refers to civilian

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"; and

85 (3) (c), concerning the

specific attacks referred to in the article

grave breach of the Protocol only

if it "will

quoted in the

text,

to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii)." See Protocol, supra note 1,

I.L.M.

at

58.

1430.

Both of these

Frankly speaking,

versus military advantage

author has never been able to understand

to be accomplished.

Is

the

bombing of a

that they are the only tanks available to support an

impending

friendly attack.

Does

that increase the

59.

Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at

60.

14 Official

Records,

how

the balancing of civilian losses

battalion of tanks

468

supra note

impending enemy

number ofjustified

found

in a residential

How

does one decide?

attack or to

be used against an

be in the range of 50? 100? 500? 1,000?

area justified if the civilian casualties will

Suppose

85(3)(c), 16

art.

provisions are applications of the rule of proportionality

this
is

makes such

cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage

civilian casualties? If so, to

what extent?

n.146.

1, at

151, 158

TJ

39; 3 Levie,

Protection,

supra note 19, at 281,

284.
61.

Camahan, Customary

International

Law, supra note

62. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 469-70.

The

6, at

506; Sofaer, Position, supra note 8,

unfortunate that these provisions are not mandatory. Levie, Pros and Cons, supra note
States apparently does not object to these articles,

have ensured their effectiveness in

all

but only to their

relevant cases.

at

468.

present author has also taken the position that

The United

5, at

541-42.

failure to include provisions

it

is

The United

which would

States affirmatively "supports" Article 5. See

supra note 4.

63.

See Articles 8-10

common

to the

first

three 1949

of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note

Geneva Conventions,

supra note 3,

and Articles 9-11

3.

Korea (1950-1953), the North Koreans alleged that the United States was
States denied the charge and proposed an investigation by the
World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The North Koreans refused
to allow such an investigation to be made but had one conducted by other Communists who, naturally, found
64.

During the

hostilities in

using bacteriological weapons.

The United

that the allegations were true. However, probably having decided that the conclusions of its own investigative
body were not receiving the desired publicity and acceptance, the North Koreans dropped the matter. Such
an investigation would now be a function of the Fact-Finding Commission, but only if its competence has
been accepted, generally or specially.
65. 31 Intl Rev. Red Cross 411 (1991). When Poland filed a declaration on October 2, 1992,
recognizing the competence of the Commission, it was the thirty-second party to do so. 32 INT'L Rev. Red

Cross 606 (1993).
66. The United Kingdom had no difficulty in setting forth
7 977 Protocol
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 717-18.
I.

ten understandings

at

the time of signing the

I

XVIII
Prohibitions

Use

the

and Restrictions on

of Conventional

68 Saint John's

Weapons

Law Review 643

University

(1994)

1980, a Diplomatic Conference convened by the General Assembly of the
InUnited
Nations in Geneva was successful in drafting a

Convention on

on

Prohibitions or Restrictions

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

the

Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects ("Conventional Weapons Convention"). Three Protocols, each relating
to a specific weapon or group of weapons, were attached. The Conventional
Weapons Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York on April 10, 1981. The United States did not sign
it

and since then has

until April 8, 1982,

ratified

only the Convention and two

The Conventional Weapons Convention and

of the Protocols.

Protocols

its

received the necessary twenty ratifications and accessions by June 2, 1983,

entered into force six months later

The purposes of this Article
considered necessary;
three Protocols;
best interests

and

(2) to

on December

2,

are (1) to determine

1983.

and

5

why these instruments were

analyze the provisions of the Convention and of the

(3) to ascertain

of the United

in

what manner

ratification will

be in the

States.

Introduction

As long ago
forth a

as

1868, the Preamble of the Declaration of

number of "limits

at

requirements of humanity."
That the progress of

which the
7

.

These

civilization

possible the calamities

necessities
.

limits

St.

Petersburg

of war ought to yield to the

.

included the following:

should have the effect of alleviating

as

much

as

of war;

That the only legitimate objects which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war

That for

is

this

to

weaken

purpose

it is

set

the military forces of the enemy;

sufficient to disable the greatest possible

number of men;

Levie on the

354
That

Law

of

War

would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
sufferings of disabled men, or render their deaths inevitable; [and]

object

this

aggravate the

That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary

to the laws

of

humanity.

22 and 23(e) of the Regulations Attached to the 1899 Hague

Articles

Convention

with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,

(II)

the same articles of the Regulations Attached to the 1907
(IV)

Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,

humanitarian

Hague Convention

include the following

rules:

The

Article 22:

and

right

of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy

is

not

unlimited.

Article 23
it is

(e):

In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions,

especially prohibited

12

[or forbidden]

:

To employ arms, projectiles,

of a nature [calculated] to cause unnecessary suffering.

or material

13

Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in the nature and lethality of weapons

which occurred during the course of the subsequent seven decades, the only
international agreement prohibiting or restricting specific conventional

which became

effective

weapons

during that period was the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,

prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological weapons.
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference that took place in

and 1977,

work of which culminated

the

Geneva Conventions

17

(only one of

in

which

two

will

Geneva between 1974

additions to the four 1949

concern

18
this Article

),

the

Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") had sponsored a number
of preliminary conferences, the last of which was a Conference of Government
Experts that met in 1972. Although those conferences were concerned with the
International

reaffirmation

armed

and development of international humanitarian law applicable

conflicts,

and not with prohibitions or

conventional weapons,

at

with

legal, military,

that the

ICRC

should arrange

...

unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in their
this suggestion,

the

ICRC

meeting

weapons

as

may

cause

19
effect.

convened meetings of a

selected

in

weapons which required consideration.
classified as

a special

March and June 1973. These meetings of experts did not
formulate concrete proposals, but sought merely to document the

group of experts
attempt to

the use of specific

and medical experts on the question of express

prohibitions or limitations of the use of such conventional

Complying with

on

the conclusion of the 1972 conference a group of the

government experts suggested
to consult

restrictions

in

20

Five categories of weapons were

causing unnecessary suffering or being indiscriminate in their

effects:

—
Weapons

Conventional
1) small-calibre projectiles; 2) blast

weapons

(land mines

and booby

weapons development. It
the weapons in these five

will

and fragmentation weapons;

traps); 4)

355

3)

time-delay

incendiary weapons; and

5) potential

be found that these experts chose well and that

categories continued to constitute the subject of

discussions in the various subsequent conferences

on

including the conference that drafted the Conventional

and Protocols which were the ultimate

result

of these

up

this matter,

and

to

Weapons Convention

labors,

The Diplomatic Conference that met in Geneva for the first time on February
20, 1974 (and did not complete its work until June 10, 1977), established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons, whose terms of reference called
i

23

weapons without making any substantive or drafting decisions.
This Committee functioned throughout the four sessions of the Diplomatic
24
Conference.
While the Ad Hoc Committee made no substantive

for it to "discuss

i

recommendations,

during

than 1979 to

Plenary

final

Meetings

the

Diplomatic

recommending that a conference be held not
reach "agreements on prohibitions or restrictions on the use

Conference adopted
later

the

a resolution

of specific weapons."

The General Assembly of the United Nations took note of that
and adopted its

own resolution,

on prohibitions or

restrictions

convening in 1979

a

resolution

United Nations conference

on the use of specific conventional weapons.

met in 1978 and 1979, and the Conventional Weapons
Conference met for the first time in Geneva from September 10, 1979, to
September 28, 1979. The Conference met again from September 15, 1980, to
October 10, 1980. At this latter session it completed the drafting of a
Conventional Weapons Convention and three Protocols annexed to that
27
This Article will focus on the meaning and intent of the
Convention.

Preparatory conferences

Conventional Weapons Convention and

whether there

are valid reasons for the

nations to ratify such instruments

its

Protocols in order to determine

United

States

and other major military

which advance the humanitarian law of war

instruments that, moreover, such nations played a major role in drafting.
I.

The Conventional Weapons Convention

The Conventional Weapons Convention
^umbrella" convention.

It

contains

no

itself

may

be termed an

substantive humanitarian provisions,

those being the subject matter of the three Protocols
It

truly

which

are

annexed

to

it.

has several provisions, however, that are either controversial or unusual.
Article

1

makes the Conventional Weapons Convention and

its

annexed

Protocols applicable in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the 1949
28

Geneva Conventions. This
it would have been preferable

is

certainly not a controversial provision, although

to restate the article itself in

full, a

practice followed

elsewhere in the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols.

It

then
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make them

proceeds to
Article

1

Law

of

War

applicable in "any situation described in paragraph 4 of

of Additional Protocol

the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

to these Conventions."*

making an

I,

international law-of-war convention

movements

applicable in conflicts involving national liberation

considered to be internal in nature),

is

one of the major reasons

States has not ratified this latter instrument.

with the objection of the United States to
Protocol

I,

primarily because

which removed the

was the

liberation

(theretofore

why

the United

Although the present author agrees

this

provision in the 1977 Additional

basis for Article 44(3)

of that Protocol

historic requirements for distinguishing legal

from members of national
effect

it

This provision of

movements, the

on the Conventional Weapons Convention or

provision has no

latter

its

combatants

Protocols.

There

is

no

question here of hiding one's personal weapons from view, concealing oneself

among

civilians preparatory to

insignia.

Anyone whose

these Protocols

who

an attack, or wearing no visible distinguishing

State or "authority" has agreed to be

bound by any of

thereafter violates the humanitarian provisions thereof will

be guilty of a war crime, whether he be
or civil war, a rebel in a

civil

war, or a

in hostilities against the colonial

uniformed soldier in an international

a

member of a national liberation movement

power.

31

While

Conventional

ratifying the

Weapons Convention, the United States could easily express its displeasure with
32
or, as France has done, by making
this provision by way of an understanding
a specific reservation.

Article 2

is

concerned with the relation of the Conventional Weapons

Convention and

its

Protocols to other international agreements, affirming that

they do not detract "from other obligations imposed
Parties

upon

by international humanitarian law applicable

provision appears to be superfluous inasmuch

instruments which could possibly have that

agreements,

as

are

is

a part

Articles

5

is

conflict." This

nothing in these

anything, they "add to,"

34

of the standard boilerplate of international
(Entry

into

texts).

from the standard

circumstances of the Conventional

6

force),

(Denunciation), 10 (Depositary), and 11 (Authentic
these articles contain variations

High Contracting

armed

there

effect. If

they do not "detract from" other obligations.
Article 3 (Signature)

as

in

the

to

(Dissemination),
Naturally,

meet the

9

some of

particular

Weapons Convention.

Article 4 (Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession) begins in the

standard fashion, but paragraph 3 requires discussion.

Expressions of consent to be

bound by any of

Convention shall be optional for each

State,

It

provides:

the Protocols annexed to this

provided that at the time of the deposit

of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval of this Convention or of
accession thereto, that State shall notify the depositary of its consent to be

by any two or more of these Protocols.

bound

Weapons

Conventional
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as
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authorizing reservations

and understandings. At the time of signing, the United

States said:

In addition, the United States of course reserves the right, at the time of ratification,
to exercise the option

provided by Article 4(3) of the Convention, and to make

statements of understanding and/or reservations, to the extent that

it

may deem

necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian

and military requirements.

Inasmuch

as

37

the Convention contains

no prohibition

against reservations or

somewhat difficult to understand why the United States
considered it necessary to announce its construction of Article 4(3) as specifically

understandings,

it is

granting that right.

Furthermore, paragraph 3 contains
State

becomes

a Party to the

There was thought

noted, the 1980 Protocol

I,

to

a

bound by any

be good reason for

two or more of these

this provision.

As

shall

be

concerned with nondetectable fragments, was

completely noncontroversial, and
ratify the

when

Conventional Weapons Convention "that State

depositary of its consent to be

shall notify the

Protocols ."

unusual provision in that

a rather

it

could be expected that

many

Conventional Weapons Convention and Protocol

I

States

might

only. Article 4

compels States to give more consideration to the other two Protocols, and thus,
it

prevents States from ratifying only the Conventional

and Protocol

I

and thereafter claiming the

status

Weapons Convention

of Parties to the Convention.

In addition to a provision rejecting the general participation

contained in Article 7(1),
respect to treaty relations

41

Article 7 contains a

between the

Parties.

the provision addressing national liberation

contained in Article

1,

(si

omnes) doctrine

number of other provisions with
Unfortunately, not content with

movements (termed an

the Conference found

it

"authority")

necessary to include further

lengthy special provisions on this subject in Article 7(4), in an attempt to link
the

Conventional

Weapons Convention with

Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

Geneva
The 1949 Geneva

four

the
4

1.

1949

are completely irrelevant to

Weapons Convention and its Protocols. Those instruments
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional

the Conventional

do not contain
weapons.

Clearly, these special provisions

national liberation

movements

were another attempt

to secure for

the benefits of all of the humanitarian law of war

upon an undertaking by an "authority" that is rarely able to control the activities
of the members of its movement and that uses the civilian population as a military
objective rather than as something to be protected. France, like the United States,
is not a Party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and had no difficulty in making
a reservation to Article 7(4)(b) of the 1980 Convention.
There is no reason
"

why the United States should not make a similar reservation,

if it is so

minded.
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Moreover,

it is

Law

of interest

of

War

that,

Conventions (with respect

to

Common Article 3(4)

while

armed

of those instruments does not

Convention

that

is

I

both provide that the application

affect the legal status

provision was included in the Conventional

Notably, one subject that

not of an international character)

conflicts

and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol

of the 1949 Geneva

of the

Parties,

Weapons Convention.

Weapons

missing from the Conventional

is

probably more important in

humanitarian law-of-war treaty

a

than in most types of treaties (other than a disarmament treaty)

of verification. Efforts to include such

no such

is

the question

provision were strongly and successfully

a

resisted.

II.

1980 Protocol

I

The 1980 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
sentence which provides that
effects

of which

is

to injure

detection by X-rays."'

made of such

weapon

prohibited to use any

by fragments which

49
is

the primary

human body

in the

materials as glass

and

this

plastic.

Protocol,

The United

States

which was adopted unanimously.

had any serious military

to have

escape

had become

of the U.S. Delegates attributed the unanimity "in part to the

one seems

a single

This Protocol was directed primarily against weapons

cosponsor of the proposal for

One

"[i]t is

("Protocol I")

Accordingly, the United States
III.

is

interest in

fact that

a
51

no
52

such

weapon."'

a

justified in ratifying this Protocol.

1980 Protocol

II

The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
53
is concerned with the
Booby Traps and Other Devices ("Protocol II")
"time-delay" weapons referred to by the 1973 Conference of Government
'

Experts.

Such weapons include:

hand-buried or delivered by

and

3)

anti-vehicle

aircraft, artillery,

Article

booby

traps;

was more controversial than

was without question of greater importance.
of the 1980 Protocol II, entitled Material Scope of Application,

1

clear that

its

subject matter

crossings or river crossings")

little

II

2)

I, it

is

limited to the use of the aforementioned

weapons on land only ("including mines
mines

and antipersonnel land mines,

or naval guns;

other devices. While the 1980 Protocol

Protocol

makes

1)

at sea

and

that

it

or in inland waterways."'

laid to interdict beaches,

waterway

"does not apply to the use of anti-ship

Although there appears

controversy involved in the drafting of this

article, its

to

have been

importance cannot

be overestimated.
Article 2, entitled Definitions, defines "mine," "booby-traps,"

devices."

It

provides:

and "other

Conventional

Weapons
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"Mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity
and "remotely delivered mine" means any
or contact of a person or vehicle,
delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from
mine
1.

.

.

.

an

aircraft.

2.

"Booby-trap" means any device or material which

adapted to

designed, constructed or

which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs

or injure and

kill

is

or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparendy safe

act.

"Other device" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to
kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically
3.

of time.

after a lapse

Inasmuch

as this definition

of "other devices" contains no examples and, unlike

weapons covered by

the procedure followed with respect to the other

Protocol,

no

additional article deals exclusively with "other devices,"

it is

this

likely

be controversy regarding exactly which weapons were the

that there will

intended target of this provision.
Article 2(4), defining "military objective," appears to have

controversy.

It

engendered no

reads:

"Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object
its

nature, location, purpose or use

action and

whose

makes an

which by

effective contribution to military

total or partial destruction, capture

or neutralization, in the

circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

was

Article 2(5)

essentially unnecessary, as

2(4). It defines "civilian objects" as "all objects
as

its

content follows from Article

which

are not military objectives

defined in paragraph 4."
Finally, Article 2(6) defines

"recording"

as "a physical, administrative

and

technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the
official records, all available

information facilitating the location of minefields,

mines and booby-traps."
Articles 3, 4,

and 5 of the 1980 Protocol

II set

forth general restrictions

on

weapons covered by the Protocol: mines, booby-traps, and
The main objective of their provisions is to protect both the

the use of all of the

other devices.
civilian

population and individual civilians from the

There appears

to

be very

little

effects

of these weapons.

in their provisions that could be considered

controversial.

The provision of Article 4 requiring "the posting of warning signs"

and "the

of warnings" of the location of mine

issue

unrealistic.

"

To

attacking force

is

a large degree, the value

fields,

of mines

slowed up by the need to search

is

however,

is

somewhat

that the progress

for, locate,

of an

and neutralize
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minefields and individual mines. This advantage
to

make

mines

public to

that

which

all,

have been

is

necessarily includes the

renders

a

minelayer is obliged

enemy, the location of

Moreover, the provisions of Article 5 presume an

laid.

accuracy for remotely-delivered mines which

requirement for

lost if the

may be

incorrect.

self-actuating or remotely-controlled

a

While the

mechanism which

mine harmless (mechanisms which have long been employed on

mines) would, in general, be

a

sea

protection for the civilian population, one might

wonder whether the safety of civilians is jeopardized when that mechanism is
one which causes the mine to destroy itself by exploding without warning.
Article 6 of the 1980 Protocol II, establishing prohibitions on the use of
CO

booby-traps,

is

very important provision for the protection of

a

particularly children.

1.

relating to treachery

(a)
is

to the rules

and perfidy,

of international law applicable in armed conflict
prohibited in

it is

circumstances to use:

all

any booby-trap in the form of an apparendy harmless portable object which

specifically

detonate

(b)

provides:

It

Without prejudice

civilians,

designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to

when

disturbed or approached,

it is

booby-traps which are in any

internationally recognized protective

or dead persons;

way

or

attached to or associated with:

emblems,

signs or signals;

burial or cremation sites or graves;

(iii)

(iv)

medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation;

(ii)

sick,

wounded

medical
(v)

(i)

facilities,

children's toys

or other portable objects or products specifically designed for the feeding, health,

hygiene, clothing or education of children;

70
(vi)

food or drink;

(vii)

kitchen

utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or

military supply depots;

(viii)

monuments, works of art or
spiritual heritage

2. It is

of peoples;

prohibited in

all

objects clearly of a religious nature;

places of worship
(x)

which

(ix)

historic

constitute the cultural or

animals or their carcasses.

circumstances to use any booby-trap which

is

designed to

cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

Introducing Article 6(1) with the phrase "Without prejudice to the rules of
relating to treachery and perfidy" was an unfortunate
international law
72
Despicable as many booby-traps have been, they have not generally
decision.
73
Obviously,
heretofore been considered to be either treacherous or perfidious.
.

it

was not intended

.

that this Protocol

and perfidious. Had
have

been

.

that

would

declare

all

booby-traps treacherous

been the intention, the lengthy enumeration would

unnecessary.

Notwithstanding,

unquestionably be used, on occasion,

as

the

quoted

the basis for an

phrase

argument

will

that any

—
Conventional
particular booby-trap

violation of the
Article 7

is

Weapons
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both treacherous and perfidious and, therefore,

a

law of war.

of the 1980 Protocol

contained in Article

2.

exceedingly

to

difficult

II

amplifies the definition of "recording"

some of

includes

It

which were

the provisions

primarily because of the technical problems

draft,

In addition, there was strong support for a provision requiring the

involved.

exchange of full information between belligerents concerning the location of
minefields immediately

of Article

(3)(a)(i)

upon the

cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, paragraph

requiring the belligerents "to take

7,

all

necessary and

appropriate measures" to protect civilians immediately after the cessation of
hostilities,

represents a

compromise reached because

a

number of nations were

some of whose territory might still be occupied
at the time of the cessation of hostilities, to make available to the occupier the
location of minefields which might become valuable in the event that there was
a resumption of hostilities. However, under sub-paragraphs (3) (a) (ii) and (iii) of
that article, where there is no occupied territory, or where troops occupying
enemy territory have withdrawn therefrom, there is no discretion involved
records of minefields and booby-trapped areas must be made available to the
unwilling to require a belligerent,

other Party and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

a

are

'

It

is

made by Morocco, there
Technical Annex to Protocol II containing guidelines on recording which
With regard to the Technical Annex the
to be "taken into account."
on

appropriate to point out here that, based
is

79

United
(1) its

a proposal

States has said:

provisions are not mandatory or uniformly applicable in

but only "guidelines" which are to be "taken into account";
information listed in the

Annex

are

of a

all

circumstances,

(2)

sufficiently general character so as to

operationally practicable and to provide sufficient flexibility; (3) the
solely to information

needed

the items of

to establish the location

be

Annex relates

of minefields and does not

require disclosure of technical characteristics of the mines used; and

(4)

the addition

of the Annex provides the assurance that the recording obligations of the Protocol

would

in any event be satisfied if the items of information Listed in the

Annex

are recorded.

In

view of the many, many

hostilities, particularly

casualties

among civilians,

caused by mines after the cessation of

there should be

no

relaxation of the rules

governing the maintenance of complete records with respect to mines laid during
the course of hostilities

and the

availability

of those records to

all

concerned

at

the earliest possible date.
Article 8 of Protocol

II

deals

with the protection of United Nations forces

and missions from the minefields, mines, and areas of booby-traps established

by the belligerent

parties prior to the arrival

of a United Nations peacekeeping,
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of

observation, or other similar mission.

reasonable and noncontroversial.

83
Its

When

provisions appear to be completely

United Nations peacekeeping or

observation forces are involved, extensive protection from minefields and

booby-traps (removal, other measures, and providing the necessary information)
is

required;

when

must provide

it

United Nations mission

a

involved, the belligerent party

is

with protection from those weapons.
9 deals with the very important subject of international

Finally, Article

cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines, and booby-traps.

War
II
OS

of World

of sea mines,

but the

failure to take

any concerted international action with

and booby-traps resulted

to innocent civilians for

many

in accidental deaths

international agreement, there

understanding.

is

cannot be

necessary,
88

II

not

is

injuries

taken

its

contents that,

of with simple

care
to

perfecdy drafted

a

nothing objectionable in

There does not appear

should not accept

and

years thereafter.

summarize, while the 1980 Protocol

deemed

At the end

an international organization was established for the removal

respect to land mines

To

85

statements

if

of

why the United States

be any reason

89
it.

IV.

1980 Protocol

III

The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
90
Weapons ("Protocol III") is unquestionably the most controversial of the three
Protocols. The early opposition of the United States to prohibitions or
•

on

restrictions

weapons was used by the Soviet

the battlefield use of incendiary

delegation "to foster the impression in most quarters that this was the basic

Undoubtedly,

obstacle to a successful conclusion of the Conference."

implications of this Protocol, rather than
reluctant to ratify the Conventional
that Protocol III contains

its

content, that

make

Weapons Convention.

no prohibition or

restriction

(other than the general prohibitions and restrictions

on

92

on

it is

the United States

Despite the

considered inevitable
that

that,

when

the occasion

both of these are banned by Protocol

Article

notable

1

of Protocol

that

while

III sets

the

is

the use of incendiary

smoke or

it

also

It is

particularly

weapons includes

shells, rockets,

and other containers of incendiary substances,"
tracers,

may be

III.

of incendiary

enumeration "flame throwers, fougasses,

it

and

the claim will be advanced

forth a series of definitions.

definition

such weapons: "illuminants,

to the contrary,

arises,

fact

the use of napalm

weapons) or on the use of any incendiary weapons against combatants,
despite the fact that the negotiating history

the

grenades, mines,

bombs

enumerates what are

signalling systems

.

.

.

the

not

munitions

designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an
additional incendiary effect

.

.

.

and similar combined

effects

munitions."

Conventional
Protocol

III

one other

has only

Drafting

article.

it

Weapons

was probably one of the

One major

most difficult tasks that the Conference and its organs encountered.
issue
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had been resolved by excluding combined-effects munitions ("CEMs")

Although the word

from the ambit of the term "incendiary weapons."

"napalm" was heard again and again during the discussions conducted with

eliminating

and was included in

one find

in Protocol III will

•

i

•

respect to this Protocol

that

word

a

number of proposals,

used. This issue

mention of napalm, thus permitting

all

but not against

its

97

nowhere

was resolved by

use against combatants

or civilian objects, which are protected against

civilians

all

incendiary attacks.
Article 2

1.

is

of such importance that

prohibited in

It is

all

it

warrants complete quotation:

circumstances to

make

the civilian population as such,

individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.

2.

prohibited in

It is

within

a

all

circumstances to

make any

99

military objective located

concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary

weapons.

3.

It

further prohibited to

is

make any

military objective located within a

concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons
other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except
is

clearly separated

with

are taken

a

when such military objective

from the concentration of civilians and

view

all

to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective

and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
injury to civilians and

4.

It is

prohibited to

feasible precautions

damage

make

loss

of

civilian life,

to civilian objects.

forests

or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack

by incendiary weapons except when such

natural elements are used to cover,

conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.

The
much.

prohibition contained in the second paragraph perhaps encompasses too
It

encourages the establishment of military objectives which are valid

military targets within cities, towns,

thus

immunizing the

and villages,

military objective

from

(all

attack

concentrations of civilians)

by air-delivered incendiary

weapons, perhaps the only appropriate means of attack.

The

drafters

would

have been better advised to use the provisions of Article 57 (2) (a) of the 1977
Additional Protocol

However,

this

is

a

I

as

the basis for the provisions of this paragraph.

problem which could be

readily corrected

by

a reservation,

or even by an understanding.

The

insertion of the phrase "other than air-delivered incendiary

in paragraph

weapons"

3 of this article was unnecessary and renders the provision
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was probably meant

by paragraph 2 of the same

types of incendiary weapons, except

all

mean

incendiary weapons are prohibited

procedure had been

under the stated

of

civilians) attacks

by ("other than" by) air-delivered

—even though

specifically prohibited

article.

that

military objective within a concentration

(a

was intended

to indicate that this paragraph

phrase could validly be construed to

this

circumstances

by

of

the possibilities not covered

all

However,

Law

(or perhaps because) that

by the previous paragraph. Was

it

intended thereby to exempt from the prohibition contained in the previous
paragraph air-delivered incendiaries under the circumstances

Or was it intended thereby to exclude air-delivered incendiaries

"except" clause?

from the "except" clause

which

set forth in the

that phrase lends

These

itself?

itself.

understanding that clearly

Any

few of the

are but a

acceptance of Protocol

sets forth

III

interpretations to

should include an

what the use of that phrase

is

believed to

have been intended to accomplish.

To

summarize,

as

far as

1980 Protocol

goes, the

it

III

an extremely

is

humanitarian agreement which contains nothing irreparable of either

a political

or a military nature that warrants the refusal of the United States and other major

powers

military

to accept

it.

Epilogue

When the United States signed the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention
in

1982

stated:

it

The United
hopes that
accession.

United

Government welcomes

States will give the

all

We

most

the adoption of this Convention, and

serious consideration to ratification or

Convention represents

believe that the

minimize injury or damage to the

efforts to

conflict.

States

Our

signature of this

States to

Convention

civilian

a positive step

population in time of armed

reflects the general willingness

than a decade

later,

on March

for ratification

I

103

1994, the Secretary of State

21,

transmitted that Convention and Protocols

recommendation

of the

adopt practical and reasonable provisions concerning the conduct

of military operations, for the purpose of protecting noncombatants.

More

forward in

and
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to the
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CONFLICTS 179 (Dietrich Schindler &Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Schindler & Toman].
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1

Final

Conventional Weapons

supra note 1, at 180.
3.

See Schindler

& Toman, supra note

1, at

192;

S.
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Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes
Schindler
1 Am.
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They are an attempt to reduce the inevitable suffering and
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88 Am. J. Intl L. 748, 749 (1994). The first Conference in 1899 reduced a number of existing customs on
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1899 Regulations. Today, these rules are collectively known as the Law of The Hague.
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Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
I, Geneva, June 8, 1977,
art. 35(1 )-(2) [hereinafter 1977 Additional Protocol I] in 1 Swiss Federal Political Department, Official Records
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
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621.
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Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 115; see abo 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 137 (using these weapons
was not prohibited or restricted by the 1972 Convention this was accomplished by the 1925 Geneva Gas
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in

14.

Bacteriological

—

Protocol).

Contrary to the

15.

the Victims of War, see
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or restrictions
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Condition of the
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31, reprinted in Schindler

Convention
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at

of some, neither the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of

note 17, nor the 1977 Additional Protocol

The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Diplomatic Conference] met from 1974 to 1977.
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Law
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infra
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for the Amelioration
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supra note 1, at
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for the Amelioration

12, 1949, 6

[hereinafter First

of the

U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S.

Geneva Convention], Geneva

of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed

6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,

Schindler

reprinted in

& Toman, supra note

1,

401 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners

of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,

423 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]
Persons in

Time of War,

,

reprinted in

6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted

495 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
18. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
19. International Committee of the Red Cross,
the

Work

of the Conference, Annexes 115, 116

in

&

Toman,

supra note

to the Protection

Schindler

&

Toman,

1, at

of Civilian

supra note

1, at

Conference of Government Experts on the

Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian

on

Schindler

Geneva Convention Relative

Law Applicable in Armed

Conflicts: 2

Report

(July 1972).

Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary Suffering or have
on the Work of Experts, paras. 11 and 12 (1973). It must be borne in mind
that, despite the occasional efforts of a few individuals, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons were never
considered to be areas open for discussion in any of the conferences to which this Article refers.
20. International

Indiscriminate Effects: Report

on

21.

Id. at chs. III-VII.

22.

"Small-calibre projectiles" was the only

the subject

(A/CONF.95/CW/5) was

weapons category

submitted

at

to

fall

the Conventional

by the wayside.

A working paper

Weapons Conference by Sweden.
the Informal Working Group on

a "Summary of the technical consultations in
Weapons Systems (A/CONF.95/CW/8); then this subject disappeared except for a resolution
adopted near the end of the 1979 session of the Conventional Weapons Conference. See 1979 Report of the
Conference to the General Assembly, (A/CONF.95/8), Oct. 8, 1979, at 51 [hereinafter 1979 Conference
Report]; and Final Report of the Conference to the General Assembly, (A/CONF.95/15), and Corr. 1-5,

This was followed by
Small-calibre

Oct. 27, 1980,

at

10 [hereinafter 1980 Final Report].

It is

understood that actual

experts failed to substantiate the Swedish thesis that small calibre
calibre

weapons, and therefore, cause more suffering than the larger

considered necessary before any action could be

field tests

weapons tumble and

recommended with

projectiles.

tear

conducted by the

more than

larger

Thus, further study was

respect to these weapons.

Of course,

the

category "potential weapons development" constituted an academic discussion of weapons not yet in the
arsenal

of any nation. Perhaps the weapons which

Conventional Weapons Convention are in
23.

16 Official Records, supra note 13,

Ad Hoc Committee were

fall

within the ambit of the 1980 Protocol

I

to the

this category.
at 5. It will

eventually disregarded. See

be found that these limitations on the

id. at

activities

of the

551-627.

24. Concurrently, the ICRC sponsored two Conferences on the subject. See Report of the Conference
of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Lucerne, 1974 (1974) [hereinafter

"

Conventional

Weapons
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Lucerne Conference]; Report of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Lugano, 1975 (1976).
25. Resolution 22 (IV), Follow-up Regarding Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, 1 Official Records, supra note 13, at Part One, 215-216 and Part Two, 52-53.
Committee I of the Diplomatic Conference had adopted a provision on the subject for inclusion in the 1977
Additional Protocol I, CDDH/I/SR. 77, 9 Official Records, supra note 13, at 481-88, but that provision had
been rejected by the Plenary Meeting, 7 Official Records, supra note 13, at 33.
26. G.A. Res. 32/152, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. NO. 45, at 57, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977),
reprinted in [1977] 31 Y.U.N. 43, U.N. Sales NO. E.79.I.1, and in 16 United Nations Resolutions 529
(Dusan J. Djonovich, ed. 1984) [hereinafter Djonovich]. For some reason, despite the more specific title that
the General Assembly gave to its agenda item, the resolution bears the title "Incendiary and other specific
conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons."
27. See generally 1980 Final Act, supra note 1.
28. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, art. 2.
29. For example, Article 7(1) of the Conventional Weapons Convention is a restatement of the first
sentence of Article 96(2) of the 1977 Protocol I.
30. Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, states that "[t]he situations referred to
in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination
." Once
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination
again, it would have been preferable to include the entire provision
but any attempt to do this would probably
have increased the non-palatability of the provision tenfold!
31. It is possible that the claim will be made, as it has sometimes been made with respect to Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, that if the State involved in a civil war, or a war of
national liberation, is a Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention and some or all of its Protocols, the
provisions of those instruments are automatically binding upon its adversary, whether or not an "authority"
has taken any action with respect thereto. This is based on the theory that all of the nationals of a State Party
to an international agreement are bound by the provisions thereof. On the other hand, rebels have generally
denied that they are bound by the acts of a government that they are seeking to overthrow.
32. See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. 4568 (1995) (declaring that "the United
States will apply the provisions of the Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol II to all armed conflicts referred
to in Articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12,
1 949") The United States may contend, as it does with respect to the provision in the 1 977 Additional Protocol
I, that this provision will protect terrorists. Such a contention has no validity with respect to the 1977 Additional
Protocol I
and it has even less validity here.
33. The French reservation (made upon signature) states, "with reference to the scope of application
defined in article 1 of the [Conventional Weapons Convention], that it will apply the provisions of that
Convention and its three Protocols to all the armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General 833, 834 (1991), 20 1.L.M. 1287 (1981) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties] (noting
reservations, declarations, and statements of signatory nations), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 193-94. No Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention is known to have taken exception to the
French reservation, though it excludes the reference to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and national liberation
movements.
34. Nevertheless, one commentator has found it necessary to allocate three pages of discussion to this
subject. Elmar Rauch, The Protection of the Civilian Population in International Armed Conflicts and the Use of
Landmines, 24 German Y.B. Intl L. 262, 264-66 (1981). The present author does concur with Rauch's
finding that the Conventional Weapons Convention is not a supplement to the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Id. at 265. Another commentator states that "[t]he purpose of this Article is to exclude the a contrario line of
argument whose adherents might claim that anything not specifically prohibited in the Convention is allowed.
.

.

—

.

—

A.P.V. Rogers,

A

Commentary on

Other Devices, 26 Mil. L.

the Protocol

& L. War Rev.

on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and

185, 188 (1987).

1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, arts. 3, 5, 6, 9-11.
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, art. 4.
37. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 832, 835, reprinted
35.

36.

at

in

Shindler

&

Toman,

supra note 1,

192, 196.

was making two separate statements: one setting forth its intent to exercise
all three protocols, and another reserving the right to make statements of
understandings and/or reservations. Indeed, if this were so, the U.S. could have made its intent much
clearer
e.g., by the use of a semi-colon instead of a comma after the words "article 4(3) of the Convention."
38. Perhaps the

United

the option of not ratifying

—

States
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Law

of
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1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A art. 4 (emphasis added).
States had suggested mandatory acceptance of all three Protocols. 1980 Report of the
United States Delegation to the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
39.

The United

40.

Which May be Deemed

Conventional Weapons

to be Excessively Injurious or to

The

13 [hereinafter 1980 Report of the United States Delegation].
to the

1980 Conventional Weapons Convention would seem to indicate

provision was unwarranted. As ofJanuary

Multilateral Treaties,
1980 Protocol

,

1

that the fear

which engendered

this

992, thirty-one States had ratified or acceded to the Convention.

Every State had also ratified or acceded to all three
which did not approve 1980 Protocol II, and France, which did not

III. Id.

This provision, contained in Article

41.

Indiscriminate Effects

supra note 33, at 832-33.

Protocols, with the exception of Bonin,
ratify

1

Have

actions of States in ratifying or acceding

1949 Geneva Conventions. See supra note

17.

7,
It

similar to the provisions

is

of

Common

Article 2(3) of the

continues the practice of reversing the procedure contained

1907 Hague Conventions which were not effective i( any single belligerent was not a Party to a particular
Convention a provision erroneously applied by Justice Pal in his dissent in the trial before the International

in the

—

Military Tribunal for the Far East. See

Howard

Levie,

S.

Terrorism

War: The Law of

in

War

Crimes

152 (1993).

The

42.

provisions adopted were actually mild

United

Interestingly, the

United

Instead, the

to those

sought by the African group of nations.

Convention only apply

Conventional Weapons Conference.

to internal conflicts if the "authority"

accepted and applied the rules of warfare which already apply to States

This meant that an "authority" could not take advantage of the Convention unless

applied certain rules of warfare concerning,

of noncombatants."

among

it

of

as a

of various international agreements." 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40,

result

14.

States insisted that the

movement "had

the liberation

compared

States did not object to these provisions at the

at

had accepted and

other things, the treatment of prisoners and the protection

Id.

43. It is suggested that it would have been more appropriate merely to make the Conventional Weapons
Convention and the Protocols, which were previously approved by the State involved in the conflict, applicable

when

the "authority" had agreed to accept and apply them.

The

44.

to the

of the ICRC's Department of Principles of Law, Yves Sandoz, has stated that
Weapons Convention and its Protocols "are valuable, or rather indispensable, supplements

Assistant Director

the Conventional

1977 Protocols." Yves Sandoz,

A New Step Forward in

International

Law:

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 21 INT'L Rev. Red CROSS 3, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). Absent in the
Conventional Weapons Convention is a provision similar to Article 1(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
specifically stating that

supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While the Convention and

it

supplement the 1977 Additional Protocol
in that Protocol, they are

to the

I

in the sense that they contain

I.

Protocols

completely independent and have no other relationship thereto. States can be Parties

Conventional Weapons Convention and some or

Additional Protocol

its

law-of-war provisions not contained

States

all

of its Protocols without being Parties to the 1977

cannot be Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol

I

without being Parties to the

1949 Geneva Conventions. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 92.
45. Upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention, France made a reservation

stating:

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the declaration of acceptance and application
will
provided for in article 7, paragraph 4(b), of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
have no effects other than those provided for in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in so
[A]s regards the

.

far as that article

is

3

1

,

common

character"

to

supra note 33, at 833-34,

Once

no Party
the Geneva Conventions

193-94.

i.e. civil

again,

1st Sess.,

141
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20 1.L.M.

known to
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at

1287 (1981), reprinted

in Schindler

& Toman,

have taken exception to France's reservation. Article
applicable

forth rules

in

wars "not of an international

wars.

made such
Cong. Rec. 4568

Indeed, the Senate

46.

Cong.,

—

at

.

applicable.

Multilateral Treaties,
supra note

.

a

reservation

when

it

ratified the

Convention.

S.

Res. 4568, 104th

(1996).

47. Upon signing the Convention, France made an interpretive statement that the application of the
Convention would have no effect on the legal status of the parties to the conflict. Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 33, at 833, 20 I.L.M. at 1287 (1981), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193.
48. France, Italy, the United States, and the People's Republic of China made statements deprecating
this omission upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33,

Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 192-96.
Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. B, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
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22 Mil. L.
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Warfare: Protocol II

War Rev.

to the

251.

1, at
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the infliction of casualties being an incidental result, such mines are

Certain Conventional Weapons,

many of

Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the

important to note that while land mines are primarily
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offensively.

II

Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,

1529 (1980),

II"].

accompanying

See supra note 19 and

provisions of both Protocol
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55.
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53. Protocol
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1, at

also W.J. Fenrick, The Law of Armed Conflict:
25 (Summer 1981). The then Major Fenrick states flatly

CAN. DEF. Q.

Treaty, 11
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United Nations Convention on

117, 120-22 (1983) (citing Lucerne Conference,

supra note 24, at 229).

56. Protocol

II,

supra note 1, at 185.

1980 Final Act supra note
It is

legislation restricting the use

See

Howard

1,

app. C, 19 I.L.M. at 1529, reprinted in Schindler

of sea mines, particularly on the high

Mine Warfare at Sea 52-53

S. Levie,

& Toman,

unfortunate, that advantage was not taken of the opportunity to draft international

all

attacks

otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in

which

are long overdue.

(1992).

1977 Additional Protocol

57. Despite the fact that Article 49(3) of the
that the provisions of that Section apply "to

seas, restrictions

from the

armed

sea

.

conflict at

.

.

I,

supra note 13, specifically states

against objectives

on land

sea," (emphasis added),

but do not

one author has

of the Section "apply to all acts of naval warfare which may affect the civilian
Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Repercussions on the
Law of Naval Warfare 57-60 (1984). The quoted provisions should preclude any such contention with

found

that the provisions

population."

1980 Protocol II.
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
59. Id. One commentator hazards the opinion that in the future most land mines will be laid by aircraft,

respect to the
58.

Carnahan, supra note 55, at 123.
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
Id. This provision appears to consider as being inhumane manually-emplaced "other devices" which

rockets, or artillery.

60.
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Toman,
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1, at

185.

With Weapons of Mass Destruction, 66 Am.J.Intl. L. 470, 470-71 (1972),
1, at 265. Its immediate source was Article 52(2) of the 1977

supra note 13.

1977 Additional Protocol

64.

See Rogers, supra note 34, at 187.
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Weapons Conference
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65.

1530, reprinted
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ways of protecting the innocent from the
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source paragraph 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of

63.

the Conventional

accompanying

understand.

1969, entitled The Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects In General

Schindler

Additional Protocol

are required in remotely-delivered mines. See supra text

as its basic

Particularly the Problems Associated

reprinted in
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1,19 I.L.M.
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International
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1980 Final Act, supra note
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art.
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Delegation

"The Conference was concerned, therefore, with finding
dangers of mines and booby traps while at the same time preserving
states:

Id.

19 I.L.M.

at

1531(1980), reprinted

in

Schindler

& Toman, supra note

1,

186.

"merely hortatory").
These various mechanisms are frequently used when the armed force which

66. Rogers, supra note 34, at 193 (labeling provision as
67.
a

remote source anticipates

that

its

troops will need to traverse the

mined

delivers the

area in the near future.

mines from
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War

1,

app. C,

1980 Final Act, supra note

68.

&

Law

Toman,

supra note

1, at

See Rogers, supra note 34, at

69.

1

should not be prefabricated so long

Conference had

in

attractive items.

It

mind

art.

6(l)(b)(v), 19 I.L.M. at

1532 (1980),

reprinted in

Schindler

187.
99.

as

With respect to this provision: "There

they are not in the shape of

were booby-traps made

to prohibit

a

is

no reason why booby-traps

harmless, portable object.

What

the

to look like watches, cameras, pens or other

did not prohibit the booby-trapping of existing attractive items."

In other words, a

Id.

may booby-trap a camera, but it may not manufacture booby-traps which appear to be cameras.
70. The Working Group proposal referred solely to "children's toys." A/CONF.95/3, Annex II, at 9;
1979 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 51, app. D. The Committee of the Whole added
the rest of item l(b)(v), probably having in mind events in Afghanistan where the booby-trapping of objects

belligerent

intended for children's care caused coundess children to be killed or maimed.

1980 Final Act, supra note

71.

supra note

1, at

app. C,

1,

art. 6,

19 I.L.M.

at

1532 (1980),

reprinted in

Schindler

& Toman,

187.

72.

Id.

73.

During World

War II

Germans were particularly adept

the

at

preparing booby-traps; but no

German

was

tried

on

the charge that such an act was treacherous or perfidious and a violation of the law of war.

74.

An

example of a booby-trap

part

of a land mine which would cause the mine to explode

it

before

own

its

mechanism

internal

definition of "other devices."
reprinted in

Schindler

&

that

would be

causes

it

1980 Final Act,

Toman,

supra note

legal,

even under the 1980 Protocol II, is one made as
if attempts were made to move it or to deactivate

to deactivate or self-destruct.

supra note 1, app.

1, at

C,

art.

These would not

The Germans used such booby-traps

185.

and in various types of aerial bombs dropped on Great Britain during World

made

37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol

1977 Additional Protocol

shall constitute perfidy."

War

II,

in their sea

mines

and no charge was ever

Schindler

& Toman, supra note

The

1.

confidence of an adversary

states "[a]cts inviting the

I

I,

supra note 13,

rare cases in

which

a

art.

supra note

1, at

.

.

.

37, 16 I.L.M. at 1409 (1977), reprinted

booby-trap might be used in connection with

such an invitation are certainly covered in Article 6(1) of Protocol II.
76. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 7, 19 I.L.M. at 1532-33 (1980),

Toman,

within the

such action had been treacherous or perfidious.

that

75. Article

in

fall

3(1)(C), 19 I.L.M. at 1530 (1980),

reprinted in

Schindler

&

187-88.

77.

1980 Report of The United

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

During the 1982

States Delegation, supra

note 40,

conflict in the Falklands (Malvinas)

at

6-7.

the Argentines

indiscriminately and without recording their locations. This resulted in

many

sowed

plastic

mines

casualties occurring after the

Adams, The Falklands Conflict 60 (1988).
1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 22-23. Morocco was plagued with explosions of World
mines and booby-traps for many years after the termination of that conflict, as were other North African

cessation of hostilities. V.
80.

War II

Cf.

countries.

G.A. Res. 35/71, U.N.

A/35/592/Add.4

countries exposed to wars
81.

GAOR

2d

Comm,

35th

Sess.,

83rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.

(1980), reprinted in 19 Djonovich, supra note 26, at 311 (recognizing that

waged by

colonial

1980 Report of the United

powers

suffer loss

of life and property

most developing

as a result

82. See, e.g., Cauderay, Anti- Personnel Mines, 33 Intl Rev. Red Cross 273 (JulyAugust
Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, passim (1993).

83.

1980 Final Act, supra note

supra note
84.

1, at

of mines).

States Delegation, supra note 40, at 7-8.

1,

app. C,

art. 8,

19 I.L.M.

at

1533 (1980),

reprinted in

1993). See also

Shindler

& Toman,

188.

See L.C.

Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 133

(1993). Following the Gulf

under the auspices of the Security Council resolutions, sustained severe casualties
during cleaning operations as Iraq failed to keep proper records of the locations of minefields. Id. Negligence
in keeping such records also resulted in numerous injuries to civilians after the cessation of hostilities in

War,

military personnel,

Cambodia and
85.

supra note

86.

the Falklands.

Id.

1980 Final Act, supra note
1, at

1

,

app. C,

art. 9,

19 I.L.M.

at

1534 (1980),

reprinted in

Shindler

& Toman,

188.

International

Agreement

for the Clearance of

Mines

World War

in

European Waters, Nov. 22, 1945,

reprinted

German prisoners of war were used to remove
land mines laid by the Germans in France. This resulted in a number of casualties. Because of that experience,
Article 52(1) of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war may not be compelled to
in

3 Bevans, supra note 9,

at

1322. Following

undertake dangerous labor and specifically

states that the

II,

removal of mines

falls

within

this category. See

Third

Geneva Convention, supra note 17, at art. 52(1)(3). During the Falklands (Malvinas) War it was alleged that
the British were violating this provision. Howard S. Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War, in The
Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law 64, 73 (Alberto R. Coll
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& Anthony C. Arend, eds., 1985). Investigation revealed that Argentine prisoners of war had volunteered
mark a stock of Argentine mines which had been stored at a location close to their prisoner-of-war camp.
post-World

87. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 126, cites three

War

to

containing provisions with

II treaties

Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953, art. II(13(a), 4 U.S.T. 235, T.I.A.S. No. 2782, reprinted in 4 Major
Peace Treaties of Modern History 2657 (Fred L. Israel, ed. 1967-1980) [hereinafter Israel] (calling for
removal of all minefields by the commander of the side whose forces emplaced them); Agreement on Ending
the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam: Protocol Concerning the Cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the
Joint Military Commission, Paris, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 5, 24 U.S.T. 38, pt.l., 39; T.I.A.S. No. 7542, reprinted
in 5 Israel 92, 93 (requiring each party to do its utmost to complete removal or deactivation of all mine-fields
and traps within fifteen days after cease fire); Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab
respect to the removal of land mines:

Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Washington, March 26, 1979,
5 Israel 331, 349 (agreeing that Israel will

reprinted in

from which

make

88. See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141

1977 Additional Protocol
Rauch's conclusion
country such

as

I

6(1)).

But

based on an overly

is

CONG. Rec. 4568

Rauch,

see

and of 1980 Protocol

II

supra note 34, at

in areas

(1996) (ratifying Protocol

286-287

would not

Nevertheless, this

II

with

(stating that provisions

mines are incompatible).

relating to

critical analysis.

which

the United States

Additional Protocol

It is

of

submitted that

present

a

problem

to

has not ratified, and apparently does not intend to ratify, the 1977

I.

See 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 8 ("The U.S. Delegation supported

89.

the adoption of this Protocol in the belief that
civilian populations,

in

remove minefields

or

withdraws).

it

understanding concerning Article

a

VI(4), 18 I.L.M. 362, 382-83,

art.

efforts to destroy

it

would

substantially

reduce collateral injury and damage to

and would require other armed forces to observe the kind of prudent and orderly

the employment of mines which U.S. forces already observe.").
90. Protocol III Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or

Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed

Restrictions

practices

on the Use of Certain

to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,

Geneva, Oct. 10, 1980, 1980 Final Act, supra note

1,

app.

D, 19 I.L.M. 1534,

reprinted in

Schindler

& Toman,

190 [hereinafter "Protocol III"].
91. 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 9.
92. Of course, the United States could do as France has already done: ratify the Convention, but accept

supra note

1, at

only Protocols

I

and

II.

However,

SeeSandoz, supra note 44,

93.

this
at

weapons present to civilians).
94. 1980 Final Act, supra note
note

is

certainly not a procedure to

1,

app.

D,

art. 1.,

19 I.L.M.

at

1534, reprinted

in

Schindler

& Toman, supra

1, at 190.

95.

It is

by the 1979 Conference Working Group
which read simply: "It is prohibited to use incendiary

interesting to note that the Draft Protocol prepared

on Incendiary Weapons included an

alternative proposal

weapons." 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 29.
96. See 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, 19 I.L.M.
note

be recommended.

13 (supporting notion that emphasis was placed on danger that incendiary

1, at

97.

at

1534, reprinted

in

Schindler

&

Toman,

supra

190.

Working Group's

See, e.g.,

Draft Protocol, 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22,

by Australia and the Netherlands, supra note 22, at 33.
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1534,

at

28; see also

the proposal
98.

note

1, at

190.

It

has also

See, e.g.,

the proposals

note 22,

at

been strongly urged

that the use

reprinted in

Schindler

& Toman,

supra

of incendiaries against combatants be prohibited.

by the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Jordan, 1979 Conference Report,

supra

31.

99. This will

mean

some of which more

that there will

be no more fire-bombing of cities such

as

Tokyo, Dresden,

etc., in

were lost than at Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
100. Beginning with the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
civilian lives

Environmental Techniques, Geneva,

Toman,

May

18, 1977, 31

U.S.T. 333, 167 I.L.M. 88,

reprinted in

Schindler

&

supra note 1, at
35(3) and
conventions
have
taken
a few
law-of-war
55; and now with the Protocol III, supra note 90, the draftsmen of
small steps towards the protection of the natural environment from the havoc of war.
101. During the Vietnamese conflict, when the North Vietnamese became aware of the fact that a large
area

163; continuing with the 1977 Additional Protocol

around Hanoi was "off-limits" for

area for military supplies.

attacks

by American

I,

supra note 13, at

aircraft, that area

arts.

became the major

collection
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That provision of the 1977 Additional Protocol I sets forth the precautions which must be taken
is to be attacked and includes the taking of all feasible precautions to minimize
civilian casualties. See 1977 Additional Protocol, supra note 13, at art. 57(2).
103. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 833, 835, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
102.

when

at

a

military objective

196.

Treaty Doc. No.

104. S.

Intl

25, 103d cong., 2d
749 (1994).

(1994) reprinted

Sess.

in

88 Am. J. Intl L. 748, 751 (1994).

105. 88

Am.

106.

At 748. "Further examination" when 14 years have elapsed since
Cong. Rec. 4568 (1995).

Id.

J.

L.

that Protocol

was

drafted!

107. S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141

Prohibitions

On The Use

and Restrictions

of Conventional

Weapons

Addendum
1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to

Protocol II to the

Certain

have Indiscriminate Effects

is

entitled Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use

of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices.

provisions for the protection

inadequate and

it is

of

While

civilians,

contains a

it
its

number of valuable

provisions

were considered

estimated that there are, today, close to 100,000,000 land

mines buried in countries around the world and that every day
innocent
for

civilians are accidently killed

or

it

difficult to

representatives of governments that they should be banned.
all

land mines

1996 an amended

Protocol

and self-destructable or

become
was

which

self-deactivating. Also, they

be so constructed that they will only explode

number of pounds, one which

civilian
(Protocol

will

convince the
solution

of time. In

is

to

May

requires that they be detectable,

cessation of hostilities. Perhaps another solution

set

One

inert after a specified period

drafted,

number of

maimed by such weapons. Their value

both defensive and offensive purposes makes

require that

a

is

must be removed

to require that

when

all

at

the

land mines

subjected to a pressure of a

exceed the weight of an individual or

automobile. (At the same time

a Protocol

a

on Blinding Laser Weapons

IV) was drafted placing restrictions on the use of laser weapons

specifically

designed to blind.)

XIX
Human

Violations of

Rights

in

Time

of

War

As War Crimes
24

There

a

is

Israel

Yearbook on

Human

Rights 119 (1995)

tendency to consider the term "human rights"

applicable to the peacetime protection of those rights

term "humanitarian law"

as

and

being solely

as

to consider the

being applicable to the protection of human rights

afforded by the law of war in time of war.

Without doubt, the humanitarian

much of the law which, in time of peace, would be termed
and there is no reason why they should not continue to bear that

law of war includes

human
title

rights;

in time of war.

law of war

human

However,

it

must be borne

humanitarian, not

is

rights.

mind that although

be considered to be a
In drafting the

is

unquestionably a humanitarian

human

rule,

Charter,

major war criminals

Crimes.

rights in

time

as follows:

Namely,

violations of the laws or customs of war.

violations shall include, but shall not

be limited

to,

Such

murder, ill-treatment or

deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in

occupied

territory,

seas, killing

villages,

on

the

or devastation not justified by military necessity.

Crimes against humanity Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,

deportation, and other

before

ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons

of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction

of cities, towns, or
Article 6(c).

murder or

.

inhumane

acts

committed

or during the war or persecutions

against

on

any

political,

civilian population,
racial

or religious

grounds... whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country

perpetrated.

at

acts constituting

of the humanitarian law of war and violations of human

War

can scarcely

the instrument that created the

Tribunal which tried the

of war. Those provisions read

it

right.

1945 London

Military

Article 6(b).

of the

of the humanitarian law of war involves

Nuremberg, the draftsman included two provisions defining
violations

all

For example, while the provision of the law of war prohibiting

the use of dumdum bullets

International

all

in

where
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provisions of Article 5(b) and 5(c) of the Charter of the International

Military Tribunal for the Far East
at

which

tried the

Tokyo were substantially similar.
The contention was frequendy advanced

concerning Crimes
humanitarian

rules,

against

major Japanese war criminals

that the provisions

and others

Humanity,

new war crimes, and

of Article 6(c)

them, created

like

were, therefore, ex post facto laws. This

contention was uniformly rejected by the tribunals. In the case of United
v.

Otto Ohlendorf, better

known as The

new
States

Einsatzgruppen case, the Military Tribunal

stated:

Although the Nuernberg

trials

represent the

have adjudicated crimes against humanity
not

.

.

mean

.

that a

new

it is

as

time that international tribunals

an international offence,

offence has been added to the

man. Nuernberg has only demonstrated
and

first

inconceivable that with

this

this

does

of transgressions of

list

how humanity can be

defended in court,

precedent extant, the law of humanity should

ever lack for a tribunal.

In

view of the judicial precedents and the numerous subsequent actions of the

international

community recognizing crimes

offence under international law,
are not well-established violations

against

humanity

as a

wartime

the contention that crimes against humanity

of the humanitarian law of war

now

no

has

merit whatsoever.

A

major example of

a

wartime violation of human

rights

occurred during

World War I when the Imperial German Government caused the deportation
from their homes in Belgium and France of a total of approximately 100,000
men,

women and children, to be used as forced labour in Germany. This practice

was discontinued, and many of the deportees were repatriated when the Imperial

German Government responded to neutral indignation at this patent violation
of human rights. During World War II, the Nazis relendessly followed the
"7

same

practice, but

persons

on

moved from

a far greater scale,

their various

home

with an estimated
countries to Nazi

forced labour, for the most part in munitions factories.

were comparatively few neutral nations
event,

it is

of 12,000,000

total

Germany

to

perform

In this instance, there

to express their indignation and, in

doubtful that such action on their part

would have had any

any

effect

on

Hitler's

Nazi Government. The comparatively small percentage of deported

persons

who

were forced

survived the extreme ill-treatment that they uniformly received
to

remain in Germany

advances or until the

now been

surrender.

The

codified in Article 49 of the 1949

to the Protection

which

German

as virtual slaves until

states:

rescued by Allied

prohibition of this practice has

Geneva Convention

(IV) Relative

Q

of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

the

first

paragraph of

Human
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Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons

from occupied

of the Occupying Power or to that of any

territory to the territory

other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

10

While the Japanese also engaged in this practice of deportation of foreign civilians
to Japan for labour purposes, they did so on a much smaller scale.

One major
to,

and on

violation of

human

rights that

a greatly increased scale,

during

of individuals, both German and foreign,
countries, in concentration camps, to

Gestapo,

occurred in Nazi Germany prior

World War
citizens

II,

was the incarceration

of both friendly and enemy

which they were

sent at the

SS and the other Nazi security organizations.

the

whim

No

of the

judicial

proceedings were involved in these actions, either before or during the

imprisonment. There was no

way

no way

to challenge the action,

to obtain a

hearing before an impartial judge. This was obviously a gross violation of human
rights

both in time of peace and in time of war. Moreover, some of these

concentration camps were basically extermination camps, places that were set

up for the

sole

whose only

purpose of exterminating inmates on

offences

were

that they

a

wholesale

scale, individuals

were merely suspected of

than 100

less

percent support of the Nazi government, or they were Jews, or gypsies, or
citizens
12
ally.

of a foreign nation, even though the

For example,

individuals

it is

known

concentration

camps

13

might have been

between four million and

were exterminated by the use of gas

Nazis in Auschwitz, Poland.
at

that

latter

at

the

camp

a

German

six million

established

by the

Exterminations on a large scale also took place

located

at

Belsen

(tried

by the

British),

at

Buchenwald and Dachau (tried by the United States), at Natzweiler (tried
17
by the French),
etc.
Another Nazi practice which was unquestionably a violation of human rights
and which was conducted against both Germans and foreigners, was

—

euthanasia

whom

individuals

submitted to
individuals

the killing of persons

it,

who were

terminally or mentally

ill

—

the

upon

the evidence

the International Military Tribunal estimated that

some 275,000

Hitler called "useless eaters." Based

had been

killed in this

manner.

18

Allied

war crimes

tribunals tried a
19
rights;
and long after

number of cases involving this blatant violation of human
World War II had come to an end, the Federal Republic of Germany succeeded
in obtaining the extradition for trial
20
doctors, charged with this offence.

of several individuals, including medical

•

A

number of the post- World War II trials in Europe involved the use of
enemy personnel for purposes of medical experiments, many of which
completely lacked any merit and practically
the victims.

human

rights

Such

a use

all

of which resulted in the death of

of defenceless persons was certainly

and of the humanitarian law of war. At

least

a violation

one such

case

of

was

376
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States in Japan.

22

number of members of the Japanese Army on the charge
human beings (Chinese, Russian, and, perhaps, American)
of bacteriological weapons.

Two

had used

to test the efficacy

other Nazi practices that constituted violations of human rights, based

and the

Decree

German

State or

all

acts

'

authorities in occupied territory.

its

so-called Night and Fog

Under the former, the death
committed by non-Germans against the

and Sabotage Decree.

Terrorist

penalty was to be applicable for

a

that they

tried a

23

on orders emanating direcdy from Hider, were the

in the

Union

In addition, the Soviet

'

Such

occupied territory in which they had occurred only

cases
if it

were

to

be

tried

was probable

that

would be adjudged. Otherwise the accused persons were to be
Germany where they were quickly executed without trial or, in rare

death sentence

taken to

cases, sent to a

concentration camp. Inquiries concerning such persons were to

be answered with the statement that "the

state

of the proceeding did not allow

further information," thus keeping the families in ignorance concerning the
status

of the accused persons, the great majority of whom did not

to their
rights

homes. This procedure was inhumane and was a gross violation of human

and of the humanitarian law of war.

The second practice mentioned was based on
This decree provided that with respect to
directed against

were

offenders

killed) If not
.

German personnel

to determine guilt

were

that they

to take place.

violation of human rights

If

to

we

to

this

meant they were

killed).

No judicial

result

proceedings

from the mere whim

procedure was inhumane and

women who

(It is

a gross

interesting

did not themselves

be given assigned work

to

be

be turned over to the Security

and of the humanitarian law of war.

were only

to

—and

children

be spared!)
consider, as

protections to

which

we

undoubtedly should, that many of the humanitarian

prisoners of

war

are entided,

and conventional laws of war, are human
that

be

to

(this

Death could

that as a humanitarian gesture,

participate in such attacks

of violence by non-Germans

or installations in occupied territory, the

were

of the occupation authorities. Again,

were

acts

apprehended until later, they were

meant

know

all

the Terrorist and Sabotage Decree.

be overpowered on the spot

to

Police (again, this

to

live to return

were violated on

a vast scale

rights,

under both the customary

human rights
Union and by

then these were

by the Germans, by the Soviet

the Japanese. Probably in excess of one million Soviet prisoners of war died from

maltreatment in the hands of the Nazis; and approximately

German

prisoners of war never returned

a similar

number of

from Soviet custody. Strange

to relate,

the Nazis substantially complied with the humanitarian law of war with respect

and American prisoners of war, perhaps because they knew that
German prisoners of war held by Great Britain and the United States were
receiving appropriate humane treatment. There was no such reciprocity on the

to British

Human
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where violations of the humanitarian law of war for the
protection of prisoners of war were standard procedure. In this respect, it is
worthy of note that while only four percent of the Americans known to have
part of the Japanese,

been in German custody died in
Americans

With

known

to

captivity,

more than 27 percent of

the

have been in Japanese custody did not survive.

War between

the possible exception of the Falklands (Malvinas)

the

human rights
and of the humanitarian law of war to enemy civilians and captured enemy
personnel have occurred in every international conflict since the end of World
Argentine and Great Britain,

War II.
was

incidents involving the denial of

This despite the post-war war crimes

to establish a precedent

beyond

trials,

one of the purposes of which

dispute that such offences

would not go

unpunished. However, a number of those conflicts ended in negotiated
settlements, that included a requirement for the return of

all

prisoners of war.

That provision necessarily resulted in the repatriation of even those

been identified
rights

as

who had

having committed offences, including violations of

human

and of the humanitarian law of war, for which they should have been

tried

and, if convicted, sentenced to appropriate punishment. Similarly, the leaders

of the authoritarian governments which

initiated these

wars and frequendy made

violations of human rights a basic element

of State policy during such

have gone unpunished. This was true

one or both of these

as to

(1950-53), in Vietnam (1965-72), in the India-Pakistan
Iran-Iraq

War

conflicts

factors in

War

Korea

(1972), in the

(1980-88) and in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91).

In Korea, the United Nations

Command had identified and was prepared to

some 200 North Koreans and Chinese Communists charged with violations
of the humanitarian law of war applicable to prisoners of war as well as violations
of the human rights of South Korean civilians. Because of the provisions of the
Armistice Agreement, all of these individuals were repatriated and went
try

unpunished.
In

Vietnam,

there

were innumerable

instances

of violations

of the

humanitarian law of war and innumerable instances of violations of human

For example, captured American soldiers and airmen
received

no medical treatment, they were subjected

rights.

who were wounded

to solitary confinement,

confined in prisons, and paraded before hostile crowds, the

members of which

them with sticks and stones. These
were all violations of the humanitarian law of war by the North Vietnamese.
Moreover, the Viet Cong executed innocent prisoners of war in reprisal for the

were permitted and encouraged

execution after

Saigon while

trial

still

of Viet

to assault

Cong

in possession

terrorists,

of a

bomb

one of whom had been captured

set to

explode just

five

minutes

in

later.

These gross violations of the humanitarian law of war by the North Vietnamese
and by the Viet
case

that

Cong

received

little

or no publicity. Unfortunately, the only

received widespread publicity was the slaughter of a group of
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Vietnamese men,
violation

of

Law

War

of

women

human

and children by American

also

of unwarranted

Regrettably, because

rights.

soldiers,

a

gross

political

two trials by court-martial for this incident took place. While
the major culprit, one Lieutenant William L. Calley, was convicted of murder
by a United States Army court-martial and was sentenced to be punished, his
interference only

punishment was manifestly inadequate
In the

Army

December 1972

for the offence

with having committed genocide in what was then East Pakistan (now

agreed to repatriate the

more than 90,000

a revolt in that area. In

1974, India

Pakistani prisoners of war

whom they

detained, despite the fact that there had long since been a cessation of active

hostilities
trial

29

India-Pakistan conflict, India charged the Pakistani

Bangladesh) during an attempt to suppress

still

committed.

between the two

countries.

However,

withheld 195 of them for

it

by Bangladesh for the crime of genocide. Pakistan brought an action against

India in the International
parties

to

whose

ofjustice, pointing out that

Genocide Convention,

the

jurisdiction to

Court

conduct

trials

territory the alleged

Article

both countries were

6 of which provides that

for violations thereof is limited to the sovereign in

genocide had occurred

(in this case Pakistan)

an international criminal court (an institution that does not yet

or to

exist).

By

agreement, the 195 prisoners of war were eventually repatriated to Pakistan and

Court ofjustice was discontinued.

the action in the International

No

trial

was

conducted by Pakistan. Without intending any criticism of Pakistan, and without

on

passing judgment

out by India for

the guilt or innocence of any of the 195 Pakistanis singled

trial,

this is indicative

Convention. In most instances, genocide

of the limitations of the Genocide
is

and

will

be government sponsored

so that, lacking an international criminal court, unless the offence

on foreign

territory, there will

already noted, during

camps" for the

killing

committed

be no punishment of the offending persons. As

World War

II,

the Nazis maintained "extermination

of Jews, gypsies, and other persons considered to be

Germany, but
Had the Genocide Convention been
"asocial", not only in

also in

Poland and in the Soviet Union.

in effect at that time, only the subsequent

German governments would have been competent
had committed

is

their offences in concentration

to try those accused

who

camps located on German

territory.

Concerning the maltreatment of prisoners of war by both sides in the Iran-Iraq

War,

a

Special Mission dispatched to those countries

by the Secretary-General

of the United Nations found that
harsh treatment and violence in the camps [in both countries] were far from

uncommon.
ill-treatment,

POWs

provided

by such means

simultaneous blows on both

a large
as

volume of infomiation about

their physical

whipping, beating with truncheons or

ears, electric

kicks often inflicted in parts of the

shocks, assaults

body where

POWs

on

cables,

sexual organs and

had suffered wounds.

Human
Physical violence appeared to be particularly

We

also received reports

common

in

POW

camps in

of collective punishment measures, such

confinement and deprivation of food and water.

.
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as

Iraq.

lengthy

.

These actions were, of course, gross violations of the humanitarian law of war,
specifically

to the

of various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention

(III)

Relative

Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Another violation of the humanitarian law of war which occurred in both
Iran and Iraq is worthy of note. Thus, the United Nations Special Mission said:
[W]e

also

heard allegations of religious pressure on non-Moslem

some

conversions to Islam by
ascertain

POWs

and of

POWs. While we were not able to
had taken place under duress, we could not

Christian

whether these conversions

but notice the atmosphere of missionary zeal that permeated some camps.

If these

conversions occurred

was contrary

Convention

to the

as a result

freedom of

as

they very probably did,

religion provisions

and constituted

(III)

of duress,

a violation

of

this

of Article 34 of Geneva

human

rights

and of the

humanitarian law of war.

One other statement made by the United Nations Special Mission in its report
bears repeating:

Having noted

that

numerous

POWs have spent three or more years in detention,

we feel compelled to pose the question: is not prolonged captivity in itself inhuman
treatment?

War

some prisoners of war spent as many as five years in
captivity. During Vietnam, some prisoners of war spent as many as seven years
in captivity. During the Iran-Iraq conflict, there were undoubtedly prisoners of
war on both sides who spent similar lengthy periods in prisoner-of-war camps.

During World

II,

These were not criminals serving

a

well-deserved punishment, but persons

had fought on behalf of their country. Whether their country
aggressor or in defence of

method of securing the

its

release

territory

scale since the

However,

American

if this

agreement such

Such

a treaty

is

as

to

fights as

and existence, there should be some

hostilities.

Perhaps

we

should return to

and parole, which have not been used on

Civil

War

be done,

the 1949

an

and repatriation of prisoners of war more humane

than awaiting the cessation of active
the processes of exchange

who

it

of more than

a

in

must be accomplished by an international

itself, as it is

impossible, to secure agreements
37
course of hostilities.

major

century and a quarter ago.

Geneva Conventions, negotiated

must be complete

a

extremely

between opposing

in time of peace.

difficult,

and sometimes

belligerents during the
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The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis

War
quickly disclosed that the two-year period which

had elapsed since the end of

hostilities in

the Iran-Iraq

War

had not brought

about any change in the attitude of Saddam Hussein's Iraq with respect to

compliance with the humanitarian law of war in general and with

From

in particular.

violations

on

a

2 August 1990, the very

massive

Iraqi invasion, the

meaning of Article

Iraq.

occurred

rights

scale.

Kuwait and foreigners
of Kuwaiti

rights

day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,

by Iraq of the humanitarian law of war and of human

At the time of the

the

first

human

civilians

Both of

in

members of the

civilian

population of

Kuwait were considered "protected persons" within

4(1)

38

of the 1949 Geneva Convention

(IV).

Thousands

were murdered and thousands of others were deported

these actions constituted violations of

humanitarian law of war.

human

rights

Under Article 47 of that Convention,

to

and of the

their status

was

not changed by the announced annexation of Kuwait by Iraq on 8 August 1990,

which, in any event, was

illegal

and

ineffective.

39

Under

Article 35(1)

Convention, the foreigners had the right to leave Kuwait. The
ordered that they be detained
humanitarian law of war

and

as

hostages.

a violation

This was

of their

human

magnified the violations by placing hostages in military

Iraqi authorities

violation

a

rights.

of that

of the

Moreover, Iraq

installations,

including

chemical weapons factories, in an attempt to immunize those installations from
attack

by the United Nations Coalition. This, too, was

a violation

of the

humanitarian law of war which specifically provides that "[t]he presence of a

may not be used render
.41
One well-informed author

protected person

certain points or areas

to

military operations."

of the humanitarian law of war in part
*

inhumane treatment of protected

immune from

has listed the Iraqi violations

as follows:

persons, as prohibited

by

Article 27 of the

Fourth Geneva Convention, including willful killing and the protection of

women
*

torture

against rape;

and brutality directed against protected persons,

as

prohibited by Article

32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;
*

the taking of hostages, as prohibited

by

Article

34 of the Fourth Geneva

Convention;
*

mass

transfers,

detention of protected persons in areas particularly exposed to

the danger of war, or transfer of part of an occupying power's
into the territory

it

own population

occupies, as prohibited by Article 49 of the Fourth

Geneva

Convention;
*

*

compelling protected persons to serve in the armed forces of the occupying
prohibited by Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;

power,

as

setting

up

war,

prohibited by Article 83 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

as

places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the danger of
42

Human
It is

apparent from

all

of the foregoing

that, despite the

hundreds of provisions

of the codified humanitarian law of war, provisions that establish
standards

and provisions

minimum

that specifically prohibit certain actions, in time

the humanitarian law of war and the laws establishing
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human

rights are

of war
all

too

frequendy violated, sometimes by individual behaviour, but perhaps even more

we

often by national policy. Regrettably,

regard with

respect

the future

to

cannot be overly optimistic in

conflicts

this

with which our planet will

undoubtedly be plagued. However, one great step in the right direction has been
taken by the United Nations Security Council in the case of the rampant
violations

of

human

rights

and of the humanitarian law of war committed by

government and the troops of the former Yugoslavia

the

(Serbia

Montenegro) in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beginning
as

September 1991,

a series

and

as early

of resolutions has been adopted by the Security

Council with respect to the armed conflict taking place in Bosnia and
Thus,

Herzegovina.

Resolution

771

contains

the

following

preambular

provision:

Expressing

alarm

grave

at

continuing reports

of widespread violations of

international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former

Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina including reports of mass
forcible expulsion

in

detention

and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians

centres,

deliberate

attacks

on noncombatants,

hospitals

and

ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian
population, and

Its

wanton

devastation and destruction of property.

operative paragraphs include the following:

1.

Reaffirms that

obligations

all

parties to the conflict are

bound

to

comply with

their

under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons

commission of grave breaches of the Conventions

who commit

or order the

are individually responsible in

respect of such breaches;

2.

Strongly condemns

any violations of international humanitarian law, including

those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing";

5.

Calls

upon States and,

as appropriate, international

humanitarian organizations

to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to

relating to the violations

of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the

Geneva Conventions, being committed
and to make

this

them

in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

information available to the Council.
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on 6 October 1992 went

resolution adopted

a step further,

creating a

Commission of Experts

to

examine the information submitted pursuant

above quoted paragraph

5.

The Commission could make

and was

to provide the Secretary-General

with

its

its

own

to the

investigations

conclusions with respect to

the evidence of the violations of international humanitarian law

committed

in

the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

By

a resolution

adopted on 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided

that

an international tribunal

shall

be established for the prosecution of persons

responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law

committed in

the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

This resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for the
establishment of such an international tribunal.

by

a resolution

proposals

adopted on 25

made by

May

He

did so

on 3 May 1993

and

1993 the Security Council approved the

the Secretary-General in his Report, including the proposed

Statute of the International Tribunal attached to that Report.
Article

of the Statute establishes the competence of the International

1

Tribunal "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international

humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991."

48

Article 2 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over "persons

committing or

ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;"

Article

3 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over "persons violating the laws or customs of

war" which include, but

are not limited to, those enumerated;

the Tribunal jurisdiction over genocidal crimes;

Article 4 gives

and Article 5 gives the

Tribunal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.

While there

is

no question

that

major

difficulties will

be encountered in

obtaining personal jurisdiction over individuals charged with violations of

human

rights

and of the humanitarian law of war enumerated

the International Tribunal,
convictions, the

mere

and

fact that

in the Statute

of

in collecting the evidence necessary for their

such a Statute has been unanimously adopted by

the Security Council augurs well for the future.
In addition to the actions of the Security Council with respect to the violations

of the humanitarian law of war by the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro)

in Bosnia

States instituted
Justice,

in

and Herzegovina, on 20 March 1993 the

latter

two

an action against the former in the International Court of

which they asked

As there was no change

for

and obtained provisional measures of relief.

in the activities

of Serbia and Montenegro, no refraining

from the policy of "ethnic cleansing" (genocide), Bosnia and Herzegovina
returned to the Court seeking additional provisional measures of

relief.

Human
Meanwhile, following the old adage
Serbia and

that "the best defence

Montenegro countercharged

that Bosnia

is

a

383
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good

offence,"

and Herzegovina

are

themselves guilty of genocide, perpetrated against ethnic Serbs in the territory

of the

latter

two

States and, in turn, requested provisional

Unfortunately, there probably

is

at least

some merit

measures of relief.

to this claim, as the

ethnic groups have a long history of such actions, and there

Balkan

litde reason to

is

believe that today's Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and Muslims are radically

from those

different

who

preceded them. However, the Court did not grant

this request.
It

believed

is

international

that

the

foregoing

summary

community of the twentieth century

clearly

indicates

that

the

has, in general, consistently

demonstrated a definite and sincere desire to ensure the protection of human
time of war. However, with

rights in

all

too great frequency, once

hostilities

have commenced, the legal protections so humanely granted have tended to be

by nations which made

disregarded, often

great oratorical gestures during the

course of drafting negotiations, but probably with

should the occasion

arise,

no intention whatsoever,

of complying with the humane provisions that they

so strenuously supported. Nevertheless, the actions taken

with respect to the

may be interpreted as a small indication that the international
community will no longer tolerate claims to the right of non-interference when
a State engages in violations of human rights in time of war.

former Yugoslavia
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1993. The British Government dispatched a team of Scotland Yard detectives to

R291041Z May

Human
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Rights

A report of the results of this investigation was submitted. It was
determined that the evidence was insufficient for prosecution.
28. Thirty-eight percent of the Americans captured by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists died

Argentina to investigate the allegations.
referred to the Public Prosecutor,

who

number who had died in German hands during World War II and
number who had died in Japanese hands during that conflict. G. Lewy,

in captivity, a figure almost ten times the

more than one-third
America
29.

in

greater than the

Vietnam 340 (1978). See the text in connection with note 26.

The Army court martial found him guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. He was released

serving three and one-half years under house arrest due to the unwarranted interference of the then

after

President of the United States. See Levie, 206-208.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; 151 Brit. Foreign & St. Papers 682; 45 Am. J. Int'lL. Supp., 7 (1951); Schindler & Toman, supra
30.

note

2, at

231.

World War II, trials for crimes against humanity committed in concentration camps located in
Germany were conducted by Great Britain, the United States, and France. For examples of such trials, see supra
31. After

Of course,

notes 14, 15, 16, and 17.
the

of national policy
as a

these

were conducted by the Occupying Powers

trials

is

the action of Iraq against

as

successors to

A current instance of genocide on own territory as a matter
the Kurds. A current instance of genocide on foreign territory

German governments of Hitler and Doenitz.

its

matter of national policy ("ethnic cleansing")

is

the action of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against

the non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
32. Prisoners of War in Iran

Geneva Convention

33.

U.S.T. 3316; 157

and

(III)

Brit. Foreign

Iraq,

& St.

Papers 284; 47

supra note 2, at 423. (See the parenthetical

UN Doc. S/16962, supra note 32,

34.

UN Doc. S/16962, 22 February 1985, at para. 273; Levie, 210.

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 6

Am. J.

Int'l L.

remark in supra note
at para.

Supp., 119 (1953); Schindler

&

Toman,

10.)

276; Levie, 211.

35. S/16962, supra note 32, at para. 285.
36. For a general discussion of this problem, see Y. Dinstein,

Swinarski, supra note

While

37.

World War

a

1, at

number of agreements with

respect to prisoners of

they have been practically non-existent during

I,

38.

See supra note 9.

39.
40.

S/RES/662, 9 August 1990, 29 l.L.M. 1327
See Arts. 34, 48, 147 of Geneva Convention,

41.

Ibid.,

42.

J.

War,"

in

war were reached during the course of
II and subsequent conflicts.

World War

supra note 9.

Art. 28.

Moore,

Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the

Rule of Law 53-54 (1992). For
see also

Amnesty

a detailed presentation

of many

International, Iraq/ Occupied Kuwait:

Rights Violations since 2 August, 1990, passim.

UN

43.

Prisoners of

(1990); Levie, 213-16.

of the specific incidents comprising those violations,

Human

"The Release of

37.

S.C. Res. 771, 13 August 1992, 31 l.L.M.

1470 (1992). This Resolution was adopted

unanimously.
44. UN S.C. Res. 780, 6 October 1992,
UN S.C. Res. 787, 16 November 1992,

ibid.

ibid.,

favour with

two

nations that

its

abstentions. (Unfortunately, the

Chairman,

Fritz

1476. This Resolution was adopted unanimously. See

also

1481. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of thirteen in

Commission met with

so

little

support from the European

Kalshoven of The Netherlands, resigned.)

S/RES/808, 22 February 1993.
See supra note 6. A number of countries submitted proposals for consideration by the Secretary-General
drafting of the proposed Statute of an International Tribunal. See, for example,
Doc. S/25266, 10

45.

46.
in the

UN

February 1993 (France); S/25300, 17 February 1993

S/25307, 18 February 1993 (Sweden); etc.
47.
S.C. Res. 827, 25 May 1993, 32 l.L.M. 1203 (1993). This Resolution was adopted unanimously.
The members of the Tribunal were elected by the General Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of
(Italy);

UN

Article 13

48.

It

of the

Statute,

and held

would have been more

their

first

meeting

in

The Hague.

appropriate to state that the competence of the International Tribunal was

"to hear and decide charges against persons alleged to have

should not) prosecute.

The

been responsible

International Tribunal will not prosecute,

it

(etc.)."

Courts do not

will try; Art. 16

(or, at least,

of the Statute makes

the Prosecutor "responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations

of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
(This

and 5 of the Statute.)
based on Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention

same inappropriate language appears in

49. This article

is

really

147 of Geneva Convention IV, supra note
50.

This

article

IV) Respecting the

1

January 1991."

Arts. 2, 3, 4,

III,

supra note

33 and Art.

9.

based on various provisions of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention (No.
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1910), 100 Brit. Foreign & St.

is
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Papers 338;

Law

Bevans, supra note

1

War

of

3, at

631; 2

Am. J.

Int'l L.

Supp. 190 (1908); Schindler

&

Toman,

supra note

2, at 63.

51.

This

article

based on Art. 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

is

Crime of Genocide,

However,

supra note 30.

should be borne in mind that the Statute of the International

it

we have

Tribunal does not purport to enforce the Genocide Convention direcdy. As

seen, Art. 6 of that

Convention provides that persons charged with its violation
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or
by such international tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
have accepted

shall

The

its

jurisdiction.

Court of

International

Justice has held that

interpretation, application or fulfilment" of the
16, para. 26;

ICJ

jurisdiction to

Communique No. 93/28

conduct

criminal

a

it

has jurisdiction to

bis,

of an individual for

trial

make

decisions "relating to the

provided in Art. 9 thereof [1993] I.C.J. Rep.
13 September 1993, at 9. However, it would not have

Convention,

as

a

violation of the Convention. (See Art. 34(1) of

the Statute of the Court.)
52.
in

This

article

is

based on Art. 6(c) of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal

connection with supra note

States to

comply with

hostilities in

—and

it

among

the individuals

can be assumed that they will

provision relieving

some or

generally, see Levie, supra

new

Yugoslavia

who

negotiate

Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the humanitarian law of war has been so frequently

violated will probably be
violations

text

requests for the arrest and detention of persons

the International Tribunal. Unfortunately, any representatives of the

an end to the

(see

with the addition of the offences of imprisonment, torture and rape.

29 of the Statute requires

53. Art.

made by

3),

all

note

who committed

insist

on including

or ordered the commission of those

in the

document ending the

of the violators of responsibility for their offences. Concerning

Moreover, the

5, at 42.

Statute,

by implication,

forbids

trials

hostilities a

this

problem

in absentia. See

its

and the Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 6, para. 101, 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1184.
54. It is worthy of note that not only does Art. 7(2) of the Statute eliminate "Head of State" and "Act of
State" defences, and that Art. 7(3) provides for "command responsibility," provisions that have been generally

Art. 21(4)(d)

accepted in law-of-war conventions, but that Art. 7(4) eliminates "superior orders"
that several diplomatic conferences

had declined

denying the defence of superior orders

where only
55.

when

it

to do.

One

cannot help but

might be applied to

their

as a

defence, something

feel that States

own

vote against

nationals, but favour

it

a rule

here,

nationals of the former Yugoslavia are involved.

Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

Communique No. 93/4, 22 March 1993.
Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3; 32 I.L.M. 890 (May 1933); I.C.J. Communique
No. 93/9, 8 April 1993, and 93/9 bis, 16 April 1993.
57. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/21, 28 July 1993.
58. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/23, 11 August 1993.
59. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/28, 13 September 1993. The new request by Bosnia and Herzegovina
was, in effect, also denied, the Court holding that what was required was "immediate and effective
of Genocide;
56.

I.C.J.

Ibid.,

implementation" of the provisional measures

set forth in its earlier

order of 8 April 1993.
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la
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Introduction

D
there

uring the two decades that followed the Diplomatic Conference which
drafted the four

1949 Geneva Conventions for

was comparatively

little

the Protection of

The only such

was the drafting of the 1954 Hague Convention for the
in the

Event of Armed

during

World War

to the clangers

and Goering in German-occupied

Among

II.

other things,

it

specifically prohibits

of damage or destruction. The United States has not

Convention but there

this

Protection of Cultural Property

and the use of cultural objects for purposes exposing

the pillage of objects of arts

them

activity in the 1950's

This Convention was undoubtedly a response to

Conflict.

the rapacious actions of agents of Hitler
territories

Victims

towards the codification or

activity directed

extension of the reach of the law of war.

War

are indications that

it is

ratified

tending towards such action

in the foreseeable future.

In 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

and Use of Outer Space, Including the
for signature.

the Earth

Other Celestial Bodies was opened

Article IV(1) of that Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit

around

of any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or

installation

on any

demilitarizes the

celestial

body.

moon and

The only other
the

Moon and

The second paragraph of that

activity in this field in the 1960's

was the 1968 Convention on

War

to

Crimes and Crimes Against

This Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the

United Nations
limitations

article, in effect,

other celestial bodies.

Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations

Humanity.

their

at a

time

when

was feared

it

that the criminal statute

of

of the Federal Republic of Germany would soon preclude that nation

of continuing

its

program of prosecutions

for

war crimes committed by German
"7

nationals during the course
that

of World

War

Convention the definition of "crimes

the specific additions of apartheid
has not ratified this
so doing.

II.

against

and genocide.

Convention and

it

It is

of interest to note that in

humanity" was extended with

Once

would appear

again, the

that

it

has

United

States

no intention of

.
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During the decade of the 1970's four conventions were drafted which
in

resulted

major additions to the law of war.

There were:
1971 Treaty on

1

the Prohibition of the

Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and

known

the Subsoil Thereof (better

1972 Convention on

2.

as

the Seabed Convention);

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)

known

Destruction (better

1976 Convention on

3.

and Toxin Weapons and on Their

the Bacteriological Convention);

as

4.

1977

11

and

of Victims of International

to the Protection

(Protocol I) (better

And

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

Protocol Additional to the

and Relating

Any Other Hostile Use
(better known as the ENMOD

the Prohibition of Military or

of Environmental Modification Techniques
Convention);

Development, Production, and

the Prohibition of the

known

the 1977 Additional Protocol

as

cannot be overstated. In 1980

Have

a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Indiscriminate

Effects

Conventional Weapons Convention)
finally

I).

few decisions reached during those two periods

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed
to

Conflicts

12

while the decade of the 1980's, and the 1990's to date, have not been

so prolific, the importance of the

or

Armed

(with
13

reached on a Convention on

was

drafted;

and

be Excessively Injurious

in

the

the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

latter six

Conventions

we

as

1993 agreement was

Stockpiling

that

known

(better

Protocols)

three

to

will

now

It is

concern ourselves.

It

with these

is,

perhaps,

appropriate to point out at this time that several of these Conventions were
drafted

by the Conference on Disarmament which meets

or

permanent

less

lessen their

basis

and under

a variety

of

Geneva on

However,

a

basic codified

"Peace Conference"; and

many law-of-war

16
Protocol,

that does not

law of war were drafted by
conventions, such

the 1936 London Submarine Protocol,

disarmament conferences

—but

this

17
etc.

as

a so-called

the

did not lessen their impact

on the law of

Seabed Treaty
I

1925

were drafted by

war.

Article

more

impact on the law of war. The various 1907 Hague Conventions

which contain much of the

Geneva

titles.

in

of the 1971 Seabed Treaty Provides that States Parties thereto

8
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undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil (thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone)

.

weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction ....
This prohibition does not apply to the

under Article

II it

territorial

.

.

any nuclear

1

waters of coastal States, but

does apply to the "seabed zone" which includes

beyond the twelve-mile
the 1958 Convention on

limit as

and Contiguous Zone.

19

In effect, the

Seabed Treaty prohibits the laying of nuclear mines or other nuclear

Article III of this

places

measured in accordance with the provisions of

the Territorial Sea

under the waters of the high

all

weapons

seas.

Convention contains the verification provisions. Every State

Party to the Treaty has "the right to verify through observation" the activities

on

the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof of every other State

Party "provided that observation does not interfere with such activities"; and a

deems it necessary, refer the matter to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Inasmuch as such activities will necessarily be taking
place on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
State Party

territorial

may,

if it

waters of any coastal State, this means that it will be taking place under

The

the waters of the high seas.

meaningless

as it

would

exist

"right" thus granted appears to be

even without the

the provision that the observation
the seabed,

may not

may even be argued

it

more or less

treaty grant. In fact, in

interfere

with a

view of

State's activities

that the provision, rather than assisting in

verifying compliance, protects the State engaged in illegal activities

observation as

it

may

label

any such observation

every State Party to the Treaty

on

would have

Security Council of the United Nations if

from

as "interference". Similarly,

the right to have recourse to the

it

had evidence

that another State

Party was violating the provisions of the Treaty even without a specific provision

granting that right.

It

can be seen that in drafting

more concerned with ensuring
verification provision than

The United

that

it

this article

the draftsmen

were

could be said that the Treaty included

with drafting

a

a

meaningful provision on the subject.

some point
to reach a decision as to whether it prohibits the use of nuclear warheads on
such weapons as the CAPTOR of the United States Navy, a weapon which lies
States

is

a

Party to this Treaty.

on the seabed and discharges
submarine,

torpedo which

a

a
is

torpedo only

It

will

when

be necessary

activated

at

by the passage of a

capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Bacteriological Convention

While we

usually refer to

the

1925 Geneva

prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases, actually

it

Protocol as

the instrument

prohibited the use not only

of asphyxiating gases but also of "bacteriological methods of warfare". In 1972,
being unable

at

that time to reach

agreement on

a

more comprehensive

390

Law
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of

War

combined chemical-bacteriological weapons convention,
signed by which the States Parties to

it

a

convention was

agreed to prohibit the "development,

production and stockpiling" of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,

and further agreed

to destroy

"use" already prohibited,

this

all

such weapons then in their arsenals.

means

20

With

that the States Parties have, in effect, agreed

no such weapons could be or would be available in any future war.
Once again, Article VI of this Convention, dealing with verification,

that

much

to

be desired.

leaves

provides for the lodging of a complaint with the Security

It

Council of the United Nations with respect to any alleged violation of the
provisions of the Convention and includes an undertaking by any State Party to
the

Convention

to cooperate in

any investigation thereafter

initiated

by the

Security Council. Unfortunately, such an investigation can, of course, be

prevented by

a

heretofore found

undoubtedly

will

it

States have

expedient to disregard mandates of the Security Council and

do

so in the future

their national interest

violators

number of

veto in the Security Council; and a

—which, of

when

course,

they believe that such action

it

will

be

when

is

in

they are the actual

of the Convention and are being investigated.

The United

States

is

a Party to this

Convention. Strange to

of the

relate, all

"non-law-abiding States", with the exception of Syria, have found it appropriate
to

became

Parties to this

comply with

its

Convention.

provisions

is

debatable.

ENMOD
By

Article

I

of the 1976

To what

extent they can be expected to

21

Convention

ENMOD

Convention a State Party thereto has

undertaken
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread long-lasting or severe effects
destruction,

Article
for

II

changing

damage or

as

means of

the

injury to any other State Party.

defines environmental modification techniques as "any technique

—through

the deliberate manipulation of natural processes

dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth." Although Article

Convention

specifically

provides that

it

—

the

of the

III

does not apply to environmental

modifications techniques for peaceful purposes, a

number of

States

have

apparently failed to ratify this Convention for fear that, despite that specific
provision, they will be accused of a violation of the
act,

if,

Convention and of a

for example, they seed a cloud in order to cause rain to

area of their territory,

when, had

that action not

fall

hostile

over an arid

been taken, the cloud might

have provided much-needed rain on the territory of a neighboring

State.
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Problems with respect to the objectives and application of the Convention

and with respect to charges of violations thereof are covered in Article

Committee of Experts

provides for the establishment of a Consultative

the former and for resort to the Security Council of the

on the

An Annex

latter.

to the

Convention

V which
to solve

United Nations

to pass

out the functions and rules of

sets

procedure of the Consultative Committee. The provisions with respect to the
Security Council are, with a

contained in the 1911

few unimportant exceptions,

Bacteriological Convention,

identical

with those

discussed above.

Because of the technical nature of this Convention, the draftsmen deemed

number of "understandings" which

appropriate to reach a

Convention

22

These understandings include

itself.

are not a part

of examples of the phenomena referred to in Article

The United

States

is

a Party to this

Convention.

conducted during 1974,

I;

and an

illustrative

II.

23

1977 Additional Protocol
After negotiations

I

1975,

1976,

and 1977,

Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government was
successful in

of the

definitions of the terms

"widespread", "long-lasting", and "severe" used in Article
list

it

a

finally

completing the drafting of the 1971 Additional Protocol J, the primary

purpose of which was to provide protection from the hazards of war to the
persons not protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions: the civilian populations
in the

unoccupied

territory

of the belligerent

24
States.

Unfortunately, primarily

because of a certain group of provisions of that Protocol,

many

France, Great Britain, and the United States, have not ratified

The Preamble

to this Protocol contains a statement to

States fully subscribes. After referring to the international

the rules of the law of war,

must be applied in

all

it

conflict or

on

including

it.

which the United

agreements containing

states that these rules

circumstances to

all

persons

instruments, without any adverse distinction based

armed

States,

the causes espoused

by or

who

on

are protected

by those

the nature or origin of the

attributed to the Parties to the

conflict.

This

some

is

a

complete rejection of the doctrine of the

nations,

under which the law of war

the aggressor, while

it is

is

"just

war", espoused by

binding upon their enemy, always

not binding upon the victim of aggression, always

oneself.

Article

1

of the Protocol

4 of that Article

states:

is

concerned with

when

it is

applicable. Paragraph

.

.
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of

War

The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts

which peoples

in

Law

and against

racist

domination and

are fighting against colonial

regimes.

.

.

alien

occupation

.

Prior to this provision the conflicts therein referred to had been considered
to be internal conflicts, civil wars to

apply. This provision, with

its

which the

corollary provisions in Articles 43

of the main objections of the United

Ever since the unratified 1814
a

person to be

a legal

He

convention.

international law of war did not

.25
and other

States,

and 44,

one

is

States, to this Protocol.

Declaration of Brussels

four requirements for

combatant have been repeated

convention

in

after

must:

commanded by

person responsible for

1

be

2.

wear

3.

carry his arms openly;

4.

conduct military operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

a

a fixed distinctive

Article 43(1) of the

emblem

his subordinates;

recognizable

1911 Additional

at a distance;

only partially follows the

Protocol I

armed forces of a belligerent to have
a responsible commander (Item 1 above) and to enforce the law of war (Item 4
above). Then Article 44(3), after stating that there are occasions when an armed
combatant cannot distinguish himself from the non-combatant civilian
historical

precedent in that

population, permits

him

it

requires the

requirement that he carry

during each military engagement; and

2.

during such time

he

as

sole

arms openly

his

1

military

combatant with the

to retain his status as a legal

is

visible to his adversary

deployment preceding an

attack.

(This

while engaged in a
is

very limited

a

application of Item 3 above).

There

is

no requirement

recognizable

distance"

at a

that

combatants wear "a fixed distinctive emblem

—or any other kind of

distinctive

marking (Item 2

above). Obviously, these provisions of the Protocol put the civilian population
at risk in

order to give additional protection to

movements. And

member of a

members of national

Article 44(4) provides that if a

national liberation

movement")

fails

combatant (read

comply with

to

liberation
that as "a

the modest

requirements of the provision concerning the carrying of arms openly, while he
will

not be entitled to the

the protection to

which

a

of the difference between
having that
prisoner of

status

of a prisoner of war, he will be entitled to

prisoner of war
1.

having the

status but, nevertheless,

war

is

entitled. In their

27
is

entitled.

status

having

demand

'

There

is

no explanation

of a prisoner of war; and

all

all

2.

not

of the protection to which

for the protection

a

of members of

Law
national liberation

even

when

movements

combatants,

illegal

World

the Third

of
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gave these individuals,

more protection than

the legal, uniformed

combatant receives.

Once

problems arose

again,

verification

provision.

It

when

the Conference attempted to draft a

ended with

a

very lengthy Article 90 entitled

Commission, the Commission being tasked with
the chore of investigating complaints of grave breaches or other serious violations
"International Fact-Finding

of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977
objection here

is

that

it is

Protocol

I.

The main

which have

applicable only to those States

filed a

statement accepting the jurisdiction of the commission.

There

are a

number of

provisions of this Protocol

codification of the customary international

from the

on

effect

and 55

of war.

the civilian population; prohibits attacks

are either a

law of war or are much-needed

additions to that law. For example, Articles 35

the natural environment

which

are attempts to protect

Article 51 prohibits attacks

which have

as their

primary purpose

the spreading of terror

among

bombing; and prohibits

reprisal attacks against the civilian population. Article

52 prohibits attacks on

the civilian population; prohibits target-area

which are not military objectives, as well
as reprisals against such objects which are not military objectives, as well as
reprisals against such objects. Article 53 prohibits attacks on historic monuments,
works of art, and places of worship, as well as reprisals against such places. Article
54 provides that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited"
and then lists specific sources of food and water supplies indispensable to civilian
life which are not to be attacked, even by way of reprisal.
On a number of occasions officials of the United States Government at the
civilian objects

policy-making level have indicated that

this

and

the

Bush Administrations
consent

to

sent the Protocol to the Senate for that body's advice
32
ratification by the President.
Whether the Clinton

Administration will do so remains to be seen
are

many of

However, neither the Reagan nor

provisions of the Protocol as binding law.
the

country accepts

rumors that

it is

determine whether

it

—

so far

it

has not

done

so but there

engaged in another review of the Protocol in order
should be sent to the Senate for the

consent to ratification and,

if so,

what understandings or

latter' s

to

advice and

reservations should be

included.

Conventional
During the

Weapons Convention

early 1970's a conference

of government experts convened by

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drafted a list of
conventional weapons which were believed to require consideration because

the International

they appeared to cause unnecessary suffering or to be indiscriminate in their
effect.

There were:

Law
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of

1.

Small calibre projectiles;

2.

Blast

3.

Time-delay weapons (land mines and booby

4.

Incendiary weapons; and

5.

Potential

and fragmentation weapons;
traps);

weapons development.

which

In 1977, near the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference
drafted the

1977 Additional

recommending
restrictions on

Protocol

J,

that

Conference adopted

be held to

that another conference

Have

attached.

three of the substantive Protocols.

all

makes the Convention and the Protocols applicable

1

met

merely an "umbrella" convention containing

itself is

administrative provisions applicable to
Article

It

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

which three Protocols were

Indiscriminate Effects, to

The Convention

Conference.

May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious

Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
or to

a

and

The General

the use of specific conventional weapons".

1979 and 1980 and drafted the Convention on

a resolution

draft "prohibitions

Assembly of the United Nations thereafter convened such
in

ultimately

described in paragraph 4 of Article

1

of Additional Protocol

in

I";

"any situation

and Article

7(4)

on that provision by providing how a State Party to this Convention
may become bound by it vis-a-vis a national liberation "authority". Paragraph 4
of Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol is as we have already seen, one of the
elaborates

why

major reasons

the United States has not ratified that Protocol.

with respect to the 1977 Additional
as

Protocol

la major objection was that

the basis for Article 44(3) of that instrument

of national liberation movements the

and
arise

it

was argued

ratified this

Convention,

made

(France

this

historic requirements for legal

Convention or

made

it

its

Protocols.

a reservation

it

served

which removed from members

that this gave protection to terrorists.

with respect to

However,

combatants

That problem does not

When

the United States

with respect to Article

7(4)(b).

reservations to several of these provisions, including Article

35
7(4)(b)).

Article 4 of this

Convention, dealing with

requires that in ratifying the

Convention

the three attached Protocols.

And,

for the calling
effective date

meet

It is

in

a State

finally, Article

must

is

rather unique.

also ratify at least

of the Convention

now

if none

expired and

It

two of

8 of the Convention provides

of a review conference by the Parties thereto ten years

ten-year period has
will

ratifications,

after the

has been called prior to that date. That

it is

expected that the review conference

September 1995.

in the Protocols themselves that important provisions

are contained.

Protocol

I

is

entided Prohibitions

of the law of war

or Restrictions

on the Use of

weapon "the primary effect
of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection
by X-ray". It was directed primarily against weapons made of such materials as
Non- Detectable

Fragments.

It

prohibits the use of any

Law
glass

and

of the United States Delegates has
military interest in such

would only

ratify
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was completely non-controversial, probably because,

plastic. It

Protocol "bans a

of

said,

"no one seems

A

weapon".

its

exist".
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It

Protocol

I

was the

more of

justified.

As of 31 December 1992,

of two

had become

thirty-five States
all

Parties to the

but Benin and France had

ratified all

ratified

Protocols

II.

Protocol

II is

concerned with

Booby Traps and Other
its

fear that States

ratification

Benin approved Protocols I and III and France

three Protocols.
38

and

that this

the Protocols. Actually, that fear does not appear to have been

Conventional Weapons Convention and

I

one

that caused the adoption

of the provision in Article 4 of the Convention requiring the
or

as

had any serious

Canadian Delegate has stated

weapon which does not
the Convention and

to have
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subject matter

Devices. It

Prohibitions
is

to

and

Restrictions on the

be noted that Article

1

Use of Mines,

makes

clear that

it

limited to land mines only. That article specifics that

is

its

coverage includes "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river
crossings" but that

it

"does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines

at sea

or in

inland waterways".

of

Article 2

this

Protocol contains two very important definitions,

among

others:

"mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
area

and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or

contact of a person or vehicle; "remotely delivered
delivered

Of

surface

by

artillery,

rocket, mortar or similar

mine" means any mine

means or dropped form an

aircraft.

course, the foregoing provision with respect to "remotely delivered

mines" would

The second

also apply to the

weapons of warships.

definition of interest

is

that relating to

"Booby-traps" means any device or material which
adapted to

kill

is

booby

traps. It states:

designed, constructed or

or injure and which functions unexpectedly

when a person disturbs

or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparendy safe

Of particular interest
the booby-trapping of
specially

is

the fact that there

which

is

is

a

list

act.

often categories of articles

prohibited. These categories include objects

designed for children, including toys, a type of booby trap widely used,

with grim

results, in

Afghanistan.

Another category worthy of note

is

kitchen utensils, or appliances except in military establishments, military locations
or military supply depots.

—
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The

cook

unit

of legal booby

is

Law

of

War

He must

an important person.

traps so that

be warned of the

possibility

he will take care in adding enemy kitchen

utensils

to his collection!

Other important provisions concerning mines

those

are

requiring the

Not only

recording of information with respect to the location of minefields.
this subject

Annex

covered in several

articles

of Protocol

but there

II,

a

is

is

Technical

containing guidelines for such recording.

There

are special provisions in Article 8

of Protocol

II

for the protection

United Nations forces and missions from minefields, mines, and booby

of

traps.

When one reads of the relief trucks which have been the victims of buried mines
on much-traveled roads both
provisions

becomes obvious

in Somalia

—but

and

in Bosnia, the

that they will be

need for such

complied with appears to be

questionable.

One
It

provision which

final

of major importance

is

contained in Article

is

9.

provides for various procedures, both national and international, to be

followed upon the cessation of

hostilities in

order to "remove or otherwise

render ineffective, minefields, mines and booby traps placed in position during

World War

there was an "International Agreement for the
39
Clearance of Mines in European Waters",
but there was no equivalent agreement

the conflict". After

II

with respect to land mines. After those
well over one hundred thousand

of mine removal on French
the

German

territory,

1949 Geneva Third Convention

end of World War

years after the

And even

Africa.

hostilities

had ended the French kept

prisoners of war engaged in the task

with many

specifically prohibits
II

there

were

at this late date there are

of which

casualties, as a result

civilian

such action.

mine

40

For many

casualties in

North

almost daily casualties caused by land

mines in Afghanistan.
It is

world
is

clear that land

as

we

mines have become one of the major problems of the

approach the Twenty-First century.

entirely inadequate for the protection

assumed the

also clear that this

of mankind from

of the major hazard to the

role

It is

a

weapon

civilian population.

42

Protocol
that has

There

is

pressure for an international agreement for the complete prohibition of the use

of land mines and

at least

some strong

limitations

on

their use appears to

be just

over the horizon.
Let us

now

turn to Protocol

III

Protocol on Prohibitions

and

Restrictions on the

Use of Incendiary Weapons. This was undoubtedly the most controversial of the
three Protocols.

It

contains only

two

articles,

the

first

and the second with the protection of civilians and

dealing with definitions

civilian objects. (It

be emphasized that the primary objective of both Protocols
protection of civilians.) Incendiary weapons are defined

as

II

and

should
III

is
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any weapons or munition which

primarily designed to set

is

fire to
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objects or to

cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combinations
thereof,

The

produced by chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the

definition goes

which have

on

to specifically exclude

from

coverage weapons

its

and combined

incidental incendiary effects

target.

effects

munitions

(CEMs). Although the word "napalm" was heard frequendy during the
discussions, that

word

be found in the Protocol

will not

itself.

Article 2(1) states that

it

is

prohibited in

all

circumstances to

make

the civilian population as such,

individual civilians, or civilian objects the object of attack

There can be no objection
not being used for
attack, incendiary

by incendiary weapons.

and

to this provision. Civilians,

rnilitary purposes,

should not be the objects of any type of

or non-incendiary.

Article 2(2) prohibits air-delivered incendiary attacks

on

located within a concentration of civilians. This provision

broad,

as

many important

communication

civilian objects

centers,

military objectives

perhaps, overly

is,

command and

military objectives, such as national

frequendy located within a concentration of

are

and many types of major rnilitary objectives, even when

civilians;

away from concentrations of

originally built

soon to be found surrounded by

civilians, are

concentrations of civilians. Decisions in this regard should be based

Of

principle of proportionality.

another type of air-delivered
a rnilitary objective, for

weapon

if,

as a

weapon can be just

matter of military

as effective in

example, the so-called "smart-bomb",

the

tactics,

destroying such
it

should be the

selected.

Article 2(3) prohibits attacks

on

military objectives within a concentration of

by incendiary weapons, other than those which

civilians

"except

course,

on

are air-delivered,

when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration

of civilians and

all

feasible precautions are taken."

military installations are "clearly separated"

As only

a small

number of

from concentrations of

civilians,

once again the doctrine of proportionality should be applied.
Article 2(4)

is

undoubtedly

a

throwback

program employed there by the United
It is

prohibited to

make

to

Vietnam and the

defoliation

States. It provides:

forests or other kinds

of plant cover the object of attack

by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements

are used to cover,

conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.
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War

There does not appear to be anything contained in
be so

restrictive

States to ratify

it;

on

Protocol which would

of the United

military operations as to justify the refusal

and

if there

of by an understanding

is

any such provision, surely

or, if deemed necessary,

the President transmitted only the

Senate for

this

by

it

could be taken care
Nevertheless,

a reservation.

Convention and Protocols

I

and

II

to the

advice and consent to ratification, accompanied by a statement to

its

the effect that action
46

on Protocol

III

was being deferred pending further

examination.

Chemical Weapons Convention
will

It

be recalled that in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was drafted and that

was subsequently widely accepted by

States.

It is

it

important to emphasize that

many States ratified it with what
What this meant was that most

Protocol prohibited "use" only. As a result

this

was known

the "First-Use Reservation".

as

nations engaged in the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical

and bacteriological weapons in order
a future

enemy make

While,

we

as

first

to

be prepared to

retaliate in

kind should

use of such weapons.

have seen, in 1972

it

was found

possible to draft a convention

prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological

weapons, the problem of chemical weapons long continued unsolved, primarily
because of the

difficult

question of verification.

It

was not

until

September 1992

that a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was

finally

submitted to the

General Assembly of the United Nations. In February 1993 that organization

approved the Convention and submitted
accession.

In fact,

It is far

to the States for ratification or

more complex than its bacteriological brother.
most complex law-of-war convention ever drafted.

lengthier and

probably the

it is

it

Let us study a few of its highlights.
Article
that

it

1.

I

will

is

the heart of the Convention.

each State party undertakes

Develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or stockpile chemical weapons, or
such weapons to "anyone";

2.

Use chemical weapons; or

3.

Engage

That

.

it

never under any circumstances:

transfer

1

By

in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.

article contains these further

To

destroy any chemical

within

its

jurisdiction;

weapons

undertakings by each Party:

that

it

owns

or possesses or that are located

..
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2.

To

weapons

destroy any chemical

that

it

has

abandoned on the
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territory

of

another State Party; and
3

To destroy any chemical weapons production facilities that it owns or possesses
or that are located within

its

jurisdiction.

Finally, that Article provides that

"Each

control agents as a

method of warfare"

the United States

concerned.

Geneva

is

Protocol in

State Party undertakes not to use riot

—and

therein

lies

the

problem

as far as

When the United States finally ratified the

1925

1915 there was an agreement between the President and the

would be issued covering the subject of riot
The Executive Order which was issued provides that the United

Senate that an Executive Order
control agents.
States

renounced the

and then

1

lists

first

use of herbicides except for certain Hmited purposes;

four situations in which

In riot conditions in areas under

it

will use riot control agents in war:

US military control including for the

control

of rioting prisoners of war;

mask or screen

2.

In situations in which civilians are used to

3.

In rescue missions in remotely isolated areas of downed airmen and escaping

attacks;

prisoners of war; and
4.

In rear echelon areas to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and
paramilitary organizations.

It is

be assumed that in

to

continue to

insist

on

ratifying the

Convention the United

States will

the legality of the use of riot control agents in those four

situations despite the very adverse reception that

such claim encountered during

the drafting process.
Article
is

II

contains a large

number of lengthy definitions. Of particular interest

the fact that research and development of methods of protection against toxic

chemicals and chemical weapons
provision.
a

Within

thirty days

is

not prohibited. Article

its

program of destruction,

the destruction of chemical

weapons production

rather unusual

of ratification or accession a State Party must make

number of declarations concerning

location,

III is a

its

ownership of chemical weapons, their

etc. Articles

IV and

V are

concerned with

weapons and the closing and destruction of chemical

facilities,

respectively. Article VII establishes an elaborate

permanent organization to oversee and verify compliance with the Convention.
Article

IX

establishes the

Organization

may be

"Challenge Inspections"
Secretariat

there

is

methods by which

obtained.

—an

verification

by an organ of the

These methods include what

on-site inspection

is

termed

by members of the Technical

of the Organization requested by any State Party which believes that

non-compliance by another State Party. (There

"Verification

is

also a

100-page

Annex" which fleshes out various parts of the Convention proper).
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Article
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"Measures to Redress

entitled

a

and to Ensure

Situation

Compliance, Including Sanctions".
Apparently, while the United States

is

not enamored with

all

of the provisions

of the Convention or of the Verification Annex, and particularly with the

wording of some of them,

it

reservation with respect to riot control agents
if any,

with respect to

States"

this

Convention

mentioned above remains

to expect
d .• 49

them

to

become

document as written with a
mentioned above. What action,

will accept the entire

to

will

be seen

Parties to

it,

be taken by the "non-law-abiding

—but

or to

would probably be unwise
comply with it if they do become
it

Parties.

Conclusion
It

may

safely

be said that while law-of-war activity during the

first

half of the

Twentieth Century was notable for the numerous 1907 Hague Conventions, the

and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the second half of

1925 Geneva

Protocol,

that century

was characterized by

legislation relating to a variety

a

melange of much-needed international

of unrelated aspects of this

field.

being overly optimistic to look forward during the balance of

It is

this

perhaps

century to

the widespread adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling

Destruction
it

and Use of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass

and on Their Destruction. However, such an event

once was.

On

3 September 1993 the

is

not

as

unlikely as

World Health Organization (WHO)

requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the

following question:

In

view of the health and environmental

weapons by

a States in

war or other armed

under international law including the

Then on 15 December 1994

effects,

conflict

be

would
a

the use of nuclear

breach of its obligations

WHO Constitution?

51

the General Assembly of the United Nations

adopted Resolution 49/75 entided "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the
International

Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

Weapons". The question posed by the General Assembly
Is

the threat or use of nuclear

international law?

weapons

asks:

in any circumstance permitted

under

52

Both of those matters

are presently

pending before the Court. Should the

Court decide the former

affirmatively,

and the

latter negatively, the possibility

of an international convention implementing those decisions and

totally

prohibiting not only the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but their very

.

Law
would be

existence,

greatly

half of the Twentieth

Unfortunately,

it

of

War Since 1 949

enhanced and the law-of-war

Century would

truly

have

a

activities
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of the

major place in

latter

history.

can be assumed with more than a reasonable degree of certainty

number of present-day, or potential,
possessors of nuclear weapons would fail to become Parties to such a
convention or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of violating
were such a fortuitous event to occur,

that

a

—

their

agreement and thereafter being in

a position to

hold the non-nuclear world

hostage.
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Before the 48th General

as Iraq,

are,

in

A

Libya,

Convention.

North Korea,

Global Agenda: Issues

of course, few

ratifications

or accessions.

36

15.

supra note

Stat.

Bevans, supra note

1

8, at

619-741; Schindler and Toman,

57, 63, 201. 791, 797, 803, 811, 819, 825, 941, and 951.

26 U.S.T. 571; 8061; 94 L.N.T.S. 65; 25

16.
1, at

1, at

2259-2441; T.I.A.S. 538-546;

A.J.I.L. (Supp.)

94 (1931); Schindler and Toman, supra note

1154.

173 L.N.T.S. 353; 3 Bevans, supra note

17.

supra note
18.

1, at

worthy of note

It is

8, at

that the parallel provision

of Article IV

(1)

of the Treaty on Principles Governing

of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the

the Activities

Toman,

298; 31 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 137 (1937); Schindler and

883.

Bodies, supra note

Moon

and Other

Celestial

provides:

5,

Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
weapons
or
nuclear
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
19. 15 U.S.T. 1606; 516 U.N.T.S. 205; 52 A.J.I.L. 834 (1958).
20. Article IX of this Convention contains a rather unusual provision by which each State Party recognizes
States Parties to the

the need for a similar convention with respect to chemical

on

the subject in

Even

21.

good

Syria

As

faith.

may now be

weapons and undertakes

to continue to negotiate

be seen, they did so for more than two decades before achieving success.
Party to the Convention as the data contained in the latest edition of

will
a

Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary- General

is

December 1992. There

only through 31

reports that Iraq continues to engage in bacteriological-weapons research

and

that

it

are frequent

has attained considerable

success in this field.
22.

US Arms

See

Toman,

supra note

Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976 Documents on Disarmament 582; Schindler and
168.

1, at

The importance which

23.

environment

is

of the Environment During

Naval

War

Armed Conflict and Other Military
Rhode Island.

Part

III,

Section

Operations will take place

the United States

at

I,

of the 1949 Civilians Convention, supra note

of which they

who

enemy

are not nationals",

populations of occupied

bears the tide "Provisions

are "in the hands

of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power

aliens in the territory

of

a belligerent, internees,

and the

civilian

territories.

Toman,

Schindler and

1,

of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories", the provisions

to the Territories

thereunder really apply only to persons

25.

war on the

September 1995 an international conference on The Protection

fact that in

College in Newport,

While

24.

Common

the United States attaches to problems involving the effect of

demonstrated by the

supra note

1, at

25; General Collection of the Laws and Customs of

War 575 (M.

Deltenre, ed., 1943; French, Dutch, German, English).
See Article

26.

Regulations Attached to the 1899 Convention (No.

1,

Customs of War on Land, 32
and Toman, supra note
respect to the
to the

1, at

1803;

Stat.

75; Article

Laws and Customs of War on Land,

Toman,

Schindler and

Toman,

supra note

of Prisoners of War, supra note

War
27.

in International

The United

exceedingly

Armed

.

1, at

Conflict

1

A.J.I.L. (Supp.)

supra note 15; Article

1, at

339; Article

339; Article

a detailed

1,

129 (1907), Schindler

1929 Geneva Convention Relative

2021; 2 Bevans, supra note
4,

4,

8, at

932; 27 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 929

1949 Geneva Convention Relative

2021; 2 Bevans, supra note

Stat.

For

247;

8, at

to the

932; 27 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 929 (1933);

1949 Geneva Convention Relative

discussion of the four conditions, see

to the

Howard S.

Treatment

Levie, Prisoners

44-59 (1979).

States takes the rather peculiar position that these provisions will protect terrorists.

difficult to find

do not engage

1

Stat.

supra note

Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47

8, at

with respect to the Laws and

Regulation Attached to the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV) with

Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47

(1933); Schindler and

of

Bevans, supra note

1

1,

II)

any justification for the arguments advanced

in pitched battles.

Inasmuch

as

in support

It is

of this position. Terrorists

there are legitimate objections to these provisions,

it is

to

be

regretted that the United States choose to emphasize an insubstantial one.
28. Lest uniformed members of national armies find it appropriate to doff their uniforms and fight like
members of national liberation movements, and, if captured, to demand the same treatment as that accorded
to members of national liberation movements, Article 44(7) specifies that it was not the intention to change
the practice of wearing uniforms by members of the regular forces. Apparently, should they remove their
uniforms and dress in civilian clothes, they will be illegal combatants even if they comply with the provisions

of Articles 43(1) and 44(3) and they

will

not be entitled to the protection accorded by Article 44(4).
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only 41 of whom had

statements accepting the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission.

None

of the

done so. Hans-Peter Gasser, "Universal acceptance of international humanitarian
law", International Review of the Red Cross, No. 302, at 450 (September-October 1994). For an in-depth
discussion of the Commission, written by one of its members, see Erich Kussbach, "The International
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission", 43 Int'l and Comp. L. Q. 174 (1994).
Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocol
30. It is interesting to note that while the 1976
I were being drafted in Geneva at the same time period, but by different bodies, Article 1 of the former uses
the phrase "widespread, long-lasting or severe", while Article 35 and 55 of the latter use the phrase "widespread,
long-term and severe". The use of the conjunctive makes the provisions of the Protocol much more restrictive
"non-law abiding"

States has

ENMOD

in their coverage.

Michael J. Matheson, "The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention", 2 Am. U.J. Int'l L. and
Pol'y 419 (1987). Mr. Matheson is the Senior Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State and was a
member of the United States Delegation at the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1977 Additional
31.

See, in particular,

International

Protocol

Law

to the

I.

32. President

Senate for

Reagan

sent the

1977 Additional Protocol

II,

dealing with non-international wars, to the

advice and consent to ratification of that Protocol. In his letter transmitting Protocol

its

President, the Secretary of State explained at

some length

Additional Protocol

Senate Transmitting Protocol

President's

I.

Message

to the

his reasons for
II,

II,

to the

not also transmitting the 1977

23 Weekly Comp.

Pres.

Doc.

91 (Jan. 29, 1987); Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., January 29, 1987.

Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons that may Cause
Work of Experts, Chapters III- VII (1973).

33. International

Unnecessary Suffering or have

Indiscriminate Effects: Report of the

34. Resolution 22(rV),

Conventional Weapons,
35.

Multilateral Treaties

Schindler and

Toman,

Follow-up Regarding Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain
note 12, Part One, at 215 and Part Two, at 252.
Deposited with the Secretary- General 813, 814 (1992); 20 I.L.M. 1287 (1981);

Official Records, supra

1

supra note 1, at 193.

Matheson, "Remarks", 1979 Proc. A.S.I.L. 156, 157.
37. William Fenrick, "The law of Armed Conflict: the CUSHIE Weapons Treaty",
36. MichaelJ.

27 (Summer 1981).

("CUSHIE"

is

the Canadian

acronym

1 1

Can. Def Q. 25,

for Causing Unnecessary Suffering of

Having

Indiscriminate Effects").
38. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, 31
States has

now

December 1992,

at

813.

The United

followed the French precedent.

39. 3 Bevans, supra note 8, at 1322.
40. Article

52 of that Convention, supra note

Unless he be

a volunteer,

1,

provides:

no prisoner of war may be employed on labour which

is

of an unhealthy

or dangerous nature.

41.

The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labour.
See, for example, Arms Project of Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human

A Deadly Legacy
earth,

145 (1993).

many of which

are

It is

still

Rights, Landmines:

estimated that worldwide there are close to 10,000,000 mines buried in the

subject to being detonated

by the

application of the appropriate

amount of

pressure.

42.

Id.,

passim.

43. This provision

and II.
44. The term

Protocols

is

probably one of the main reasons

why

France and the United States

ratified

only

I

"feasible precautions"

supra note 12, causing the

Schindler and

Toman,

had been used

United Kingdom to

supra note 1, at 717.

state,

of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
what it believed the words to mean.

in several articles

when

signing,

With slight variations Article

1(5)

of this Protocol adopts the British

interpretation.

Convention and its Protocols, see Howard S. Levie,
Use of Conventional Weapons", 68 St. John's Law Review 643 (1995).
46. S. Treaty Doc No. 103-25, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994); 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 748 (1994). The United
States ratified the Convention and Protocols I and II on 24 March 1995.
45.

For

a

much more

detailed analysis of this

"Prohibitions and Restrictions

47.

Many commentators

on

the

take the position that

it

now

represents part of the customary international law

of war.

Order 11850, 8 April 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 16187 (1975); 14 I.L.M. 794.
According to a recendy-published article nine countries which already possess chemical weapons are
not signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Taiwan, North Korea,
48. Executive
49.
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Somalia, Serbia, and Sudan.
at
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Sherman McCall, "A Higher Form of Killing", Naval

Inst.

Proc, February 1995,

40-44.
50.

It is

on 25 May 1993 the Security Council of the United
S/RES 827, establishing an International Tribunal, and approving a Statute for that Tribunal,
who might be accused of a wide variety of violations of the law of war (war crimes) alleged to

appropriate to record here the fact that

Nations adopted
to try persons

have been committed by the government and armed forces of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
against the people

of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See 32 I.L.M. 1203 and 1192 (1993). Then, on 8 November 1994
S/RES 955, establishing a similar Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of

the Security Council adopted

Rwanda or in neighboring States by
These actions constitute major steps forward in the enforcement of the law of war.
51. International Court ofJustice, Communique 93/30, 13 September 1993.

serious violations of international humanitarian law in

52.

Id.,

Communique

94/24, 23 December 1994.

citizens

of Rwanda.

War Crimes

Prosecuting

Before

An

International Tribunal

28 Akron Law Review 429 (1995)

probably appropriate to begin this discussion by stating that while
Itauthor
has acted as an official reviewer of records of war crimes
is

trials,

has read

and analyzed innumerable records of those

prosecuted an individual accused of a war crime.
will necessarily

the

trials,

the

and

he has never personally

Accordingly,

this discussion

be based upon what others have said and done with respect to

problem of prosecuting war crimes

Some people would

cases before international tribunals.

label such a discussion as "academic", intending the

word

means knowledge gained from the
study of what the majority of actors in the arena have done when confronted
with the problems of prosecuting charges of the commission of war crimes, then
this presentation will, indeed, be "academic." However, the author prefers to
consider that a discussion based on the experiences of many such prosecutors is
practical and instructive, rather than academic.
Generally speaking, except in a few specific areas, the functions of the
prosecutor in war crimes trials do not differ greatly from the functions of the
to

be interpreted pejoratively.

If "academic"

prosecutor in any other area of criminal law although they

Thus, just

in detail and, frequendy, in magnitude.

prosecutor, whatever

name

appointed or elected to

office, the first

of this author, a dubious honor.

more

the

as

is

of course,

differ

function of any
is

to get himself

function of the war crimes prosecutor

Such an appointment

War crimes prosecutions

is,

are far

is

in the opinion

more

tedious,

In almost every instance

exhausting, than ordinary local prosecutions.

the prosecutor

first

the locality gives to that position,

to get himself appointed to that position.

far

will,

who

dealing with accused persons and witnesses

speak a

language which he does not understand and with documents written in a
language which he cannot read.
translator-interpreter,

which

in

Not only must he

and of itself can be

a

rely

entirely

on

his

very frustrating business,

but every interrogation, both off and on the stand, consumes double the normal
time

—or more.

the case

is

In other words, only seek the job of prosecuting

important enough to give you

a place in history

Jackson, Benjamin Ferencz, Telford Taylor, and a

few

—

as it

others.

war crimes

if

did for Justice
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1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal
provided for four Chief Prosecutors of equal stature with their overall functions
Article 14 of the

specified in detail.

Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal

Far East provided for one Chief of Counsel responsible for the

for the

investigation and prosecution with

no other

limitations

on

his activities,

and

war with Japan each having the
option of designating an Associate Counsel. This latter arrangement would
appear to be much more preferable inasmuch as an organizational pyramid
topped by a committee is not exactly recommended as a sound management

with the other ten nations which had been

at

practice.

Now,

having disregarded the advice given above, and having sought and

—
job —your

obtained the job of prosecuting war crimes before an international tribunal

being

a military

lawyer, having been told of your assignment to that

next function, and your primary and most important

task,

is

or,

the collection of

the evidence that will identify and establish the guilt of the culprits, the evidence
that

you

will

produce

at

the

trial

and which

will,

you hope,

result in the

conviction and punishment of the accused.

You

will find that a great

mass of material will have already been collected

-11

by various governmental and non-governmental agencies.
will

all

too frequendy develop that

inadequate; that witnesses

who

many of the

Unfortunately,

interrogations of witnesses

have been interrogated and from

statements have been obtained have been released and have

population

or, if

it

were

whom helpful

merged

into the

they were not local residents, they will have returned to their

homes, probably halfway around the world; and that many of the documents
with which you are presented have either not yet been formally translated
if they

have been, that the translations are not

way you

reliable.

or,

At some point along the

will ask yourself why

you ever sought and took the job of prosecuting
war crimes. But, like any good lawyer, you will press ahead, seeking the
documents and the witnesses that you need to fill the lacunae which will
this will pose many
continuously make their appearance. Make no mistake

—

problems

unknown to

the

not have survived the

hometown prosecutor. Many potential witnesses will
documents

hostilities; essential official

destroyed during the course of hostilities, or,

more

recently,

by

will

have been

their custodians;

others will be in the possession of uncooperative agents of the

government of

the potential accused, perhaps even in the hands of the potential accused himself;

they will be in a foreign language and will be difficult to identify, even

if

you

not have
most
you
—and
by unfriendly witnesses
knowledge. Prevarication and
accomplish
much
every prosecutor—but
phenomenon known

know exacdy what you

are seeking

for the

will

stalling

that

to

and

part

much

harder to identify

is

it is

when

language with which the prosecutor

it is
is

being done in

a

easier to

a foreign

language,

a

not familiar. Frequently, the interpreter

Prosecuting
will

War Crimes

omit the hemming and hawing that has taken place during an interrogation

and, after

what appears

to have

been

'No'"

—and

But

all is

all

not

you can do
as

bleak

as

is

shrug

it

"He

state:

says

off and continue plodding along.

You will have some good investigators

might appear.

and interrogators and some good

argument

a five-minute back-and-forth

with the witness, he will turn from the witness to you and

will

407

translators

and

interpreters

and gradually you

accumulate the evidence that you believe will establish beyond

doubt the commission of war crimes by

specific persons.

a reasonable

Incidentally, the

searching out, collection, analysis, and indexing of documents by the U.S.
investigators in

Germany during and

more than any other

single factor to the success

International Military Tribunal at

conducted

Now

World War

after

II

probably contributed

of the prosecution before the

Nuremberg and

the Subsequent Proceedings

12

there.

you

are confronted

with the next function of the prosecutor of war

crimes before an International Tribunal

—

the decision as to the identity of the

persons to be indicted and tried. In the international arena there

is

no grand jury

make the final decisions on this question. Unlike the hometown prosecutor,
you may be selective and omit naming an individual as an accused even though
you believe that you have evidence that proves his guilt beyond any possible
Leave the small fry, no matter how guilty, to some national court,
doubt.
to

You are

military or civilian.

going to prosecute before an International Tribunal

and you want only the top people, those

were responsible for the decision

who

who
who

established policy, those

to undertake an aggressive war, those

gave the orders for massive atrocities against the civilian population, including
genocide, those

who were responsible for the policies that resulted in the studied

maltreatment of prisoners of war. This selection
if it has to

be done by group decision,

Military Tribunal in

Nuremberg.

of one individual, Gustav Krupp,

as

is

not an easy

task, particularly

was the case for the International

There the prosecutors included the name

who was

whose prosecution the Tribunal had no

senile

and non compos

mentis

and

alternative but to defer indefinitely.

As

he was in the U.S. Zone of Occupation, the American prosecutors should have

been aware of

this

and should not have named him in the indictment.

other names, those of Raeder and Fritsche, were added to the

at

Soviet

some prisoners who
(Fritsche was acquitted and Raeder received a sentence

insistence solely in order to include

were in Soviet custody.

list

Two

among

the accused

to life imprisonment.)

Of course,

in determining the identity

of the persons to be named in the

indictment charging the commission of war crimes, the most important element
that the prosecutor

individual.

While

the Tribunal,

must bear in mind

is

the evidence available against each

acquittals are unquestionably

evidence of the impartiality of

they are anathema to the prosecutor, particularly

when he

can
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much more selective than the hometown prosecutor in naming the persons

whom

he proposes to prosecute. The drafting of the indictment

He must

of major importance.

ensure that while the charges correspond to the

document, they

offenses listed in the Tribunal's constitutive

the evidence against each
at

the

therefore,

is,

named accused which he

is

also

correspond to

going to be able to present

trial.

The

substantive law that will be the basis of

difficult to identify. Basically,

will

it

your prosecution

will not

be

undoubtedly be stated in your constitutive

document and will be supplemented by well-known and generally accepted laws
and customs of war. However, one problem that the prosecutor of war crimes
before an international tribunal will have to face, which is unknown to his
hometown counterpart, is the question of the procedure pursuant to which the
trial is to be conducted. While it may happen that the prosecution and the defense
in a war crimes trial have similar legal systems and trial procedures, the chances
are very great that they will

not

—and even

before an International Tribunal

its

rules

if

they do, inasmuch

your

as

trial is

of procedure will be tailored to that

Tribunal and will differ markedly from most national procedural systems,

probably being a composite of several systems; and
the

members of the Tribunal

if both

are multinational in character, as occurred in the

International Military Tribunal in

Nuremberg with four

International Military Tribunal for the Far East in

common

traditional

law

followed in war crimes

rules

Tokyo with

on the bench,

nations represented in the prosecution and

For example, the continental

nations with different

and on the bench and in the

legal systems represented in the prosecution

multiplied.

the prosecution and

civil

law does not

the

even by American military commissions; and one

trials,

this to

be

a

to

which

in the

were conducted

trials

of Occupation in Germany

one which was found

common

after

to

a fair

1945 London Charter and

in the

World War

II,

American and

British

in

Zones

the one that will undoubtedly
as

Prosecutor, and

be most repugnant by American lawyers bred on

law system, was the provision exempting the tribunals from

Three

"technical rules of evidence."

be so widely known:

rules

a criminal

be indispensable to

be included in any charter or law under which you will act

traditional

that

problem.)

the laws under

the

was

Nuremberg had apparently not found

The major procedural change included

the

trial

no examining magistrate, the procedure which initiates

(Strange to relate, the French judge at

trial.

is

of evidence and such rules were generally not

under French law, and which he considered

trial

problem

know many of the

of the reasons for the dissent of the French judge in the Tokyo
there had been

eleven such

common

first,

law

aspects

that while the use

rules

of evidence,

of evidence of many other

it

of this matter do not appear

of affidavits was and

was not and

is

legal systems; second, that

is

to

contrary to

not contrary to the

where an

affidavit

Prosecuting

War Crimes

was introduced in evidence by either side, the other side had the
the production of the affiant

on the witness

stand, a right

right to
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demand

which was

rather

infrequently exercised; and third, that the defense use of this affidavit privilege,
as

compared

to one.

to

its

use by the prosecution, was

on the order of more than ten

20

Article 19 of the

not only that

it

1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal stated

was not bound by technical

rules

of evidence, but that the
91

Tribunal should admit "any evidence which it deems to have probative value."'

Article 13(a) of the Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East was
22
Article 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
to the same effect.

Former Yugoslavia authorizes the judges of that Tribunal to adopt rules for
Rule 85(C), adopted by the judges of that
"the admission of evidence."

the

Tribunal, provides that

deems

to

"A Chamber may admit any

have probative value."

Tribunal for

Rwanda

Article 14

relevant evidence

which

it

of the Statute of the International

requires the judges of that Tribunal to adopt the rules of

procedure and evidence adopted by the International Tribunal for the Former

deem necessary."'
community does not intend

Yugoslavia "with such changes

obvious that the international
tribunals should
are typical

of the

as

they

It

that international

be bound by technical rules of evidence such

common law

would appear
as

those

which

system.

you have collected your evidence, you have reached a decision as to
whom you will charge, you have drafted your indictment, you have served it
on the persons accused, you have filed it with the Tribunal, and you are ready
to go to trial. There we will leave you. Apart from the different rules of evidence
discussed above, and some comparatively minor variations in other aspects of
the trial procedure, the trial itself should present few novelties for any attorney
who has previously tried a criminal case in an American court.
Finally,

Notes
Major General) George Hickman, then the Command Staff Judge
Command, in Tokyo, and Major (later Colonel) Toxey Sewell,
a member of the Command Staff Judge Advocate's Office, the author, then the Chief of the War Crimes
Section of that office, spent the 1950 Thanksgiving weekend as a member of a Board charged with reviewing
1.

Together with Colonel

(later

Advocate of the United Nations and Far East

last three Japanese war crimes trials in which some of the accused had received death sentences
and in writing one opinion and reviewing the two other opinions written with respect to these cases. (Due
to clemency granted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, none

the records of the

of these accused was executed.)
2.

In addition to the records of trial themselves, see, for example, Telford Taylor, Final Report to the

Secretary of the

Army on

the

Nuremberg War Crimes

1949 [hereinafter Report]; Clio

Command, 29 June

1948; Kerr

Straight,

Trials

Under Control Council Law No.

10, 15

August

War Crimes, European
Hoover Institution, Owens Collection, File

Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate,

Memorandum,

Archives of the

No. 79084-A.
3. While the hometown prosecutor prosecutes for a single murder, the prosecutor before an International
Tribunal may prosecute for genocide
the murder of entire ethnic groups with members of those groups
numbering in the thousands.
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4.

Raman

Law

of

Escovar-Salom, the

War

first

individual

named

the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for

as

the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law Committed

of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (S/RES/827 (1993), 23 May 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1203 (1993)), resigned that office in order to accept what he must have considered to be a more favorable
appointment without having instituted any proceedings before the Tribunal [this Tribunal is hereinafter
in the Territory

referred to as the International Tribunal for the
5.

However, they

6.

The

are also far

more

Former Yugoslavia].

gratifying

when brought to

a successful

present Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the

Goldstone of South Africa.

conclusion by the prosecutor.

Former Yugoslavia

is

Judge Richard J.

He is also the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution

of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Committed

in the Territory

of

Rwanda (S/RES/955

hereinafter referred to as the International Tribunal for

the elite group
7.

(1994)) 8

Rwanda].

It

November 1994

Law

[the latter Tribunal

is

remains to be seen whether he will join

mentioned above.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 566

Stat.

1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,

in

and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, at
43 (Charles Bevans ed.) [hereinafter Bevans]; Howard Levie, Terrorism in War: The Law of War

3 Treaties

Crimes, Appendix VIII, at 549 [hereinafter Levie].
8. Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, T.l.A.S. 1589; 4 Bevans, supra
note

Levie, supra note 7,

7, at 27;
9.

The

single

the International Tribunal for the
supra note 6;
infra

Appendix XII,

at

571.

Chief Prosecutor has been adopted

and the International

for

all

of the more recent International Tribunals. See

Former Yugoslavia, supra note 4; the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court,

note 26.
10.

Omitted

perhaps,

a

are such

mundane

need

tasks as the

courtroom, the organization of

a staff

to obtain funding, the securing

of

office space and,

of attorneys, technicians, computer operators, investigators,

interrogators, translators, secretaries, etc.
11. By the end of hostilities in the Persian Gulf Crisis the United States Army had one War Crimes team
on location and one in Washington and a lengthy Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm)
was prepared. Amnesty International also prepared a lengthy report on the subject. For a considerable period
before the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established a Commission of Experts created
by the Security Council of the United Nations was collecting evidence which became available to the
Prosecutor of that Tribunal. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994. See also the data submitted by the United States,
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 15, at 24 (12 April 1993). Human Rights Watch Helsinki
also produced a number of reports containing evidence of specific war crimes committed in the former

Yugoslavia.

Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority, 401 (1962); see also Report, supra note 2, at 17-18.
of the prosecution in Tokyo to include the Emperor, Hirohito, among the accused was
and that was a political decision made by
the only decision not to prosecute that engendered controversy
12.

See, e.g.,

13.

The

failure

—

other than the Prosecutor. Levie, supra note 7,
14.

For the more or

Tribunal

at

less

at

144.

haphazard manner in which the accused to be tried by the International Military

Nuremberg were

selected, see

Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials,

85-90 (1992).

Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, International Conciliation
260 n.25 (April 1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg Trials].
Fritsche, Schacht, and von Papen.
16. There were three acquittals by the International Military Tribunal
Levie, supra note 7, at 57 n. 76. There were no acquittals by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East. Id. at 143. Of the 177 individuals actually tried in the "Subsequent Proceedings" at Nuremberg, 35 were
15.

Telford Taylor,

No. 450,

at

—

Nuremberg Trials, supra note 15, at 371.
However, even in this area some problems will be encountered. Thus, the crime of conspiracy,
well-known to the common law, is not known to the civil law, a matter which caused problems for the
draftsmen of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 7; see also Report of Robert
H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials vii (1949); see
also Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment 54-56 (1949) (for the Tribunal reaching
judgment at Nuremberg).
18. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 4, likewise has a bench drawn from
eleven different nations, as does the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 6.
acquitted.
17.

19.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal,

20.

Levie, supra note 7,

21.

See supra note 7.

at

259-60.

art.

19, supra note 7.

1

Prosecuting
22.

See supra note 8. Paragraph c of that article

admissible in evidence,

most of which

23.

See supra note 4.

24.

International Tribunal for the

was quite detailed

violate the traditional

common

in

War Crimes

41

enumerating items which would be
rules of evidence.

law

Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted

11

February 1994, 33 I.L.M. 484, 533 (1994).
25.

See supra note 6.

Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statute of an International Criminal
Court (Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, G.A.O.R., 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (U.N. Doc. A/49/10, 1994)), provides that the judges of the Court may make rules
regulating "the rules of evidence to be applied." There appears to be little doubt that any rules adopted by the
judges of such a Court will closely resemble those referred to in the text.
26. Article 19(b) of the International

XXII
The Statute

of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:

A Comparison With The
Look

Past and a

at the Future

21 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce

I.

o

many proposals have been made

for the creation of an international criminal court.

been met with decided apathy on the part of governments

on

the part of the

(1995)

Introduction

ver the course of the twentieth century,

a feeling

1

These proposals have

—perhaps because of

government policy-makers of many nations

that they

might be establishing an international criminal jurisdiction which would
thereafter

forty-five years

actions.

During the

Article

227 of the 1919 Treaty of

provided for a special international tribunal for the
the League of Nations created a

ex-Kaiser;

first

of this century, the 1907 Hague Conference drafted a convention

establishing an International Prize Court;
Versailles

own

be exercised with respect to their

trial

of the

Permanent Court of International

and the draftsmen of the Charter of the United Nations

Justice ("PCIJ');

included, as an annex thereto, a Statute of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").

Of those

jurisdiction

and

Allies

of World

War

Charter for an International Military

major German

one

to try the ex-Kaiser

officials

had any criminal

Then, on 8 August 1945, the four

never came into being.

it

major victorious

courts, only the

London on a
Tribunal ("IMT"), empowered to try the
II

reached agreement in

accused of having committed war crimes during the
"7

course of those

hostilities.

Subsequently, a similar type of tribunal, the

International Military Tribunal for the Far East

Tokyo

for the

trial

of the major Japanese

war crimes during the course of the
Although sometimes maligned as

officials

tribunals, military

national courts tried

war crimes

established in

accused of having committed

hostilities in that area.

"victors' courts," these

international criminal courts to function in the

war crimes

("IMTFE"), was

government

modern

era.

were

truly the

Other international

courts, military commissions,

cases alleged to

first

and

have occurred during the course

of World

War

9
II.

of

War

No war crimes trials, as such,

although preparations for such

time,

The

Law

Levie on the

41 4

trials

have been conducted since that

on occasion, taken

have,

place.

recent action of the Security Council of the United Nations in establishing

an "International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for

Law Committed in
may be an indication that

Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Former Yugoslavia

Territory of the

since 1991 "

12

the

the

diplomatic logjam has finally been broken and that action with respect to a
general international criminal court will be taken in the not too distant future.

Accordingly,

appears

it

appropriate

International Tribunal for the

London

Charter,

War

II

the

Former Yugoslavia and

which was the

creating post- World

analyze

to

to

compare

basic source for almost

international

all

new

of the

Statute

it

to the

13
*

1945

of the documents

and national war crimes

tribunals, as

well as to the latest Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared

by the International Law Commission ("ILC");
extent the

new

Statute contains novel provisions

and

to determine to

which would be

what

suitable for

an international court with more general criminal jurisdiction over individuals,
provisions
in

its

which should be considered by the

Law Commission

next draft of a Statute for an International Criminal Court.
II.

Court

three or

Organization of the International Tribunal

26 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides

Article

the

International

is

of fifteen judges, but that

to consist

more

may

The

chambers of

establish

Such chambers have been formed

judges.

specific cases.

it

that

for the hearing

Statute of the International Tribunal for the

Yugoslavia goes a step further, dividing the Tribunal, which

of

Former

to consist of

is

eleven judges, into two permanent Trial Chambers of three judges each and

permanent Appeals Chamber of five judges.
and the usual Registry.
international law.

18

The

17

In addition, there

provision for an Appellate

...

There was no review

the International Military Tribunal.

19

of,

a

a Prosecutor

is

Chamber

unique in

is

and no appeal from, the decision of

General MacArthur reserved the right to

review the decision of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East but
this

was executive review, not judicial appellate review. The Military Governor

of the U.S. Zone of Occupation of Germany reserved the right to review the
decisions of the international military tribunals established under Allied Control

Council

Law No.

10 and he

set aside

some convictions and made many

reductions in sentences, but once again this was executive review and clemency,

not judicial appellate review. Article 60 of the Statute of the International Court

of Justice provides that

its

judgment

Article 48 of the

ILC

would

an Appeals

establish

"is final

and without

appeal.'"

However,

Draft Statute also provides for appeals and Article 9 thereof

Chamber

consisting of the President

and

six

other

415

International Tribunal

By implication, none of them may have been members of
Chamber by which the accused was convicted.

judges.

III.

The

Qualifications for

qualifications for the judges

the Trial

Judges

of the International Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia are substantially the same

as

those for judges of the International

The method of selection of the judges is the usual complicated
United Nations, with the Secretary-General, the member nations,

Court ofjustice.
system of the

the Security Council, and the General Assembly

all

One unusual

playing a part.

method of selection of judges for the International Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia is that "non-member States maintaining permanent

aspect of the

the

observer missions

at

United Nations Headquarters"

nominating and in the election process.

24
It is

are included

believed that this

both in the
is

a practice

which should not be followed. Article 6 of the ILC Draft Statute provides for
the election of judges by a majority of the States parties to the Statute of the
Court. This is the general practice of multilateral international agreements and
is

deemed

appropriate for an international criminal court.

the qualifications forjudges set forth in the
to

ILC

An

Draft Statute

unusual aspect of

is

that, in addition

being qualified for appointment to the highest judicial office of their country,

ten of them must have "criminal

trial

experience" and eight of them must have

"recognized competence in international law."
IV.

Competence

Former Yugoslavia

for the
Article

of the International Tribunal

227 of the 1919 Treaty of

created the

power

to

international morality

try

the

and the

Versailles

gave the special tribunal which

ex-Kaiser "for a supreme

sanctity

London Charter was much more

of

treaties."'

offense

it

against

Article 6 of the

1945

numerous specific offenses
under the rubrics of "Crimes against Peace," "War Crimes," and "Crimes against
27
Humanity."
The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia

is

set forth

definite, listing

even more broadly. Article

1,

entitled Competence of the

International Tribunal, states:

The

International Tribunal shall have the

for serious violations

power

to prosecute persons responsible

of international humanitarian law committed in the

territory

of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.

28

would have sufficed to grant jurisdiction to the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to try all of the offenses which
might be charged in cases brought before it. However, it is followed by articles

This provision alone probably

41 6

Law

Levie on the

which elaborate on

of

War

perhaps,

(or,

the foregoing provision by enumerating

restrict)

four specific categories of international humanitarian law intended to be included

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

29

Article 2

lists as

offenses within the

jurisdiction of the International Tribunal "grave breaches of the

Conventions;"*

Article 3

and customs of war;

31

lists

Article 4

,,33

Crimes

against humanity."*

conventional war crimes
acts

lists

of genocide;

32

1949 Geneva

- violations

and Article

5

of the laws
"crimes

lists

.

against peace, perhaps the

major criminal

of

act

view of the patendy aggressive

acts

ordered by the leaders of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),

it is

our times, are notable for their absence.

In

regrettable that the Secretary-General did not see

to include crimes against
35
peace as a fifth category of jurisdiction for the International Tribunal.
fit

Obviously, the foregoing provisions of the Statute of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction

would be

far

jurisdiction.

from adequate

Any

for an international criminal court of general

such court must have jurisdiction which includes not only the

of international humanitarian law

offenses constituting the violations

listed in

Former Yugoslavia, but also
of the numerous other international

the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
jurisdiction over such offenses as violations

conventions concerned with aviation

—

And,

slavery, terrorism, torture, etc.

hijacking, drugs, hostage taking, piracy,

certainly,

any such international criminal

court should be given jurisdiction over acts constituting violations of the General

Assembly's Definition of Aggression.
the International

Law Commission

this overall objective.

violations of the laws

humanity,

it

37

20 of the Draft Statute prepared by

Article
is

only partially successful in accomplishing

After listing the crimes of genocide, aggression, serious

and customs applicable in armed conflict, and crimes

adopts the procedure of referring to an

Annex

in

which

against

are listed

the nine conventions with respect to the violations of which the International

Criminal Court would have jurisdiction on the
established"

by those Conventions and

serious crimes

they are "crimes

that they "constitute exceptionally

of international concern." The basic defect in

granting jurisdiction

is

Commission could not
meets their

basis that

criteria.

obvious.

The members of

the

manner of

this

International

possibly be aware of every treaty or convention

For example, Article

Law

which

of the 1888 Convention for the

1

Protection of Submarine Cables specifically provides that the "breaking or injury

of a submarine cable, done willfully or through culpable negligence
a

punishable offense."

This meets the

Submarine Cable Convention

is

not

criteria

among

those

be found in the 1926 Slavery Convention,
Suppression of Counterfeiting,

the 1950

that, in

'

listed.

forth above

.

is

.

shall

—but

be

the

Similar provisions will

the 1929

Convention

White Slave Convention,

inevitable that if the policy of enumeration

unintended omissions, but

39

set

.

for the
etc. It

is

followed there will not only be

omitting some conventions, the

ILC may

417

International Tribunal

well have reached conclusions contrary to those

which an

international criminal

court might reach.

Commentary to the Annex in which the specific treaties are listed, the
statement is made that "[tjreaties which merely regulate conduct
are not
In the

.

included in the Annex." This

is

followed by an explanation

as to

.

.

why

certain

specific treaties have been omitted from the list. Thus, the regulations attached
42
43
and 1 907 Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of
to the 1 899

War

on Land have been omitted because they "contain no provisions dealing with
individual criminal responsibility"
International Military Tribunal

—

this despite the fact that at

had determined

customary international law of war

44

Similarly, the

the Protection of Cultural Property in the

steps to prosecute

who commit

its

Article

28

calls

that they constituted part

and had found violations of

provisions thereof to be criminal offenses.

omitted, although

Event of Armed Conflict

for the States Parties "to take

and impose penal or

the

of the

specific

1954 Convention for

disciplinary sanctions

upon

all

been

has

necessary

those persons

or order to be committed a breach of the present Convention."

This would appear to meet the criteria set forth above

Property Convention
five

Nuremberg

is

not

among

those

47

—but

the Cultural

The conventions

listed.

listed are

law-of-war conventions (the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977

Additional Protocol

1

and 1971 Montreal

),

two

aircraft hijacking

conventions (the 1970 Hague

Conventions), the 1973 Apartheid Convention

1973 Convention on Internationally Protected Persons

on the Taking of Hostages

53

•

,

the 1984 Convention

,

,

the

the 1979 Convention
54

on Torture

,

two maritime

conventions (the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the

Safety

of Maritime Navigation

~

and the 1988 Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf ), and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in
57
Narcotic Drugs.
Article 22 of the ILC Draft Statute sets forth the extent to

which

States ratifying the

Convention containing the Draft Statute would be

bound by the foregoing list.
While it is possible that jurisdiction over
mentioned above

as

examples, and the

violations of the unlisted treaties

many

other similar

treaties,

could be

based on the grant ofjurisdiction over "crimes under general international law,"
the fact that a treaty

is

not mentioned in the

against jurisdiction, particularly

where

it

list

would provide

meets the

first

a strong

criterion but

argument
still is

not

listed.

Article 23

of the ILC Draft Statute would

also give the international criminal

court jurisdiction over cases specified in Article 20
the Security Council. Paragraph
that this provision

1

which

are referred to

it

by

of the Commentary on Article 23 points out

does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court and that

included so that the Security Council

would not be compelled

it

was

to establish ad

Law

Levie on the

41 8

of

War

hoc tribunals. Paragraph 2 thereof indicates that the "cases" referred to

not be complaints against individuals, but would be "a 'matter', that
situation in

which Chapter VII of the Charter

Prosecutor to investigate and indict
V.

The contention
entities (States

law and
except
decide.

individuals.

on occasion, been advanced

has,

and international organizations)
national laws

may

Concerning the claim

that only international

are the subjects of international

cannot be punished for violations of that law
so provide

and

that international

against international

international law be enforced.

Yugoslavia gives
its

said:

who commit such

entities,

crimes can the provisions of

58

6 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former

Article

like

it

jurisdiction over "natural persons."

immediate predecessors,

it

has

It is

indisputable that,

been given jurisdiction

to try individuals

charged with violations of the provisions of international humanitarian law.

ILC

refers to a

"person" or "persons" and to "the accused."

sentence of Article 6 of the 1945

London Charter provided

plan or conspiracy to

commit any of the foregoing crimes

The

final

that various

categories of persons "participating in the formulation or execution of a

common

are responsible for

all

performed by any person in execution of such plan." Article 7(1) of the

Former Yugoslavia, while somewhat

Statute of the International Tribunal for the
similar,

who

The

Draft Statute apparently did not consider such a provision necessary but

frequendy

acts

so

law does not provide for the

law are committed by men, not by abstract

and only by punishing individuals

may

their national courts

punishment of individuals, the International Military Tribunal
Crimes

to the

it

Individual Criminal Responsibility

that, therefore, individuals

as their

named

to say, a

is

applies," leaving

would

is

more specific.

It

provides for the individual responsibility of any person

"planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted

in the planning, preparation or execution"

In general, the 1945
tribunals for the

trial

of one of the

London Charter and

listed offenses.

the other directives creating

of war crimes alleged to have been committed during the

course of the hostilities in

World War

II

contained provisions denying to the
61

accused the right to interpose the defenses of act of state and of superior orders.
Article

7(2)

of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia adopts the rule of the 1945

London Charter with

respect to the

defense of act of state. Article 7(4) thereof adopts the rule of the 1945

Charter with respect to the defense of superior orders.

The

London

fact that the Statute

of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopts the "superior
orders" rule set forth in the 1945

London Charter

is

itself

almost unique for an

9

International Tribunal

international

document

drafted after the post-

Wo rid War

II

41

war crimes

trials.

The

Secretary-General of the United Nations included such a provision in the

draft

convention on genocide which he prepared for the use of the Economic

and Social Council, but

it

did not survive the final drafting process;

provision was proposed by the International

Working Document

Committee of

("ICRC")

in the

drafted the

1949 Geneva Conventions and it was rejected by

and it was proposed by the

which

Of course,

Conference.

Red

the

Cross

Conference which
that Conference;

ICRC in the Working Document for the Conference

1977 Additional

drafted the

for the Diplomatic

such a

and

Protocol I

it

was rejected by

for the delegates at those Conferences, there

that

was

fear

deny the defense of superior orders would have an adverse effect on
military discipline in the armed forces of the States participating in the
that to

Conferences which might
conferences; here there was

or accede to the conventions drafted by the

ratify
less

concern with respect to the military

on

or the lack thereof, which the denial of this defense might have
forces

of the several

entities

Finally, Article 7(3)

discipline,

the

armed

of the former Yugoslavia.

of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia disregards the limitations placed on the responsibility of commanders
for acts
Protocol

to

of their subordinates contained in Article 86(2) of the 1977 Additional
("if they

i

knew, or had information which should have enabled them

conclude in the circumstances

at the

time") and adopts a

resembling the much-maligned rule of the Yamashita Case:
reason to

test

"if he

more

knew or had

know."
Territorial

VI.

and Temporal Jurisdiction

Neither the 1945 London Charter of the IMT, nor the Charter of the
contained
"trial

"try

closely

territorial

or temporal limitations, providing

as

IMTFE,

they did solely for the

and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis" or

and punish Far Eastern war criminals." As

to territoriality,

to

both in Europe

and in the Far East, the place of the commission of the offense was generally not
considered relevant.

69

However,

Military Tribunal

found

committed

after 1

those

70

World War II. So,
The Statute of the
both

territorial

in the territory

as to

...

that, for certain offenses its jurisdiction

too, did several of the later

Nuremberg

International Tribunal for the

and temporal

limitations: an offense

of the former

no cut-off date)

place in the constitutive

to

-71

Socialist

must have been committed

Republic of Yugoslavia

72
.

Obviously,

Tribunals.

Former Yugoslavia contains

this

(this

would, of

Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,

and Slovakia); and it must have been committed after
is

was limited

September 1939, the date of the commencement of

course, include Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina,

there

.

temporal limitations, the International

1

January 1991 (However,

type of provision

document of a permanent

.

would be out of

international criminal court

420

Levle on the

Law

War

of

of general jurisdiction. However, applying the principle of nullum crimen sine

39 of the ILC Draft Statute properly provides that the offense charged

Article

must have been

There

a

crime "at the time the act or omission occurred."

Concurrent Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy

VII.

own

no question but

is

also for violations

When

of international law.

1863, Article 59 thereof provided for the

committed before capture
had not been punished by

World War

trial

own

own

his

law, civilian or military, but

of a prisoner of war for an offense

army or people "for which he
74

After both

authorities."

made by defeated nations

World War

by other

trials

tribunals, either

jeopardy. If this was their hope or expectation,
I,

Germans

the

initiative

two

tried

cases in their

before undertaking the

trials

it

procedure

a

Eisenhower.

'

The

after

trials

bis in

would

idem, or double

realized. After

courts and

on

of individuals named by the

World War

several Japanese

was not

own

attempt by Admiral Doenitz, Hitler's successor

adopt such

and

by those of the victorious nations or by

by application of the doctrine of non

international tribunals,

I

to exercise their national

jurisdiction in the hope, perhaps in the expectation, that such

preclude

try their

Lieber drafted his famous code in

against the captor's

attempts were

II,

have jurisdiction to

that national courts

nationals for violations not only of their

War

lege,

trials,

II

their own
75

was

An

Allies.

German Head of

as

World

State, to

by General

frustrated

which were conducted before

this

procedure was halted by General MacArthur, were disregarded and the accused

were

retried

by Allied military commissions.

77

Despite these precedents, Article

9 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gives

concurrent jurisdiction to national courts and the Tribunal, with "primacy" in
the

latter.

However,

Article 10(2) of the Statute places

some

restrictions

on

the

application of the doctrine of doubleJeopardy insofar as the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal

been

tried

(a)

by

a national

the act for

is

concerned.

court

may

which he or she was

It

provides that an individual

who

has

be tried by the International Tribunal

still

was characterized

tried

as

if:

an ordinary crime;

or
(b)

the national court proceedings

were not impartial or independent, were

designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the
case

Once

was not diligendy prosecuted.

again, the drafting leaves

explained that subparagraph
the

national

statute."

courts

(a)

much

to

means

be desired. The Secretary-General has

that "the characterization

did not correspond to

If the offense for

was "theft" or "robbery,"

is

its

characterization

which the individual was
that an "ordinary

of the

act

by

under the

tried in the national court

crime" to which the doctrine of
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double jeopardy

is

not applicable so that the individual

may

thereafter be tried

by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for "plunder of private
property", an offense specifically set forth in Article 3(e) of the Tribunal's Statute?

And
will

sub-paragraph

(b),

quoted above, means that the International Tribunal

have no alternative but to conduct a hearing on

apply the provisions of that subparagraph.

provided

specifically that the doctrine

It

its

jurisdiction before

would have been

it

can

better to have

of double jeopardy was inapplicable to

Former Yugoslavia where the prior trial was
This would have constituted notice to the national
in a national court.
authorities that they would be unable to immunize an individual by any of the
the International Tribunal for the

types of trials referred to in sub-paragraph

(b),

while relieving the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of the task of a preliminary hearing to

determine whether the national

trial falls

within the ambit of that sub-paragraph.

The Tribunal could then have taken into

consideration the action of the national

court and authorities to the extent that it

deemed such

as partially

provided in the third paragraph of Article 10 of its Statute.

The Rules adopted by
in this respect,

the International Tribunal for the

do not appear

provides that where

it

to

be helpful in solving

falls

or legal

is

closely related to, or otherwise involves,

questions

which may have implications

investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal,"

Chamber of the Tribunal
defer to the Tribunal.

concerned by the Trial
a State's failure to
latter

may

problem. Rule 9

this

within the paraphrased provisions of Article 10(2)

of the Statute, or that "what is in issue
factual

Former Yugoslavia,

appears to the Prosecutor that any national investigation

or criminal proceedings

significant

consideration appropriate

that a formal request

he

may propose

for

to a Trial

be made that the national court

Rule 10 provides for the formal request
Chamber
and Rule 1 1 provides that in

to the State

the event of

;

respond to the Trial Chamber's request within sixty days, the

request the President of the Tribunal to report the matter to the

Security Council.

VIM.
Article 13

Rules of Procedure and Evidence

of the 1945 London Charter provided that the International

Military Tribunal could draft rules of procedure, the only limitation being that

they could not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter
15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
authorizes

it

to adopt rules

of procedure and evidence.

itself.

Article

Former Yugoslavia
While

it

does not

London Charter, it is unlikely that any
judicial body would adopt a rule which was in direct conflict with its basic
constitutive document. The members of the International Tribunal met at The
Hague and, on 11 February 1994, they adopted their Rules of Procedure and
include the limitation contained in the

Evidence.
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of

1945 London Charter was perhaps the most controversial

Article 19 of the

provision included in that instrument, particularly insofar

were concerned.

It

deems

it

common

the

law system (the

were not followed.
adopt

own

its

in that

rules

may

assumed

of evidence of

strict rules

that the rules

it

authorizes the Tribunal to

Inasmuch

include.

common law system do

of evidence of the

to be

admit any evidence

of evidence," with no limitations

rules for "the admission

system, and a majority of the judges are from

was

not

Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for

whatsoever on what those
rules

"shall

rule against hearsay, the best evidence rule, etc.)

Former Yugoslavia goes even further

the

"shall

it

have probative value." Thus, the

to

American attorneys

provided that the International Military Tribunal

be bound by technical rules of evidence" and that

which

as

as

many of the

strict

not exist in the continental law

non-common-law

countries,

it

with respect to evidence adopted by the eleven

Judges of the International Tribunal would most probably follow the example

of the 1945 London Charter. Accordingly,

not surprising to find

it is

that, after

providing that national rules of evidence are not binding on the Trial Chambers,

Rule 89 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence continues with the
following:

In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a

(B)

rules
it

of evidence which will best favour

and

are

consonant with the

spirit

a fair

Chamber

shall

apply

determination of the matter before

of the Statute and the general principles of

law.

(C)

A Chamber may

admit any relevant evidence which

it

deems

to have

probative value.
(D)

A Chamber may

exclude evidence

outweighed by the need
(E)

to ensure a fair

if its

probative value

is

substantially

trial.

A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained

out of court.

It is

interesting to note that while Article

"Evidence," that
admissibility

article

is

entided

does not contain any similar provisions relating to the

of evidence. However, the Commentary to that

that the matter should

to

44 of the ILC Draft Statute

be dealt with by the Court in

its

article indicates

Rules, calling attention

Rules 89-106 of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Strange to

relate,

while Rule 91 of that Tr ounal contains lengthy provisions on

the action to be taken in the event of the commission of perjury before

Paragraph 2 of the

out

that

Commentary

prosecutions

International Criminal

national court. This

Criminal Court.

88

for

to Article

perjury

would put

a

44 of the ILC Draft Statute points

committed by witnesses before

Court would have

it,

to be

premium on

the

brought before the appropriate

perjury before the International
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Of particular

interest are the provisions for the protection

of the accused

contained in both the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and in the Rules adopted by that Tribunal. Article 21 of the Statute
lists

the "Rights of the Accused."

accused with
fair trial, it

While

these rights are such as to provide an

of the various protections generally considered

all

would, perhaps, have been better to have borrowed the "fundamental

guarantees" of Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol

One
for

89
1.

been made of the Statute of the International Tribunal
the Former Yugoslavia and of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted
criticism that has

by the Tribunal

However,

as

Rule 74 authorizes

out, the Tribunal's
a State,

do not grant victims the

that "they

is

represented by counsel."

a

Chamber

by the Chamber." This would

the victim to appear before the

right to plead

and be

the critic of this alleged omission points

organization or person to appear before

issue specified

to

essential for a

Chamber,

it

to "invite or grant leave to

and make submissions on any

certainly include granting leave to

either in person or

by counsel, and

make submissions on the issues of the horrendous nature of the offense charged

and of the

guilt

of the accused.
IX.

One

The Prosecutor

of the major mistakes made in the drafting of the 1945 London Charter

which provided that each of the four signatories
(France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) should appoint
91
With no single "boss" to make final decisions, it was
a "Chief Prosecutor."

was contained in

its

Article 14,

only the adoption of a proposal
distribution

made by

the Soviet Chief Prosecutor for the

of the prosecutorial functions that made possible the functioning of

Nuremberg.

the prosecution at

The problem of State

equality does not arise

with respect to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article
16 of which provides for a single Prosecutor to be nominated by the

Secretary-General of the United Nations and to be appointed by the Security

Council,

and

a

staff to

be appointed by the Secretary-General on the

recommendation of the Prosecutor.

Similarly, Article 12

Statute provides for a "Procuracy," consisting

Deputy Prosecutors who,
to the

Convention

X.

A judicial body
it

may be

called.

of a Prosecutor and one or more

like the judges, are to

establishing the Court.

of the ILC Draft

be elected by the States Parties

94

The Registry

cannot operate without an administrative branch, whatever

While

a

number of articles of the

Statute of the International

Court ofJustice refer to functions to be performed by

a "Registrar," there

provision in that Statute actually establishing such an office.

is

no

The 1945 London

Levie on the
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War

Charter, likewise, had no provision in this respect, but nevertheless a Secretariat

was established

perform the necessary administrative functions for the

to

International Military Tribunal. Article 3(b) of the Charter of the International

Tribunal

Military

Far

the

for

East

established

Secretariat

a

perform

to

administrative functions for that Tribunal. Article 17 of the Statute of the

Former Yugoslavia provides

International Tribunal for the
consisting of a Registrar

and

staff "for the

International Tribunal" to be appointed

ILC

Article 13 of the

Nations.

Registrar and the

are,

administration and servicing of the

by the Secretary-General of the United

Draft Statute

quite similar except that the

is

by the judges.

Registrar, if any, are to be elected

Investigation

XI.

There

Deputy

for a Registry

and Preparation

of Indictment

of course, no true police, no grand

and no examining

juries,

magistrates or judges of instruction in the international arena. Accordingly,
official

upon

prosecutors have been called

evidence; where

deemed

conduct the prosecution

to initiate investigations; to collect

appropriate, to draft and

at

the

and 15 of the 1945 London

Articles 14

trial.

indictments; and to

file

Charter so provided. Article 18 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
the

Former Yugoslavia

may

only

the

quite complete in

Prosecutor institute

own

indictments on his
different

is

approach to

this

its

coverage of these matters.

may

he

investigations,

may

of the States which

valid reason

perceived for denying

come

file

complaints

this right to

is

It is

believed

too restrictive; and no

the Prosecutor

who may

well

into the possession of evidence of a serious violation of international

law with respect to which no State has
Article

file

The ILC Draft Statute adopts a quite
problem. Under its Article 25, complaints may only
initiative.

that the listing

have

and

draft

Not

'

be filed by certain categories of States and by the Security Council.

is

96

filed,

or

is

willing to

file,

a

complaint.

19 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former

"Review of the Indictment," is rather unusual. When the
indictment is received by one of the Trial Chambers of the International
Tribunal "the judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been

Yugoslavia, entitled

transmitted shall review

confirmed or dismissed.

it"

99

and, as a result of this review, the indictment

Normally, in the

common

law system,

is

either

a preliminary

only undertaken

determination with respect to the validity of an indictment

is

when

would appear that
law system, where

a

challenge

is

initiated

the procedure adopted

by the accused named

more

therein.

It

closely follows the continental

all

of the prosecution's evidence

by

a magistrate

is

attached to the indictment and

before being referred for

is

reviewed

trial.

Like Article 19 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the previous draft of the

ILC

Draft Statute provided that the Bureau

of the Court (consisting of its President and

its

two Vice

Presidents) "acting as
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an Indictment Chamber,

examine the indictment and determine whether

shall

or not a prima facie case exists."
a

convoluted procedure

is

filed

by

a State,

101

The

present draft prepared by that

set forth in its Articles

body

has

When a complaint

26 and 27.

or results from action of the Security Council, the prehminary

by the Prosecutor. If he concludes that there is no
sufficient basis for the filing of an indictment and for a prosecution, he must so
inform the Presidency. At the request of the State which filed the complaint, or
investigation

and review

of the Security Council
Presidency

may review

is

complaint

if the

is

based upon action of that body, the

the action of the Prosecutor and

"may

request"

reconsider his decision. Apparently, his subsequent decision not to

indictment

is final.

If his investigation

If

it

The Presidency

reviews the indictment and

its

the case should not be heard

or the Security Council,

as

Chamber to

by the Court,

the case

file

an

may

it

files

is

a

with the

supporting material.

determines that the case should be heard by the Court

indictment and establishes a Trial

to

of the complaint indicates that there

prima facie case, the Prosecutor drafts an indictment which he
Registrar.

him

hear the case;

it

if it

confirms the

determines that

so notifies the complainant State

be.

Cooperation and Judicial Assistance

XII.

Having determined that there is a valid indictment against an accused, he
must be brought before a Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. Because of the situation existing at the end of World War
II,

with most of the individuals accused of war crimes being found in defeated
.

States, little difficulty

was encountered in

this

regard at that time.

103

Unlike the

provisions with respect to cooperation and judicial assistance appearing in

law-of-war

treaties,

which

are frequently optional

the extradition treaties of the State in

found,

Article

Yugoslavia

is

and dependent largely upon

territory the accused

is

to

be

29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former

set forth in

mandatory terms. "States

International Tribunal"; "States shall

unable to avail

whose

most

itself

comply without

shall

cooperate with the

delay."

of the exclusionary provisions of

including particularly the "political offense" exception,

its

A State will be

extradition treaties,

when

the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issues an order for the arrest and surrender

of an individual within the

committed
Statute

Of

territory

who

is

charged with having

of any of the provisions of Articles

1

through 5 of the

if

not most, of the

of the Tribunal.

course,

individuals
will

a violation

State's

it

undoubtedly

whose surrender

will

will

be found that many,

be demanded by the International Tribunal

be located in the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these

entities

can be expected to be reluctant to

surrender any of their personnel to the International Tribunal for

trial

for
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of

violations of international humanitarian law.
final cease-fire

on behalf of those

The

individuals

who

negotiate the

entities will, understandably, vigorously

including any provision in that

document

calling for

compliance with the
107

provisions of the Statute, particularly for the surrender of personnel for

While the

Statute

is

contained in a Security Council resolution and

binding upon authorities in
dissolution of

all

of the

what was once the

entities

which came

Socialist Federal

oppose

is,

into being

trial.

therefore,

upon

the

Republic of Yugoslavia,

it

can be anticipated that considerable difficulty will be encountered by the
International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia

in securing the custody

of

many of the individuals against whom valid indictments may be filed, particularly
if a provision in any cease-fire agreement setting forth the right to demand such
custody

is

seen

as

causing a prolongation of hostilities.

Part 7 (Articles 51-57) of the

51

is

ILC

Draft Statute deals with this subject. Article

concerned with general matters and the Commission's Commentary

that article states that

it

is

"adapted from

article

International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia."
"shall respon d

29 of the Statute of the

108

without undue delay" to the requests of the International Criminal

suspect or try him.

—

too, provides that States

It,

Court; and Article 54 mandates that a "custodial State"

specialty

to

109

Article

55

sets

forth

shall either extradite the

the well-established rule

that an individual delivered to a court for trial

may only be prosecuted

for the offense or offenses included in the request for his custody.

reason the Secretary-General did not consider

it

of

For some

appropriate to include such a

provision in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

nor did the Judges of that Tribunal consider

it

appropriate to include such a

provision in their Rules.
XIII.

Articles 20, 21,

is

Trial

and 22 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia make
proceedings and

The

it

clear that the Trial

Chamber is

in control of the

responsible for ensuring not only that the accused receives a
•

fair trial,

trial

but also that victims and witnesses receive proper protection.

110

The

usual rights of the accused (the presumption of innocence, to be informed of

the charges against
his

own

him

in a language

choice, to have a

prompt

defense, to be present at the
to obtain the presence
is

necessary,

trial

ill
trial,

are set forth seriatim.

12

to

of witnesses on

and not to be compelled
1

which he understands,

to have counsel

of

but with adequate time to prepare the

examine the witnesses
his behalf, to

against

him and

have an interpreter

if that

to testify against himself or to confess guilt)

Understandably, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence

adopted by the Judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
include a great

many

provisions necessary to ensure that the Judges of the Trial

International Tribunal

Chambers of that Tribunal will be

427

and to enforce

able to control the proceedings

the necessary decorum.

XIV. Penalties

A

major difference between the relevant provisions of the 1945 London

Charter and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
is

that,

Article

unlike the former,

where

a death sentence

was

far

from unusual, under

24 of the Statute the penalties which may be imposed by the

limited to imprisonment.

This

understandable

is

as

many

latter are

nations have

now

abolished the death sentence in their domestic judicial systems.

The 1945 London

Charter, as well as

many of the

other post-

Wo rid War II

laws and regulations establishing various types of tribunals for the conduct of

war crimes

trials,

authorized the judicial body to impose financial forfeitures.

Except for the French,
is

this

power was

No

rarely, if ever, used.

such provision

included in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

which
Trial

does, however, include in

Chamber

its

to "order the return

Article 24(3) a provision authorizing the

of any property and proceeds acquired by

by means of duress, to their rightful owners.
There are, of course, no international prisons. After World War II, the
Germans convicted of war crimes were normally incarcerated in German prisons
while the Japanese convicted of war crimes (except those convicted by Soviet
criminal conduct, including

courts)

were incarcerated

prisons

were located

in a Japanese prison. In those cases,

in occupied territory or the country involved

into a contractual arrangement with respect to such prisoners.
exist

however, the

with respect to any accused

who may

had entered

No such situations

be convicted and sentenced

to

imprisonment by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
Accordingly, another solution of the problem was required. Article 27 of the
Statute provides, in essence, that States
their willingness to accept for

may

indicate to the Security Council

imprisonment in

their penal institutions persons

convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal then

designates a State

from those which have

so notified the Security Council.

Once

of one of the volunteer

States, the

in a prison

imprisonment

is

to

be in

accordance with the laws of that State, "subject to the supervision of the
International Tribunal." Thus, Article 28 specifically provides that

if,

which the individual is confined, "he or she is
pardon or commutation of sentence," the State concerned is to
119
International Tribunal which then decides the matter.

laws of the State in

under the

eligible for

notify the

ILC

Draft Statute likewise provides for incarceration in

prisons maintained by States

"which have indicated to the Court their willingness

Article 59(1) of the

to accept

convicted persons." However, paragraph 2 of that

if no State is

designated, the convicted person

is

article

provides that

to serve the sentence "in a prison
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by the host

available

designates the State of the seat of the
that State an obligation

which

it

Inasmuch

State."

Court

may be

as

of that Statute

as Article 3(1)

on

the "host State," this imposes

unable or unwilling to accept.

XV. Appellate Proceedings

We

have already seen that Article 12 of the Statute of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides for

of five judges.
that

'

a

permanent Appeals Chamber

Article 25 of the Statute sets forth the grounds for appeals to

body, grounds which include both errors of law and errors of

unusual aspect of
Prosecutor
acquittal?

may

appeal.

Does

this

would appear that it

It

any time limit for the
the Tribunal's

judgment

provision

this

is

filing

An

fact.

that either the convicted person or the

is

mean

that the Prosecutor

121

may

appeal from an

Strangely, the Statute does not include

does.

of such appeals. That omission has been

Rule 108 which allows

thirty days

rectified

by

from the date on which the

pronounced.

In addition to the provisions for appeals, the Statute of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides, in
proceedings

when

a fact

and had not been made
in the case

is

discovered which had not been previously

available to the Tribunal at the trial or

of an appeal, the application for review

convicted person or by the Prosecutor.

Prosecutor might only

Article 26, for review

its

make such an

accused has been convicted and the

It

on

However,

have just been discussed,
Article 48

it is

in

1

22

appeal.

may be made by

As

either the

would normally be assumed

that the

application in the interest ofjustice, if the

new

evidence might warrant upsetting that

conviction or reducing the severity of the punishment, and not
has been acquitted.

known

view of the provisions

the accused

relating to appeals

doubtful that such an assumption

of the ILC Draft Statute

if

is

also provides for appeals

which

warranted.

123

by either the

Prosecutor or the convicted person and Article 49(2) (b) refers to an "appeal

brought by the Prosecutor against an acquittal." However, Article 50 of the ILC
Draft Statute makes
Trial

it

Chamber, or of the Appeals Chamber, on the

evidence

of the decision of

clear that applications for revision

may only be made where

of newly discovered

basis

there has been a conviction. This

unlike the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal

judgment of

become

acquittal

pronounced by

that,

Former Yugoslavia,

Court may not seek

Chamber of

means

that

to

reopen

a

Court which has

final.

Conclusion

XVI.

While the
not

a

a

Statute of the International Tribunal for the

a perfectly drafted

instrument,

it

appears that

it

will

Former Yugoslavia

is

accomplish the purpose

429

International Tribunal

for

which

function

it

was intended

—provided, of

course, that the possibility that

not largely nullified by the provisions of any

is

On

agreement.

final

it

may

cease-fire

the other hand, the Draft Statute for an International Criminal

Court prepared by the International Law Commission, while an improvement
over the previous
to the grant

something to be desired, particularly with respect

drafts, leaves

ofjurisdiction.

It is

to

be hoped that before

a final draft

is

approved

by the General Assembly for reference to the States in the form of a Convention,
its provisions in this and other respects will be both clarified and enlarged.
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Court ofJustice.
6. This special tribunal did not come into being because the Netherlands, where the ex-Kaiser had
sought and obtained asylum, refused to extradite him. (It may well be asserted that the tribunal that tried Peter

supra note 3, at 1153, 1179. Like

only States

may be

von Hagenbach

its

parties in cases before the International

in 1474, consisting as

international criminal tribunal. See 2

Obviously,
7.

London
Intl L.
8.

it

was not

a

it

did of the representatives of twenty-eight Allied City-States, was an

Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law 462-466

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 56
Charter]; 3

(1968).

much-followed precedent).
Stat.

1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 1945

Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at 1240; 39 Am. J.
Howard, Levie, Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes 549 (1993).

Treaties and

(Supp.) 258 (1945);

Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, T.I.A.S. No. 1589; 4 Treaties

Other International Agreements,

and

supra note 3, at 27; Levie, supra note 7, at 571.

by the United States Military Governor pursuant to the
10 (1 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals xvi (1949-1953) [hereinafter Trials of War Criminals]; Levie, supra
note 7, at 558) tried twelve cases in the zone of Germany occupied by the United States. (These trials are
known as the "Subsequent Proceedings.") Other war crimes cases tried after World War II were tried by
9.

International military tribunals established

directive contained in Allied

Control Council

Law No.

national courts, either military or civilian.
10. Later national trials

Eichmann),

all

courts-martial of their
to

be "war crimes

States

Army

by France (Klaus Barbie), Germany (Horst Schumann), and

involved offenses alleged to have been committed during

World War

II.

Israel

Trials

(Adolf

by national

own personnel for violations of the international law of war are not generally considered

trials"

although that

is

what they

actually are.

court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley (46

Thus, the much-publicized trial by a United
(1973)) for having murdered, and

C.M.R. 1131

men to murder, Vietnamese civilians was a true war crimes trial, even though it was not
by the general public.
11. During the hostilities in Korea the United Nations Command was prepared to conduct war crimes
trials, had identified and isolated potential accused in the prisoner-of-war camps, and had issued implementing
laws; however, because the provisions of the Armistice Agreement required the repatriation of all prisoners
of war who desired repatriation, no such trials were conducted. After the 1972 war between India and Pakistan,
having ordered his

so considered
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of

War

the former held back 195 prisoners of war for

trial by Bangladesh for the crime of genocide; however, these
were eventually repatriated without trial. During the 1990-1992 Persian Gulf Crisis the United
States Army prepared a Report on Iraqi War Crimes, the unclassified version of which covered over one
hundred pages, and Amnesty International published a lengthy report on the same subject. However, no war

prisoners of war

crimes

trial

were conducted.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 827, Intl Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl Humanitarian Law Committed in The
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1203 (1993) [hereinafter International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia]. The Statute of that
1

2.

Tribunal and the Secretary-General's Commentaries are also contained in the Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May
in 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter the S/G Report]. Discussions of the Statute will be
The United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 1993 Am. Soc. Intl L. Proc. 20; Diane

1993, reprinted

found

in

Orendicher, Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, ASS'N

and James O'Brien, The International Tribunal for
Yugoslavia, 87 Am. J. INTL L. 639 (1993).
13.

Affairs

In a

document

and transmitted

drafted

by

Student Law Socy News., June-August 1993, at 13;
Humanitarian Law in the Former

Violations of International

Commission of Jurists

a

to the Secretary-General

established

by the French Minister of Foreign

of the United Nations, the statement

is

made

that the

establishment of the International Tribunal then being considered for Yugoslavia could "be the prelude" for
a

permanent international criminal court. Letter from the Permanent Representive of France, Feb.

U.N. Doc. S/25266,

10, 1993,

para. 25.

14. The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared by the International Law
Commission, together with the Commission's Commentaries, is set forth in the Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, paras. 40-91,
UN. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter ILC Draft Statute]. The report of the discussion of this Draft Statute
in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1994 is not yet available.
15. We are assisted in this respect by the Commentaries of the Secretary-General which are contained
in the S/G Report, supra note 12, and by those contained in the International Law Commission's Report,

supra note 14, in connection with

its

Draft Statute.

A

perhaps overly

critical analysis

of the Statute of the

Former Yugoslavia will be found in Human Rights Watch Helsinki,
Procedural and Evidentiary Issues for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal (1993). It is to be noted
that on 8 November 1994 the Security Council, by S.C. Res. 955, adopted a Statute which is, mutatis mutandis,
International Tribunal for the

identical to that for the

former Yugoslavia, establishing

a tribunal

for the trial

of serious violations of

Rwanda, or in neighboring States by
Rwandan citizens, United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 955, Statutes of the Intl
Tribunal for Rawanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 [hereinafter International Tribunal for Rwanda].
1 6. For example, the International Court ofJustice has established a Chamber for Environmental Matters
to which will be assigned cases involving problems affecting the environment where the Parties agree to the
use of a Chamber. I.C.J. Communique No. 94/10, 14 March 1994.
17. As an amusing aside, it is understood that when queried at the organization meeting held in The
Hague in February 1994, every one of the eleven judges recently elected to the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia expressed a desire to sit on the Appellate Tribunal!
18. See International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, at arts. 1 1 & 12. Rule
international humanitarian law alleged to have

been committed

in

23 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the International Tribunal (33 I.L.M. 503 (1994))
established one other body, the Bureau of the International Tribunal. It consists of the President, the

two Trial Chambers. It acts administratively, not judicially.
26 of the 1945 London Charter specified that the judgment of the International Military

Vice-President, and the Presiding Judges of the
19.

Article

Tribunal "shall be
20.

final

So, too, did

its

and not subject to review." 1945 London Charter, supra note 7, at art. 26.
predecessor, Article 60 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,

supra note 4.
21.

Article 12(2) of the Statute

the Appeals

Chamber
22.

Chamber of the

for the International Tribunal for

is

15, provides that

also to serve as the

Appeals

Rwanda.

supra note 12, at

art.

at art.

2 and INTERNATIONAL

TRIBUNAL

13(1).

Statute of the International Tribunal for the

judges have been elected and have met in
will

Former Yugoslavia

See Statute of the International Court ofjustice, supra note 5,

for the Former Yugoslavia,
23.

of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note

International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia,

The Hague.

A

list

supra note 12, at

art.

13(2).

The

of the members of the International Tribunal

be found in Bruce Zagaris, Clinton Administration Supports War Crimes Tribunal, Am. SOC. Intl L. Newsl.,

Mar.-May 1994,

at 17.
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International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, at arts. 13(2)(a) and
Commentary of the Secretary-General (see S/G Report, supra note 12) mentions

24.

Paragraph 75 of the
provision, but

it

does not explain the reason

25. Article 9(1) of the

appointed

ILC

why

was included.

Draft Statute, supra note 14, further provides that

members of the Appeals Chamber

as

it

(d).

this

shall

at least three of the judges
be those with "recognized competence in international

law."

The United States representatives on the Commission that recommended this provision to the
Meeting
of the Peace Conference, Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott, took the position that
Plenary
moral offenses were not justiciable. Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representative of the Untied States
26.

to the

Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, 14

Law No.

Am. J. Intl

L.

128 (1920).

The basic law under which the
American Zone of Occupation of Germany tried the twelve "Subsequent
Proceedings" at Nuremberg, was substantially to the same effect.
28. See supra note 12. The drafting of this provision leaves much to be desired. It would have been more
appropriate to state that the International Tribunal had the power "to try persons allegedly responsible," or
27. Allied Control Council

10, supra note 9, at

art. 2, xvii.

Military Tribunals in the

"accused of" rather than "to prosecute persons responsible." Prosecution

of the Tribunal; and persons are not "responsible" until that has

Moreover,
to

it

was obviously not intended

the function of the Prosecutor, not

is

been determined by

that the "serious violations

trial

and conviction.

of international humanitarian law" were

have been committed "in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute."
29. In paragraphs 33-35 of his Commentary, (S/G Report, supra note 12), the Secretary-General points

out that the

listed

international

items are

law and

of international humanitarian law (the law of war) which are customary

rules

all

that, therefore, there can

be no claim of nullum crimen

sine lege

-

that the action

is

ex post

facto.

Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114-3695, T.I.A.S. No.
3362-3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 31-468; The Laws of Armed Conflict, supra note 2, at 373-594. There is no
mention of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
30.

Protection of Victims of International

Humanitarian

Annex
2, at

Armed

1;

Law Applicable

in

Armed

I),

Swiss Federal Political Department,

1

Geneva, 1974-1977,

Conflicts,

72 Am. J. Intl L. 457 (1977); 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977);

Pt. 1, at 115;

U.N. Doc. A/321144,

The Laws of Armed Conflicts,

supra note

621.

Geneva Conventions

31.

for the Protection

3362-3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 31-468;

Protection of Victims of International
Official

to the

Armed

supra note 2, at 373-594. There is no
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Conflicts (Protocol

I),

Swiss Federal Political Department,

1

Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International

Humanitarian

Annex

of War Victims, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114-3695, T.I.A.S. No.

The Laws of Armed Conflicts,

mention of the 1977 Protocol Additional

2, at

Conflicts (Protocol

Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International

Official

1;

Law Applicable

in

Armed

Conflicts,

Geneva, 1974-1977,

72 Am. J. Intl L. 457 (1977); 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977);

Pt. 1, at 115;

U.N. Doc. A/32/144,

The Laws of Armed Conflicts,

supra note

621.

32. It must be borne in mind that while Article 4 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia is basically a reproduction ofArticle 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide (openedfor signature Dec.

OF

Armed

CONFLICTS, supra note

9,

1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 45 (Supp.) 7 (1951);

2, at 231), the International

The Laws

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia would

its own Statute, rather than under that Convention.
and 5 borrow generously from the 1945 London Charter, supra note 7. The Statute of the

normally exercise jurisdiction under
33. Articles 3

International Tribunal for

genocide

(Art. 2);

Conventions

(Art. 4).

setting forth the

Rwanda,

supra note 15,

crimes against humanity (Art.

This

latter refers to

lists as

3);

the offenses of which that Tribunal has jurisdiction:

and violations of

common

Art. 3

of the 1949 Geneva

the "mini-convention" contained in each of those conventions

humanitarian rules applicable in non-international wars.

Assembly of the United Nations, the International Law
Commission continues to prepare drafts of a Draft Code of Offenses (now Crimes) Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind. United Nations, General Assembly, Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 42d Sess., 6th Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/42/L.13 [hereinafter ILC
Draft Code]. For the latest version of this Draft Code, see 30 I.L.M. 1584 (1991). See also Commentaries on
the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind (M.C. Bassiouni ed., 1993).
35. It is probable that he feared that including crimes against peace as a category of triable war crimes
would have resulted in opposition to the Statute by a number of nations. In Article 20 of the ILC Draft Statute,
34. Pursuant to the will of the General
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supra note 14,
(b)

which

defines the general jurisdiction of the proposed international criminal court, paragraph

this

unless the Security Council has

first

determined that

a State

committed the

has

act

this Statute

of aggression which

the subject of the complaint.

is

ILC

War

of

category of international crimes. However, Article 23(2) provides:
complaint of or direcdy related to an act of aggression may not be brought under

does include

A

Law

Draft Statute, supra note 14,
See also 1-2

36.

that the foregoing

is

at art. 23(2).

International Crimes: Digest/Index (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986)(which will indicate
but a small number of the subjects of international conventions, the violations of which

Bassiouni's, DRAFT Statute
International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 1, is quite conservative in its proposed grant ofjurisdiction.
37. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess. (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974). See supra note
14, arts. 20(b) and 23(2) of the ILC Draft Statute (which would give the International Criminal Court
jurisdiction over acts of aggression but only when the Security Council has determined them so to be. This
is a good solution because, in effect, the action of the Security Council would constitute the legislative
establishment of the substantive offense and the Court would then be required to perform only its natural

should be within the jurisdiction of an international criminal court.).

function

—

the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused before

it

of

a

legislatively-established

offense).

24

38.

Stat.

989; T.S. 380;

1

Treaties and

Other International Agreements,

supra note 3, at 92;

75 B.F.S.P. 356; 163 Consol. T.S. 391.
39. 60 U.N.T.S. 253.

112L.N.T.S. 371.
96 U.N.T.S. 271.
42. 32 Stat. 1803; 1 Treaties and
40.

41.

J.

Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at 247; 1 Am.
The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 63.
43. 36 Stat. 2227; T.S. 539; 1 Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at
2 Am. J. Intl L. (Supp.) 90 (1908); The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 63.
44. Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and

Intl L

631;

(Supp.) 129 (1907);

Aggression 83 (1947) [hereinafter Nazi Conspiracy].
Commission

of the Regulations

fall

and

conflict

and military commissions. Another

Id at 62, 68, 72. So, too, did dozens of other military tribunals

45.

reason given by the

are thus

for not including the

Hague Regulations

in the

Annex

listing

is

that "aspects

within the notion of serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed

covered by

article 20(c)

Conventions and the 1977 Protocol

I,

of the statute." But

supra note 30,

all

of which

this

are,

also true

is

of the four 1949 Geneva

however, included in the Annex

listing.

Government of the Netherlands, Records of the Conference Convened by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Held at The Hague from 21 April
to 14 May 1954 5; The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 745.
46.

The Commentary

47.

create crimes as such

to the

art 8)."

(cf.

Annex

states that this

Convention

is

not included because

"[i]t

does not

This completely disregards the quoted provision of the Convention.

48.

See supra note 30.

49.

22 U.S.T. 1641; T.I.A.S. No. 7192.

24 U.S.T. 564; T.I.A.S. No. 70.
1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
52. 28 U.S.T. 1975; T.I.A.S. No. 8532; 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
53. T.I.A.S. No. 11081; 1315 U.N.T.S. 205.
54. U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, (1984); 23 United Nations Resolutions (General Assembly) 395
50.
51.

(D. Djonovich ed.).
55.

27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).

56.

Id. at

57.

Id.

58.

Nazi Conspiracy,

59.

S/G Report,

685.

Council has referred
in the text.

It

that

Yugoslavia, anyone

who

from the
.

common

that in a

number of resolutions

set forth in the

provision of the 1945

caused considerable difficulty for the representatives of the

Nuremberg. While

61

which points out

the Security

to "individual criminal responsibility."

"Conspiracy" was the nub of the offense

60.

quoted

supra note 44, at 53.

supra note 12, at para. 53,

word does not appear

in the Statute

civil

London Charter
law countries

of the International Tribunal

"aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of

law point of view, be guilty of having participated in

See generally 1945

London

Charter, supra note 7,

Tribunal for the Far East, supra note

8, at art. 6;

at arts.

7 &:

8;

Allied Control Council

a

for the
a

at

Former

crime would,

criminal conspiracy.

Charter of the International Military

Law No.

10, supra note 9, at art. 4.
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Nevertheless, the defense of superior orders was the defense most frequently interposed in post-World
II

at

war crimes trials and the defense of act of state was
465-469 and 512-521.
62.

The 1945 London

Yugoslavia,

supra note 12,

also asserted in a great

Charter, supra note 7, and

both provide

accused of criminal responsibility, "but

that the order

may be

ILC Draft Code, supra note 34, rejects that
him not to comply with that order."

many

cases.

War

Levie, supra note 7,

International Tribunal for the Former

of a government or of a superior

not relieve an

shall

considered in mitigation of punishment." Article 11 of the

defense only

"if,

in the circumstances at the time,

it

was

possible

for

63.

Howard S.

Levie, The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders,

30 Mil. L. & L. War. Rev. 199 (1991).
64. Remarks and Proposals at 64, ICRC (1949); 2B Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva
of 1949, at 115, Swiss Fed. Pol. Dep't. (1949); Levie, supra note 63, at 199-200.
65.

Draft Additional Protocol

to the

Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,

at 25,

ICRC

(1973); 9 Official

Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts at 386-392, Swiss Fed. Pol. Dep't. (1978); Levie, supra note 63, at 200-203.

As indicated in note 62,
limiting,

supra, the International

Law Commission

has included in

66. Paragraph 58 of the

Former Yugoslavia

will

Draft

S/G Report,

Code

a

provision

supra note 12, points out that the International Tribunal for the

be called upon to consider the merits of other defenses, "such

mental capacity, drawing upon general principles of law recognized by
67.

its

but not completely denying, the assertion of the defense of superior orders.

all

as

minimum

age or

nations."

See supra note 30.

327 U.S. 1 (1947); Levie, supra note 7, at 156.
69. Concerning its basic law, Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 9, the Military Tribunal
in the Einsatzgruppen Case said: "As this law is not limited to offenses committed during war, it is also not
restricted as to the nationality of the victim, or to the place where committed" (emphasis added) (4 Trials OF War
Criminals, supra note 9, at 499). A French law limited the jurisdiction of its Permanent Military Courts sitting
in France to offenses committed in France or against French nationals. There were no such limitations on
French military courts sitting in Germany.
70. The International Military Tribunal has so held with respect to crimes against humanity. See Nazi
Conspiracy, supra note 44, at 84. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 9, and the United States
Zone Military Government Ordinance No. 7, 18 October 1946 (1 Trials OF War Criminals, supra note
9, at xxi; Levie, supra note 7, at 563), are similarly lacking in temporal limitations and were similarly construed.
It should be noted, however, that the tribunals which sat in Europe all considered 1 September 1939 to be
68.

Union did not become a belligerent until June 1941
December 1941.
2 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 12 and

the date of the beginning of the war, although the Soviet

and the United
71.

The

States did

not

become

a belligerent until

Military Tribunals in The Medical Case,

of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 1213; and the Ministries Case, 13 Trials
War CRIMINALS, supra note 9, at 112, so held. However, the Military Tribunals which heard the Justice
Case, 3 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 956, and the Einsatzgruppen Case, 4 Trials of War
174; the Flick Case, 6 Trials

OF

all

Criminals, supra note
72.
Article 7

For the

9, at

499, held otherwise.

territorial limitations

of that Tribunal's Statute

sets

placed on the International Tribunal for

Rwanda,

note 15.

see supra

the temporal limits ofjurisdiction as the period beginning

on

1

January

1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.
73.

It

should be noted that the Secretary-General did not consider

of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
non-applicability of any statute of limitations.

However,

a

a

it

necessary to include in the Statute

provision concerning the applicability or

provision with respect to limitations of time

would

no such provision

in the

be appropriate for an international criminal court of general jurisdiction. There

ILC Draft

is

Statute.

74.

United

75.

James

States
F.

Army, General Orders No.

Willis,

100, 24 April 1963; Levie, supra note 7,

Prologue to Nuremberg 130

participation in the Leipsig Trials, the

Germans continued

to

(1982).

at

529, S32.

After the Allies refused further

conduct hundreds of such

trials, all

of which

concluded with the acquittal of the accused. This did not stop the French from subsequently trying
these

same
76.

many of

individuals, usually in absentia.

Peter Padfield, Donitz: The Last Fuehrer 428

77. Levie, supra note 7, at 141. In any event, there

is

(1984).

considerable doubt that the doctrine of mom

his in

trials for the same offense by different sovereigns.
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, at art. 10, para. 1,
specifically prohibits a trial by a national court for an offense for which the accused has previously been tried
by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

idem precludes
78.
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Levie on the
S/G Report,

of

War

supra note 12, at para. 66(a).

79.

See

80.

Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the

Former Yugoslavia,

supra note 18, provides that, "Subject to Article 10(2)

national courts are not binding

ILC

81. Article 42 of the

of the International Tribunal
to the

same

on the Tribunal." This, however, adds nothing

to the Statute.

Draft Statute, supra note 14, adopts the provisions of Article 10 of the Statute

for the

Former Yugoslavia with some minor

variation.

It is,

therefore, subject

infirmities.

An

82.

International Tribunal for the

of the Statute, determinations of

oddity of

Rule

this

that

is

where

a

Chamber makes such

Trial

a request,

it is

disqualified

from

taking further proceedings in the matter.

Rule 13 is the reverse of the coin. Where an individual has been tried by the International Tribunal
Former Yugoslavia and proceedings are thereafter instituted against him in a national court, a Trial
Chamber, following the procedure set forth in Rule 10, mutatis mutandis, will request the national court to
discontinue its proceedings; and, if it fails to do so (presumably within sixty days), the President of the Tribunal
83.

for the

may

so report to the Security Council.
84. Article 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for

Tribunal
the

Rwanda,

supra note 15, provides that the

adopt the rules of procedure and evidence already adopted by the International Tribunal for

shall

as they deem necessary."
ILC Draft Statute would also authorize the International Criminal
functioning of that Court. However, the rules so drafted would be subject to the

Former Yugoslavia "with such changes

See supra note 18. Article 19 of the

85.

Court

to draft rules for the

approval of a conference of the States Parties to that Statute.
See Levie, supra note 7, at 52-53, 259-262. In this respect,

86.

it is

worthy of note

that the rules

of

procedure proposed by the United States for the International Tribunal included the following provisions:

The

19.5(A)

having
value

a

as

shall in
it,

general admit any relevant oral, written or physical evidence

and

exclude any evidence which in

shall

opinion

is

of no

The

Trial

Chamber

shall in

general require the best evidence available.

Draft Rules of Procedure for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons

States,

Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law Committed

in the

Former Yugoslavia.

See supra note 18. Other, generally non-controversial, rules with respect to evidence will be found

87.
in

its

proof ....
(B)

United

Chamber

Trial

bearing on the issues before

Rules 90-98. They include such subjects

96 (Evidence

in Cases

that consent shall

as

"False Testimony," "Confessions," "Judicial Notice," etc.

of Sexual Assault) provides

not be allowed

as a

that

no corroboration of the

victim's testimony

is

Rule

required,

defense, and that prior conduct of the victim shall not be admitted as

evidence.

The ILC Commentary,

88.

International Tribunal for the

99-106

are

89.

supra note 14, erroneously refers to Rules 89-106 of the Rules of the
Former Yugoslavia. The reference should have been to Rules 89-98. Rules

concerned with sentencing procedures.

See supra note 30. Additional items for the protection of an accused will be found in

Rule 42 (Rights

of Suspects during Investigation), Rule 43 (Recording Questioning of Suspects), Rule 45 (Assignment of
Counsel), Rule 63 (Questioning of Accused), Rule 66 (Disclosure [of Evidence] by the Prosecutor), Rule 67
(Reciprocal Disclosure), Rule 68 (Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence).

33 I.L.M. 484, 488 (1994).

90.

Bruce

91

See supra note 7. Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra

.

Zigaris, Introductory Note,

note 8, avoided this problem by providing for one Chief of Counsel and an Associate Counsel
by each nation which had been at war with Japan and which desired to appoint one.

be appointed

to

92. Levie, supra note 7, at 54.

TRIBUNAL FOR THE Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, properly
Government or from any other
source." An identical provision is in Article 13(4) of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, and in Article 15(2)
of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 15. The latter Statute also provides that
93. Article 16(2) of INTERNATIONAL

provides that the Prosecutor "shall not seek or receive instructions from any

the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the
International Tribunal for

as

Rwanda, with an

94.

See supra note 14.

95.

The

Former Yugoslavia shall serve as the Prosecutor
Deputy Prosecutor and additional staff.

provisions with respect to the Registry of the International Tribunal for

provisions contained in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the

to be

two
96.

Rwanda

Former Yugoslavia,

are the

same

but, there are

separate Registries.

Former Yugoslavia provides that
on the basis of information obtained from any source."
The Commission of Experts created by S.C. Res. 780

Article 18(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the

the Prosecutor

may

"initiate investigations ex officio or

Article 18(1) then goes

(1992), 6

for the

additional

on

to

list

possible sources.

October 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1476 (1992),

for the purpose of receiving

and analyzing the evidence of

435

International Tribunal

been committed in Bosnia -Herzegovina, is not specifically mentioned. It may be
Report (S/ 1994/674, 27 May 1994) and its voluminous records are included under
the heading of "United Nations organs." They have already been made available to the Prosecutor.
97. On 8 November 1994, the prosecutor, Judge Richard J. Goldstone of South Africa, filed an
indictment against Bosnian Serb Dusan Tadic, alleging murder, torture, forced evacuations, and gang rape.
Judge Goldstone also requested a Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to seek
the custody of Tadic from the German authorities who were keeping him in confinement in Munich and had
indicted him for genocide and murder. The Chamber did so, and the German authorities indicated an intention
to comply with the International Tribunal's request. Associated-Press Dispatch, Shrapnel, Snipers Killed in
war crimes

alleged to have

considered that

Central Sarajevo;
16.
is

On 7

Final

its

War Crimes

November

Tribunal Seeks Serb Accused of Murder, Torture, Chi. Trib.,

who

been a concentration camp commander and
answer to a request for his custody made

alleged to have

Serb

is

First to

Face Post-World

War

II

is

1994,

9,

at

Dragan Nikolic who

believed to be in Bosnia.

It

to the Serbian authorities in Bosnia.

interesting to see the

Cohen,

November

1994, the Prosecutor filed with the Tribunal an indictment against

War-Crimes Indictment, N.Y. Times, Nov.

8,

1994,

at

will

be

Roger

A5,

col.

1.

98.

A

proposal to permit the Prosecutor to

International

Law Commission's Commentary

99. Unfortunately, paragraph

reason for this provision

file

complaint was rejected. See paragraph 4 of the

95 of the Commentary, S/G Report supra note

merely paraphrases the

as it

a

to Article 25, supra note 15.
12, does not give us a

Statute's provision.

100. Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, provides the method for the review of an indictment; Rule 28 provides
that in July of each year the President of the Tribunal shall assign for each month of the next calendar year
Judge of a Trial Chamber to review the indictments.
101. See Report of the Working Group, arts. 10(3), 32, 33 I.L.M. 258, 260, 274 (1994).

102.

ILC

a

Draft Statute, supra note 14.

103. See Levie, supra note 7, at 238-250.

While

a

number of individuals wanted

for

trial

did

manage

to

reach sanctuary in several South American countries and even in the United States and Canada, in most such
cases their

whereabouts were not

104. See,

e.g.,

Article

known

many

for

years so

no

88 of the 1977 Additional Protocol

supra note 30,

"subject to the rights and obligations established in the Conventions,"
shall give

due consideration,"

105. See the

S/G Report,

were made.
which contains such phrases

requests for custody

I,

"when

as

circumstances permit," "they

etc.

supra note 12, at paras. 23

106. In paragraph 126 of the

S/G

&

125.

Report, supra note 12, the Secretary-General takes the position that

such an order "shall be considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations."
107.

When World War II in Europe was approaching its conclusion, the United States drafted a proposed

surrender agreement to be submitted to the Germans. Concerning this draft the Soviet representative

said:

which required the German authorities
and people to cooperate in apprehending war criminals and making them available for trial. The Soviet
government, he said, did not want a reference to war criminals in the document because the men who
came to sign might themselves fall into this category and might, therefore, refuse to do business at all.
Earl Ziemke, The United States Army in the Occupation of Germany 112 (1975). It is inevitable that
the officials negotiating the final cease fire in the former Yugoslavia will seek to include some type of amnesty
provision in that document. There are those who believe, with considerable justification, that including any
such provision will constitute a major setback for the future of the United Nations.
[T]he U.S. draft

[is]

acceptable except for paragraph VII

108. See supra note 14.

would be "to a requesting State" rather than to the International
Commentary to its Article 21 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the

109. This article provides that extradition

Criminal Court. Paragraph 5 of the ILC's

Commentary

to

its

Article 54, supra note 14, explain that this provision

was intended to cover instances where
Court over the crime alleged.

the custodial State has not accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal

While paragraph 108 of the Commentary contained in the S/G Report, supra note 12, attributes this
requirement "to the particular nature of the crimes committed," the protection of victims and witnesses

110.
latter

(and of the accused) has also been recognized as a requirement in Article 43 of the

ILC

Draft Statute, supra

note 14. Rules 69 and 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 18, contain additional provisions aimed

at

protecting victims and witnesses. All of these

Rules will also apply to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. See supra note 84.
111.

The 1945 London

Charter, supra note 7,

and one accused, Martin Bormann, was so

tried.

at art. 12,

There

is

authorized

trials

in the absence of the accused

no such provision in the Statute of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the right of the accused "to be tried in his presence"

would appear

Law
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436

to negate the possibility

ILC

41(l)(d) of the

of trials

Commentary on
a trial

note 30.

this

They

See

a

Commentaries of the S/G,

supra note 12, at para. 101. Article

general rule, the accused should be present during the

However,

matter, supra note 14).

in the absence

These

112.

in absentia.

Draft Statute, supra note 14, gives the accused the right "to be present

37(1) thereof states that "[a]s

with

War

of

rights are

Article 37(2) authorizes the Trial

of the accused where such absence
not quite

well set forth

as

as in

is

due

the

Article 75(4) of the

trial."

Chamber

to certain specified actions

Article

the lengthy
to proceed

on

his part.

1977 Additional Protocol

from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and

arc extracted

at

trial." (See

I,

supra

Political Rights,

999

U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).

The

Law Commission

apparently expects that the International Criminal Court will
no provisions with regard thereto are included in its Draft Statute.
114. The Italian proposal for an International Tribunal would have required the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia to "apply the penalties provided for by the criminal law in force at the time of the
commission in the State in whose territory the crime was committed." S/25300, 17 February 1993, Annex I,
art. 7(1). While there is considerable merit to this proposal, in view of the fluid situation in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia its adoption might have caused some difficulties.
115. Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence promulgated by the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, lists the factors to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal in
113.

International

likewise adopt rules

on

this

subject

as

determining the sentence to be imposed. Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14,
the imposition of imprisonment,
"[t]he

Court

is

to

life.

Paragraph

1

of the Commentary to that

not authorized to impose the death penalty." Id

of the Security Council for

Rwanda

up

this

Rwanda

year

at

Commentary,

art.

also authorizes

article states flatly that

47, para.

1.

As

member

a

voted against the creation of the International Tribunal for

Rwandan

because that Tribunal would not be able to impose the death penalty while

courts, trying

would be doing so. Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwanda War Crimes; Kigali Votes No on U.N.
Resolution, Wash. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at A44, col. 1.
116. Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, also authorizes the imposition of fines and provides

lesser criminals,

for the disposition

117.

of fines so imposed and collected.

Rule 105 of

the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the

Yugoslavia, supra note 18, elaborates
also

on

this

provision of its Statute.

provided for restitution orders but such

a

The previous

provision was omitted from the 1994

Commentary to Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, indicates
a matter would be more appropriate for a separate civil proceeding.
118.

If several States

draft

that

it

Former

of the ILC Draft Statute

draft.

Paragraph 3 of the

was considered

that such

have notified the Security Council of their willingness to accept for imprisonment

persons convicted and sentenced by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal

is

to

which the convicted person will be confined. There is no indication in
the Statute as to how, and to what extent, reimbursement will be made to the imprisoning State for the
expenses incurred in the confinement of persons convicted and sentenced by the Tribunal. Presumably, this
will be negotiated by the Secretary-General and the State concerned.
119. Rule 125 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former

designate the State in the prison of

sets forth the criteria to be employed by the Tribunal for granting pardon or
commutation of sentence. (Inasmuch as "pardon" normally refers to executive clemency and is always available,
with no qualifying requirements, the term "parole" would have been more appropriate than the term

Yugoslavia, supra note 18,

"pardon"

—

unless

capacity. Article

it

is

considered that the Tribunal will be acting in an executive, rather than

60 of the ILC Draft

Statute, supra note 14, refers to "pardon, parole or

a judicial,

commutation of

sentence").
120.

See supra text

accompanying note 17.
Commentary, S/G Report,

121. Paragraph 117 of the

supra note 12, states that "the Prosecutor should

on the same grounds." Again, there is no indication as to whether
this means that he may appeal an acquittal. Rule 99 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 18, appears to assume that he may do so. After providing for the immediate release of an accused who
has been acquited, that Rule states:
(B) If, at the time the judgment is pronounced, the Prosecutor advises the Trial Chamber in open
court of his intention to file notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 108, the Trial Chamber may, at the
also

be entitled to

initiate

appeal proceedings

request of the Prosecutor, issue

a

warrant for the arrest of the accused to take effect immediately.

Rule 118 refers to the possible absence of the accused when the appellate judgment is delivered,
he "having been acquitted on all charges."
122. Article 50 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, is to the same effect. Rule 115 of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, covers the use of new evidence during the course of an appeal.
123. Rules 107 to 118 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, amplify the provisions of the Statute with respect to appellate proceedings.
Id.

In addition,

XXIII
Was the Assassination

Abraham

of

Lincoln

a War Crime?
Dr.

Mudd

and

the Lincoln Assassination:

The Case Reopened 213

(John P.Jones ed., 1995)

There

does not appear to be any dispute about the following

facts

concerning the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln: that on 14

box at Ford's Theater in Washington, D.C.,
watching a performance of "Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed
by John Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage (where he
delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement) one of Booth's spurs caught on
a flag decorating Lincoln's box with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that
despite this he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington; that
he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that Dr. Samuel Mudd, a
Booth acquaintance living in Maryland, treated Booth's leg and provided him
April 1865, while sitting in a

with a makeshift crutch; and that
to

all this

occurred five days after Lee's surrender

Appomattox.

Grant

at

From

that point

—

on there is litde agreement on the facts
and even less on
the applicable law. However, as to some of the facts which are disputed, there
is really no basis for argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with
Lee's surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came to an end.
That

is

not

so.

Lee had merely surrendered the

Army of Northern Virginia. The

Confederate States of America had other armies in the

continued to
the

fight,

assassination.

field,

armies which

armies which did not surrender until well after the date of

Moreover, because of the presence

of thousands

of

Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial law had been declared for that

which was fortified and heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status
still existed on 14 April 1865, when the assassination took place.
The current manual on the law of war of the United States Army defines a
war crime as "a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military
or civilian." Adopting this definition, the sole question that this article will
attempt to answer is: Was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law of war and, hence, a war
city,

crime?

To

refine

our discussion even

further:

Is

the

murder of an individual
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committed
victim

in

Law

of

War

wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality

as

the

war crime?

a

answer to these questions

If the

is

under the law of war

in the affirmative,

commission would unquestionably have jurisdiction

military

persons, including Dr.

Samuel Mudd, brought before

answer to these questions

offense. If the

jurisdiction of a military

law which

is

For our purposes

we

to try the accused

charged with such an

in the negative, the question

of the

commission becomes one of constitutional and national

beyond the purview of this

is

it

a

will

discussion.

assume the worst case for the accused:

1) that

the

evidence established that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln;
2) that the eight individuals

convicted by the military commission on 30 June

Mudd,

1865, including Dr. Samuel

were

parties to that conspiracy;

as

well

3) that all

others

as

who were

not charged,

of the conspirators charged, being

of the District of Columbia or of the State of Maryland, were nationals

residents

of the Union;

4) that, nevertheless, all

of the Confederate cause; and
motivated by

a desire

on

of the conspirators were strong supporters

5) that the

conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was

their part to help that cause.

The charge with respect to which the military commission opened its hearings
on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight accused pleaded "Not Guilty" on the
following day, alleged that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously"

combined, confederated, and conspired

and

others.

There

is

no

itself

considered the offense charged to be

murdering the President and
be

this to

There

a

8

a

were

in violation of the

law

demonstrates that the prosecution
conspiracy to

his successors-to-be

and

commit

that

it

the present author has said elsewhere:

number of actions which, while they

are

treason by

did not consider

-

war crime. As

are a

and murder Abraham Lincoln

allegation that their acts

of war. The wording of the charge

•

to kill

9

wartime criminal offenses

and are punishable by the injured belligerent, do not come within any definition
of war crimes. Thus, while there
are violations
is

not

so.

is

a

wide-spread belief that espionage and treason

of the laws and customs of war and

are, therefore,

war

crimes,

this

International law does not forbid espionage and treason; national laws

12

do.

Presumably, the accused,

would

in

some manner

Union

citizens,

assumed

is

not

a violation

The post-World War
tried Austrians,

of assassination

benefit the Confederate cause, even at that late date in

the war. Their acts were, therefore, traitorous

treason

their acts

—

of the law of war, and
II

Hungarians

trials

tried

but, as

it is

it

has just

been shown,

not a war crime.

which Germans tried Germans, Austrians
Hungarians, etc., were not true war crimes

in

trials.

For the most part they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many

cases,

prosecuted misuse or abuse of power.

Nor were

the euthanasia cases or
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camp

the concentration
after, 1

cases (involving actions

September 1939, the

official

which took place

which had

Nordhausen Concentration Camp

II

in

They were

cases.

existed at the time of the offenses,

but which, for obvious reasons, had not been enforced by Nazi
In the

War

date of the beginning of World

Europe), which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes
violations of German criminal law,

prior to, and

case, the

13
officials.

review of the case contains

the following statement:

For an

illegal act to

must be

act

a

be

a

war crime

must be

certain elements

crime in violation of international law;

(2)

present, viz., (1) the

of nationality between the perpetrator and the victim; and

must have been committed

as

to the conspiracy to assassinate

was not

it

may be
a

the criminal act

of those alleged to have been

Lincoln.

was no

The

disparity

perpetrators and the victim;

the assassination of Lincoln

war. Therefore,

trial

Abraham

violation of international law; there
as

(3)

a disparity

an incident of war.

These elements were not present in the

persons charged

must be

there

and

act

parties

charged was not

a

of nationality between the
extremely doubtful that

it is

considered to have been an incident of the

war crime.

Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed the assassination

of Abraham Lincoln,

Union

a

citizen,

by those

who were
•

citizens, will find

support in the

trial

of Mariano Uyeki,

15

likewise

a case for

Union

which the

present author can find no justification:

Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in
parents.

When

his Filipino

10

the

war broke out

Iloilo,

Panay, the Philippines, of Japanese

in 1941 he apparendy suffered at the hands of

schoolmates because he was pro-Japanese and

it

was alleged

that

on

May 1942, after the Japanese occupation of Panay, and without any justification,

he shot and killed

a

period he was acting

fellow Filipino teenager. There was
as

some evidence

at that

an interpreter for the Japanese and that he was wearing

at

Army uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a prisoner of war on 1 September
least parts

of a Japanese

1945. Early in 1946 he was tried for the murder by a United States Military

Commission.

He

was convicted and sentenced

vacated because "the validity of the proceedings
is

no explanation of the

the

basis for that statement.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

he was

a Filipino citizen

and

that the

United

jurisdiction to try him. His application

had

originally

been

a national

by rendering military
that the military

for a writ

to death.
is

That conviction was

faulty." Unfortunately, there

He

then made an application to

of habeas corpus, claiming that

States Military

Commission had no

was denied on the ground

that

even

if he

of the Philippines, he had forfeited that nationality

service to the Japanese

Government. This was not

commission had jurisdiction

to try

him,

Supreme Court of the Philippines had no jurisdiction

it

was

to rule

a decision

a decision that the

on

the jurisdiction
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of

War

of the United States court because he was not
retried

by another United

States Military

Commission

He was

of the Philippines.

a citizen

in April

1946 and was again

convicted and sentenced to death.

Concerning

When

this case

the present author

was committed

the offense

one (pro-American) Filipino

was

civilian. It

accused
Japanese

in 1942,

a

for trial

by

may have
it

was

matter of the murder of

a

was

a

civilian

a case for the courts

United

States Military

of the Philippines and not

did have

its

own

find a basis for the jurisdiction of the

commission

for this offense

United

the

fully
It is

States military

committed in 1942. Regrettably, no application
writ of habeas corpus was made to the United States Courts.

for a

In other words,
is

it is

a violation

not believed that motive alone can convert an offense

of national law into one which

Had Booth and

law.

were not yet

fully-developed criminal justice system.

difficult to

which

upon entering

1944,

Philippines

the

a

Commission. Even though the

lost his Filipino nationality in

Army, and even though

independent,

it

to say:

by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino
violation of the criminal law of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines. Surely, this

war crime

went on

his fellow conspirators

the assassination of President Lincoln

and the

fact that

they acted

as

is

a violation

of international

been disappointed

office seekers,

would certainly not have been a war crime,

they did because of their political motivation,

because of their desire to support the Confederacy, does not convert a

common

law national crime into an international crime.

The

conclusion

is

reached that the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln

by John Wilkes Booth and

his fellow conspirators

war crime, but was a
committed by Union citizens in the hope

of war and, therefore, was not
treasonous act

was not

a

Confederate cause. Accordingly, even

if

we

Dr. Mudd's conviction of conspiracy to

a violation

of the law

politically motivated,

that

it

would help

the

assume that the evidence supported

commit

murder under
national law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military commission
at that time and place complied with the constitutional and statutory law of the

United

treason and

States.

Notes
Otto

Why Was

Lincoln Murdered? (1937) (discussing one extreme, and
William Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder CONSPIRACIES (1983)
(containing a 15-page bibliography and more scholarly discussion on the subject); see also Louisj. Weichman,
A True History of the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln and the Conspiracy of 1865 (Floyd H.
Risvold ed., 1975) (setting forth the contents of a number of interesting documents).
2. For example, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston did not surrender to Union General William
T. Sherman until 18 April 1865. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies, ser. I, vol. XLVII, pt. Ill, 243-45 (Washington, GPO 1895).
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Eisenschiml,
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General Sherman was reprimanded for giving General Johnston what were considered to be excessively
favorable conditions for his surrender and the Federal
at

Government repudiated

the surrender agreement!

Id.

301-02, 334-36, 345.

Department of the Army,

3.

Much

Field

of this manual was the work of the

Manual FM27-10, The Law

late

of Land Warfare ^ 499 ( 1956).
Richard R. Baxter, subsequently the United States Judge on

the International Court ofJustice.

In amplification of the foregoing the present author has stated:

—
or
—may commit

man or woman, enemy nationals, allied nationals, and neutral
war crime and may be tried and punished for the criminal act.
Howard S. Levie, Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes 431 ( 1993). No national of the United
States was tried by a United States military commission for a war crime during or after World War II although
a considerable number were tried by courts-martial for violations of the Articles of War, then the Army's penal
code; and many of those trials would have been considered to be war crimes trials if they had been tried by
the enemy. For such activities during Vietnam, see W. Hayes Parks, Crimes in Hostilities (pt. 1 & conclusion),
60 Marine Corps Gazette 16 (Aug. 1976), 60 Marine Corps Gazette 33 (Sept. 1976).
4. There were a number of trials by military commissions after the Civil War which, unquestionably,
involved war crimes, primarily the maltreatment of Union prisoners of war held in the South. The most famous
of these was the trial of Captain Henry Wirz, who had commanded the notorious prisoner-of-war camp at
Andersonville, Georgia. See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867); 8 American State
Trials 657 (John Davison Lawson ed., 1918). For a different type of war crime, see T.E. Hogg et al., Gen.
Orders No. 52, Dep't of the Pac. (June 27, 1865) in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, ser. II, vol. VIII, 674-81 (Washington, GPO
Anyone

military

civilian,

nationals

a

1899).

Of course, Booth

5.

must be added

He

to this group.

was not

defendant

a

at

the

trial

because, while

being pursued by the Union authorities, he had been shot and killed in Garrett's barn, near Bowling Green,

had

Virginia. John Surrat, another alleged conspirator,

returned to the United States until
are

assuming to be

jury.

He
6.

was not

It

a

left

the country and, not having been apprehended and

considerable period thereafter, could not be tried with those

his fellow conspirators.

He

was

whom we

tried in a civil court in 1867, the trial resulting in a

hung

retried.

has often been charged that the conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln was approved by Jefferson

Davis and members of the Confederate Cabinet. In

fact,

the charge (or indictment) includes their names and

the specification includes a statement to the effect that the conspirators

were "incited and encouraged" by

Davis and other well known Confederates. However, no substantial evidence of their involvement was adduced
at

the conspiracy

trial.

Davis was taken into Union custody on 10

and he was not brought before the Commission.

been

tried for
7.

18-21
as

He was

released

May

1865, after the

from custody in

trial

was under way,

1867 without having

any offense.

Benn Pitman, The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators
(New York, Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin 1865) (facsimile ed. 1954). This is the courtroom testimony

recorded by Pitman, the
8.

Ex

In

claimed to be

official

court reporter.

317 U.S. 1 (1942), where unlawful belligerents, including one individual who
of the United States, had entered this country for purposes of espionage and sabotage,

parte Quirin,
a citizen

the Court stated that "even

when committed by

of committing sabotage while wearing
absence of uniform essential to one

is

a citizen, the offense [entering the

civilian clothes]

is

distinct

as

immaterial, and there
9.

10.

.

.

.

since the

irrelevant to the other." Id. at 38.

only citizens can commit treason, their
is

country for the purpose

from the crime of treason

In other words, unlawful combatants wearing civilian clothes and bent

law of war; inasmuch
is

May

attire at

on sabotage

are in violation

of the

the time of the commission of the act

no unlawful combatancy involved.

Levie, supra note 3,

at 3.

A. Reshetov, International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for International Crimes, in
Trials and International Law 167 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990);

See, e.g., Iu.

The Nuremberg

Jacob Berger, The Legal Nature of War Crimes and the Problem of Superior Command, 38 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
1203, 1204 (1944); W.L. Ford, Resistance Movements in Occupied Territory, 3 Neth. Intx L. Rev. 355, 372
(1956). Ford appears to take the position that neither spying nor sabotage

Sabotage by legal combatants
violation.

Roling

says:

"Both

is

not

a violation

in the case

is

a violation

of the law of war. Sabotage by

of espionage and

in that

of

'risky

war

illegal

acts'

of the law of war.

combatants

is

such

the term 'war crimes'

a
is

used metaphorically. This concept should be kept for breaches of the laws and customs of war, for violations

of the international law concept ofjus
and

Practice,

2

Intx

L. in

the Neth.

in bello. "

B. V.A. Roling, Supranational Criminal Law

161, 194 (1979).

in

Netherlands Theory

.
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With

1 1

Law

of

respect to espionage and

War

war treason. War

Office,

The Law OF War ON Land ^ 624

(Sir

Hersch
as war

Lauterpacht, rev., 1958), states rather conservatively that "the accuracy of the description of such acts

United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War 487 (1948).
12. Nathan Hale, Major John Andre, Mata Hari, Richard Sorge were not war criminals. They did not
violate the laws and customs of war; each of them violated the laws relating to espionage of the enemy of the
and they were punished under those laws. The United States Supreme
belligerent for which he or she acted
Court erred in Ex parte Quirin when it stated that spies are "offenders against the law of war." 317 U.S. at 31.
Similarly, Quisling, Petain, Laval, Lord Haw Haw, Kawakita, Tokyo Rose, etc., were not war criminals. They
crimes

is

doubtful." See also

War Crimes

—

did not violate the laws and customs of war, they were collaborationists

own

countries

— and they were punished under

who

violated the treason laws of their

those laws.

13. The trials of Germans by German courts for membership in Nazi organizations determined to have
been criminal in nature were mandated by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which sat in
Nuremberg and by the judgment of that Tribunal.
14. See Levie, supra note 3, at 283. This case was officially known as The Trial of Kurt Andree. National
Archives, Records Group 338, File
1079, Rolls 1-16. It was tried by a United States military commission
at Dachau, Germany, in December 1947.
15. Archives of the Hoover Institution for War, Peace, and Revolution, U.S. Armed Forces W. Pac, File
CSUZXX 191-A, Box 2, Levie, supra note 3, at 236.

M

16.

Levie, supra note 3,

17.

Id.

at

236.
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Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic

I.

Events

the Persian Gulf

in

Law Journal 153

Introduction

since the cessation of the hostilities during the

Gulf

have

Crisis

demonstrated conclusively the mistake that was made in not allowing the
forces

of the Coalition of Nations, operating in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991, to

occupy Iraq in

members

its

surrendering.

prisoners of war

law,

The Iraqi Army was
Saddam Hussein and

entirety.

1

for

of its

could have been made

his aides

i

and they could have been put on trial for violations of international

and particularly of the law of war.

no need

in full retreat with thousands

embargoes and no

Had this been done, there would have been

difficulty in searching for,

and destroying, nuclear,

chemical, and biological plants, weapons, and materials in Iraq.

This essay examines, in retrospect, whether a legal basis existed for the
establishment of an International Military Tribunal to try
his aides for

war crimes

a Tribunal existed

and

in the Persian Gulf.
exists. It will

still

It

do

Saddam Hussein and

argues that a legal basis for such
so

by

first

establishing the legal

foundation for and jurisdiction of a war crimes tribunal in the Persian Gulf.
will then describe the substantive

law

will outline the substantive evidence

that the Tribunal

would

it

of war crimes already available that could

be presented before the Tribunal, including, but not limited
rights

apply. Finally,

It

of foreign and protected persons, other

human

to, violations

of the

rights violations,

and

environmental destruction and use of chemical and biological weapons.

Legal Foundation For

II.

And

in

The

provisions of the 1945

Military Tribunal

An

*
at a

earlier,

(IMT)

War Crimes

Tribunal

the Persian Gulf

London Charter which

were the foundation

and necessarily

Conference entided

Jurisdiction of a

much less

for

detailed, version

Crisis in the Gulf:

created the International

most of the war crimes
of this

article

was presented

Enforcing the Rule of Law, sponsored by

Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association,
International Club, Washington, D.C., on Jan. 30-31, 1991. The author also made

the Standing
at

the

a presentation

on

the subject at a hearing

on War

Crimes: Hearing before the Subcommittee

on International Law, Immigration and Refugees of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives,

102d Cong.,

1st Sess., (1991).
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directives

Law

promulgated

in

of

War

Europe

World War

after

and they were repeated

II,

almost verbatim in the corresponding activity in the Far East.

There was,

members of the Coalition of Nations
involved in the Gulf War to draft and become Parties to an agreement such as
the London Charter. This agreement would contain provisions for the
therefore, adequate precedent for the

establishment and procedure of an International Tribunal similar
necessarily identical with, those contained in the

we now

London

but not

to,

Charter. Moreover,

have the additional precedents of the establishment, by the Security

Council of the United Nations, of an International Tribunal for the Former

and an International Tribunal for the

Yugoslavia,

trial

of persons accused of

having committed war crimes in Rwanda, or in neighboring States by

Rwandans, during the year 1994. Therefore,

in

its

the Security Council might well have declared
International Tribunal for the

trial

1991 cease-fire Resolution,
intention to establish an

its

of persons accused of having ordered or

on and after August 2, 1990.
There is one jurisdictional issue that would undoubtedly be raised by the
defense if Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi military were to be
tried by an International Tribunal. Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention
committed war crimes

in

Kuwait and

in Iraq

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

War

provided that any sentence

adjudged against a prisoner of war must be "by the same tribunals and in
accordance with the same procedure

armed
United

as in
,,11

of the Detaining Power."

forces

Supreme Court held

States

.12

the case of persons belonging to the

In the famous Yamashita Case,

the

that this provision did not apply to trials for

pre-capture offenses (war crimes), but only to offenses committed while under
the status of a prisoner of war. This decision

was almost uniformly adopted by

the courts of other countries trying war crimes cases after World War
the 1949

Geneva Diplomatic Conference

Convention,
Article

14

Article

its

102 included

new

drafted the

version of the 1929

a provision similar to that

63 of the 1929 version but ending with the phrase "and

the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed."

Conference then drafted Article 85 of that Chapter which

war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power
capture

to

retain,

shall

even

if

convicted,

the

When

II.

15

if,

benefits

furthermore,

In addition, the

states,

for acts

contained in

"[p]risoners of

committed
of the

prior

present

Convention."

Undoubtedly, one purpose of this provision was
to that

applicable to

all trials

was alleged

accused became

a

preclude the

to

constituted tribunal?

to

make
a

the provisions of Article 102

Detaining Power, whether the

have been committed prior

prisoner of war.

trial

is,

of prisoners of war by

offense charged

this

That

of the Yamashita Case.

to establish a rule contrary

The

to,

question which then

or

after, the

arises

is:

Does

of a prisoner of war for war crimes by an internationally

The answer would appear

to

be in the negative

as

such

a
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trial

would not be "prosecuted under

the laws of the Detaining Power," but

under international law. Furthermore, the accused would not be
Detaining Power but by an international

1949 Geneva Prisoner of

Committee of the Red
reasoning

its

that Article

is

War

entity.

While

by

tried

Commentary on

the

a

the

Convention, prepared by the International

Cross, advances a contrary interpretation of that phrase,

not particularly convincing.

129 of the Convention, an

19

Commentary

Further, the

concerned

article

specifically

states

with the

punishment of "grave breaches" of the Convention, "does not exclude handing
over the accused to an international criminal court whose competence has been
,20

recognized by the Contracting Parties."
It

to

its

appears that if a Detaining
national law, for a

Power

war crime committed

"by the same courts according

to the

prior to capture,

same procedure

of the armed forces of the Detaining Power."
International Tribunal

of war pursuant

elects to try a prisoner

21

as in

must do so

the case of a

However,

whose members have been

it

if

the

elected

member

trial is

by an

by the Security

Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, or have been selected by

members of a Coalition or by the Parties
such a Tribunal would have jurisdiction despite
the

of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of

War

to a

convention on the subject,

the above-mentioned provisions

Convention. The applicable

rules

procedure and evidence could be included in the Charter of the Tribunal,
the case of the International Military Tribunal

which

sat in

The Substantive Law

III.

Having

Former Yugoslavia.

war crimes

alleged to have

would have

jurisdiction

its

substantive provisions,

of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, are
23

London Charter, the provisions of that article would
actions of Saddam Hussein and his military commanders.

based on Article 6 of the

be applicable to the
A.

the case of

been committed during the

Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, and assuming that
like the Statute

as in

22

of the Tribunal

established that our International Tribunal

to try individuals for

as in

Nuremberg, or they

could be drafted and adopted by the members of the Tribunal,
the International Tribunal for the

Article 6(a):

Crimes Against Peace

Article 6(a) of the

London Charter

states:

Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war

of aggression, or
assurances,

or

of

a

war

in violation of international treaties, agreements or

participation

in

a

common

accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

plan

or

conspiracy

for

the
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A number

Law

of

War

War

of writers have urged that in the post World

provision constituted the creation of an offense ex post facto.

contention of those accused

at

Nuremberg and Tokyo,

as

2S

II trials this

This was also the

'

well

other cases

as in

where the accused were charged with waging aggressive war. Nevertheless, both
the International Military Tribunal (IMT)
and its counterpart in the Far East,

(IMTFE)

the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
a

ruled that such

crime already existed in international law. Professor B. V. A. Roling, the Dutch

judge on the IMTFE, dissented from

some

28

this ruling.
ruling/

IMTFE

years later he stated that the

However,

had:

recognized the legal existence of the crime against peace
Charter. In so doing

it

in an article written

as

defined in the

contributed to the recognition of this crime.

decision,

Its

combined with later actions taken within the United Nations, confirmed the crime
against peace as a crime

Thus,
war,

as

under international law.

appears that since at least 1945, if not before, the waging of aggressive

it

well

as

the waging of war in violation of international treaties, has been a

violation of international law

IMT

offense the

and

a

war crime. Recognizing

said, "[t]o institute a

international crime;

war crimes

in that

it is

contains within

it

In examining whether
Article 6(a),
States.

therefore,

is

not only an

Law

30

accumulated

itself the

from other

evil

of the whole."*

of Aggression Against Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein's

actions

fall

within the purview of

necessary to refer to Article 5 of the 1945 Pact of the League

it is

32

war of aggression,

the severity of this

the supreme international crime differing only

B. Application of Article 6(a) and the

of Arab

29

Both

Iraq

and Kuwait were

original Parties to this treaty, Article

which specifically prohibits the use of force for the resolution of disputes
between member states. Better known, of course, are the provisions of Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter which require members (and both Iraq and
5 of

Kuwait

are

members)

to refrain

"from the

or political independence

territorial integrity

threat or use of force against the
33
of any state. " After many decades

of debate, that provision has been amplified by the General Assembly resolution
of Aggression.

entitled Definition
that "[ajggression

is

territorial integrity

the use of

armed force by

State,

invasion or attack by the

following qualify

armed

or any military occupation,

forces

its

Article

as acts

.

but

also

of aggression:

of a State of the

however temporary,

3S

."'
.

territory

resulting

of another

from such

invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof.

1

a State against the sovereignty,

or political independence of another State

specifies, in Article 3(a), that the

The

This Resolution provides in
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Moreover, Article
a

5(2)

states that "[a]

crime against international peace. Aggression gives

responsibility."

In addition,

it is

which both

is

to international

rise

crime and that he could have been indicted and tried therefor.
equally clear that he has been guilty not only of planning,

preparing, initiating, and
that his actions

war of aggression

seems indisputable that Saddam Hussein has been guilty of

It

this international

to

of the resolution

waging

war of aggression

a

against Kuwait, but also

have been in violation of international
Iraq

and Kuwait were

Article 6(b) of the

War crimes: namely,

and agreements

Parties.

London Charter
violations

treaties

states:

of the laws or customs of war. Such violations

shall

include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor

or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons

on

the seas, killing of hostages,

plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
villages,

Both

or devastation not justified by military necessity.

Article 147

War

Time of War

Convention,

40
to

countries of the world) are Parties,
listed in Article 6(b)
acts.

39

and Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva

which

list as

and Kuwait

Iraq

which

of the London Charter,

as

well
is

well
all

most

as

of the

acts

number of additional

as a

even better supplied with

of substantive international criminal law than were the courts

World War II.
invaded Kuwait on August

tried those cases after

Iraqi troops

forces

(as

"grave breaches" almost

Thus, a court trying war crimes cases today

specifications

towns or

of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection

of Civilian Persons in
Prisoner of

cities,

38

were ordered

to the Persian

2,

1990.

Gulf five days

41

United

later,

States milita

on August

7,

1990.
43

Saddam Hussein announced the annexation of Kuwait on August 8, 1990.
After World War II the contention was frequently advanced that because an
invaded country had been incorporated into Germany, the law of war, and
specifically the

law of military occupation, no longer offered protection to the

inhabitants of the occupied territory.

In the view of the Tribunal

it is

Concerning

unnecessary in

doctrine of subjugation, dependent as
application

where the subjugation is the

it

is

result

this

contention the

this case to

upon

IMT said:

decide whether this

military conquest, has any

of the crime of aggressive war. The

doctrine was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an

army

the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true owners.

The

.

subjugation of Kuwait by Iraq was, without question, "the result of the

crime of aggressive war"

August

.

in

8,

—but was

there an

army in the

field,

opposing

Iraq,

on

1990? The answer to that question must be in the negative. Kuwait
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had been overrun and
had mobilized

its

armed

its

of

War

army had

disintegrated.

forces prior to this date,

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia

and had an army in the

but that army was mobilized solely for self-defense against an Iraqi attack.

not to "restore [Kuwait] to

United

its

true owners."

States forces (and those

While

it

might be urged

and international authority

Kuwaitis. This raises the issue

war of aggression? Or,
of war protect

by

as in

was

that the

at that

to restore

time those

Kuwait

to the

IMT felt it unnecessary to decide: Does

which the

the doctrine of subjugation apply

It

of the other nations which soon assembled in

Saudi Arabia, on the Iraqi border) were "an army in the field,"
forces lacked both national

field;

where the subjugation

is

the result of a criminal

the context of this particular problem, does the law

civilian inhabitants (and prisoners

of war) of a country victimized

war of aggression and formally annexed by the aggressor?
The doctrine applied by the IMT, that there could be no annexation of
a

occupied territory while there was an opposing army in the

upon

the principle that any annexation

announced before the

field,

was based

conflict

had

fully

terminated and peace had been restored was unlawful. Today, Article 5(3) of
the Definition of Aggression states that "[n]o territorial acquisition or special

advantage resulting from aggression
it is

is

or

true that resolutions of the General

binding,

it

would

quoted above
other words,

shall

be recognized

as

lawful."

While

Assembly of the United Nations are not

certainly appear that the provision

with respect to aggression

an expression of present-day customary international law. In

is

it is

a principle

of customary international law that there can be no

lawful annexation resulting from an aggressive war; ergo Iraq's annexation of

Kuwait was unlawful. Moreover, Security Council Resolution 662, adopted on
August

9,

1990, stated that the Security Council, "[d\ecides that the annexation

of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no

and is considered

null

decided "to continue

and void."
its

46

efforts to

In this Resolution, the Security Council also

one of military occupation,

a status

continued thereafter despite

status

occupation.'"

of Kuwait continued to be

which began on August

Iraq's

ownership by annexation on August

Geneva

.47

put an early end to the

annexation was unlawful, then the

If the

2,

1990, and which

unlawful attempt to change
8,

occupied territory

shall

it

to

one of

1990. Moreover, Article 47 of the 1949

Convention provides," [protected persons

Civilians

legal validity,

who

are

in

not be deprived, in any case or in any manner

whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention ... by any annexation

by the
,

latter

•

[Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied

,,48

territory.

Accordingly,

it

must be concluded

a nullity,

and

war and,

specifically,

that subsequent to

that the annexation

August

2,

of Kuwait by Iraq was

1990, Iraq was

by the law of military occupation.

bound by

the law of

'
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IV.

A.

Substantive Evidence of

and

Violations of the Rights of Foreign Nationals

The 1907 Hague Regulations

49

Offenses

Iraqi

Protected Persons

and the two 1949 Geneva Conventions

referred to above, contain provisions which, as will be discussed later,

violated

by the

Iraqi

army

in

Kuwait and

in Iraq.

The

were

violations occurred both

before and after the unlawful annexation. Convincing evidence of these offenses

was collected and evaluated by the appropriate
and

after the hostilities.

offenses against the

Iraq invaded

authorities during the course of,

Moreover, information with respect to numerous

law of war was

official Iraqi television,

When

50

and from

through the media, including the

available

a report

prepared by Amnesty International.

Kuwait on August

2,

1990, there were

and other foreign nationals in both Kuwait and
not allowed to leave Iraq, they had the
entitled to

status

many Americans

As these individuals were

Iraq.

of "protected persons" and were

of the protections afforded by the 1949 Geneva Civilians

all

"who

Convention. Articles 48 and 35 thereof provide that protected persons

of the Power whose territory

are not nationals

is

occupied" have the right to

leave the occupied territory, "unless their departure
interests

51

is

contrary to the national

of the State."" The exception was included primarily to enable a State

who were

to prevent neutral persons,

the occupied territory.
individuals as hostages.

Its

53

important to

its

economy, from leaving

purpose was not to enable a belligerent to detain such

The United

States nationals,

among

others,

were not

only compelled to remain in Kuwait and in Iraq in violation of Article 48, but
they were held there
returnees,

as hostages.

and constituted

a violation

Convention. This Convention
Article

1

of Article 134 of the Geneva Civilians

specifically prohibits the taking

of hostages and

47 makes such action a "grave breach" of that Convention.

these hostages

armament
deter

to

This was well publicized and verified by the

were frequendy forced

factories (including those

the

Coalition

armed

bombardment. This violated

to

installations

producing chemical weapons), in an

forces

Article

remain in military

Moreover,

from attacking

these

sites

28 of that Convention which

and

effort

by

air

specifically

prohibits using protected persons "to render certain points or areas

immune

from military operations."

There have been reports
Iraqi,

who were

to Iraq.

in

Kuwait

that thousands

as

refugees

from

of persons, foreign, Kuwaiti, and
Iraq,

were deported from Kuwait

This was a violation of Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians

Convention which prohibits "[i]ndividual or mass
deportations of protected persons

Occupying Power ..."
this

provision

is

a

from occupied

forcible transfers, as well as

territory to the territory

of the

Furthermore, Article 147 provides that a violation of

"grave breach" of the Convention

—

a

war crime.
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B. Other

Human

Law

of

War

Rights Violations

human

In referring to the massive violations of

Kuwait immediately

Amnesty

after the Iraqi invasion

rights

which occurred

in

and occupation of that country, the

Report contains the following statement, " [t]hese include
and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and

International

the arbitrary arrest

[Kuwaiti] military personnel; the widespread torture of such persons in custody;
the imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds

of unarmed

civilians,

including children."

Murder and torture are specifically prohibited by Article 32 of the 1949
Geneva Civilians Convention and both are listed among the "grave breaches"
of Article 147. According to the Amnesty International Report, hundreds of
extrajudicial executions

were

carried out.

'

Some of

these

were apparently

occasioned by the refusal of the Kuwaiti citizens involved to pledge allegiance
to

Saddam Hussein.

Civilians detained

by the

Iraqis

such allegiance in order to obtain their freedom.

were required

to pledge

1907 Hague

Article 45 of the

Regulations forbids compelling the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear
allegiance to the hostile

The Amnesty

Power.

International

Report

also indicates that:

[Widespread destruction and looting of public and private property was
out.

Most

and food

critical

carried

of these has been the looting of medicines, medical equipment

supplies.

The

massive scale of destruction and looting which has been

reported suggests that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather
reflected a policy adopted

by the government of Iraq.

These actions violated Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which
prohibits wanton destruction of property; Articles 46 and 56 thereof which
protect private property and that of municipalities and institutions; and Article

47 of those Regulations, which prohibits pillage.
Civilians
real

Article 53 of the

1

949 Geneva

Convention likewise prohibits the destruction and appropriation of

or personal property not justified by military necessity and Article 147 makes

such destruction or appropriation
Iraqi television

is

a

"grave breach" of that Convention.

reported to have

being paraded through the

streets

64

shown two captured American airmen

of Baghdad.

It

also

conducted on-screen

war from the United States and other Coalition
nations. Both of these actions were violations of Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention which specifically provides that prisoners of war

interviews of prisoners of

must be protected
curiosity."

'

against

"intimidation

Similar actions during

and against

World War

II

insults

resulted in a

and public

number of

convictions for violations of this aspect of the laws and customs of war.

Persian Gulf

451

Moreover, in the first few interviews each of the prisoners of war looked battered

—which would seem

and bewildered and made

a statement favorable to Iraq

some of the

indicate that at least

prisoners, if not

all,

to

had either been coerced by

force or drugged.

announced

Iraq

centers.

that

it

had placed prisoners of war in economic and

As in the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, the 1949 Geneva Prisoner

of War Convention, in

Article 23(1), specifically prohibits using the presence

its

immune from

of prisoners of war "to render certain points or areas
operations.

War

, 5

military

68

crimes

conducted

trials

after

World War

demonstrated that where

II

there was a general pattern of violations of the law of war,

orders emanating from the top echelons of leadership

Hussein and
officials

scientific

his agents. It

was on

this basis that

—

many of the

law has

law. Article 29 of the

the conflict in

now been

was the

in this case,

result

of

Saddam

higher-ranking Nazi

were convicted of conventional war crimes. This

international

it

of customary

rule

incorporated into conventional international

1949 Geneva Civilians Convention

whose hands protected persons may

them by

be,

states, "[t]he
is

Party to

responsible for the

agents, irrespective of any individual
69
responsibility which may be incurred."
Articles 12(1) and 131 of the 1949
70
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention are to the same effect.

treatment accorded to

No

attempt has been

been committed by
an almost

made

to

its

list

and

discuss every

However, those

Iraq.

total disregard for the provisions

law of war.

When

who composed

the Coalition captured

would comply with

the 1949

expected the same of Iraq.

this

71

Convention,

as

well

as

of the customary and conventional

its first

Iraqi

oil

armed

that the Coalition

(1980-1988),

it

was undoubtedly

other law of war conventions,

of the London Charter,

his followers

that

it

would be
72

Iraqis in this conflict.
it

will

realized that

the subject

Referring back

be found that with one or two

exceptions (for example, the murder of persons on the high seas

Hussein and

men

platforms off the coast of

Government

Iraqi

soldiers, the

However, based upon the non-compliance by both

of similar widespread violations by the
to Article 6(b)

may have

Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and

War

during the Iran-Iraq

that

have been enumerated indicate

on the

the anti-aircraft crews

Kuwait, the United States informed the

sides

that

war crime

73
),

Saddam

have substantially violated that provision.

C. Wanton Environmental Destruction

The Governments have been exceedingly slow

in drafting law-of-war
74

agreements, or even provisions, for protecting the environment.
Iraqi actions against the

environment the following was found:

75

Concerning
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The Gulf was

when between

fouled

discharged into

by

it

War

of

seven and nine million barrels of

Iraq. In the desert, five

were damaged or destroyed:

five

hundred and eight of them were

were damaged

the remaining eighty-two

in such a

fifty

million barrels of oil flowed freely from

was

total devastation

water sources

From

of the

hundred and ninety

them onto

fragile desert ecological

critical to survival.

.

.

set

wellheads

on

fire,

and

that twenty-five to

the desert floor.

The

result

system and the pollution of

.

Government of Canada,

9 to 12 July 1991, the

manner

oil

were

oil

General of the United Nations, hosted

a

in concert with the Secretary

conference of international experts in

Ottawa, Ontario, to consider the law of war implications of the environmental

by the

devastation caused

cited constitute violations of the

a.

Article 23(g) of the

There was general agreement

Iraqis.

law of war,

Annex

specifically:

1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting

to the

Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907,

the

"enemy property
b.

demanded by

unless imperatively

Article 147

of the

GC

that the actions

forbids the destruction of

the necessities of war;" and,

[1949 Geneva Civilians Convention], makes the

"extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and

and wantonly"

carried out unlawfully

Clearly, the oil well destruction

a grave breach.

by

Iraq served

designed to wreck Kuwait's future, carrying
extreme.

a

military purpose, but

was

scorched earth policy to the

77

D. Use of Chemical and

The

a

no

Biological

Weapons

use of chemical and biological

weapons

is

worthy of attention. In 1925

Protocol was drafted in Geneva prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating,

poisonous or other

gases,

and of all analogous

liquids, materials,

also prohibits "the use

of bacteriological methods of warfare."

to this Protocol as are

most of the nations represented

79

which opposed

Iraq.

against Kurdish

and

armed

Shiite rebels in

by the Coalition

forces facing

confrontation.

it,

While

Iraq

is

It

a Party

in the multilateral force

Nevertheless, Iraq has used poison gas against Iran and

supplied with this type of
hostilities

or devices.

its

own

territory. It

was apparendy well

weapon and had threatened that in the event of
forces it would use poison gas not only against the

but also against

Iraq did fire a

Israel,

which had played no

number of missiles

part in the

against Israel, they

had

conventional warheads.

There

are

hostilities. If

some

claims that

proven

it

did use gas or biological weapons during the

that Iraq did so, this will

be one more treaty Iraq will have

Persian Gulf

and one more war crime or

violated,

a
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crime against humanity to be charged

Saddam Hussein and his agents.
Article 6(c) of the London Charter contains

against

the following definition of crimes

against humanity:

Crimes

humanity:

against

deportation, and other

Namely,

inhumane

acts

murder,

extermination,

committed

before or during the war, or persecutions

on

against

any

political, racial,

enslavement,

civilian population,

or religious grounds

in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country

where

perpetrated.

With respect to this category of offenses, the IMT said, "from the beginning
of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also
crimes against humanity."
it

apdy describes the

81

If

one

situation in

substitutes

Kuwait and, perhaps,

V.

tried for

in Iraq.

if

custody of Saddam Hussein and the

Military Council could be obtained, they could be charged and

having committed crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against

humanity during the
all

that statement,

Conclusion

This essay has demonstrated that

members of his

1990 for 1939 in

Iraqi invasion

of Kuwait.

To do

so

would

require

some or

of the States which actively supported the actions against Iraq (or the Security

Council of the United Nations) to reach an agreement under which

would be

established, evidence collected, charges

made, and

a Tribunal

a trial,

or

trials,

conducted.
In any event,
Gulf,

it is

to

be hoped that in the light of the experience in the Persian

and the problems

that

Saddam Hussein

has caused in the implementation

of the cease-fire resolution, should he or another
peace of the world

commit

at

some

rnilitary

future date, the international

the same mistake of not

making him pay

despot disturb the

community

will not

for his crimes.

Notes
1.

Unfortunately,

as

so often happens, to have included a provision concerning

trials

for

war crimes

in

enunciated in U.N. Doc.

S/RES/687 (1991), would undoubtedly have lengthened
the period of hostilities. Eventually, this would have resulted in Saddam Hussein and other high ranking Iraqis
seeking refuge in a country that would have granted them asylum and would have refused to try or extradite
the terms of the cease

them

as

2.

fire

required by international agreements to which

One eminent

all

of the States involved are

Parties.

made a case for Saddam Hussein's
Crime?, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1990, at Dl.

student of this area of international law has

assassination. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a
Although the word "assassination" is inherently repulsive, this is not an idea

that

should be dismissed out of

Saddam Hussein was a uniformed member of the Iraqi Army and was, therefore, a legitimate target.
Killing him during the course of hostilities would have been a legitimate act of war and not an assassination.
During World War II the British in Africa mounted an unsuccessful operation in North Africa the sole purpose
hand.

Levie on the
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of which was to
a successful

kill

German

Law

War

of

Rommel

Field Marshal

operation aimed specifically

at killing

and

United States mounted
Yamamoto. (If the attempt to assassinate
World War II would have probably ended

his staff. In the Pacific, the

Japanese Admiral

Hider by members of the German resistance had been successful,
a year or so earlier and thousands of lives might have been saved

at

the cost of

one

life,

which was already

forfeited.)
3.

One
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of the most extensive,

On
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if
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On

biased, reviews
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a
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Crimes]. The Charter was drafted by representatives of
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5. See e.g., Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, 15 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 23 (1947) (hereinafter Trials of War Criminals); see also War
Crimes, supra note 4, at 558.
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11.
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Convention
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21.
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For the United States

this

would mean

by courts-martial require more

rigid rules

trials

by
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trial
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23.
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286, 288. As the

hostilities in

Rwanda were of an internal nature,
Rwanda are somewhat different in

of the International Tribunal for
8.

There

at

286.

24.
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of course, no "crime
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Stat, at

1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
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form,
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art. 6(a),
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Stat, at

1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
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Trial, in

Nazi

F. Riiter eds., 1977).

4 Encyclopedia, supra note 25,

30.

Definition of Aggression,

at

242, 244.

The

"later actions taken

as Affirmation of the Principles of International

G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.

numerous other resolutions.
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, supra note

142 (1974);

as

5, at

GAOR,

29th

Sess.,
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The making of a
require, if war

is

to

national policy
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though

a consideration

it

may require, and of necessity does

of matters military

as

well

as

matters

political.
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peace.)
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for the

crime of waging an aggressive war,

a

that

crime
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54. Although there was no such conventional prohibition in existence during World War II, many courts
53.

found

that this practice violated

customary international law. But

see, United States v.

Trials of War Criminals, supra note 5, at 1230.
55. 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, art. 28, 6 U.S.T.

Wilhelm List (The Hostage

Case), 11

Additionally, according to the

Army Report,

taken by Iraq, 106 of whom were used by Iraq

at

3538, 75 U.N.T.S.

at

308.

evidence was available that "over 4,900 U.S. hostages [were]
as

human

shields."

Army Report,

supra note 50, at 6.
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Persian Gulf
56.

This

1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
deportation to any other country. It is this provision which has served as the basis

See

article also prohibits

of the complaints against Israel when it deported Palestinian terrorists.
57. See 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, art. 147, 6 U.S.T.

at

3618, 75 U.N.T.S.

at

388.

Amnesty International Report,
Id. at 45. The figures contained in

58.

59.

emanating from refugee Kuwaiti

of torture employed by the

officials

Iraqis. Id. at

and

supra note 51, at 4.

Amnesty International Report are far below those
The Report includes a list of thirty-eight methods

the

individuals.

38-41.

60. Id. at 20.
61.

See

1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 49,

62.

See

Amnesty International Report,

The evidence
the law of war

art.

45,

36

Stat, at

2306,

1

Bevans

supra note 51, at 5. Similarly, the

at

651.

Army Report states:

collected during this investigation establishes a prima facie case that the violations of

committed against Kuwaiti

and property, and against third party

civilians

of Saddam Husayn

[sic].

and

his subordinates

See

Army Report,

63. See 1907

Bevans

They

for

his retreat across

Army was
was

of the Ba'ath Party,

also

supra note 49,

arts.

23(g), 46, 47, 56,

The Hostage Case, supra note 54,
a

36

Stat, at

2302, 2306, 2309,

1

1295. In the Hostage Case, General

at

scorched earth policy which was not militarily necessary

Norway from Finland. The Tribunal held that although his information that the Soviet

in close pursuit

of his troops was incorrect, he had

Much

a right to act

on

his belief that this

information

of the Norwegians, he was acquitted of this charge. Id. at 1297.
64. See 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, arts. 53, 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3552, 3618, 75
correct. Id. at 1296.

U.N.T.S.
65.
at

officials

supra note 50, at 13.

Hague Regulations,

Rendulic of Germany was charged with ordering
during

which Saddam Husayn,

bear responsibility.

648, 651, 652, 653; see

at

war crimes

are

were
knowledge

nationals,

so widespread and methodical that they could not have occurred without the authority or

at

See

to the dismay

322, 388.

1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, supra note

14, art. 13, 6

U.S.T.

at

3328, 75 U.N.T.S.

146.
66.

Trial of

Kurt Maelzer, 11

supra note 4, at 342; see also

id. at

Law Reports of
343

{Trial

Trials of

War

Criminals 53 (1949),

War

Crimes,

ofMasataka Kaburagi).

67. In subsequent television interviews the prisoners of war did not look so battered and, while they gave
more than "name, rank, serial number, and date of birth," they did not make statements favorable to Iraq.
68. See 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, supra note 14, art. 23, 6 U.S.T. at 3336, 75 U.N.T.S.
at

154, 156.

Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, art. 29, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308.
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, supra note 14, arts. 12, § 1, 131, 6 U.S.T. at 3328,
3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146, 238.
71. The statement did not indicate who the Detaining Power was but, presumably, in this instance it was
the United States. Only States, and then too only those states Parties to the Convention may be Detaining
Powers. Fortunately, the mistake made in Korea, where the United Nations Command was deemed to be
the Detaining Power, was not made again. Prisoners of war captured by the armed forces of Arab States were
transferred to the custody of Saudi Arabia. All others were transferred to the custody of the United States.
Such transfers are authorized by Article 12(2) of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, supra note
14, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
72. In 1985, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1985), the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a
mission to both Iran and Iraq to determine how these two countries were treating the prisoners of war held
by them. The Mission found that both countries were in substantial violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Moreover, it stated that: "Physical violence appeared to be
particularly common in
camps in Iraq." Report of the Mission, U.N. Doc. S/16962, Feb. 22, 1985, ^j
69.

See 1949

70. See 1949

POW

273.
73.

The Army Report,

supra note 50, at 13, does charge that

one naval war crime committed by Iraq

was, "[e]mployment of unanchored naval mines and mines lacking devices for their self-neutralization in the

event of their breaking loose from their moorings in violation of Article

1,

Hague

VIII." This refers to the

1907 Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct.
1907, 36

Bevans 669.
74. The 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Stat.

2332,

Modification Techniques, 1976 (better
(1977);

and

18,

1

Articles 35(3)

known

as

the

ENMOD

and 55 of the 1977 Protocol Additional

1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International

Any Other

Hostile

Use of Environmental

Convention), 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 88
to the

Armed

Geneva Conventions of August
Conflict (Protocol

I),

June

8,

12,

1977,
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of

War

72 AJ.I.L. 457 (1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) constitute the entire international legislation on the subject of
the protection of the environment during the course of hostilities. There are, however, a number of
international rules that can be said to protect the environment indirectly. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra
note 49, and Article 2(4) of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
(Protocol

III)

to the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

Which May be Deemed

to be Excessively Injurious or to

Have

Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19

ENMOD

535 (1 980) Iraq is not a Party to the
Convention, nor to the 1977 Additional Protocol,
nor to the Conventional Weapons Convention.
While not drafted as an environmental protection provision, it is appropriate to call attention to Article
53 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, which provides, "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of
I.L.M.

real

1

524,

1

.

or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other

is prohibited, except where such destruction is
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 39, 6
U.S.T. at 3550, 75 U.N.T.S. at 320.

public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations,

75.

The Army Report,

76.

Id.

77.
aspects

An elaboration of these events can be found in On Impact, supra note 3, at 21-25, 62-72. The legal
of the problem have been widely commented upon. See e.g., Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime

Environmental Damage:

&
L.

supra note 50, at 10-11.

Gerard Tanja,

New

Challenges/or International Law, 23 Cal.

Protection of the

Rev. 169 (1993); Mark

J.

Environment

in

Times of Armed

W. Intl L.J.

Conflict:

67 (1992); Liesbeth Lijnzaad
The Iraq-Kuwait War, 40 Neth. Int'L

T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction

Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 479

Reisman ET al., The Laws of

War 28,

(1993,).

in

But

Modem Warfare:
W. MICHAEL

see

69 (1994).

Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
became a Party to the 1925 Protocol in 1931. It made a "first use" reservation similar to that

78. Protocol for the Prohibition of the

Bacteriological
79.

Iraq

made by many other
a

Parties.

The

Protocol does not have

a

general participation

{si

omnes) clause. Iraq

is

not

on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 11

Party to the 1972 Convention

Bacteriological (Biological)

I.L.M. 309 (1972).
80.
at

See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 4, art 6(c), 59 Stat, at 1547, 82

U.N.T.S.

286, 288.
81.
82.

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, supra note 26, at
Many of the problems which can be envisioned for such

84.
a

Tribunal could be solved easily by reference

adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations for the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 7, and for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 8, and by the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the members of those Tribunals. (Concerning the rules of
to the Statutes

procedure and evidence adopted by the members of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
also Directive

Trial or

see

There have since been some amendments to these rules. See 33 I.L.M. 838, 1620 (1994). See
on Assignment of Defense Counsel, 33 I.L.M. 1581; Rules Governing the Detention of Persons Awaiting

supra note 22.

Appeal Before

the Tribunal or Otherwise

Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal.

Id. at

1591 (1994).

Enforcing The Third

Geneva Convention On

The Humanitarian Treatment Of

War

Prisoners Of

7 United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 37 (1997)

During the period of early history, through the Biblical days, the Egyptian,
Greek, and

Roman empires,

and the Crusades, and well into the Middle

Ages, there was no protection for individuals taken prisoner in conflict and they

were

either killed or enslaved.

eighteenth centuries that

merely unfortunate

it

human

It

was not

until well into the seventeenth

began to be accepted
beings

who were

some

bilateral

1

hostilities.

While

agreements touching on the subject, the

attempt to legislate in

this area

was Chapter

of war were

being held in custody solely to

prevent them from once again engaging in the
in

that prisoners

and

II

first

this resulted

multilateral

of the Regulations Attached to
2

Hague Convention No. II on the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
a document containing 17 articles with respect to prisoners of war. The 17
articles of Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land were, for all
practical purposes, identical to those of 1899. The provision of these two
instruments most relevant to our discussion is Article 4(2) which provides that:
"They [i.e., prisoners of war] must be humanely treated." Although these
Conventions had no penal provisions as such, after both World War I and World
War II individuals were tried and convicted for what amounted to violations of
the 1899

their provisions.

During the course of World
Convention

relating to the protection

inadequate that a great
subject

1929,

War

I

the provisions of the 1907

of prisoners of war were found to be so

number of bilateral and

multilateral agreements

were drafted and entered into by the opposing

as

an aftermath of World

War I,

Hague IV

the International

belligerents.

on

the

Then

in

Committee of the Red

ICRC), which had previously been concerned solely with the sick
and wounded of armed forces in the field and at sea, entered the prisoner-of-war
arena by sponsoring the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War
and World War II was followed by four new
ICRC-sponsored conventions, the third of which was the 1949 Geneva
Cross (the

;
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Law

Levie on the

Convention Relative

War

of

Treatment of Prisoners of War.

to the

Third Geneva Convention

we

that

will

It is

be primarily concerned.

with

1949

this

view of the

In

breadth of the subject-matters covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

this discussion will

be limited

humanitarian law violations" and to

to the provisions relevant to "deterring

Q

those "strengthening enforcement" of those provisions.

some

First,

statistics: as

United Nations. At

that

of 31 December 1995 there were 185 members of the

same time, there were 186

1949

States Parties to the

Geneva Conventions. The only members of the United Nations, or Parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, who were not Parties to these
Conventions were Eritrea, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Nauru.
The near
universality of these conventions
to say that they are

now part of the

whether or not they
There
are

are a

obvious and it is probably not an exaggeration

is

customary law of war, binding on

all

nations,

are Parties thereto.

number of articles of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention which

worthy of mention

in the context of

our study

as

they establish either the

coverage of the Convention or the substantive humanitarian rule which
followed. Thus, Article

1

is

Parties undertake to respect

in

all

Note

circumstances."

short and to the point:

and

when

it is

civilian

always an easy task,

as

Article 2 specifies

in

all

cases

Convention

that not only does a Party itself undertake to respect
it is

responsible for ensuring respect thereof

and military, and by other Parties, including the belligerents
and

a neutral

be

"The High Contracting

to ensure respect for the present

the provisions of the Convention,

by its people,

to

is

its allies

when

it is

a co-belligerent.

This

latter

is

not

the United States learned in Vietnam.

when

the Convention

applicable. First,

is

of declared war or of any other armed conflict which

two or more of the High Contracting

Parties

even

it is

applicable

may arise between

if the state

of war

is

not

recognized by one of them.

The

latter part

fact that

of this provision has increased in importance because of the

although there have been more than

conflicts since the

end of World

since that of the Soviet
therefore,

Union

been no formal

acts

Second, the Convention

even

if that

occupation

is

hundred international armed

there have been

against Japan in

applicable in the case of a military occupation,
resisted; and, third, the general participation

Hague Conventions

and the Convention

between

of the belligerents

is

applicable as

not

a

declarations of war

August 1945 and there have,

omnes) clause of the 1899 and 1907
is

no

recognizing the existence of a state of war.

is

not

War II,

a

is

(si

specifically rejected

States Parties thereto

even

if

one

Party to the Convention. In view of the wide

acceptance of this Convention,

this provision,

which was of major importance

Third

when

adopted, has lost that

status. Its

importance

the fact that in his 1948 dissent in the

Geneva Convention

when

drafted

is
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evidenced by

of the major Japanese war criminals

trial

by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Justice Pal of India found

World War II in the Pacific Japan was not bound by the rules set
the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV and its annexed Regulations

that during

forth in

12

were not Parties to that Convention.
Article 4 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention is an extremely lengthy
article which specifies the numerous classes of individuals who are entided to

because Bulgaria and

Italy

prisoner-of-war status

when

they

purposes of the present study

it

into the

fall

may be assumed

violation of the humanitarian provisions of the
prisoners of war

and

power of

that at the time

the enemy. For the

that at the time

of the alleged

Convention the victims were

of the prosecution for that alleged violation

of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention, the accused were entitled to
the status of prisoners of war.

13

two very important provisions. Its first paragraph provides that
the Convention is applicable "from the time they [i.e., persons entitled to
prisoner-of-war status] fall into the power of the enemy until their final release
Article 5 has

and

repatriation."

contended

The North Koreans and

the Chinese

Communists

he had "repented"

until

Communist

indoctrination

;

—which

meant

that

he had accepted

and the North Vietnamese contended

although no American prisoners of war had been

tried,

criminals captured in flagrante

were not

delicto

protection of the Convention.

and, therefore,

they were

article specifically

entidement to prisoner-of-war

war

entitled to the

provides that

status,

that,

all

Neither of these contentions was legally

Moreover, the second paragraph of that
a dispute as to the

Korea

of war was not entitled to the benefits of the

that a prisoner

Convention

is

in

valid.

if there

the individual

is

entided to the protection of the provisions of the Convention until his status
has

been determined by

made

in either

a

competent

tribunal.

No

such determinations were

North Korea or North Vietnam, but

prisoners of

war held by

those entities were denied the protection of the provisions of the Convention.
Article 8

neutral

which

is

concerned with the operations of the Protecting Power, the

Power which

represents a belligerent in the territory of

its

has the very important responsibility of ensuring that prisoners of

receive the

humane

is

selected

war

treatment and other protections to which they are entitled

under the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.

Power

enemy and

by the

belligerent

which

it is

to represent

A

and

Protecting
it

must be

whose territory it is to operate. While most
had Protecting Powers during World War II, the 1982 Falklands

acceptable to the belligerent in
belligerents

War is

the only real instance of the designation, acceptance, and functioning of

Protecting Powers during hostilities since 1949 despite the great
international wars

which have occurred

since that time.

'

This

number of

is,

indeed, a

Levie on the
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tragedy, as the

ensure

Law

of

War

mere existence of a Protecting Power

more humane treatment

is

frequently sufficient to

for prisoners of war.

Article 9 provides that nothing in the

Convention

adversely affecting the humanitarian activities of the
impartial humanitarian organization,

which

ICRC,

activities are,

the consent of the belligerent concerned. In Korea the

perform

its

be considered

to

is

as

or of any other

however, subject to

ICRC

was allowed

to

normal functions of inspecting prisoner-of-war camps, consulting

individual prisoners of war, providing relief supplies, etc.,

by the United Nations

Command in South Korea, but it was not permitted to function in North Korea.
In

ICRC

Vietnam the

Vietnam, but

it

was allowed

to

perform

its

normal functions in South

was not permitted to function in North Vietnam. During the

Vietnam one well-known academic took the position that an
anti-war group of which he was a member was such an "impartial humanitarian
hostilities in

The

organization."

During the Iran-Iraq

present author strongly challenged that conclusion.

War there were

not only no Protecting Powers, but both

countries frequendy denied the International
access to

its

Committee of

the

Red

Cross

prisoner-of-war camps. Eventually, the Secretary-General of the

United Nations sent

a special mission to inspect the prisoner-of-war

camps

in

both countries and numerous violations of the provisions of the 1949 Third
20

Geneva Convention were found to have been committed by both sides.
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention contains a number of substantive
provisions which define certain inhumane conduct towards prisoners of war as
punishable. Thus, Article 13 provides:

Any

unlawful act or omission by the Detaining

endangering the health of a prisoner of war in
be regarded

may be

its

causing death or seriously

custody

is

prohibited and will

breach of the present Convention.

as a serious

prisoner of war

Power

In particular,

no

subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific

experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

Likewise, prisoners of war must at

of violence and against

insults

all

22

times be protected, particularly against acts

and public

23
curiosity.
OA

Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

And

Article

130

Grave breaches

to

of the following

states:

which the preceding Article

acts, if

Convention: wilful

committed

killing, torture

relates shall

be those involving any

against persons or property protected

or

inhuman

by the

treatment, including biological

experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,

compelling

a prisoner

of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully

Third

Geneva Convention

depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular

trial

463

prescribed in this

Convention.

These two

articles refer specifically to

Geneva Convention.

provisions of the 1949 Third

Convention requires

serious or grave breaches

of the

Article 129(1) of that

States Party "to enact legislation necessary to provide

effective penal sanctions for persons

committing, or ordering to be committed,

any of the grave breaches" defined in Article 130. Based upon the precedents

of post-

Wo rid

War

this

II,

provision was unnecessary.

prohibitive provision of a law-of-war convention

punishable

violation of a

war crime;

a

war crime

war crime is within the discretion of the trial court.

27

Article

129(3) requires each State Party to take measures for the punishment of
violations of the

those contained in Articles 14, 16, 17, 23, 26, 34, 52,

level

etc., are

as,

for example,

likewise punishable

although the international community considers them to be on a lesser

of importance than violations of the provisions of Articles 13 and 130.

There
of the

all

1949 Third Geneva Convention other than the grave breaches.

Thus, violations of other provisions of the Convention such

offenses,

is

of international law; the punishment to be assessed for

as a violation

the commission of a

a

is

A

will

be little

substantive

difficulty in identifying the acts

provisions

which constitute violations

1949 Third Geneva

of the

28

Convention.

Unfortunately, the procedural provisions of that Convention, while easily
identified,

Articles

may

some problems of application.
82-88 and 99-107 set forth rules which are intended
present

any prisoner of war

Power, whether for
trial.

Most of those

However,
Article

who

is

subjected to a judicial proceeding by the Detaining

a pre-capture or a post-capture offense, will receive a fair

provisions should cause

no

difficulty

of implementation.

two which will.
63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention provided:
shall

only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals

and in accordance with the same procedure

armed

forces of the detaining

In the Yamashita Case

30

as

in the case of persons belonging to

Power.

the United States

Supreme Court held

that this

provision was directed at post-capture offenses only and did not apply to
for pre-capture offenses (war crimes). This ruling

courts before

War

II

which the issue was

with the

raised in the

result that those cases

its

of evidence.

own

rules

was followed by

war crimes

were not

military tribunals, military commissions,

each with

29

there are

A sentence
the

to ensure that

tried

and other

by

trials

all

of the

cases tried after

World

courts-martial, but

by

specially established courts,

concerning procedure and, particularly, the admission

Law

Levle on the
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of

War

Apparently the participants in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the

1949 Third Geneva Convention desired
pre-capture,

as

well

as

make

to

To

post-capture, offenses.

provisions applicable to

its

accomplish

included in that Convention Article 102 which, for
identical

this

end they

practical purposes,

all

is

with Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention; then

they drafted a

new provision

Convention, which
Prisoners of

to

be found in Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva

states:

war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power

committed prior

to capture shall retain,
32

even

if

for acts

convicted, the benefits of the

present Convention.

would appear that the draftsmen were attempting to provide that when
prisoners of war are tried for pre-capture offenses, that is, for war crimes, they
It

would, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102, be entitled to be

"by the same courts according

same procedure

to the

of the armed forces of the Detaining Power"

as in

the case of members

—which means

of the Convention were adopting a rule contrary to that

Yamashita Case.

33

Of course,

commissions or other

armed

such

could

trials

specially created tribunals

forces of the Detaining

Power could be

still

tried

that the draftsmen
laid

down

in the

be conducted by military

—but only
tried

if

members of the

by such commissions or

tribunals.

There

is

one possible view of

Convention which might

result in

its

Article

being interpreted differendy. As

seen, that article refers to prisoners of

Detaining Power."

When

Power" or

Red

is it

is

it

is

for a violation of a provision of the

The

post-World

were and

War

II

land.

war crimes

are violations

a national statute

On

United

States

the other hand,
trials

Committee of the
based on national law,

International

Cross urges very strongly that such a prosecution

supreme law of the

is

where
it is

treaties are part

often argued:

of international law;

(2) that it

would be

the

war crimes

difficult to find

a prisoner

of war

of the Capturing Power, or the denial of quarter, or the

use of prisoner-of-war labor in a munitions factory; and
Article
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